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The DEATH of SOPHONISBA

Publish'd, June 1st 1742. by J. & P. Knapton.

T H E
ROMAN HISTORY

FROM THE
FOUNDATION of ROME
TO THE
BATTLE of ACTIUM:

THAT IS,
To the END of the COMMONWEALTH.

By Mr. R O L - L I N,

*Late Principal of the University of Paris, Professor of Eloquence in the
Royal College, and Fellow of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and
Belles-Lettres.*

Translated from the F R E N C H.

V O L. IV.

THE THIRD EDITION.
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A PLAN
of the
CITY of
SYRACUSE.



T H E
R O M A N H I S T O R Y
F R O M T H E
F O U N D A T I O N o f R O M E
T O T H E
B A T T L E o f A C T I U M.

B O O K T H E S I X T E E N T H.

THIS book contains only the space of four years, from the 537th to the 540th year of Rome. It includes principally, the history of Sicily from the death of Hiero, the siege and taking of Syracuse by Marcellus; and some exploits in Spain and Italy.

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Hiero, a faithful ally of the Romans. Praise of that Prince. Hieronymus succeeds Hiero. Hiero's design to re-establish liberty in Syracuse. Wise precautions, which he takes at his death. Andranodorus removes all the other guardians. Character of Hieronymus. Conspiracy against that young Prince. He declares for the Carthaginians. He treats the Roman Ambassadors with indecency. Fabius prevents Otacilius his niece's husband
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from being elected Consul. Fabius and Marcellus are chosen Consuls, and enter upon office. Distribution of the troops. Creation of Censors. Mariners furnished by private persons. Hannibal returns into Campania. The Roman Generals repair to their provinces. Battle between Hanno and Gracchus near Beneventum. The Romans gain the victory. Gracchus grants the slaves that served him their liberty, in reward of their valour. Gentle punishment of the cowardly. Joy of the victors in their return to Beneventum. New advantage of Marcellus over Hannibal. Severity of the Censors at Rome. Admirable proofs of the love of the public good in many private persons. Caslinum retaken by Fabius. Various small expeditions.

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Ant. C.

215.

Liv. xxiii.
30.

NEVER did ally shew himself more faithful, zealous, and constant than Hiero II. was to the Romans during the space of almost fifty years, from the beginning of that alliance till his death. His fidelity was put to a rude trial after the bloody battle of Cannæ, which was followed by the almost general defection of the allies of Rome. But even the ravaging of his dominions by the Carthaginian troops, whom their fleet landed there, was not capable of changing him. He had only the grief to see, that the contagion of bad example had extended even to his own family. He had one son, named Gelo, who had married Nereis, the daughter of Pyrrhus, by whom he had Hieronymus, of which we shall soon speak. Nothing had been more his desire than to inculcate into him the sentiments he had himself for the Romans; and he often repeated to him, that * as long as he should continue faithful to them, he would find in their amity, troops, treasure, and the protection solely capable of supporting his reign. Gelo, despising the age of his father, and setting no value upon the alliance of the Romans, since their last disgrace at Cannæ, had declared openly for the Cartha-

* Si ea fecissem, in vestra amicitia exercitum, divitias, munimenta regni me habiturum. SALLUST, in Bell Jug.

ginians. * He had already armed the multitude and solicited the allies of Syracuse to join him, and perhaps he would have caused commotions in Sicily, if a sudden unexpected death had not broken his measures. It happened so opportunely, that it left some suspicion, says Livy, that the father had antedated it. This suspicion seems to me not to tally with the mild and virtuous disposition of Hiero. He did not long survive his son, and died at the age of fourscore and ten, infinitely lamented by his people. He had reigned fifty-four years.

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Ant. C.
215.

Liv. xxiv.

Hiero was not a powerful King: his dominions were scarce half Sicily. But he was a great Prince, if we are capable of forming to ourselves a just idea of true greatness. When he had attained the sovereignty, he made it his sole purpose entirely to convince his subjects, that he thought himself placed on the throne only to make them happy. He fought, not to make them fear, but to make them love him. He considered himself less as their master, than as their protector and father. One of his principal cares was to support, and increase, the natural fertility of the country, and to place agriculture in honour; which he considered as a certain means for diffusing plenty throughout his kingdom. And indeed this care, and it cannot be too often repeated, is one of the essential parts of good policy; but one that unhappily is too much neglected.

Hiero applied himself entirely to it. He did not judge it unworthy of a King to study and inform himself in the arts of agriculture. He even was at the trouble to compose books upon that subject, of which we ought to regret the loss. But he considered this object in a manner worthy of a King. Corn was the principal riches of the country, and the most certain fund of the Prince's revenue. To establish good order in this commerce, to secure and render happy the condition of the husbandmen, who formed the greatest

Plin. xviii.

3.

* *Movissetque in Sicilia res, nisi mors adeo opportuna, ut patrem quoque suspitione aspergerat, armantem eam multitudinem sollicitantem que socios absumpsisset.* Liv.

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Ant. C.
215.

part of the State ; to fix the duties paid the Prince, in which his principal revenue confifted ; to obviate the diforders, which might creep into them ; and to prevent the unjust vexations which it might poffibly be attempted to introduce in procefs of time, Hiero made regulations fo wife, fo reasonable, fo full of equity, and fo conformable, at the fame time, to the interefts of the People and thofe of the Prince, that they became in a manner the Codex of the country, and were always inviolably obferved as facred laws, not only in his reign, but in all fucceeding times. When the Romans had fubjected the city and dominions of Syracufe, they impofed no new tribute upon it, and * decreed, that all things fhould be regulated according to the Laws of Hiero, in order that the Syracufans, in changing their mafter, fhould have the confolation of not changing their polity, and of feeing themfelves in fome meafure governed by a Prince, whose name alone was ever dear to them, and made thofe laws infinitely venerable and in a manner facred to them.

It is in effect of this wife government, that we have not been afraid to call Hiero a great King. He might have undertaken wars, gained battles, made conquelts, extended the bounds of his dominions : for he did not want valour, of which he had given good proofs, before he afcended the throne. If he had abandoned himfelf to frantic ambition as Agathocles did, who an hundred years before had ufurped the fovereignty at Syracufe, he could, as well as him, have carried the war into Africa with the hopes of better fuccefs, efpecially as Carthage was then at war with Rome. If fuch a war had fucceeded, Hiero would have paffed for an hero in the fenfe of moft men. But with how many taxes muft he have burthened his People ? How many hufbandmen muft he have torn from their lands ? How much blood muft thefe victories have coft ? And of what advantage would they have been to the Staté ?

* Decumas lege Hieronica femper vendendas cenfuerunt ut iis jucundior effet muneris illius functio, fi ejus Regis, qui Siculis chariffimus fuit, non folum instituta, commutato imperio, verum etiam nomen remaneret. Cic. orat. in Ver. de frum. n. 15.

Hiero, who knew wherein folid glory confifts, placed his in governing his people wifely, and in making them happy. Inftead of conquering new countries by the force of arms, his care was to multiply his own in fome meafure, by the cultivation of the lands, in rendering them more fertile than they were; and actually to multiply his people, who conftitute the true ftrength and riches of a State; which cannot fail to happen, when the people that manure the lands are allowed a reasonable proportion of the fruits of their labours.

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Ant. C.
215.

When we fee Syracufe enjoy an happy tranquility through the wife conduct of Hiero, and his fubjects quietly employed in cultivating their lands as in times of perfect peace, whilft all around them, nothing is heard but the dreadful tumult of arms, and Africa, Italy, and even a part of Sicily, are agitated by a violent and cruel war; may we not cry out with admiration, Happy the people that a wife King governs fo, and ftill more happy the King, that conftitutes the happinefs of his people, and finds his own in his Duty! Let us fuppofe on the contrary this fame Hiero entering victorious after many campaigns into his capital in the midft of the public acclamations, but finding at his return the people miferable, exhausted by taxes, reduced to an hideous poverty, and moft of the lands neglected, and many even abandoned during the abfence of the husbandmen; fad confequences of long wars, but almoft always inevitable. If he retains any fenfe of humanity, can he fupport a glory, that cofts his people fo dear; and not deteft the laurels dyed in the blood of his fubjects?

Hiero's love of peace did not prevent his taking precautions againft the enemies, that might attempt to difturb him. He had no thoughts of attacking; but he put himfelf into fuch a condition to make a good defence. He had a numerous and well equipped fleet. We fhall foon fee the amazing preparations he had made to enable Syracufe to fustain a long fieve: and that * like a Prince of wifdom and fore-

* In pace, ut fapiens aptarit idonea bello. HORAT.

A. R. 537. fight he had provided during peace, all that might be
 Ant. C. necessary in war.
 215.

We hear nothing in the life of Hiero of magnificence, either in buildings, furniture, equipages, or the table. It was not because the Prince wanted riches to gratify a taste very common at Syracuse, if it had been his own; but he knew how to make a better use of them, and more worthy of a King. The sum of an hundred talents (an hundred thousand Crowns) which he sent to the Rhodians, and the presents he made them after the great earthquake, that had ruined their Island, and thrown down the famous Colossus, are illustrious marks of his liberality and magnificence. A wise œconomy enabled him to assist his allies powerfully. We have seen him in the times of necessity, with joy and ardor supply the Roman army with provisions and cloaths, from no other motive than to testify the esteem and gratitude, with which his heart was affected in respect to them. The Roman generosity indeed did not suffer that liberality to continue unrepaid: but he had no such view, and therefore had all the merit of it.

What, in my opinion, crowns all the praises due to this Prince, is his constant and unalterable attachment to the side of the Romans, even in their misfortunes, and particularly after they had lost the battle of Cannæ, when they seemed irretrievably ruined. In these decisive moments, common virtue hesitates, deliberates, consults, hearkens, and weighs the specious reasons, which human prudence suggests against being overhasty in resolving how to act. A great soul considers such a doubt alone and such a delay almost as determinate infidelity. Hiero well knew, that he hazarded every thing in declaring publicly for the Romans at such a conjuncture: but he shuts his eyes to the danger, and consults only his duty and his honour. Can the most glorious conquests and victories be compared with so noble a disposition? We do not know men, when we know them only by their exploits and great actions. They are still concealed and unknown

known in respect to us, whilst their hearts are a mystery to us. It is from the goodness of the heart, its integrity, and fidelity, that we first know what they are. For we are all that we are in the heart. Now Hiero's seems to shew itself here, and to declare itself in a manner, which ought to do him great honour.

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The Death of that Prince occasioned great revolutions in Sicily. The Kingdom was fallen into the hands of Hieronymus his grandson. That * Prince was yet an infant, who, far from being able to resist the seduction of sovereign power, and to sustain the weight of government, was not capable of bearing as he ought that of his own liberty and of governing himself. His guardians, and those, who had the care of his education, instead of opposing the vices, to which he was naturally inclined, plunged him still deeper into them, in order to engross all authority in his name. It was then † seen how important it is to the good of a State, that a Prince who begins to reign whilst young, should be surrounded only by persons capable of inspiring him with sentiments and principles worthy of a King; and what a misfortune it is, when flattery from thenceforth engrosses their ears and heart.

Hiero, towards the end of his life, had intended to reinstate the liberty of Syracuse, in order to prevent a kingdom he acquired, and strengthened by his valour and prudence, from being entirely ruined by becoming the sport of the caprice and passions of a young King. But the Princesses, his two daughters, spared no pains in opposing so wise a design; in hopes that the young Prince would only have the name of King, whilst themselves with their husbands, Andranodorus and Zoippus, who held the first rank amongst his

* Puerum, vixdum libertatem, nedum dominationem laturum.

† Pertinere ad utilitatem reipublicæ, occurrere ille, quos Senatus innocentissimos habeat, qui honestis sermonibus aures [Principis] imbuant. TACIT. HIST. IV. 7.

Properant, occupare Principem adhuc vacuum. Ibid. V. 1.

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215.

guardians, should have all the authority. It * was not easy for an old man of ninety to withstand the caresses and arts of those two women, who besieged him night and day; to retain all his freedom of mind in the midst of their pressing and assiduous insinuations; and to sacrifice with courage the interest of his family, to that of the public.

All that he did to prevent, as much as possible, the evils he foresaw, was to appoint Hieronymus fifteen guardians, who were to form his council. He conjured them at his death never to depart from the alliance with the Romans, to which he had inviolably adhered during fifty years, and to teach the young Prince, their pupil, to tread in his steps, and to follow the principles, in which he had hitherto been bred.

As soon as the king had breathed his last, the guardians he had appointed for his grandson, summoned an assembly of the people, presented the young Prince to them, and read the will. A small number of persons placed there expressly to applaud it, clapped their hands, and raised cries of joy. All the rest, in a consternation equal to that of a family, whom death had just deprived of a good father, kept a mournful silence, which sufficiently argued both their grief for the loss they had just sustained, and their fear for the future. Hiero's † funeral was afterwards solemnized, and more honoured by the grief and tears of his subjects, than by the care and respect paid to his memory by his relations.

The first care of Andranodorus was to remove all the rest of the guardians, by declaring to them, that the prince was of age to govern for himself. He was then almost fifteen years old. Thus, divesting himself the first of the guardianship, which he held in common with many colleagues, he united the power

* Non facile erat nonagesimum jam agenti annum, circumfesso dies noctesque muliebribus blanditiis, liberare animum, et convertere ad publicam privata curam. Liv. V.

† Funus fit regium, magis amore civium & charitate, quam curâ suorum celebre. Liv.

of them all in his own person. The wisest dispositions of dying Princes are little regarded and seldom executed after their deaths.

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215.

The * best Prince in the world and the most prudent, succeeding a King so much beloved by his subjects as Hiero had been, would have found it difficult to console them for the loss of his predecessor. But, as if Hieronymus had sought by his vices to make him still more regretted, he no sooner ascended the throne, than he shewed how much all things were changed. Neither King Hiero, nor Gelo his son, during so many years, had ever distinguished themselves from the rest of the citizens by their dress, or any other ornament, that favoured of pomp. But now Hieronymus was on a sudden seen to appear dressed in purple, with a diadem on his head, and surrounded with a troop of armed guards. Sometimes he even affected to imitate Dionysius the tyrant, by going abroad like him in a chariot drawn by four white horses. † All the rest answered this equipage: an express contempt for every body; haughty and disdainful in hearing; an affectation of saying nothing but disobliging things; difficulty of access, so as to be almost inaccessible not only to strangers, but to his guardians themselves; a refinement in discovering new kinds of debauches; and a cruelty, that rose so high as to extinguish all sense of humanity in him. This odious disposition of the young King terrified people so much, that some of his guardians either killed themselves, or withdrew into voluntary banishment.

Only three men, Andranodorus and Zoippus, both Hiero's sons-in-law, and one Thraso, had free admittance to the young King. He hearkened little to

* Vix quidem ulli bono moderatoque regi facilis erat favor apud Syracusanos, succedenti tantæ caritati Hieronis. Verum enimvero Hieronymus, velut suis vitiis desiderabilem efficere vellet avum, primo statim conspectu, omnia quam disparia essent, ostendit.

† Hunc tam superbum apparatus habitusque convenientes sequebantur, contemptus omnium, superbæ aures, contumeliosa addicta, rari aditus, non alienis modo, sed tutoribus etiam, libidines novæ, inhumana crudelitas.

them

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Ant. C.
215.

them in all other things: but, as the two first had openly declared for the Carthaginians, and the third for the Romans, that difference of opinions, and the warm disputes to which it frequently gave birth, drew upon them the young tyrant's attention.

Liv. xxiv.
4.

Much about this time, a conspiracy against the life of Hieronymus was discovered. One of the principal citizens called Theodotus, was accused. When he was tortured, he confessed the crime for himself; but no torments were capable of making him betray his accomplices. At length, as if he had given way to the excess of the tortures, he accused the King's best friends, though innocent, amongst whom he named Thrafo as the chief of the whole enterprize; adding, that they should have been far from engaging in it, if they had not had a man of great credit at their head. The warmth Thrafo had always expressed for the party of the Romans, made the deposition of Theodotus seem probable; so that he was immediately executed with those declared to be his accomplices, who were as innocent as himself. Whilst Theodotus was made to suffer the most cruel torments, not one of his accomplices hid themselves or fled, so much did they rely upon his fidelity and constancy, and such force of mind had he to keep their secret. In consequence, by a very uncommon and singular event, a conspiracy discovered was not frustrated in effect, and did not fail to succeed as we shall soon see.

Liv. xxiv.
6.

Thrafo's death, who was the sole tie of the alliance with the Romans, left the field open to the partisans of the Carthaginians. Ambassadors were sent to Hannibal, to treat with him; and on his side he sent a young Carthaginian of quality to Hieronymus, named Hannibal as well as himself, with whom he joined Hippocrates and Epicides, born at Carthage, of a Carthaginian mother, but of Syracuse by origin, from whence their grandfather had been banished. After the Treaty was concluded with Hieronymus, the young officer returned to his general; and by Hannibal's permission, the other two remained with
the

the King. The King sent Ambassadors to Carthage, to make the treaty more authentic. The conditions were, "That after they should have driven the Romans out of Sicily, upon which the young prince relied as a thing of certainty, the river Himera, which almost divides the whole island, should separate the province of the Carthaginians from his kingdom." Hieronymus, puffed up with the praises of his flatterers, demanded some time after, "that all Sicily should be ceded to him, leaving Italy to the Carthaginians for their share." The proposal seemed frantic and idle to Hannibal, as it really was: but he disguised his thoughts, having no other view, than to make the young King quit the side of the Romans. How happens it, that the experience of all ages and nations does not teach Princes what they ought to think of flatterers?

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Ant. C.
215.

Upon the first rumour of this treaty, Appius Claudius, Prætor of Sicily, sent Ambassadors to Hieronymus, to renew the alliance, that had subsisted between the Romans and his grandfather. That Prince, affecting a ridiculous and ill-placed haughtiness, received them with a disdainful air, "asking them in a tone of derision what had happened at the battle of Cannæ: that Hannibal's Ambassadors related incredible things of it: that he should be very glad to know the truth of it from their own mouths, in order to determine in respect to the choice of his allies." The Romans replied, that they would come to him again, when he had learned to receive Ambassadors seriously; and withdrew.

Hieronymus undoubtedly did not know, that railery does not become a Prince, especially when offensive and injurious, and that in the midst of the gravest and most important affairs. But he hearkened only to his pride, and probably, amongst his flatterers, praised himself for this language, in which he found an haughtiness worthy of a great King. All the rest of his conduct was of the same turn. Soon after his cruelty and other views drew upon him an unfortu-

nate

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
235.

nate end. Those who had formed the conspiracy, of which we have spoke, pursued their plan, and having found a favourable occasion, killed him on a journey he went from Syracuse to the country and city of the Leontines. And thus ended a very short reign, but full of disorders, injustice, and violence.

Appius, who foresaw the consequences of his death, gave the Senate advice of the whole, and took all the necessary precautions for preserving the part of Sicily, that belonged to the Romans. I omit all the violences committed by Hippocrates and Epicides at Syracuse, the murder of the Princesses descended from Hiero, the slavery into which the unfortunate inhabitants of that city were reduced, being forced in a manner against their will to become the enemies of Rome. I

Anc. Hist. have treated those things elsewhere with sufficient extent. I shall confine myself here to what particularly concerns the Romans.

Liv. xxiv.
4.

About the end of this year the Consul Q. Fabius set out for Rome to preside at the election of magistrates for the ensuing year, and having given notice of the assembly of the People for the first assembly-day, immediately on his arrival he repaired to the field of Mars without entering the city. There, as the youth of the century Anienfis, to whom it had fallen by lot to give their suffrage first, nominated T. Otacilius with M. Æmilius Regillus for Consuls, Fabius caused silence to be made, and spoke as follows: “ If we were at peace in Italy, or were at war
“ with a General, who was not capable of taking ad-
“ vantage of our errors, I should consider any one as
“ an enemy to your liberty, that should take upon
“ him to oppose the choice you think fit to make.
“ But as our Generals have committed no fault in
“ this war, and against this enemy, that has not been
“ attended with some great misfortune to the Com-
“ monwealth, you ought to use no less precaution,
“ nor be no less upon your guard, when you are to
“ elect Consuls, than when you are to give the enemy
“ battle. Each of you ought at that time to say to
“ himself:

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215.

“ himself: I am to choose a Consul equal in the field
 “ to Hannibal. Whatever precautions we take in that
 “ choice, Hannibal has always great advantages of
 “ us. He is in the continual exercise of command-
 “ ing armies. His authority is not confined with-
 “ in certain bounds, nor limited to a certain time.
 “ He is not obliged to receive the law from any one.
 “ He decides with absolute power on all occasions,
 “ according as conjunctures seem to require. This
 “ is not the case with our Consuls. They are sudden-
 “ ly put into office, and hold it only for a year.
 “ They have scarce began to act in pursuance of their
 “ measures, than their time is elapsed, and a successor
 “ sent them. These principles being admitted, let us
 “ now consider, what men those are whom you have
 “ just chosen. M. Æmilius Regillus is priest of Ro-
 “ mulus: so that we could neither let him remove
 “ from Rome, nor keep him there, without preju-
 “ dice to the affairs of religion, or to those of war.
 “ As to T. Otacilius, he is married to my sister’s
 “ daughter, and has children by her. But your fa-
 “ vour, Romans, either to my ancestors, or myself,
 “ have taught me not to prefer the interests of my
 “ family to those of the Commonwealth. When the
 “ sea is calm, any body can steer the ship. But when
 “ a furious storm arises, and the vessel is become the
 “ sport of the winds and waves, a man of skill and
 “ courage, an able and experienced Pilot, is neces-
 “ sary. We are not now upon a calm sea. More
 “ than one storm has already brought us to the very
 “ brink of drowning. For which reason we cannot
 “ use too much precaution in the choice of a man ca-
 “ pable of carrying us into the harbour. We have
 “ made trial of you, Otacilius, in less considerable
 “ employments, in which you have not so well acquit-
 “ ted yourself, as to induce us to confide more im-
 “ portant ones to you. The fleet you commanded
 “ this year, had three destinations. It was to have
 “ ravaged the coasts of Africa, secured those of Italy,
 “ and above all to have prevented aids of money,
 “ men,

A. R. 537. " men, and provisions from coming to Hannibal
 Ant. C. " from Carthage. Raise Otacilius, Romans, to the
 215. " Consulship, if he has answered only one of these
 " views. If, on the contrary, whilst he has had the
 " command of the fleet, Hannibal has received all
 " that has been sent him from Carthage, with as much
 " security as if the sea had been entirely open; if the
 " coasts of Italy have been more infested this year than
 " those of Africa: with what right can Otacilius pre-
 " tend that he ought to be chose to command against
 " Hannibal, in preference to all others? If you were
 " Consul, I should think, after the example of our
 " ancestors, that it would be necessary to create a
 " Dictator; and you would have no reason to wonder,
 " or be angry that there was a better General than
 " you are in the Commonwealth. No body is more
 " interested than yourself in not having a burthen laid
 " upon you, that you would sink under. Let us
 " then conclude, Romans, that we cannot take too
 " much care in the choice of our Consuls. It is not
 " without pain, that I now desire you to call to mind
 " Thrasymenus and Cannæ. But to avoid the like
 " misfortunes, it is sometimes necessary to set those
 " fatal examples before your eyes. Herald, call to
 " the century Anienfis to give their suffrages again."

T. Otacilius made abundance of noise, and reproached his uncle with great haughtiness, that he was for having himself continued in the Consulship. But Fabius ordered his Licitors to approach Otacilius: and as he had not entered the city, having come into the place where the assemblies were held, he bade him observe, that the fasces, the mark of his power as to life and death, were still borne * before him. This was giving Otacilius to understand, that his life would answer for his continuing his seditious outcries. He was silent; and the privileged century being returned to vote, elected Fabius and Marcellus Consuls. This

* The fasces were not carried before the Consuls, when they were in the city; which custom had been introduced by Valerius Publicola.

was the fourth Consulship of Fabius, and the third of Marcellus, including that to which he had been nominated; and had been obliged to abdicate. All the other centuries were unanimously of the same opinion. They afterwards proceeded to the election of Prætors. In order to console Otacilius for having failed of the Consulship, he was created Prætor for the second time. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who was then in the same office, was continued. The two others were, Q. Fabius, the Consul's son, then Curule Ædile, and P. Cornelius Lentulus. After the nomination of the Prætors, the Senate decreed, that Q. Fulvius, without drawing lots, should have the office of Prætor of the city, and, consequently, that he should command in Rome in the absence of the Consuls.

We have just seen an uncommon example, both of a wonderful docility in the youth of a century, who renounce their first choice, without hesitating, upon the advice of a wise Consul, and of a generous steadiness in Fabius, who forgets the consideration of proximity of blood, and is only attentive to the interests of the Commonwealth. But what seems most admirable in this Consul, is his having had the courage to set himself above popular reports, and the disagreeable suspicions, that might be formed against him, from judging, that he had only excluded his nephew, to have himself chosen Consul in his place. A great soul, conscious of its own sentiments, and that they are known, is not afraid of such a reproach; and tho' there were reason to fear it, it makes That a sacrifice to the love of its country and its duty. And indeed it had been betraying it in some measure, to have been silent in such a conjuncture. * Every body in general did Fabius justice. They said, that the necessity of the State requiring that the most able Gene-

* *Tenipus ac necessitas belli, ac discrimen rerum faciebant, ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii Consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod, cum summo imperatore esse opus reipublicæ sciret, seque cum haud dubiè esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reipublicæ, fecisset.* Liv.

A. R. 537. ral the Commonwealth then had, should be placed at
 Ant. C. the head of the armies, that great man, who could
 215. not but know himself to be that General so necessary
 to the State, chose rather to expose himself to the en-
 vy, so unusual and irregular a proceeding would draw
 upon him, than neglect the interests of his country.

Val. Max.
 iv. 1.

Almost fourscore years before, another Fabius had
 signalized his zeal for the public good on an occasion,
 which has some resemblance to that we have just re-
 lated. This was Q. Fabius Maximus Rullus. See-
 ing the centuries inclined to elect his son Q. Fabius
 Gurges Consul, he opposed his nomination as much
 as he could; not that he believed his son wanted me-
 rit to fill that office with dignity: but he represented
 to the People, that it was contrary to good order to
 confer the first dignity of the State so often upon the
 same family. Now his great-grandfather, grandfather
 and father, had held it several times, and himself had
 been five times Consul. The People paid no regard
 to his opposition. But Fabius, in laying aside the
 tenderness and prejudice of a father, had all the ho-
 nour of a sacrifice, that could not but cost him dear.

Two very considerable inundations happened this
 year. The Tiber having overflowed, carried away
 many houses in the country, and destroyed a great
 number of men and cattle.

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 Ant. C.
 214.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS, IV.

M. CLAVDIVS MARCELLVS, III.

Liv. xxiv.
 9.

This year, which was the fifth of the war with
 Carthage, Fabius and Marcellus, having taken pos-
 session of the Consulship, drew upon themselves the
 eyes and attention of the whole people. It was long
 since two Consuls of such extraordinary merit had
 been seen in office. The Senate being assembled,
 continued all who had actually any command in their
 employments. They decreed also to keep eighteen
 legions under arms. That each of the Consuls should
 have two under them: that the provinces of Gaul,
 Sicily,

Liv. xxiv.
 11.

Sicily, and Sardinia, should each have two for their defence: that the Prætor Fabius should command two in Apulia: that Tib. Gracchus should remain in the neighbourhood of Luceria, with the two, that had been formed of the slaves who had voluntarily listed: that the Pro-consul C. Terentius Varro should retain one in the country of Picenum; as should M. Valerius, to be employed in the neighbourhood of Brundisium, where he was with a fleet: and that the two last should remain at Rome to guard it. The Consuls had orders to fit out a number of ships, which when joined with those that were in the port of Brundisium, and in the neighbouring roads, would form a fleet for this year of an hundred and fifty sail.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

Q. Fabius held the assemblies for the creation of Censors. M. Attilius Regulus and P. Furius Philus were raised to that dignity.

As seamen were wanting, the Consuls, in virtue of a decree of the Senate, ordained, that every citizen whose self, or father, had been adjudged by the Censors, L. Æmilius and C. Flaminius, to possess an estate from about an hundred and twenty-five pounds to two hundred and fifty, or who should since have acquired such a fortune, should furnish one seaman paid for six months. That whoever had from about two hundred and fifty to seven hundred and fifty, should furnish three with their pay for an whole year. That whoever had from seven hundred and fifty to two thousand five hundred pounds, should furnish five. That whoever had above two thousand five hundred pounds, should furnish seven. And lastly, that each Senator should furnish eight with a year's pay. The seamen raised in virtue of this decree, having been armed and equipped by their masters, embarked with biscuit for thirty days. This was the first time, that the fleet of the Romans was supplied with seamen at the expence of private persons.

These preparations, which were much more considerable than had ever been before, made the inhabitants of Capua apprehend, that the campaign this year

A. R. 538. would open with the siege of their city. They there-
 Ant. C. fore sent Ambassadors to Hannibal, to desire him to
 214. make his army approach Capua, representing to him,
 Liv. xxiv. 'that armies were raised at Rome to besiege it, and
 12. that of all the cities, which had abandoned the side
 of the Romans, there was none against which they were
 so much incensed.' The consternation, with which
 they brought Hannibal this news, obliged that Ge-
 neral to hasten his march, in order to be beforehand
 with the Romans. Accordingly he set out from Arpi,
 and came to incamp at his old camp at Tifata beyond
 Capua. Afterwards having left a body of Numidians
 and Spaniards to guard his camp, and Capua, he ap-
 proached Puteoli, to make himself master of it.

Fabius had no sooner been informed, that Hannibal
 had quitted Arpi to return into Campania, than he set
 out to put himself at the head of his army, marching
 night and day with extreme diligence. He ordered
 Tib. Gracchus at the same time to quit Luceria, and
 to come with his troops towards Beneventum; and the
 Prætor Q. Fabius his son, to take Gracchus's post
 near Luceria. At the same time two Prætors set out
 for Sicily; as did P. Cornelius, to repair to his army;
 Otacilius, to take upon him the command of his fleet,
 and to secure the coasts. In a word, all repaired to
 their respective provinces: and those who had been
 continued in their employments, had orders to remain
 in the posts where they were the year before.

It was about this time, that the negotiation between
 Hannibal and the Tarentines began, which at length
 ended in the taking of Tarentum. Five young per-
 sons of the most illustrious families of that city came
 to Hannibal, and gave him hopes, that that city would
 surrender as soon as he made his troops approach it.
 It was a very commodious place to him for Philip to
 land at, in case he came to Italy. He promised them to
 march that way; exhorting them however to put all
 things in a condition on their side, to assure the suc-
 cess of the enterprize. He continued some time in
 Campania,

Campania, and made new attempts upon Puteoli, and Nola, but as ineffectual as the former.

A.R. 538.
Ant. C.

214.

Liv. xxiv.
14—16.

Hanno and Tib. Gracchus were set out, as if in concert, the first from the country of the Bruttii with a considerable body of horse and foot; and the other from his camp at Luceria, in order to approach Beneventum. The Romans at first entered the city. But having been apprized, that Hanno was incamped three miles from thence upon the banks of the Calor, and that he was destroying the neighbouring country, he also quitted Beneventum, and having incamped about a thousand paces from the enemy, he assembled his soldiers to harangue them. Most of them were the slaves, who, during the two years they had been in the service, had chose rather to deserve their liberty by actions, than to demand it in words. He had however observed, on quitting his winter-quarters, some confused murmurs. They complained of so long a slavery, asking one another, whether they should never see themselves free. Gracchus took occasion from thence to write to the Senate, to acquaint it with what they merited, rather than what they demanded. He represented, ‘that they had hitherto served with equal fidelity and courage, and that they wanted nothing but liberty to make them accomplished soldiers.’ The Senate in answer had left him at liberty to act in that respect as he should judge most for the good of the Commonwealth.

Therefore before he came to blows with the enemy, he declared to his troops: ‘That the time was come for obtaining that liberty they had so long and so ardently desired. That the next day he should give the enemy battle in the open field: that there, without fear of ambuscades, they would have room to make their courage and bravery appear. That whoever should bring him the head of an enemy, should immediately have his liberty as a reward; but that he would punish those as slaves, that should give way and quit their posts. That their fate was now in their own hands. That as a security for the performance of his promise,

A. R. 538. they had not only his word, but that of the Consul
 Ant. C. Marcellus, and of the whole Senate, whom he had
 214. consulted upon this head, and who left it entirely to him.' He then caused the letters of Marcellus, and the decree of the Senate, to be read. They immediately raised cries of joy, and with one accord, demanded eagerly to be led against the enemy, and that the signal of battle should be immediately given. Gracchus dismissed them, after having promised, that he would give it the next day. Full of joy, especially those whom the action alone of the next day was to deliver from slavery, they passed the rest of the day in preparing their arms, and in putting them in a condition to second their valour well.

The next day, as soon as the signal was given, they were the first to assemble round Gracchus's tent; and that General drew up his troops in battle at sun-rise. The Carthaginians did not refuse to fight. Their army was composed of seventeen thousand foot, most of them Bruttii and Lucanians; and of twelve hundred horse, all Numidians and Moors, except a small number of Italians, that were amongst them. That of the Romans seems to have been of equal force. The battle was long, and fought with abundance of ardor. During four hours, the victory remained doubtful on both sides. Nothing incommoded the Romans more, than the heads of the enemy, which they were eager to secure, because their liberty had been attached to them. For when a soldier had bravely killed his opposite, he at first lost a considerable time in cutting off his head, in the midst of the tumult and disorder; and when he had at length effected it, the necessity of holding and keeping it, employing one of his hands, made him incapable of fighting; so that the battle was left to the worst and most timorous part of the troops. When Gracchus was apprized by the legionary Tribunes, that his soldiers wounded no longer any of the enemy, who were in a condition to defend themselves; that they were all employed in cutting off the heads of the dead, and that they held them afterwards

terwards in their hands instead of their swords; he immediately ordered them to be told, 'to throw down the heads; that they had sufficiently signalized their valour, and that those who had done their duty, might assure themselves of their liberty.'

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

The battle then began again, and Gracchus also made his horse advance against the enemy. The Numidians came on to meet them, and the horse fighting with no less ardor than the foot, the victory again became doubtful. The two Generals animated their soldiers both by their words and example. Gracchus represented to his troops, that they had to do only with the Lucanians and Bruttii so often defeated. Hanno said of the Romans, that they were only slaves, whose chains had been taken off to make them bear arms. At last Gracchus declared to his soldiers, that there was no liberty for them, except the enemy were beaten and put to flight that day.

This menace animated them to such a degree, that raising new cries, and becoming that moment new men, they threw themselves upon the Carthaginians with a fury that nothing was capable of sustaining. At first the first line, then the second, and at last their whole main body was broken. The flight was universal, and they regained their camp with such terror and consternation, that none took care to defend the gates of it against the Romans, who entered it pell-mell with the defeated, and began a new battle in it, more confused in so narrow a space, but for the same reason more bloody. During this tumult, the Roman prisoners, to second their countrymen, formed themselves in a body, and having seized arms, which they found at hand, attacked the Carthaginians in the rear, and left them no way to escape. It was in effect of this, that of so great an army scarce two thousand men got off, and those almost all horse, with their commander. All the rest were killed. Thirty-eight ensigns were taken. Gracchus lost about two thousand men. The whole plunder was abandoned to the soldiers, except the prisoners and cattle, which

A. R. 538. should be owned and claimed in the space of thirty days.

Ant. C.

214.

When the victors returned into their camp, four thousand slaves, who had fought with less courage than their comrades, and who had not entered the enemy's camp with them, retired to an adjacent hill, to avoid the punishment they believed they had deserved. The next day, a Tribune of the army brought them to the camp, at the time when Gracchus, having assembled his army, was beginning to harangue. First, he gave the old soldiers the praises and rewards they deserved, in proportion to the valour each of them had shewn upon this occasion. Afterwards, addressing himself to those who were still slaves, he told them, that on so joyful a day he chose rather to praise all in general and without distinction, than to reproach any of them. That therefore he declared them all free, and prayed the Gods that it might be for the honour and advantage of the Commonwealth. They raised great cries of joy, and embracing and congratulating each other, lifted up their hands towards heaven, and wished the Roman People and their General all kind of prosperity. * It was then most evident, as Livy says elsewhere, that of all good things, there is none so grateful to man, as liberty.

Gracchus then, resuming his discourse : “ Before I
 “ had made you all equal, (said he to them) by the liberty
 “ I have just given you, I was unwilling to make an odious
 “ distinction between you. But now that I have
 “ acquitted myself of my promise, and that which I
 “ made you in the name of the Commonwealth, in order
 “ not to confound valour with cowardice, I will
 “ cause the names of those to be given me, who to
 “ avoid the reproaches and punishment their fault deserved,
 “ separated from their companions; and making
 “ them all appear before me one after another, I will
 “ oblige them to promise me upon oath, that as long
 “ as they shall carry arms, they will eat their meals
 “ standing, unless prevented by sickness. You cannot

* Ut facile appareret, nihil omnium bonorum multitudini gratius, quam libertatem, esse. Liv. xxxiii. 32.

“ but suffer this mortification with patience and without
 “ complaint, if you only reflect a little, that your cow-
 “ ardice could not be punished more gently.”

A.R. 538.

Ant. C.

214.

Ibid. 16.

After this discourse he ordered them to put up their baggage, and begin their march. The soldiers, with their booty either on their shoulders or driving it before them, returned to Beneventum, singing and dancing with such transports of joy, that they seemed rather guests returning from a feast, than soldiers from a battle. The inhabitants came out of the city in a body to meet them, and were lavish in their professions of joy, and congratulations. They emulated each other in inviting the troops to eat and lodge at their houses. The tables were ready spread in every court-yard, and they desired Gracchus to suffer them to eat and drink with them. Gracchus consented, on condition that they should all eat in public. The inhabitants accordingly brought out the tables before their doors, with all they had prepared upon them. Those who had lately received their liberty, had white woollen caps upon their heads, which was the badge of it. Some lay upon beds according to the custom of those times; (I shall speak in the sequel of the manner in which the Romans eat their meals;) the rest were standing, and at the same time ate, and served their companions. Gracchus found this sight so singular and so new, that when he returned to Rome, he had it painted, and placed the picture in the temple of Liberty, which his father had caused to be built upon mount Aventine with the money that arose from fines, which he had also dedicated.

Liv. xxiv.

17.

Whilst these things passed at Beneventum, Hannibal, after having ravaged the whole country about Naples, went and incamped near Nola. When the Consul Marcellus was informed of his approach, he ordered the Proprætor Pomponius to join him with the army, that was incamped at Sueffula, and immediately prepared to set out to meet Hannibal, and to give him battle. In the dead of night he detached Claudius Nero with the flower of his cavalry through the gate, that was most distant from the enemy;

A. R. 538. with orders, after having taken a great compass, to
 Ant. C. approach by little and little, the place where the Car-
 214. thaginians were keeping always out of sight; and
 lastly, when he saw the action begun, to advance sud-
 denly and charge them in the rear. Nero did not
 execute these orders, whether he lost his way, or had
 not sufficient time. The battle was fought without
 him, and the Romans however had the advantage;
 but not being seconded by their cavalry, their project
 did not succeed as they expected. Marcellus, not
 daring to pursue the enemy in their flight, made his
 troops retire, though victorious. Hannibal however
 lost this day above two thousand men; and Marcel-
 lus not above four hundred. Nero, having to no
 purpose fatigued his men and horses, during a day
 and night, returned without so much as having seen
 the enemy. It is a great affliction to an able Gene-
 ral, who has formed an important project, to see it
 rendered abortive by the imprudence or folly of the
 person on whom he has relied for the execution of
 it. The Consul in consequence reproached Nero in
 the severest terms; telling him it was his fault only,
 that they had not repaid Hannibal the defeat at Can-
 næ. The next day Marcellus again drew up his troops
 in battle: but Hannibal did not quit his camp, tacitly
 confessing himself overcome. The third day he retired
 by the favour of the night; and renouncing the con-
 quest of Nola, which he had so often attempted in
 vain, marched towards Tarentum, where he expected
 better success.

Liv. xxiv. The Romans had no less attention to their affairs at
 18. home, than to those of the war, and shewed no less
 courage and elevation of mind in them. The Censors
 not being employed in the public works for want of
 money, applied solely to reforming the manners of
 the citizens, and to correct the abuses which the war
 had introduced, like bad humours, which the body
 contracts in long diseases. They first cited those be-
 fore them, who were accused of having intended to
 have abandoned the Commonwealth, and quitted Italy;
 after

after the battle of Cannæ. L. Cæcilius Metellus, then A. R. 538.
Ant. C. 214. Questor, was the most considerable amongst them. He and his associates were ordered to make their defence, and not being capable of justifying themselves, they were convicted of having held discourses contrary to the interests of the Commonwealth, and which tended to form a conspiracy for abandoning Italy.

Next those over acute interpreters, in finding subterfuges to dispense with oaths, were made to appear: those cunning Deputies, who having sworn to Hannibal, that they would return into his camp, believed themselves discharged from their engagement by going back again for a few minutes under an imaginary pretext. The doctrine of equivocals is not a new one: but its being condemned and severely punished even by the Pagan world, is very remarkable.

All those of whom we have just spoke were punished with the greatest penalties the Censors had power to inflict. They were deprived of all suffrages in the public assemblies, were expelled from their tribes, and retained only the quality of citizens, in respect to paying taxes. And such amongst them as were Roman Knights were degraded, and had the horses kept for them by the Commonwealth taken from them.

They treated with the same severity all those of the youth, who had not served during four years, without having been sick, or having some good and valid reason to the contrary. The latter amounted to above two thousand.

This rigour of the Censors was followed by a decree of the Senate not less severe. It condemned all those who had been noted, or stigmatized, by the Censors to serve in the infantry as private men, to go to Sicily, and to join the army of Cannæ, without hopes of obtaining their discharge, till Hannibal should be driven out of Italy.

From what we have just said, it may be judged, how proper the wise severity of the Censorship was to awe the citizens; to keep up good order in every branch of the Commonwealth; to make the customs and
institutions

A. R. 538. institutions be observed; in a word, how potent a
 Ant. C. barrier it was against disorders, against the infraction
 214. of the laws, and the corruption and looseness of manners, which continually augment, except strong obstacles from time to time be laid in their way, to stop, or at least to weaken their course.

Liv. xxiv. As the Censors found no money in the treasury,
 18. they did not make the usual contracts either for the repair of the temples, or the other current expences of that kind. Those who used to make such contracts with them came to the Censors, and desired them to treat with them in the same manner, as if the treasury was in a condition to supply the necessary sums; declaring, that none of them could demand any money, till the war was at an end.

The masters of the soldiers, whom Gracchus had made free near Beneventum assembled next, and declared in like manner, that though the magistrates, appointed by the Commonwealth to pay them, had given them notice to come and receive the price of their slaves, they would not take the money, whilst the war subsisted.

This general unanimity to ease the exhausted treasury induced those also, who had the fortunes of minors and widows in their hands, to give the Commonwealth credit for the money; persuaded that there could not be a more sacred and inviolable asylum than the Public Faith, nor one, where such previous deposits could more safely be placed. *NUSQUAM EAS (PECUNIAS) TUTIUS SANCTIUSQUE DEPONERE CREDITIBUS, QUI DEFEREBANT, QUAM IN PUBLICA FIDE:* which is highly for the honour of a State.

This generosity and disinterestedness passed from the city to the camp. The horse and the officers would not receive their pay: and those that did receive it were treated as mercenary wretches, void of honour.

Where is there now a like zeal, and love for the Public Good? But where is there to be found a Public Faith like that which subsisted at Rome as the ba-
 sis

sis of the government? It may with the greatest reason be considered as the most certain resource of States: but in order to its being so, it is absolutely necessary, that it should never suffer any violation upon any occasion whatsoever.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

The Consul Q. Fabius was incamped near Casilinum, which was defended by a garrison of two thousand Campanians, and seven hundred Carthaginians. The Magistrate of Capua armed the people and slaves indifferently, in order to fall upon the Roman camp, whilst the Consul was employed in making himself master of Casilinum. Fabius was exactly informed of all that was contriving at Capua. For this reason he sent to his colleague at Nola, to acquaint him that “it was absolutely necessary to oppose the attempts of the Campanians with another army, whilst he attacked Casilinum with his. That he therefore desired him to join him with his troops, leaving a small number of them to guard Nola; or, if his presence were necessary there, and that city had any thing still to fear from the enterprizes of Hannibal, in that case he (Fabius) would send for Gracchus, who was at Beneventum.” When Marcellus received this courier from his colleague, he left two thousand men at Nola, and marched with the rest of his army, to Casilinum. His arrival obliged the Campanians, who were already in motion, to remain quiet. In consequence Casilinum saw itself attacked by two consular armies. As the Roman soldiers, in approaching too near the walls, received abundance of wounds without any great advantages, Fabius was of opinion, that they should give over attacking a little paltry place, which gave them as much trouble as a considerable city could have done; and especially as they had affairs of much greater importance upon their hands. He was upon the point of retiring, when Marcellus represented to him, * “That if, on the one side, great Generals

* Marcellus, multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non demittenda esse, dicendo, quia magnæ famæ momenta in utramque partem fierent, tenuit, ne irritò incepto abiretur.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

ought not to undertake all kinds of things indifferently, on the other, they ought not easily to abandon the enterprizes they had once formed, because reputation, in war, has usually great consequences, and exceedingly conduces to its good or bad success." Fabius gave into this opinion, and continued the siege. The Romans then made their mantles advance, and erected all the other machines against the walls, that were usually employed in those times. The Campanians, who were in garrison in Casilinum, terrified by these preparations, demanded permission of Fabius to retire to Capua in safety. A small number of them had already quitted the place, when Marcellus seized the gate through which they escaped. At first he put all indifferently to the sword whom he met at the gate; then having forced his way into the city, he killed all he met. About fifty Campanians, who had quitted the place first, having taken refuge with Fabius, received an escort from him, which conducted them to Capua. The prisoners, as well Campanians as Carthaginians, were sent to Rome, and shut up in the prisons. As to the inhabitants, they were carried away, and distributed into the neighbouring cities.

Liv. xxiv.
20.

At the same time Gracchus, who was in Lucania, having dispersed his troops without precaution to ravage it, was attacked by Hanno, who had his revenge for the loss he had sustained near Beneventum.

Marcellus was returned to Nola, and Fabius had entered Samnium. The latter either by capitulation or storm reduced several cities; in the taking of which twenty-five thousand of the enemy were either killed, or made prisoners. The Consul sent three hundred and seventy deserters to Rome, who were all thrown down the Tarpeian rock, after having been whipt with rods in the Forum. Marcellus was kept at Nola by sickness, which prevented him from acting.

Hannibal in the mean time was arrived at Tarentum. No motion was made there in his favour, because the garrison had been augmented upon the first
rumour

rumour of his march. Discovering that vain hopes had been given him, he returned towards Apulia. When he arrived at Salapia, as the place seemed commodious to him for winter quarters, and the end of the campaign approached, he caused as much corn to be carried thither, as he could bring off from the countries adjacent to Metapontum and Heraclea.

S E C T. II.

Marcellus one of the Consuls is charged with the war in Sicily. Epicydes and Hippocrates are created Prætors at Syracuse. They animate the People against the Romans. A wise discourse of a Syracusan in the assembly. It concludes for a peace with the Romans. The two leaders of the Cabal disturb all things at Syracuse, and make themselves masters of it. Marcellus takes the city of Leontium; he then approaches Syracuse. He besieges it by sea and land. Terrible effects of the machines of Archimedes. Sambuca of Marcellus. He changes the siege into a blockade. Reflexion upon Archimedes, and his machines. Different expeditions of Marcellus in Sicily during the blockade. Pinarius commander of the garrison of Enna, frustrates the bad designs of the inhabitants by a bloody execution. The soldiers confined to serve in Sicily, send deputies to Marcellus, to desire to be reinstated in the service. Marcellus writes to the Senate in their favour. Severe answer of the Senate. Marcellus deliberates whether he shall quit or continue the siege of Syracuse. He holds intelligence in the city, which is discovered. Part of the city taken. Fears of Marcellus. Various events followed by the taking of all the different quarters of Syracuse. The city is plundered. Death of Archimedes. All Sicily becomes a province of the Romans. Marcellus regulates the affairs of Sicily with abundance of equity and disinterestedness. Last action of Marcellus in Sicily. Victory gained by Hanno.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.
Liv. xxiv.
21.

THE death of Hieronymus had less changed the dispositions of the Syracusans in respect to Rome, than it had given them able and enterprizing Generals in the persons of Hippocrates and Epicydes. This determined the Romans, who apprehended, that a dangerous war might break out in Sicily, to send Marcellus one of the Consuls thither, to take upon him the direction of affairs.

Hist. Ant.
Liv. xxiv.
27.

Before he arrived there, many sad and horrid things had passed at Syracuse, of which the description may be seen elsewhere. In the last place Epicydes and Hippocrates, both firmly attached to the interests of Hannibal, (as has been said before) had been elected Prætors there. These new Prætors did not at first make known their intention, how sorry soever they were, that Ambassadors had been sent to Appius, to demand of him a truce of ten days; and that after having obtained it, others had been made to set out, to renew the treaty of alliance with the Romans, which Hieronymus had renounced. Appius then commanded near Murgantia a fleet of an hundred ships; and from thence observed the motions made by the Syracusans, in effect of the liberty to which they had been lately restored, and which had not yet taken a very fixed and solid form. In the mean time, he sent the Syracusan deputies to Marcellus, who was just arrived in Sicily. The Consul was informed by them of the conditions of peace proposed, and finding them reasonable, sent Ambassadors also to Syracuse, to conclude the peace, and renew the antient alliance with the Prætors themselves.

Liv. xxiv.
28.

The Roman Ambassadors found, on arriving there, the state of things much altered. Hippocrates and Epicydes, believing they had nothing farther to fear, after they had received advice, that the fleet of the Carthaginians was arrived at the promontory of Pachynus, at first by secret practices, and at length by open complaints, had inspired every body with a great aversion for the Romans, in giving out, that designs

were

were formed for delivering up Syracuse to them. The conduct of Appius, who had approached the entrance of the port with his ships, to encourage those of the Roman party, added new force to these suspicions and accusations, so that the multitude ran tumultuously to prevent the Romans from landing, in case they should have such a design.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

In this disorder and confusion it was judged proper to call an assembly of the People. Opinions differed very much in it, and the disputes were so hot that they gave room to apprehend some sedition. Apollonides, one of the principal Senators, made then a very wise speech, and as salutary an one as could be conceived in the present conjuncture. "He shewed that never had city been nearer either to its destruction or preservation, than Syracuse now actually was. That if they all should unanimously embrace either the side of the Romans, or that of the Carthaginians, their condition would be happy. But if they were divided in opinion, the war would be neither more warm nor more dangerous between the Romans and Carthaginians than between the Syracusans themselves divided against each other; as each faction would have within the same walls, its troops, arms, and Generals. What therefore was most essential to be done, was for all to agree and unite together. That at present the most important question was not to know, which of the two alliances was to be preferred. That however he would observe in respect to the choice of allies, that the authority of Hiero ought in his opinion to take place of that of Hieronymus, and that the amity of the Romans, well known by an happy experience of fifty years, seemed preferable to that of the Carthaginians, which could not be much relied on for the present, and had been found very bad by the past. He added one farther motive that was by no means an indifferent one: that in declaring against the Romans, they would have the war that moment upon their hands; whereas, on the side of Carthage, the danger was more remote.

The

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

The less passionate this discourse seemed, the more effect it had. The opinions of the different bodies of the State were thought necessary, and the principal officers of the troops, as well natives as strangers, were admitted to the conference. The affair was long discussed, and with great warmth. At length, as they saw no present means to sustain the war against the Romans, they determined for peace, and deputies were sent to them to conclude it.

Liv. xxiv.
32.

This resolution would have saved Syracuse, if it had been put in execution. But Hippocrates and Epicydes embroiled every thing by their seditious practices, and by false suppositions and calumnious accusations equally animated the multitude and the troops against the Romans. After various intrigues and events, the particulars of which may be found in the place referred to before, those two heads of a party made themselves masters of Syracuse, caused their colleagues to be killed, and themselves to be declared sole Prætors in a tumultuous assembly. In this manner did Syracuse, after a dawn of liberty, fall again into a cruel slavery.

Anc. Hist.

Marcellus, as we have said, arrived a little before in Sicily, and having joined his troops with those of Appius, had taken the city of the * Leontines by storm, on the first attack. When he was informed of all that had passed in Syracuse, he immediately advanced towards that city, and encamped with his army near the temple of Jupiter Olympicus, fifteen hundred paces from Syracuse. Before he proceeded farther, and committed any act of hostility, he sent deputies to let the inhabitants know, that he was come to reinstate the liberty of the Syracusans, and not to make war upon them, except he should be obliged to it. They were not permitted to enter the city. Epicydes and Hippocrates went out of the gates to meet them, and having heard their proposals, answered haughtily, "that if the Romans in-

* Leontium, a city upon the eastern side of Sicily, not far from Catana.

tended to besiege their city, they should soon perceive, that there was a wide difference between attacking Syracuse and attacking Leontium. Marcellus was therefore determined to attack the city by sea and land.”

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

Syracuse, of which Marcellus is going to form the siege, was situated upon the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, advantageous situation, commodiousness of its double port, fortifications erected with great care and art, and the multitude and riches of its inhabitants, rendered it one of the greatest, finest and most powerful cities of the Greeks. Cicero gives us an account of it worth repeating. * He tells us, that the air of it was so pure and serene, that there was not a day in the year, however cloudy and tempestuous, on which the sun did not shine.

Cic. Verr.
vi. 117—
119.

It was founded by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Mægara, upon the same coast.

Strab. vi.
269.

It was composed, at the time of which we are speaking, of five parts, that were in a manner so many cities joining together: The Isle, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis; or the New-town, and Epipolæ.

The Isle, situated to the South, was called Nasos, a Greek word, that signifies an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect, which was in use at Syracuse. It was also called Ortygia. It was joined to the main land by a bridge. In this Isle were the palace of the Kings and the Citadel. This part of the city was of great importance, because it made those who possessed it masters of the two ports that surrounded it. For this reason, when the Romans had taken Syracuse, they would not suffer any Syracusan to live in the isle. There was in this isle a fountain called Arethusa, much celebrated in the fables of the poets.

Cic. Verr.
vii. 97.

Strab. vi.
270.

Extremum hunc Arethusa mihi concede laborem

Virg.
Ec. x:

*Sic tibi, cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,
Doris amarâ suam non intermisceat undam.*

* Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cælique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna, turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. Cic. Verr. vii. 26.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

ACHRADINA, situated entirely upon the sea-side, was the finest, most spacious, and best fortified part of the city. It was separated from the rest by a good wall, flanked with towers from distance to distance.

TYCHA, so called from the Temple of Fortune, which was the ornament of this quarter, extended partly along Achradina, ascending from the south to the north. It was also much inhabited. It had a famous gate, called Hexapyla, which led into the country. Almost opposite to Hexapyla was a little town called Leon.

NEAPOLIS or New-town extended west along Tycha.

EPIPOLÆ was an eminence without the city, that commanded it, and was very steep, and consequently of very difficult access. When the Athenians besieged Syracuse, it was not inclosed with walls, and had none till the time of Dionysius the Tyrant, when it formed a fifth part of the city, but was little inhabited. At the bottom of this eminence was a famous prison called the mines, Latonicæ; and close by it the fort Labdalon. It was bounded at top by another fort called Euryalus.

The river Anapus ran a small half league from the city, and emptied itself into the great port. Not far from its mouth was a kind of castle called Olympium, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius.

Syracuse had two PORTS, very near each other, being separated only by the isle: The GREAT, and the LITTLE PORT, called otherwise Laccus. The great port had on the left a gulf called Dasco, and a fort called Plemmyrium.

A little above Achradina, near the tower Galeagra, there was a third port called Trogilus.

The plan of Syracuse, which I have caused to be engraved from that of the learned Geographer Philip Cluvérius, will make every thing obvious which is said of it in the siege of that city. I follow this plan, which I believe preferable to that I have given in the Ancient History.

Marcellus

Marcellus left the command of the land-forces to Appius, and retained that of the fleet. It consisted of sixty galleys of five benches of oars, which were filled with soldiers armed with bows, slings, and darts, to scour the walls of the besieged. There were abundance of other vessels laden with all kinds of machines for the attack of places. As he had made himself master of Leontium on the first assault through the terror he had spread amongst the inhabitants, and as he did not despair of entering on some side such a city as Syracuse, composed of many parts separated from each other, he caused the formidable machines, which he had prepared for attacking the place, to be brought near the walls, and exposed to the eyes of the inhabitants. He might easily have succeeded, if there had been one man less in Syracuse.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.
Liv. xxiv.
34.
Plut. in
Marcel.
305.—
307.
Polyb. viii.
415—
418.

This was the famous Archimedes, the relation and friend of King Hiero. Entirely removed from business, and the cares of government, he placed his whole pleasure in study. He was by natural inclination, solely engrossed by whatever geometry has of most noble, elevated, and sublime in it. It was only at the request of King Hiero and his earnest sollicitation, that he was at last prevailed upon not to keep his art continually soaring after intellectual things, but to make it descend sometimes to things corporeal and sensible; and to render his demonstrations and discoveries more accessible and palpable to the generality of mankind, by uniting them practically with things of use.

In the siege of which we speak, Syracuse found the benefit of our great Geometrician's complaisance for the King. The Romans, in making the assault at once by sea and land, expected by the terrible appearance of their attack, to throw the city into the utmost terror and consternation. But the besieged had Archimedes with them, who was in a manner all things to them. He had taken care to provide the walls with every thing necessary for a good defence.

As soon as he had began to make his terrible engines play, they let fly upon the infantry all kind of

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

darts, and stones of an enormous weight, which were discharged with such a noise, force, and rapidity, that nothing could withstand them, and beat down and crushed to pieces all in their way; so that they occasioned an horrible disorder in the ranks of the besiegers.

Marcellus was no better treated on the side next the sea. Archimedes had disposed machines for discharging to any distance whatsoever. Though the enemy were at a great distance from the city, he reached them by the means of balistas and catapultas of a suitable bigness and force. When the discharges went beyond them, he had smaller, more proportioned to the distance, which occasioned so great a confusion amongst the Romans, that they could not undertake any thing.

These were not the greatest dangers. Archimedes had placed lofty and strong machines behind the walls, which letting fall great beams, with immense weights at the end of them, upon the ships, sunk them to the bottom. Besides this, he caused a grapple fastened to a chain to project suddenly, by which he who guided the machine, having caught hold of the prow of a ship, and raised it up in the air by the means of the counterpoise that was managed within the walls, set the vessel upon the poop, and held it some time in that situation: then letting the chain go by the means of a windlace or pulley, let it fall down again with its weight either upon the prow or side, and often sunk it entirely. At other times the machines, having carried the ship towards the shore with cordage and hooks, after having made it whirl round a great while, dashed and broke it to pieces against the rocks, that projected under the walls, and in that manner destroyed all on board of it. Every minute galleys, seized and suspended in the air, and whirling round with rapidity, exhibited a dreadful sight, and falling into the sea were swallowed up with their whole crews.

Marcellus, on his side, used also balistas and catapultas, but much inferior to those of the learned geometrician.

metrician. He had at a great expence provided machines, called Sambucæ, from their resemblance to the musical instrument of that name. It was composed of eight galleys of five benches, from one side of which the oars had been taken away, from some on the right and from the others on the left; and which were joined together two and two on the sides where there were no oars. The machine consisted of a ladder, four feet broad, with breast-works on both sides, which when set up was as high as the walls. It was laid lengthwise from the poop to the prow in the inside of the galleys made fast to each other, and reached considerably beyond their beaks. On the tops of the masts pulleys were placed with cords in them. When it was to be used, cords were made fast to the extremity of the machine, and the men upon the poop raised it up with the help of pulleys: others on the prow assisted to raise it up with levers. The gallies were afterwards warped up to the foot of the wall, to which these machines were applied. This is, no doubt, a kind of modern draw-bridge. The bridge of the Sambuca was let down upon the walls of the besieged, and served the besiegers for passing to them.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

This machine had not the effect expected from it. Whilst it was still at a sufficient distance from the walls, Archimedes discharged a great piece of a rock of above (1) twelve hundred weight; after that a second, and presently after a third: all which hitting it with a dreadful whizzing and noise, threw down and broke its props to pieces, and gave such a shock to the galleys that supported it, that they parted from each other.

Marcellus, almost discouraged and reduced to extremities, drew off his galleys with all possible diligence, and sent orders to his land-troops to do the same. At the same time he assembled the council of

(1) Mr. Rollin says ten quintals. The quintal, which the Greeks call *ταλαντον*, was of several kinds. The least was an hundred and twenty-five pounds: according to which ten quintals were above twelve hundred.

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214.

war, in which it was resolved, that the next morning before day-break, they should endeavour to approach the walls. They were in hopes, by this means, to avoid the machines, which for want of a distance proportioned to their force, would not have sufficient play.

But Archimedes had provided against every thing. He had long before prepared, as we have already observed, machines that carried to all distances, with a great abundance of darts proportioned to them, and ends of beams, which being very short, required less time to make them ready; and these could be discharged more often than others. Besides which, he had caused holes to be made in the walls very near each other, (which are now called loop-holes) where he had placed (1) scorpions, that not carrying far, wounded those who approached, and were not perceived.

When the Romans in consequence had got to the foot of the walls, thinking themselves well covered there, they again found themselves either the mark of an infinity of darts, or overwhelmed with the stones, that fell from above on their heads; there being no part of the wall, that did not continually pour a mortal hail upon them, which fell downright. This obliged them to retire. But they were no sooner removed, than new discharges were made upon them in their retreat: so that they lost abundance of men, and almost all their galleys were shattered and beat to pieces, without being capable of doing the least hurt to the enemy. For Archimedes had placed most of his machines safe behind the walls; so that the Romans, overwhelmed with an infinity of wounds, without seeing either the place or hand from which they came, seemed properly, says Plutarch, fighting with the Gods.

Marcellus, though at his wit's end, and not knowing how to oppose these machines, which Archimedes

(1) Scorpions were a kind of cross-bows used by the ancients for discharging darts and stones.

employed against him, could not forbear jesting upon them. "Shall we not give over making war," said he to his workmen and engineers, "with this Briareus of a geometrician, who uses my galleys and Sam-bucæ so roughly. He infinitely exceeds the hundred-handed giant spoken of in fable, in the number of discharges he makes upon us at once." Marcellus had reason to ascribe this to Archimedes alone. For, in reality, the Syracusans were in a manner only the body of the machines and batteries of that great geometrician, who was himself the soul, that moved and acted them all. In consequence, no other arms were used: the city employed only those of Archimedes, both in defending and attacking.

Marcellus at length, seeing the Romans so terrified, that if they only perceived a little cord, or the least bit of wood upon the wall, they immediately fled; crying out that Archimedes was going to discharge some dreadful machine upon them, he renounced the hopes of being able to take it by making a breach, gave over all attacks, and resolved to put an end to the siege in time by turning it into a blockade. The only resource that the Romans thought they had, was to reduce the great numbers of the people in the city by famine, in cutting off all provisions, that could be brought them either by sea or land. During eight months which the Romans were before the city, there were no kind of stratagems, that were not invented, nor any actions of valour omitted, except assaults, which they did not dare to attempt any more. Of so much weight are a single man and a single science, when properly employed. Remove but one old man from Syracuse, the city must inevitably be taken by all the forces the Romans have there. His presence alone stops and disconcerts all their measures.

Let us judge from this example (and it cannot be too often repeated) what interest Princes have in protecting arts, in favouring the learned, and encouraging academies of sciences by distinctions of honour, and solid rewards, which never hurt nor impoverish States.

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Ant. C.
214.

I say nothing here of the birth and nobility of Archimedes; nor indeed was he at all indebted to them either for his profound knowledge, or his reputation. I consider him only as a learned man, and a great geometrician. What a loss had it been for Syracuse, if, for the sake of saving some expence, some pension, such a man had been left in inaction and obscurity? Hiero was far from acting in this manner. He knew all the merit of our geometrician; and it is a very great one in Princes to know that of others. He placed it in honour, he made use of it; and did not wait till occasion and necessity reduced him to do so: that would have been too late. By a wise foresight, the true characteristic of a great Prince and a great minister, he prepared, in the arms itself of peace, all that was necessary for sustaining a siege, and for making war with success; though at that time there was not the least appearance, that any thing was to be apprehended from the Romans, with whom Syracuse was in the strictest amity. Accordingly we see, in an instant, come forth, as out of the earth, an incredible number of machines of all kinds and magnitudes, of which the sight alone was capable of giving armies terror and dismay.

Amongst these machines are some, of which the effect is scarce conceivable, and the reality of which we might be tempted to call in question, if we might be allowed to doubt the testimony, such, for instance, as of Polybius, an almost cotemporary author, who wrote from memoirs quite new, and in the hands of all the world. And indeed how can we refuse to give into the concurrent report of Greek and Roman historians, of friends and enemies, in respect to facts, of which whole armies were witnesses, and felt the effects; and which had so great a share in the events of the war. What passed in this siege of Syracuse, shews also how high the genius of the ancients rose in the art of besieging and defending places. Our artillery, which so perfectly resembles thunder, has not more effect than the machines of Archimedes, if it has so much.

Mention

Mention is made of a burning-glass, by the means of which Archimedes burnt part of the Roman fleet. No ancient author speaks of it: it is a modern tradition, for which there is no foundation. Burning-glasses were known by the ancients; but not of this kind, which the most skilful in geometry and mechanics even believe impracticable.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

Marcellus, according to Polybius, continued eight months before Syracuse with Appius: which must have been to the end of the Consulship, and perhaps even farther.

Polyb. viii.

Livy places the expeditions of Marcellus in Sicily, and his victory over Hippocrates, in this first year; though they must necessarily have been in the second year of the siege. And in reality that historian relates no military actions of Marcellus in this second year, because he ascribes to the first, what passed in that we are going to enter upon. For it is contrary to all probability, that nothing should have been done, especially as the Romans had a numerous army in Sicily, and a General who certainly wanted neither vigour nor activity. This reflection, as I have already observed in the Ancient History, is Mr. Crevier's, late professor of Rhetoric in the College of Beauvais, in his new edition of Livy, of which I have more than once given my thoughts, and which is every day a great help to me in my Work. I shall therefore place the events, that Livy ascribes to the first year, in the second, which we are going to begin.

I also ask permission not to break in upon the affairs of Sicily by facts contained in the Roman History during the two years the siege is still to continue. I shall recur to them in the sequel. These facts, so separated, will be much the clearer. And I shall observe the same method on some other the like occasions.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS, III.

TI. SEMPRONIVS GRACCHVS.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

After Marcellus had resolved only to blockade Syracuse, he left Appius before the place with two thirds of

A. R. 539. of the army, and with the rest advanced into the island,
 Ant. C. where he made some cities return to the side of the
 213.
 Liv. xxiv. Romans.

35.

At this time Himilco, General of the Carthaginians, arrived in Sicily with a great army, in hopes of entirely reconquering it, and driving out the Romans. Hippocrates quitted Syracuse with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse to join him; in order to act in concert against Marcellus, with their united forces. Epicydes remained in the city, to command there during the blockade. Marcellus, in returning from Agrigentum, where the enemy had been before-hand with him, and had seized the place, met the army of Hippocrates, attacked, and defeated it. This advantage kept many of those who intended to go over to the Carthaginians in their duty.

Liv. xxiv.
 36.

Almost at the same time two fleets arrived in Sicily. On the one side, fifty-five armed galleys under the command of Bomilcar entered the great port of Syracuse: on the other, a Roman fleet, composed of thirty galleys of five benches, landed a legion at * Panormus. Both states applied so strenuously to the war in Sicily, that they seemed to think no farther of Italy. The enterprize of the Carthaginians had no effect. Himilco, who was in hopes of taking the Roman Legion in its passage from Panormus to Syracuse, missed his aim, by steering a different course. The Carthaginian fleet did not continue long near Syracuse. Bomilcar despairing of being capable of making head against the Romans, who had twice as many ships as himself, and being convinced that a longer stay would only conduce to starving his allies, set sail and repassed into Africa.

Himilco confined himself to reducing some places. The first he retook was Murgantia, whither the Romans had sent a great quantity of provisions of all kinds. The inhabitants surrendered it to him by

* Palermo, upon the Northern coast of the island.

treachery. The revolt of this city inspired a great many others with the desire of change; so that on all sides the Roman garrisons were either drawn out of the places they held by force, or delivered up to the perfidy of the inhabitants.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

The city of Enna was upon the point of treating its garrison in the same manner, which was commanded by L. Pinarius, an equally brave and faithful officer, and who was not of a character to suffer himself to be surprized. He knew, that the inhabitants had resolved to deliver him up to the enemy, and that in order to do so they had sent for Himilco and Hippocrates, who were already on their way. Pinarius perceived, that there was no time to be lost. After having apprized his soldiers of the extreme danger, to which they were upon the point of being exposed, and having taken, with great secrecy, all the necessary measures, he gave them the signal agreed upon. The soldiers instantly dispersed themselves into all the quarters of the city. They plundered, ravaged and killed all that came in their way, as they might have done in a place taken by storm, being no less exasperated against people, without arms and defence indeed, but traitors and villains in their hearts, than if they had met with resistance, and the danger had been equal on both sides. Thus the Romans retained Enna, by a bloody execution; which perhaps only necessity can excuse. Marcellus was not displeased with this conduct of Pinarius. He even gave the whole plunder to the soldiers; convinced, that to prevent the Sicilians from sacrificing the Roman garrisons to the Carthaginians, nothing less than so terrible an example of vengeance was necessary.

Liv. xxiv.
37---39.

Enna is situated exactly in the middle of Sicily. Besides which it was particularly famous for the worship of Ceres and Proserpina. There was an ancient tradition deeply implanted in the minds of all the people of Sicily, that the whole island was sacred to those two Divinities, who had been born in it: that

Cic. in Ver.
designis, ii.
106---108.

it

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

it was indebted to Ceres for the invention and use of corn: that Proserpina had been carried away by Pluto from a wood belonging to the city of Enna; and that traces of that rape were still to be seen there. The temple of Ceres, the mother of Proserpina, was in such universal veneration with the Sicilians, that, when they went thither, they believed they went rather to the goddess herself, * than to adore her in her temple. This religious reverence shewed itself in effect of what had lately happened at Enna. The news of the massacre that had been committed there, spread in one day over the whole province; so that those of the Sicilians, who found in this action not only cruelty to men, but impiety to the Gods, conceived still more aversion than before for the Romans; only those who till then had been divided between them and the Carthaginians, made no farther scruple to declare for the latter.

Marcellus returned to Syracuse, and after having sent Appius to Rome to demand the Consulship, he appointed T. Quintius Crispinus his Successor in the command of the fleet and of the camp, and settled his winter-quarters a six or seven † *stadia* (or furlongs) from Epipolæ, in a place called Leon, where he intrenched himself.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

We have already observed that Sicily, at the time we are speaking of, was divided into the Roman province, and the kingdom of Hiero, or State of the Syracusans. Marcellus was with his army in this second part: But there was another army in the Roman province, where every thing was quiet; and

* Tanta erat auctoritas & vetustas illius religionis, ut, cum illuc irent non ad ædem Cæreris, sed ad ipsam Cærerem proficisci, viderentur.

† Thucydides gives it this situation Lib. 6. in which he is rather to be followed than Livy, who places this little town five miles from Hexapylon.

where no war was actually carried on. In this last army were the soldiers, who had escaped the battle of Cannæ, under the command of P. Lentulus, Prætor or Proprætor. From these soldiers banished into Sicily without hope of returning to Italy as long as the war with the Carthaginians subsisted, Marcellus, whilst he was in winter-quarters, received a deputation consisting of the principal officers of the horse and foot. He that was to speak, addressed himself to him in words to this effect.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

“ Marcellus, we should have had recourse to you
“ in Italy during your Consulship, when the decree
“ of the Senate, which we dare not call unjust, but
“ which is certainly very rigorous, was passed against
“ us, if we had not expected to be sent into a pro-
“ vince, where the deaths of two Kings had occa-
“ sioned great revolutions, to maintain against the
“ united forces of the Sicilians and Carthaginians a
“ rude and laborious war, in which we might have
“ appeased the resentment of the Senate by our blood
“ and wounds. It was thus that in the times of our
“ fathers, those, who had been taken prisoners near
“ Heraclea by Pyrrhus, obliterated the disgrace of
“ their defeat by fighting against that Prince.

“ But, after all, wherein have we deserved such
“ heavy effects of your past and present indignation,
“ illustrious Senators? For, great Marcellus, when
“ I speak to you, I seem to see both the Consuls, and
“ the Senate united in your person. At least I assure
“ myself, that had we fought under your auspices at
“ the battle of Cannæ, the fate of the Commonwealth
“ and our own would have been more happy. Per-
“ mit me, before I give you an account of our sad
“ situation, to make our apology.

“ If our defeat is not to be imputed to the wrath
“ of the Gods, or to the immutable decree of the
“ Fates, that disposes of all human things, but to a
“ fault committed by men; upon whom ought this
“ fault to fall? Is it upon the soldiers or upon the
“ Generals? I who am but a subaltern, shall be far
“ from

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

“ from blaming my General; especially as I have
 “ been informed, that the Senate caused thanks to
 “ be returned him for not despairing of the safety of
 “ the Commonwealth; and that ever since his flight
 “ at Cannæ he has always been continued in com-
 “ mand; and that all the other legionary Tribunes,
 “ who escaped from that battle, demand offices, and
 “ obtain them without difficulty. But suffer me at
 “ least, illustrious Senators, to ask you, whether it
 “ be just, that whilst you are full of lenity and indul-
 “ gence for yourselves and your children, you should
 “ make the whole weight of your anger and severity
 “ fall upon soldiers as upon vile slaves? Will you
 “ admit that the Consul and the principal persons of
 “ the city might fly, without dishonouring themselves,
 “ when there was no other resource; but that you
 “ sent the soldiers to the battle only to perish in it?
 “ At the battle of Allia, almost the whole army fled.
 “ At the Furcæ Caudinæ the soldiers delivered up
 “ their arms without so much as having attempted to
 “ use them: not to mention other battles, of which
 “ the events have been equally unhappy and shame-
 “ ful. However, no body thought of noting those
 “ armies with any kind of infamy; and there was so
 “ far from being reason to repent such indulgence in
 “ respect to them, that the city of Rome owed her
 “ preservation to the very legions that had fled to
 “ Veii with so much terror and precipitation; and
 “ the troops who returned to Rome without arms,
 “ after having shamefully passed under the yoke of
 “ the Samnites, having been sent back with new arms
 “ against the same enemy, made them in their turn
 “ experience the vile disgrace by which they had taken
 “ so much pleasure to mortify us.

“ But as for the soldiers who fought at Cannæ, can
 “ they with reason be accused of cowardice, when it
 “ is remembered, that above fifty thousand were
 “ killed upon the spot; that the Consul made off
 “ with only seventy horse; and that those, who did
 “ not lose their lives, preserved them only, because

“ the

“ the victor was tired with killing? When the pri- A. R. 540.
 “ soners were refused to be ransomed, every body Ant. C.
 “ praised us for having preserved ourselves to serve 212.
 “ our country, for having retired to the Consul at
 “ Venusia, and for having formed him a body of
 “ troops, that wore the face of an army.

“ At present our condition is more unhappy and
 “ harder than that of prisoners ever was in the times
 “ of our forefathers. For the severity used in respect
 “ to them, was always confined to making them
 “ change their arms, to reducing them from a more
 “ honourable into a less distinguished corps, and to
 “ assigning them a place in the camp inferior to what
 “ they had held before: but they did not fail, on
 “ the first occasion wherein they signalized them-
 “ selves, to recover all that had been taken from
 “ them. None of them were ever banished; none of
 “ them deprived of the hopes of compleating the
 “ time of their service, and they were always led on
 “ against the enemy to fight, and either to put an end
 “ to their lives or their ignominy. As for us, who
 “ can be reproached with nothing, but that we were
 “ desirous, that some Romans should survive the bat-
 “ tle of Cannæ, we are removed not only from our
 “ country, and from Italy, but even from the sight
 “ of the enemy; we are left in a shameful banishment,
 “ without hopes of effacing our disgrace, of appeas-
 “ ing the wrath of our country, and of dying with ho-
 “ nour. We do not ask, either that an end should
 “ be put to our misery, or that we should be suffered
 “ to lie idle; but only that our valour should be put
 “ to the trial; to be exposed to fatigues and dan-
 “ gers, and that we should be replaced in a condi-
 “ tion to discharge all the duties of men of courage,
 “ soldiers, and Romans.

“ The war has now been carried on two years in
 “ Sicily with great ardour. The Carthaginians and
 “ Romans, in their turns, take cities from each other:
 “ battles both of horse and foot are fought: Syra-
 “ cuse is besieged by sea and land: we hear the sound
 “ of

A. R. 540. " of arms and the cries of battle ; whilst we are lan-
 Ant. C. " guishing in an unworthy repose, as if we had nei-
 212. " ther swords, nor arms, to use them.

" Tib. Sempronius has already fought several times
 " with the legions of slaves, and has made them ob-
 " tain in reward of their valour the liberty and rank
 " of citizens. Employ us at least as slaves purchased
 " for this war. Let us be suffered to come to blows
 " with the enemy, and to deserve our liberty by fight-
 " ing. Make trial of our valour, by sea, by land,
 " in pitched battles, or in sieges. Expose us to what-
 " ever is most difficult or terrible in fatigues and dan-
 " gers : we are ready to undertake all things, that
 " we may once for all do what, it seems, we ought
 " to have done at Cannæ ; as the whole time we have
 " survived that unfortunate battle, has been punished
 " with ignominy."

Liv. xxv.
 7.

After this discourse they threw themselves at the
 feet of Marcellus. That General answered them,
 " that the favour they asked was not in his power ;
 that he would write to the Senate, and would execute
 the orders that should be sent him." Accordingly
 he wrote, and his letters were delivered to the new
 Consuls. After they had been read in the Senate, the
 Senators, who were consulted upon this affair, re-
 plied, " That they did not think it proper to trust
 the safety and glory of their country to soldiers, who
 had abandoned their companions in the plains of
 Cannæ. That if Marcellus was of a different opinion,
 they left him at liberty to act in respect to them as he
 should judge best for the good of the Common-
 wealth ; on condition however, that they should en-
 joy no exemption, that they should receive no military
 rewards, and should not see Italy, as long as the Car-
 thaginians should continue the war in it."

Plut. in
 Marc.
 p. 305.

This severity afflicted Marcellus, and when he re-
 turned to Rome, he complained highly to the Senate,
 that after all the services he had done the Common-
 wealth, they should not vouchsafe to grant him entire
 pardon for the soldiers, in whose favour he had wrote

to

to them. But that wise body had its rules and principles, to which they believed themselves obliged inviolably to adhere, notwithstanding the apparent reasons for the contrary, that is, notwithstanding the extremity to which the Commonwealth was then reduced, and the pressing occasion it had for troops after the total defeat of its armies at the battle of Cannæ. It was from this very extremity that the Senate took the reasons for their conduct. And indeed what impression must not the example of such a severity, and in such conjunctures, have made upon the troops in all succeeding times. In this manner was discipline preserved in the Roman armies; and it was that discipline, which rendered them victorious over all nations.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212,

In the beginning of the third year of the siege of Syracuse, whilst the Romans on another side were beginning that of Capua, Marcellus had made little progress. He saw no means for taking Syracuse, either by force, because Archimedes continually opposed him with invincible obstacles; or by famine, because the Carthaginian fleet, which was returned more numerous than before, caused convoys to enter the place at will. He therefore deliberated, whether he should remain before the city to push the siege, or march towards Agrigentum against Hippocrates and Himilco. But, before he took the latter resolution, he was desirous to try whether he could not make himself master of Syracuse by some secret intelligence. He had in his camp many of the principal Syracusans, who had come thither to take refuge in the beginning of the troubles. Marcellus addressed himself to them, promising them, that if the city surrendered to the Romans, it should retain its laws, privileges, and liberty. They did not want good will; but it was not easy for them to come to the speech of their relations and friends, who remained in the city; because the authors of the revolt suspected many of the inhabitants, and redoubled their vigilance and attention, to prevent any attempt of that nature in favour of

Liv. xxv.
23.

Liv. xxv.
23.

A. R. 540. the Romans without their knowledge. It was a slave
 Ant. C. of one of these Syracusan fugitives, who having got
 212. into the city as a deserter, carried on secretly an intrigue, into which fourscore of the principal persons of Syracuse entered. They divided themselves in order to come sometimes one party and sometimes another into the camp of Marcellus, hid in barks under fishing nets. All the measures were taken for putting the city into the hands of the Romans, when one Atalus, out of resentment for not having been let into the secret, discovered the conspiracy to Epicydes, who put all the conspirators to death.

Liv. xxv.
 84.
 Plut. in
 Marc.
 308.

This enterprize having miscarried in this manner, an accident supplied him with a new resource, and revived his hopes. Some Roman ships had taken one Damippus, whom Epicydes had sent to negotiate with Philip King of Macedonia. Epicydes expressed a great desire to ransom him, and Marcellus was not averse to it. A place near the port Trogilii was agreed upon for holding the conferences concerning the ransom of the prisoner. As they met there several times, a Roman soldier taking it into his head to consider the wall attentively at a nearer view, had counted the stones of it, and measured the height of each of them with his eye; then having cast up the whole, he discovered, that the wall was not so high by a great deal, as himself and others had believed it, and he concluded, that with ladders of no extraordinary length, it would be easy to get upon it.

The soldier, without loss of time, gave Marcellus an account of the whole. All knowledge and wisdom is not always confined to the General's head: a private soldier may give him good hints. Marcellus did not neglect this information, and assured himself concerning it with his own eyes. Having caused ladders to be got ready, he took the opportunity of a festival celebrated for three days at Syracuse in honour of Diana, during which the inhabitants abandoned themselves to feasting and merriment. At the time of night when he supposed that the Syracusans,
 after

after having passed the day in eating and drinking, were in their first sleep, he made a thousand chosen soldiers advance softly to the wall with the ladders.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
2126

When the first were got up without noise or tumult, others followed them; the boldness of the first encouraging the second. These thousand men, taking the advantage of the enemy's tranquility, who were either drunk or asleep, had soon scaled the wall. Having soon forced the gate Hexapylon, they seized the part of the city called Epipolæ.

The question was now no longer to deceive, but to terrify, the enemy. The Syracusans, roused by the noise, began to take the alarm, and to put themselves in motion. Marcellus ordered all the trumpets to sound at once; which spread such a consternation amongst the inhabitants, that they all fled; believing, that there was no quarter of the city not in the hands of the enemy. Accordingly, it will soon appear, that the taking of Epipolæ occasioned that of Neapolis and of the quarter called Tycha. There still remained however not only the isle, but the strongest and finest part of Syracuse, called Achradina, which was well capable of defending itself, having its walls separated from the rest of the city.

Marcellus, at day-break, had entered Epipolæ with all his troops. Epicydes having instantly drawn together some soldiers, which he had in the Isle, that adjoined to Achradina, marched against Marcellus: but finding him stronger and better accompanied than he had imagined, after a slight skirmish he retired hastily into Achradina, less affected with the force and number of the enemy than with the fear, that some conspiracy might be formed in the city in their favour, and that he should find the gates of Achradina and the Isle shut against him.

All the captains and officers that were with Marcellus, congratulated him upon the success of his arms, and upon so unforeseen a good fortune. As to himself, when he had considered from an eminence the beauty and extent of this city, which was then the

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

vallest and most opulent in the world, he could not help shedding tears, either of joy, for having executed so difficult and glorious an enterprize, or of sorrow, to see the wonderful work of so many ages upon the point of being reduced to ashes. He called to mind two powerful fleets of the Athenians sunk in former times before this city, two numerous armies, with two illustrious Generals that commanded them, cut to pieces : so many wars sustained with so much courage against the Carthaginians ; so many famous Tyrants and powerful Kings ; especially Hiero, whose memory was still quite recent, who had signalized himself by so many royal virtues, and still more by the important services, which he had done the Roman people, whose interests had always been as dear to him as his own. Moved by this remembrance, he believed, before he attacked Achradina, that it was incumbent on him to send to the besieged, to exhort them to surrender voluntarily, and prevent the ruin of their city.

The gates and walls of Achradina were guarded by deserters, as men, who having no hopes of pardon in the conditions of a treaty, which should be made with Marcellus, would defend them against him with the utmost obstinacy. Accordingly, they would not suffer any one to approach the walls, or hold any conversation with the inhabitants.

Marcellus, not having succeeded on that side, turned his views upon a fort called Euryalus, situated at the extremity of the city farthest from the sea, which commanded the whole country on the land side, and which, for that reason, was highly proper for receiving convoys. Philodemus, who commanded in it, fought for some days only to amuse Marcellus ; till Hippocrates and Himilco should come to his aid with their troops. Marcellus seeing, that he could not make himself master of this post, incamped between the New-town and Tycha.

But at last Philodemus, not seeing himself succoured, surrendered the fort, upon condition, that he should

should march out with the garrison to Epicydes in Achradina. A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The deputies of the New-town and Tyche, came to Marcellus carrying olive-branches, and implored him to forbid his soldiers to put them to the sword and to burn the city. He granted them their request: but those two quarters were abandoned to be plundered by the troops.

Bomilcar in the mean time, who was in the port with ninety ships, taking the occasion of a dark and tempestuous night, that made it impossible for the Roman fleet to lie at anchor, set sail with five and thirty ships for Carthage, informed the Carthaginians of the condition to which Syracuse was reduced, and returned with an hundred sail.

Marcellus, who had put troops into Euryalus, and no longer apprehended being attacked in his rear, prepared to besiege Achradina. The two parties lay still for some days.

About this time arrived Hippocrates and Himilco. The first, with the Sicilians, having encamped and intrenched himself near the great port, and made the signal for those who occupied Achradina, attacked the old camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus commanded; and Epicydes sallied at the same time upon the posts of Marcellus. Neither of these enterprizes succeeded. Hippocrates was vigorously repulsed by Crispinus, who followed him quite into his intrenchments; and Marcellus obliged Epicydes to shut himself up in Achradina.

As it was then autumn, a plague came on which made great havock in the city, and still more in the camps of the Romans and Carthaginians. At first the distemper was moderate, and occasioned only by the bad air and season. Afterwards communication with the sick, and even the care taken of them, spread the contagion: from whence it happened that some, neglected and abandoned, died through the malignity of the disease; others received help that became fatal to all that approached them: so that the eyes were

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

continually struck with the sad sight of death, and of the funerals that followed it, and the ears heard nothing night and day, but the groans of the dying, or of those who lamented them. But at length the habit of seeing the same objects made people's hearts so hard and insensible, that they not only ceased to lament those whom death swept off, but did not so much as give them interment, and the earth was covered with corpses, that lay as they fell in the sight of their comrades, who expected the same fate every moment.

The Sicilians, who served in the Carthaginian army, no sooner perceived, that the distemper was communicated by the corruption of the air they breathed near Syracuse, than they retired to their several cities, from which they were not very distant. But all the Carthaginians, who had not the same resource, perished with their Generals Hippocrates and Himilco. As for Marcellus, seeing with what excess the distemper raged, he quartered his soldiers in the houses of the city, where the shade and cover relieved them exceedingly: but that did not prevent his losing abundance of men.

Liv. xxv.
27-30.

Such a scourge, one would think, should have put a stop to the war on both sides: but it seemed to rekindle every day more and more. Bomilcar, Admiral of the Carthaginian fleet, who had made a second voyage to Carthage, to bring new succours from thence, returned with an hundred and thirty ships of war, and seven hundred transports. The contrary winds prevented him from doubling the cape of Pachynus. Epicydes, who apprehended, that, if the same winds continued, this fleet would take disgust and return into Africa, left the care of defending Achradina to the Generals of the mercenary troops, went to Bomilcar, and persuaded him to venture a battle, as soon as the weather would permit. Marcellus on his side, seeing that the troops of the Sicilians augmented every day, and that if he waited much longer, and suffered himself to be shut up in Syracuse, he should be very much straitened both by sea and land,

land, resolved, notwithstanding the superiority, which the enemy had from the number of their ships, to prevent Bomilcar from landing at Syracuse. As soon as the winds abated, Bomilcar stood out to sea in order to double the cape the better, and with design to give battle. But when he saw the Roman ships advance to him in good order, on a sudden, no body knew why, he made off, sent orders to the transports to regain Africa, and retired to Tarentum. Epicydes, fallen from such high hopes, and not daring to return into a city already half taken, sailed for Agrigentum, rather with design to wait the event of the siege there, than to make any motion from thence.

When it was known in the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had quitted Syracuse, and that the Carthaginians abandoned Sicily, they sent deputies to Marcellus, after having sounded the disposition of the besieged, to treat of the conditions upon which Syracuse should be surrendered to him. It was agreed unanimously enough on both sides, that what had belonged to the Kings should belong to the Romans: and that the Sicilians should retain all the rest, with their laws and liberty. After these preliminaries, they demanded a conference with those whom Epicydes had appointed to command during his absence. The deputies in conferring with them, gave them to understand, that they had been sent by the army of the Sicilians to Marcellus and them, to make a treaty, in which the interests of those besieged, as well as of those who were not, would be taken care of; it not being consistent with justice, that the one should provide for their particular safety, in neglect of the other. They were afterwards introduced into the place, and having informed their friends of the conditions they had already settled with Marcellus, they engaged them to join with them in putting to death Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes surnamed Sindon, all Lieutenants of Epicydes, who having little regard for the good of Syracuse, did not fail to oppose the negotiations of peace.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

After having rid themselves of these petty Tyrants, they called an assembly of the People; and represented to them, “That whatever ills they suffered, they ought not to complain of their fortune, as it now depended upon themselves to put an end to them. That if the Romans had undertaken the siege of Syracuse, it was out of affection for the Syracusans, not enmity. That it was not till after having been informed of the oppressions they suffered from Hippocrates and Epicydes, those ambitious retainers of Hannibal, and afterwards of Hieronymus, that they had taken arms, and besieged the city, not to ruin it, but to destroy its tyrants. But since Hippocrates was dead, Epicydes absent, his Lieutenants killed, and the Carthaginians had abandoned all they possessed in Sicily, what reason could the Romans now have, not to preserve Syracuse; as they would do, in case Hiero, the most faithful of their friends and allies, was still alive? That neither the city, nor the inhabitants, had any thing to fear but from themselves, if they let slip this occasion of being reconciled with the Romans. That they never would have so favourable an one as the present, when they were just delivered from the violent sway of their Tyrants; and that the first use of their liberty ought to be, to return to their duty.”

This discourse was perfectly well received by the whole Assembly. It was however judged proper to create new Magistrates, before they sent deputies to the Romans, and those deputies were chosen out of the number of such as had been elected Prætors. The person who spoke in their name, and who was instructed to use all possible endeavours to obtain, that Syracuse should not be destroyed, being arrived at the camp of Marcellus with his Colleagues, spoke to him as follows. “Illustrious General, it was not the people of Syracuse who broke the alliance with the Romans, but Hieronymus, less criminal to Rome than to his country; and afterwards, when the peace was re-established by his death, it was still no Syracusan, that interrupted it, but the instruments
“ of

“ of the Tyrant, Hippocrates and Epicydes. It was
 “ they made war upon you, after having reduced us
 “ into captivity, whether by force or artifice and per-
 “ fidy: and no body can say, we had any interval of
 “ liberty, that was not a time of peace with you.
 “ Now, as soon as we are become our own masters
 “ by the deaths of those, who enslaved Syracuse, we
 “ come to deliver up our arms, persons, walls and
 “ city, determined not to refuse any conditions you
 “ shall think fit to impose upon us. For the rest,
 “ continued he, addressing himself still to Marcellus,
 “ the present question concerns your interests as much
 “ as ours. The Gods have granted you the glory of
 “ having taken the finest and most illustrious of all
 “ the Grecian cities. All that we have ever done of
 “ memorable, whether by sea or land, augments
 “ your triumph, and exalts its lustre. Fame does
 “ not suffice to make known hereafter the greatness
 “ and strength of the city you have taken; posterity
 “ cannot judge of them but with their own eyes. It
 “ is necessary, that we should shew to all those who
 “ shall land here, from whatever part of the uni-
 “ verse they come, sometimes the trophies we have
 “ gained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, and
 “ sometimes those which you have gained from us;
 “ and that Syracuse, placed for ever under the pro-
 “ tection of Marcellus, may be a perpetual and sub-
 “ sisting monument of the valour and clemency of
 “ him, who took and preserved it. It would not be
 “ just, that the remembrance of Hieronymus should
 “ make more impression upon the Romans, than that
 “ of Hiero. The latter was much longer your friend,
 “ than the other your enemy. Suffer me to say it,
 “ you have experienced the effects of Hiero’s amity:
 “ but the frantic undertakings of Hieronymus have
 “ fallen only upon his own head.”

The difficulty was not to obtain from Marcellus
 what they asked of him for the besieged, but to pre-
 serve tranquility and union amongst themselves in the
 city. The deserters, convinced that they should be
 delivered

A. R. 540.
 Ant. C.
 212.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

delivered up to the Romans, inspired the foreign soldiers with the same fear. Both in consequence suddenly taking arms, began by massacring the magistrates newly elected; and running on all sides, plundered and put all to the sword that came in their way. They nominated six officers, three to command in Achradina, and three in the Isle. The tumult being at length appeased, the foreign soldiers, discovered, from every thing they heard concerning what was concluded with the Romans, that their cause was quite separate from that of the fugitives. At that moment arrived the deputies, who had been sent to Marcellus, who fully undeceived them.

Amongst those who commanded in Syracuse, there was a Spaniard, named Mericus: means were found to bring him over. He delivered up the gate near the fountain Arethusa, and received the soldiers that Marcellus sent thither. The next day at sun-rise, Marcellus made a false attack upon Achradina, in order to draw all the forces in it to that side, and also of the Isle that adjoined to it; to make it easy for some vessels to throw more troops into the Isle, which would be unguarded. Every thing succeeded as he had designed. The soldiers, whom those vessels threw into the Isle, finding almost all the posts abandoned, and the gates, through which many were just gone to defend Achradina against Marcellus, still open, they took possession of it with little opposition. Marcellus, being apprized, that he was master of the Isle, and of part of Achradina, and that Mericus, with the body he commanded, had joined his troops, caused a retreat to be sounded, to prevent the troops from plundering the Treasury of the Kings of Syracuse, which was not found to be so considerable as it had been believed.

The deserters having taken advantage of this interval of tranquility to escape, the Syracusans, delivered from all fear, opened the gates of Achradina to Marcellus, and sent deputies to him, who had orders to ask nothing further of him, than that he would
be

be pleased to preserve the lives of themselves and their children. Marcellus having consulted his Council, to which he had admitted the Syracusans who had taken refuge in his camp, replied to these deputies : “ That Hiero, during fifty years, had not done the Romans more good, than those who had been masters of Syracuse for some years had intended them harm : but that their ill-will had hurt only themselves, and that they had punished themselves for the violation of treaties in a more cruel manner, than the Romans could have desired. That he had besieged Syracuse during three years not to reduce it into slavery, but to deliver it from the tyranny exercised over it by the Commanders of the deserters. That after all, the Syracusans would be in the wrong to ascribe a revolt continued for so many years to the want of liberty ; as it was in their own power either to have followed the example of their fellow citizens, who had sought refuge in the Roman camp ; or that of the Spaniard Mericus, who had delivered up himself and his garrison ; and that they might at least have taken the generous resolution sooner of surrendering themselves, as they at last determined. That as for himself, he did not think the honour of having taken Syracuse a recompence equivalent to the pains and dangers he had undergone in so long and so rude a siege.”

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

After this discourse, he sent his Quæstor with some Liv. xxv. troops into the Isle, to take and guard the treasury of³¹ the Kings : then having placed safeguards at the doors of those who had continued faithful to the Romans, he abandoned the city to be plundered by the troops. He would most willingly have spared it this sad disaster : but he could not refuse that permission to the soldiers ; who, if he had, would have taken it of themselves. Many even demanded that Syracuse should be burnt and demolished : but he could not be prevailed upon to consent to that ; and it was not without great difficulty, that he abandoned to them all the riches of that superb city, and all the slaves that they found in it ; expressly forbidding them however to touch

A. R. 540. touch any free person; to kill or hurt any one what-
 Ant. C. soever, and to make slaves of any of the citizens. It
 212. is said that the riches, plundered at this time in Syracuse, were equal to what might have actually been found in Carthage, had it been taken.

Liv. ibid. An unforeseen accident gave Marcellus great grief.
 Plut. in At the time whilst all was in confusion in Syracuse,
 Marc. 380. Archimedes, shut up in his closet like a man of another world, that does not concern himself with what passes in this, was employed in considering geometrical figures, which he had drawn upon the sand. This contemplation had engrossed not only his eyes, but his whole soul, in such a manner, that he had neither heard the tumult made by the Romans in running about on all sides, nor the noise with which the whole city resounded. On a sudden a soldier came in to him, and bad him follow him to Marcellus. Archimedes desired him to stay a moment, till he had solved his problem, and compleated the demonstration of it. The soldier, who regarded neither his problem nor his demonstration, and who did not so much as understand those words, enraged at his delay, drew his sword, and killed him.

Marcellus was infinitely afflicted, when he was informed of his death. Not being able to restore his life, as he would very gladly have done, he did all in his power to do honour to his memory. He made a strict enquiry after all his relations, treated them with great distinction, and granted them extraordinary privileges. As to Archimedes, he caused his funeral to be solemnized with great magnificence, and erected him a monument amongst those of the most illustrious men Syracuse had ever produced. His tomb had remained a long time unknown and buried in oblivion till Cicero's time, who coming to Syracuse in quality of Quæstor, discovered it with some application. I have related in what manner elsewhere.

Anc. Hist. By the taking of Syracuse, all Sicily became a province of the Roman people: but it was not treated, as the Spaniards and Carthaginians were afterwards,
 Cic. in ver. de frum. n. 13. on

on whom a certain tribute was imposed, as the reward of the victors, and the punishment of the vanquished: *quasi victoriæ præmium & pœna belli*. Sicily in submitting to the Roman people preserved their ancient rights and customs, and obeyed them on the same conditions as it had done its Kings.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
214.

Some days before the reduction of Syracuse, T. Otacilius, with fourscore galleys of five benches of oars, sailed from Lilybæum to Utica; and having entered the port of that city before day, took all the transports in it laden with corn. He afterwards landed his troops, and plundered the whole country round about, and returned on board his ships with a great booty. He arrived at Lilybæum three days after he had set out from thence, and brought with him an hundred and thirty vessels laden with all kinds of provisions, and particularly a great quantity of corn, which he immediately sent to Syracuse. This supply delivered both the victors and the conquered people from a famine, which began to threaten them, and from the fatal effects it would have had upon both, had it arrived later.

Marcellus, after the taking of Syracuse, applied himself in regulating all the affairs of Sicily, which he did with a justice, disinterestedness, and integrity, that acquired himself in particular great glory, and did infinite honour to the Commonwealth in general. Hitherto, says Plutarch, the Romans had manifested to other nations that they were highly capable of conducting wars, and very formidable in battles; but they had given no great instances of their lenity, humanity, and clemency; in a word, of the virtues necessary to good government. Marcellus seems to have been the first, who, on this occasion, shewed the Greeks, that the Romans excelled them no less in justice, than in valour and ability in war.

Before Marcellus quitted Sicily, all the cities of that province sent deputies to him, to negotiate their interests. He treated them all differently, according to the different degrees of attachment or opposition
their

A. R. 540. their inhabitants had shewn in regard to the Romans.
 Ant. C. Those who had constantly adhered to their party, or
 212. at least had reunited with them before the taking of
 Syracuse, were received and treated honourably, as
 good and faithful allies. Those whom fear had reduced
 to surrender after that conquest, received, as conquered,
 such terms as the victor thought fit to impose upon them.

Liv. xxv. The Romans had still however in the neighbour-
 40, 41. hood of Agrigentum a remainder of the enemy, who
 were not to be neglected, commanded by Hanno and
 Epicydes, the only Generals of the Carthaginians, that
 continued in Sicily: a third sent by Hannibal was
 come to join them in the room of Hippocrates, whose
 name was Mutines. He was an active and enterprising
 man, who under such a master as Hannibal had learned
 all the arts and stratagems, that could be used in
 war. With a body of Numidians, which his Collegues
 gave him, he over-ran and ravaged the lands of the
 enemy, taking care, on the other side, to encourage
 the allies, and to give them timely aid, in order to
 retain them in his party; so that in a short time all
 Sicily resounded with his name, and he became the
 most assured refuge of those, who favoured the Car-
 thaginians. Marcellus having taken the field to put
 a stop to his incursions, Mutines, without giving him
 time to breathe, attacked the Romans in their very
 post, spread alarm and terror on all sides, and the next
 day, having given them a kind of battle, he obliged
 them to retire behind their intrenchments, and to keep
 themselves close within them.

But, whilst these things passed, a sedition having
 arose amongst the Numidians, three hundred of them
 abandoned their camp, and went into a neighbouring
 city. Mutines set out immediately to bring back the
 seditious, after having strongly recommended to the
 two other Generals not to come to blows with the ene-
 my in his absence. The others, resenting that advice,
 which seemed to carry with it the air of a command,
 and being besides jealous of the glory of Mutines, to
 shew

shew their independance, made haste to offer the enemy battle. Marcellus, who had repulsed the victorious Hannibal before Nola, could not bear to see himself insulted by those he had defeated both by sea and land; ordered his troops to arm immediately, and advanced in good order against the enemy. They could not sustain the charge of the Romans; especially when they saw themselves abandoned by the Numidian cavalry, upon whom they relied most for the victory; and who, partly through a remainder of the discontent, that had occasioned the sedition, and partly thro' an attachment to Mutines, whom the two other Generals affected to despise, had engaged with Marcellus not to fight. The Carthaginians in consequence were soon put to the rout, with the loss of a great number of soldiers killed and taken, and eight elephants. This was the last action of Marcellus in Sicily, who returned victorious to Syracuse.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The year was almost elapsed. At Rome Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, who had never exercised any Curule office, were nominated Consuls.

I return now to the facts, which I postponed, to avoid interrupting the history of the events of the war in Sicily.

S E C T. III.

First campaign of Cato the Censor. Philip declares against the Romans. He is beaten near Apollonia by the Prætor M. Valerius. Success of the Scipios in Spain. Distribution of the provinces. Departure of the Consuls. Dasius Altinius of Arpi, traitor to the Carthaginians, as he had been to the Romans. Horrible cruelty of Hannibal. Fabius retakes the city of Arpi. An hundred and twelve Campanians surrender themselves to the Romans. Taking of Alernum. Great fire at Rome. The two Scipios make an alliance with Syphax, King of Numidia. A Roman officer forms an infantry for Syphax. Treaty of the Carthaginians with Gala,

Gala, another King of Numidia. Syphax is twice defeated by Massinissa, son of Gala. The Celtiberians begin to serve amongst the Romans. Pomponius, as incapable a General, as unfaithful farmer of the revenues, is defeated by Hanno. Novelties in religion reformed by the authority of the magistrates. P. Scipio chosen Ædile before qualified by age. Fraud of the Publicans or Tax-farmers, and amongst others, of Postumius, severely punished. Creation of a Pontifex Maximus. Levies made in a new method. The hostages of Tarentum, who had made their escape from Rome, brought back, and punished with death. Tarentum is delivered up to Hannibal by treachery. He attacks the citadel ineffectually, and leaves it blocked up. Origin of the games called Ludi Apollinares.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS, IV.

M. CLAVDIVS MARCELLVS, III.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

IT was under these Consuls, that Cato, who became so famous in the sequel, made his first campaign. He was at that time almost twenty years old.

Liv. xxiv.
40.

We have seen that Philip King of Macedonia had the year before made a treaty with Hannibal, the execution of which had been deferred only by the taking of his Ambassadors. He at last declared himself openly this year against the Romans. The Prætor Valerius who commanded a fleet near Brundisium, and along the coasts of Calabria, received deputies from the people of Oricum, a city of Epirus, who informed him, that that Prince had first come to found Apollonia, after having gone up the river Aous with six-score galleys of two benches of oars : but that afterwards abandoning that enterprize, which appeared too long and too difficult, he had secretly approached Oricum during the night with his army, and that on the first attack he had made himself master of that city, situated in the midst of a plain, without either walls sufficiently strong, or troops numerous enough,
to

to defend it. They desired the Prætor to send them aid, to repel the enemy, who must assuredly have formed designs against the Romans, and had attacked Oricum, only because that city seemed commodious in respect to his views against Italy.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

Valerius, having confided the care of guarding the coast to T. Valerius his Lieutenant, set out with his fleet, which he kept in readiness, and in condition to act, after having embarked on board transports such of the troops, as the ships of war could not carry: and having arrived at Oricum the second day, he easily retook that city, in which Philip on retiring, had left but a weak garrison.

The deputies of Apollonia came to Valerius in this place, and informed him that their city was besieged by Philip, only because they refused to join with him. That they were no longer in a condition to resist him, unless the Romans sent them aid. The wars of Illyricum had given the Romans occasion to make alliances along all that coast. Valerius promised them, that he would do what they desired; and without delay sent ships of war with two thousand soldiers, under the command of Nævius Crista, a brave and very experienced officer, with orders to repair to the mouth of the river Aous, near which Apollonia was situated. Nævius landed his troops at this place, and having ordered the gallies, that brought them, to return to Oricum, and rejoin the rest of the fleet, he marched his soldiers, removing from the river, by a way not guarded by the Macedonians, and entered the city in the night, without being perceived by the enemy. They lay still all the next day. Nævius employed it in examining what forces there were in Apollonia, and what arms and regular troops it could further supply. The condition in which he found all things, had already given him entire confidence, when he was informed, that the enemy passed their time with incredible security and indolence. For this reason he quitted the city without noise at midnight, and entered the enemy's camp, who were so little upon their

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

guard, that above a thousand men had entered their works, before they were perceived by any body; and if they had refrained from slaughter, they might have reached the King's tent without any opposition. But the cries of those, who were put to the sword at the gates, at length roused the Macedonians, who were seized with such a terror, that not only none of them took arms, or attempted to repulse the enemy, but the King himself fled almost naked, as he was when he waked, to the river's side and his ships, in a condition which ought to have made a private soldier ashamed. How infamous was this for a King and a General! The whole army ran the same way in a crowd.

Near three thousand men were killed or taken in the camp: but the number of prisoners was much greater than that of the dead. After the camp of the Macedonians was plundered, the Apollionates caused the Catapultæ, Balistæ, and other machines to be carried off that had been intended for battering their walls, with design to use them for their defence, in case they should ever be exposed to the same danger. All the rest of the plunder was abandoned to the Romans.

When this news was brought to Oricum, Valerius immediately sailed with his fleet towards the mouth of the river, to prevent Philip from getting off with the help of his ships. That Prince in consequence, not believing himself in a condition to fight the Romans either by sea or land, after having drawn part of his ships ashore, and burnt the rest, retired by land into Macedonia, with the remainder of his soldiers, most of whom had lost their arms and baggage. M. Valerius passed the winter at Oricum with his fleet.

In Spain, the Carthaginians, during this year, had at first some advantages; but they received several blows, and lost several battles, in which on their side they had, all together, forty-five thousand men killed or taken, with the loss of fifty elephants, and above an hundred and fifty ensigns. Cn. Scipio, one of the two Roman Generals, who commanded in Spain with his brother Publius, had his thigh ran through
with

FABIUS, SEMPRONIUS, Consuls.

67

with a javelin in one of these actions. The Romans, having had such good success, thought it shameful for them to leave Saguntum above five years in the hands of the Carthaginians, the ruin of which had occasioned the war. They beat the Carthaginian garrison out of it, and having retaken the city, settled as many of the old inhabitants as they could find in it.

A. R. 538.
Ant. C.
214.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS.

TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHVS, III.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

The first of these two Consuls was the son of the great Fabius. When the Consuls, who had been chosen in their absence, were arrived at Rome, the distribution of the provinces and troops was regulated; and it was decreed that two new legions and twenty thousand allies should be levied. The Consuls, after having raised these legions, and recruited the rest, took care, according to custom, to expiate the prodigies, which Livy with reason calls vain * phantoms, that illude the eyes and ears, and are afterwards believed something real and serious.

After this ceremony the Consuls set out, Sempronius for Lucania, and Fabius for Apulia. The father of the latter joined him near Sueffula, in order to serve under him as his Lieutenant-general. When his son went to meet him, the Lictors who walked before him, out of respect for the age and great reputation of that illustrious person, suffered him to advance on horseback without speaking to him; and he had passed eleven of them, when his son perceiving it, ordered the last, that walked immediately before him, to do his duty. Upon that officer's calling to the old man to dismount, he immediately complied, and approaching the Consul said to him: "I was willing, son, to try whether you knew that you were Consul."

It was in this camp, that Dasius Altinius of the city of Arpi came to the Consul in the night, attend-

Liv. xxiv.
45—47.

* Ludibria oculorum auriumque credita pro veris.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

ed only by three slaves, and promised to deliver up Arpi to him for a reward proportioned to such a service. Fabius having deliberated upon the affair in the council of war, some were of opinion, "That after having caused him to be whipt, he should have his head cut off, as a deserter and traitor, who, having no other rule but his private interest, was alternately the enemy of both nations. That after the battle of Cannæ, convinced that it was always necessary to go over to the side of fortune, he had declared for Hannibal, and had brought his fellow-citizens into his revolt. That at present seeing, contrary to his expectation and wishes, that the affairs of the Romans took a better turn, and that the Commonwealth seemed to rise upon its losses, he came to offer those he had betrayed before a new treachery. That his heart had always been on one side, whilst his body was on the other, as contemptible an enemy as faithless ally. That it was necessary to make an exemplary punishment of him, and add it to those of the schoolmaster of Falerii and Pyrrhus's physician, as a third lesson for the traitors and villains that were for imitating him."

The father of the Consul was not of this opinion. He said, "That at a time when the war was carried on on all sides, they talked as if they were at peace with every body. That far from inviting the States of Italy from continuing on the side of the Carthaginians by an ill-placed severity, it was necessary to endeavour to bring them back to their alliance with the Romans. That it were imprudent to treat those, who inclined to return to their duty, with rigour. That if people might abandon the Romans, and not have liberty to come over to them again, it was not to be doubted, but Rome would soon have no allies, and that all Italy would join Hannibal. That after all, he was not absolutely for reposing any confidence in Alitinius. That there was a medium to be taken in the affair. That without considering him at present either as an enemy or a friend, it was necessary to keep him

near

near the camp in some safe and faithful city, where he should continue a prisoner at large during the war. That when it should be terminated, they might judge whether it were most proper to punish him, either for his past revolt, or to pardon him for his present return." He, and those who attended him, were laden with chains, and sent to Cales with a great sum of gold which he had brought with him, and which was kept very faithfully for him. During the day he was suffered to walk abroad under a guard, that carefully locked him up at night.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

As soon as the People of Arpi discovered his absence, they sought for him carefully, but to no purpose. As he was the principal citizen of the place, the rumour of his absence spreading on all sides, occasioned abundance of trouble and alarm; and the fear of some revolution induced them to give Hannibal advice of all that had passed. This news gave him no manner of pain. For besides his having long considered Altinius as a man, in whom no confidence could be safely placed, he found a pretext in his flight for seizing his estate, which was very considerable. But, to make the world believe, that anger had a greater share in his revenge than avarice, he used his family, not only with severity, but with the most horrid cruelty and barbarity. He caused his wife and children to be brought to his camp, and having ordered them to be tortured first to make them discover what was become of Dasius, and afterwards what gold and silver he had left in his house; when he was informed by this means of every thing, he commanded them to be burnt alive; which was executed upon the spot.

Fabius having set out from Sueffula, immediately formed the design of besieging Arpi. After having taken a near view of its situation and walls, he resolved to attack it at a place, which being the strongest, was also the least guarded. He formed a detachment of his best officers and bravest soldiers, whom he ordered to scale the wall at that place in the

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

night, and afterwards to force a low and narrow gate, which opened into a street not much frequented in a part of the city almost abandoned. A storm rose very luckily for them; and the rain, which began about midnight, having obliged the sentinels to shelter themselves by quitting their posts, the wall was scaled, and the gate forced. On the first sound of the trumpets, which was the signal agreed upon, Fabius made his troops advance, and entered the city a little before day through the gate he had caused to be thrown down. The enemy waked then, the rain having ceased before day-break. The garrison, which Hannibal had placed in Arpi, consisted of five thousand men, to whom the inhabitants had added three thousand of their citizens armed at their own expence. The Carthaginians, who were not assured of their fidelity, and who apprehended that they might attack them in the rear, made them march in the front. The fight began in the midst of darkness, and in narrow streets; the Romans having seized not only the avenues, but even the tops of the houses next the gate, to prevent the damage that might be done them by stones from above. Whilst they were thus at blows, upon some reproaches which the Romans made the people of Arpi for having given themselves up to a foreign and barbarous nation, the latter professed that it had been much against their will, and that they had been sold by their principals, without waiting their consent. Soon after, in consequence of these mutual explanations, the Prætor of the city having been brought to the Consul, who gave him his word that the past should be forgot, the Arpinians on a sudden turned their arms against the Carthaginians. At that instant, about a thousand Spaniards came over to the Consul's side, requiring nothing more, than that the Carthaginian garrison should be permitted to retire. The gates were immediately opened to the Carthaginians, no hurt was done them, as had been agreed; and they went to Hannibal at Salapia.

In

In this manner did Arpi return to its obedience to the Romans, without the loss of any of its inhabitants, except him who had twice betrayed them. Double pay was given to the Spaniards, who from thenceforth continued faithful to the Romans, and did them great services on many occasions.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

Whilst the Consuls were, the one in Apulia, and the other in Lucania, an hundred and twelve of the most illustrious citizens of Capua, under pretence of desiring to plunder the enemy's country, demanded permission of the magistrates to quit the city, and as soon as they had obtained it, they repaired to the camp of the Romans near Sueffula. After having made themselves known to the advanced guard, they demanded to be conducted to the Prætor, to whom they had something important to communicate. Cn. Fulvius, who commanded at this post, having been informed of their demand, ordered ten of them to be brought to him without arms. When they had made known their desire to him, which extended no farther than that their estates should be restored to them, when Capua should submit again to the Romans, he received them all under his protection.

Liv. xxiv.

47.

The Prætor Sempronius Tuditanus (it was this Tuditanus, who, the night after the battle of Cannæ, escaped through the enemy, whilst the rest through fear did not dare to quit the camp) this Prætor made himself master of Aternum by storm. He took more than seven thousand prisoners, and found a great quantity of brass and silver money in it.

At the same time a fire happened at Rome, and burnt with so much violence during two nights and a day, that it consumed a great number of buildings and temples.

This same year, the two Scipio's, encouraged by the considerable advantages they had gained in Spain, where they had added new allies to the old ones they had brought back into the party of the Romans, extended their views as far as Africa itself. Having

Liv. xxiv.

49.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

been informed, that Syphax, * King of a great part of Numidia, after having been a friend to the Carthaginians, had on a sudden declared against them, they sent an embassy to him, consisting of three officers (Centurions,) whom they commissioned to make a treaty of amity and alliance with him, and to assure him that if he continued to make war against the Carthaginians, the Roman People, to whom he would thereby render great service, and themselves, would cultivate all occasions to do what should be agreeable to him, and to testify their entire gratitude. That barbarous Prince received the embassy with great joy, and in a conversation, which he had with the three deputies, who were all old officers, upon the manner of making war, he could not forbear admiring the discipline which the Romans caused to be observed in their armies; and the comparison which he made between their method and his, shewed him how ignorant he was in the art of war. "He demanded of them, as the first proof of the amity and alliance they came to offer him, that only two of them should return to give an account of their commission to their Generals, and leave the third with him to instruct his troops in the art of fighting on foot, of which he owned that his Numidians, though very dexterous in managing horses, knew little or nothing. He added, that from the earliest origin of their nation, their ancestors had never made war in any other manner, and that himself and his subjects had been formed from their infancy in this. But as they had an enemy who was very strong in infantry, it was highly for his interest to become equal to them in that respect. That he had men in abundance: that all that was to be done, was only to give them proper arms, to teach them to handle them well, and to keep their ranks in battle, instead of drawing up and fighting in throngs, as had been their custom." The Ambassadors answered, that they

* Numidia was a great country of Africa, bounded on the north by mount Atlas, which separated it from Africa proper, and Mauritania: on the south it had Libya interior.

would do all he desired : but they made him promise, that he would dismiss the officer they left with him, if their Generals did not approve of his staying in his dominions.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

This officer was called Q. Statorius. The two others returned to give an account of their embassy ; and Syphax sent some on his side to receive the engagements of the Roman Generals. He gave them orders at the same time to make the Numidians, that served in the Carthaginian army, go over to the Romans. Statorius on his side found amongst the youth of Numidia enough to form Syphax bodies of infantry, whom he taught to perform the exercise, and all the military evolutions : to follow their colours, and keep their ranks, with as much ease as the Romans themselves. And lastly he inured them so well to fatigues and all the duties of military discipline, as they were practised in the armies of the Commonwealth, that the King soon relied as much upon his infantry as upon his cavalry, and even defeated the Carthaginians in a battle he fought with them in the open field.

The Ambassadors of Syphax also occasioned a revolution in Spain highly in favour of the Romans. For most of the Numidians, on the first rumour of their arrival, went over to them.

The Carthaginians were no sooner informed of the treaty, lately concluded between Syphax and the Romans, than they sent Ambassadors to Gala, King of that part of Numidia, of which the people were called Massyli, to ask his alliance and amity. Gala had a son called Masinissa, only seventeen years old, but in whom, even so early, virtues began to shine out, which seemed to promise, that he would leave his descendants a kingdom more opulent and of greater extent, than that he should receive from his ancestors. The Carthaginian deputies told Gala, “ That Syphax had joined the Romans only with design to strengthen himself against the other Kings and States of Africa. That it was therefore for Gala’s interest to unite as soon

A.R. 539. soon as possible with the Carthaginians : that before
 Ant. C. Syphax should go to Spain, or the Romans come to
 213. Africa, it was easy to prevent and crush the former,
 who had hitherto only the name of ally from the Ro-
 mans."

It was not very difficult for them to persuade Gala to raise an army, which Masinissa was appointed to march to their aid ; and who having joined the troops of Carthage, defeated Syphax in a great battle, in which thirty thousand men were killed upon the spot. Syphax, with a small number of horse, retired to the country of the Maurusii, that lay at the extremity of Africa along the ocean, near the straits of Gibraltar ; there, a great number of Barbarians, upon the rumour of his presence, having repaired to him from all parts, he presently formed a considerable body of an army. But Masinissa, not to give him time to breathe, or to go to Spain, from which he was separated only by a small arm of the sea, soon came up with him with his victorious army. It was there only with his own forces, and without the aid of the Carthaginians, he continued a war with Syphax, in which he acquired great glory.

Nothing memorable passed in Spain, except that the Roman Generals engaged the youth of the * Celtiberians to serve under them, by promising them the same advantages as they had from the Carthaginians ; and their sending of above three hundred Spaniards of principal distinction into Italy, to debauch, if they could, those of their nation who carried arms under Hannibal. Till this year, the Romans, according to Livy, had never employed mercenary soldiers in their armies : the † Celtiberians were the first that served as such.

Liv. xxv. Whilst the things I have just been relating passed in
 3. Spain, Hannibal continued in the territory of Taren-

* Celtiberia was a part of Hispania Tarraconensis. This people inhabited the country upon the right side of the Iberus. Numantia was one of their principal cities.

† Freinshemius relates after Polybius and Zonaras, that in the first Punic war, some Gauls were received into the pay of the Romans.

tum, full of hopes of making himself master of that city, by the treachery of the inhabitants. Some very inconsiderable places surrendered to him.

A. R. 539.
Ant. C.
213.

At the same time, of the twelve states of Brutium, that had joined Hannibal some years before, and those of Consentia, and Thurium, which was the antient Sybaris, returned to their alliance with the Romans. Their example would have been followed by a greater number, if the defeat that L. Pomponius Veientanus, † Præfect of the allies, drew upon himself by his rashness, had not prevented it. He had been a Tax-farmer, before he applied himself to the profession of arms. Some advantages, which he gained over the enemy in the country of the Brutii in respect to foraging, having flushed him, he looked upon himself as a consummate General. Having in consequence hastily drawn together some troops, he had the boldness to offer Hanno battle, who killed or took a great number of men, as well peasants as slaves, as ignorant of discipline as their Leader. The least loss sustained on this occasion was that of the commander himself, who being taken prisoner, suffered * the punishment his senseless enterprize, and an infinite number of injuries he had done the State, and his Associates by frauds, rapine, and all other unjust methods, deserved.

The length of the war, the troubles of which usually induce a neglect of civil government, had introduced so great a change in the minds of the Romans, and so altered the religion of their ancestors by the mixture of many foreign ceremonies, that, says Livy, both the Gods and men seemed to have become quite different from what they were before. A multitude of soothsayers and sacrificers without title or authority, accustomed to enrich themselves, by a gain equally easy and illicit, at the expence of a blind

† This was a military office equal to that of a Tribune in the legions.

* Tum temerariæ pugnae auctor & antè publicanus, omnibus malis artibus & reipublicæ & societatibus infidus, damnosusque. Liv.

A. R. 539. and credulous populace, had filled people's minds
 Ant. C. with idle superstitions. Persons of merit had long
 213. expressed in secret their disgust of this abuse. It was
 carried to such an excess, that the Senate at length was
 obliged to order the Prætor M. Atilius to put a stop
 to such practices. That Magistrate ordered by a de-
 cree, published in the assembly of the People, "that
 whoever had in their keeping any forms of predic-
 tions, prayers, or sacrifices in writing, should deliver
 them in to him before the first of April; and all
 persons, of whatsoever condition they might be, were
 prohibited to sacrifice in any public or sacred place,
 with any new or foreign ceremonies."

Liv. xxv.
 2.

This year, P. Cornelius Scipio, afterwards surnam-
 ed Africanus, was created Curule Ædile. When he
 presented himself as a candidate for that office, the
 Tribunes of the People opposed his nomination, giv-
 ing for their reason that he was not of sufficient age to
 exercise it. He boldly replied: "If all the Romans
 "are willing to elect me Ædile, I am old enough."
 Immediately all the Tribes gave him their suffrages
 with so much zeal and unanimity, that the Tribunes
 immediately desisted from their opposition. Scipio
 was then but one and twenty. I shall very soon ob-
 serve what the age was, that was necessary for hold-
 ing the great offices.

The Curule Ædiles celebrated the Roman Games
 during two days with as much magnificence as was
 possible in those times; and caused a congius of oyl
 to be distributed to each street, that is about five
 pounds fourteen ounces.

The plebeian Ædiles accused several Roman La-
 dies of leading bad lives; some of whom were found
 guilty, and banished.

Polyb. x. The election of P. Scipio into the office of Ædile
 578. is differently related by Polybius, and I think it pro-
 per to repeat here what he says of it.

Lucius Scipio, the elder brother, according to that
 Author, of him we are speaking of, stood for the
 Curule Ædileship. At first Publius did not care to
 ask

ask that office in conjunction with his brother, for A. R. 539.
 fear of hurting him, or of appearing to set up in Ant. C.
 competition with his elder, which was not decent, 213.
 and contrary to his intention. But when the time of
 the assemblies approached, reflecting on one side,
 that the people were not much inclined in favour of
 Lucius, and on the other, that he was much beloved
 by them, he thought, that the only means to get the
 Ædileship for his brother, was to set up with him.
 In order to bring his mother into this opinion (for he
 had only to conciliate her, their father being then in
 Spain) he thought of the following expedient. She
 interested herself extremely for her eldest son: she
 went every day from temple to temple to solicit the
 Gods in his favour, and offered frequent sacrifices to
 them. It is remarkable that the Pagans, in all their
 private or public undertakings, addressed themselves
 to the Gods to obtain success. Publius went to her,
 and told her that he had twice dreamed the same
 dream: that in it both himself and his brother seemed
 to have been created Ædiles, and that they were both
 returned home from the Forum when they met her at
 the door to receive them, and that she tenderly em-
 braced them. A mother could not be insensible to
 those words. "Would to the Gods," cried she,
 "that I might see so happy a day!" "Are you wil-
 "ling, mother, that we should make the attempt,"
 said Scipio to her? She gave her consent, not ima-
 gining but that all this was serious. This was enough
 for Scipio. He ordered such a white robe to be made
 for him, as was usually worn by the candidates for of-
 fices; and one morning before his mother was up,
 he put on this robe for the first time, and in that ha-
 bit appeared in the Forum. The People, who before
 highly regarded him, and wished him well, were
 agreeably surprized at so extraordinary a proceeding.
 He went forwards to the place assigned for the candi-
 dates, and stood by his brother. All the suffrages
 were united not only in favour of him, but of his bro-
 ther by his recommendation. They returned home;
 and

A. R. 539. and their mother had been informed of what had just happened. Transported with joy, she came to the door to receive her two sons, and flew into their arms to embrace them. The pretended dream of Scipio, which his mother took great care to publish, did not a little contribute, according to Polybius, in effect of the good and sudden success, with which it was followed, to cause him to be considered afterwards as a man favoured and even inspired by the Gods; and we shall see that on his side, he took pains to confirm the Romans in that opinion.

Ant. C. 213.
Liv. xxvi. 18.

However P. Scipio might be created Ædile, it is certain, that he was then but one and twenty or two and twenty years old, as three years after, when he was sent to command in Spain, he was but four and twenty. The Laws that directed the years, at which persons might hold the great offices, were not yet in use: but, afterwards, it was not allowed to exercise them before having served ten campaigns, and consequently before twenty-seven years of age; for the Romans began to serve at seventeen. In the 573d year of Rome, in the Consulship of Q. Fulvius Flaccus and L. Manlius Acidinus, L. Villius, a Tribune of the People, passed a law, that fixed the age at which the Curule offices might be demanded and obtained: for only those were in question. According to Manucius, the age for the Curule Ædileship was seven and thirty; for the Prætorship, forty; and for the Consulship, three and forty.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C. 212.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS, III.

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

Q. Fulvius had been twice Consul and Censor in the interval between the first and second Punic wars, and had been twice Prætor since Hannibal had entered Italy. Claudius was the same, who had commanded in Sicily before, and under, Marcellus. The Commonwealth had twenty-three legions on foot this year, that is, two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men.

A great

A great confusion was raised at Rome on the occasion of M. Postumius Pyrgensis a Publican, or Tax-farmer; who had not his fellow for avarice and fraud, except the Pomponius mentioned above. We have spoke before on the contract made by the Commonwealth with persons of business for supplying the armies in Spain with all necessary provisions; and we have seen, that one condition of that contract was, that the Commonwealth should stand to all the losses, that might happen by violent storms. This convention had made way for two kinds of knavery. They had given in false shipwrecks; and the true ones they had declared, had been purposely occasioned by themselves. For, having laden old ruinous vessels with merchandize of little value and small quantity, they had sunk them, after having saved the seamen in skiffs prepared for that purpose. They afterwards had given in false accounts of a great number of considerable effects lost.

The Prætor M. Atilius, being informed of this fraud, had declared it to the Senate the preceding year. But, as in the present conjuncture it was necessary to hold fair with the contractors, it was not judged proper to pass a decree against them. The People acted with more severity in respect to them. Spurius and Lucius Carvilius, two brothers, and Tribunes of the People, enraged at so hateful and infamous a malversation, accused Postumius, and carried their point so as to have him fined two hundred thousand Asses, that is, about five hundred pounds sterling. The day on which he was to appear to make his defence being come, he came before the People, assembled in so great a number, that the place of the Capitol was scarce big enough to contain them. His cause was pleaded. The People were so averse to him, that his only remaining hope was, that C. Servilius Casca, one of the Tribunes of the People, and his near relation, would oppose the conclusions of his colleagues, before the Tribes proceeded to vote. The witnesses having been heard, the Tribunes made the

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.
Liv. xxv.
3, 4.

Ducen-
tūm milli-
um æris
multam
dixerunt.

A. R. 540. multitude disperse ; and were going on to draw lots,
 Ant. C. to know which of the Tribes should vote first. In
 212. the mean time the accused pressed Casca to dismiss the
 assembly, by declaring in their favour, and opposing
 the proceedings of his colleagues. Casca was in great
 perplexity, divided between the fear of seeing his re-
 lation sentenced, and the shame of defending so bad
 a cause. The contractors seeing that they had little
 to hope from his protection, in order to excite some
 commotion, that might prevent the decision of this
 affair, advanced with their followers into the space,
 which had been left open by the withdrawing of the
 multitude, disputing highly against the Tribunes and
 the People themselves. They were upon the point
 of coming to blows, when the Consul addressing him-
 self to the Tribunes : “ Don’t you see,” said he,
 “ that they despise your authority ; that they treat you
 “ with violence ; and that, if you do not immediately
 “ dismiss the assembly, a sedition will break out.”

As soon as the People were retired by the order of
 the Tribunes, the Senate was assembled, to whom
 the Consuls represented the tumult, which the inso-
 lence of the Publicans had excited amongst the Peo-
 ple, in order to prevent them from voting. They ob-
 served, “ that Camillus, whose banishment had occa-
 sioned the ruin of the city, had suffered his country
 to pass an unjust sentence against him. That before
 him the Decemviri, by whose laws Rome was still ac-
 tually governed, and afterwards many other Romans,
 principal persons of the Commonwealth, had in like
 manner suffered with submission the judgments passed
 on them by the People. That none but Postumius
 had presumed to use violence in order to deprive his
 citizens of the liberty of their suffrages. That he
 had dissolved the assembly, trampled upon the autho-
 rity of the Tribunes, and attacked the People at the
 head of a seditious rout in a manner drawn up in
 battle. That if they had not proceeded to blows, if
 blood had not been shed, it was only owing to the
 moderation and patience of the magistrates, who had
 given

given way for the present to the presumption of a few frantic wretches, that were upon the point of putting every thing in a flame.”

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The persons of the greatest consideration having expressed themselves much in the same terms, and the Senate having declared by a decree, that the conduct of the Publicans, on this occasion, was a rebellious attempt against the public order, and of pernicious example, the Tribunes immediately dropped the pecuniary punishment, with which they would at first have been satisfied, and having formed new articles against the accused, that amounted to banishment, they in the mean time ordered the Lictor to seize the person of Postumius, and carry him to prison, if he did not give security for his appearance at the time and place assigned him. Postumius gave security, but did not appear on the day fixed: which made the People, on the motion of the Tribunes, decree, that if Postumius did not appear before the first of May, and having been cited, should neither appear himself, nor any body for him, he should be deemed from thenceforth as banished, his estate should be sold for the use of the Commonwealth, “and fire and water be prohibited him.” There was no law at Rome for condemning a citizen to banishment in express terms: but “to prohibit him fire and water,” without which life cannot be preserved, was actually to condemn him to banishment, by obliging him to seek that elsewhere, which he could not have in his country.

An exemplary punishment of this kind, repeated from time to time, would put a stop to many frauds and knaveries, which impunity continues and encourages in contempt of laws and public good.

After Postumius was sentenced, all who had any share in the tumult and sedition, were cited to appear and to give security for doing so; in consequence of which those who wanted bail were carried to prison. Most of them, to avoid this danger, went voluntarily into banishment. And this was the issue of the

A. R. 540. frauds of the contractors, and of the insolence of
 Ant. C. those who undertook to defend it.
 212.

Assemblies were afterwards held for the election of a Pontifex Maximus in the room of P. Cornelius Lentulus, who had died a little before. Three competitors stood for this office, and solicited it with great ardor, and vivacity: Q. Fulvius Flaccus, then Consul for the third time, and formerly Censor; T. Manlius Torquatus, who had also been twice Consul and Censor; and P. Licinius Crassus, who was upon the point of standing for the Curule Ædileship. The last, young as he was, carried it against his competitors, notwithstanding their advanced age, and the great offices they had borne. The reasons of this preference are not unworthy our curiosity. Perhaps there was no other but the caprice of the People. The person elected however merited the honour of such a choice, as we shall see in the sequel of this history. Crassus was the only one, in an hundred and twenty years, who had been created Pontifex Maximus before he had exercised any Curule offices.

The Consuls found great difficulties in compleating the levies. There was not sufficient number of youth to recruit the old legions, and form the new ones, that were to be set on foot. The Senate, without dispensing with their duty in that respect, created a double Triumvirate, and those commissioners had orders to go to all the towns and cities of Italy, one half of them within fifty miles round Rome, and the other beyond that distance, to enquire what number of youth each district could supply. They had orders to lift all that seemed strong enough to bear arms, though not of the age assigned by the laws. The Tribunes were desired, if they thought proper, to propose a law to the People, in virtue of which, those, who should lift before the age of seventeen, should be allowed their campaigns, in the same manner as if they had entered the service at seventeen or upwards. The Triumviri made the levies according to their commission.

The Romans had long apprehended the revolt of the Tarentines as much as Hannibal had room to hope it, when an event, that passed at Rome itself, hastened the execution of it. Phileas, a citizen of Tarentum, had long been at Rome under the character of an envoy. He was of a restless disposition, and suffered the repose with impatience in which he had long languished. He found means to get access to the hostages, whom the Tarentines had given to the Commonwealth, and who were kept in the temple of Liberty. No great care was taken to guard them; because it was neither for the interest of themselves or their country, to deceive the Romans. In frequent conversations that he had with them, he persuaded them to make their escape: and having corrupted two of those who kept the keys of the temple, at the close of day he took them out of their place of confinement and fled with them. As soon as day appeared, the noise of their escape spread in the city. Persons were immediately dispatched after them, who came up with them at Tarracina, fifteen or sixteen leagues from Rome, and brought them back. They were treated with the utmost rigor; and after having been scourged with rods in the Forum, were thrown down from the top of the Tarpeian rock. The Roman people, in so sudden and cruel a punishment, * consulted only their rage, and the desire of revenge, which are bad counsellors, and never hear reason. Reason acts slowly: it weighs and examines every thing: it leaves room for reflection and repentance: it never punishes without regret; and, when compelled to it, proportions the punishment to the crime. Anger is precipitate, violent, and unjust: it hearkens to nothing, and follows only the first impulse which passion inspires. The revolt of two powerful cities of

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

* Cupidine atque ira, pessimis consultoribus, grassari. SALLUST. in bell. JUGURTH.

Ira sibi indulget, ex libidine judicat, & audire non vult. Ratio utrique parti locum dat & tempus --- ut excutiendæ spatium veritati habeat. Ratio id judicari vult, quod æquum est: ira id æquum videri vult, quod judicavit. SENECA. de ira, l. 16.

A. R. 540. Italy made the Romans sensible, how wrong they were
 Ant. C. in proceeding to such a severity.

212.
 Liv. xxv.
 8---11.
 Polyb.
 viii. 529.
 &c.

So cruel a punishment exceedingly enraged the Tarentines. Many of the principal persons of the city formed a conspiracy for delivering it up to Hannibal. They were a great while concerting the measures necessary to the success of their design. The Carthaginians at length were received into the city in the night, whilst the Commander of the Roman garrison, called Livius, was full of wine and fast asleep. Most of the Romans escaped into the citadel. It was almost entirely surrounded with the sea like a peninsula; and the rest was covered with very high rocks, and inclosed with a wall and broad fosse on the side next the city. Hannibal rightly judged, that it would be impossible for him to make himself master of it by force, and by besieging it in form. In consequence, not to fall into the inconvenience, either of abandoning greater enterprizes by continuing there to defend the Tarentines, or of leaving them exposed to the hostilities of the Romans, he resolved to separate the city from the citadel by an intrenchment, which they should not be able to force. Great progress was made in the work in a very short time, especially after the Romans had made a salley upon the workmen, and been repulsed with considerable loss. The Carthaginians afterwards continued their works without opposition. They dug a broad and deep fosse, upon the side of which they raised a strong palisade. The citadel had been for some time attacked with machines and works of all kinds, when succours, that came by sea from Metapontum, gave them the boldness suddenly to attack the enemy's works in the night. Part of them they burnt, and destroyed the rest.

Hannibal having assembled the principal Tarentines, explained to them the difficulty of the enterprize. The citadel commanding the mouth of the port, left the sea open to those shut up in it; whereas the city could not receive provisions by sea, and the besiegers had more to fear from famine than the besieged

sieged themselves. He therefore made the Tarentines sensible, "That it was not possible to take a citadel so well fortified by assault: that it was no less difficult to take it by a regular siege, as long as the enemy were masters at sea. That if he had ships, with which he could prevent convoys from coming to them, he could soon reduce them either to abandon the place, or to surrender." The Tarentines agreed in all he said; but they did not see how they could make their galleys put to sea, whilst the enemy were masters of the entrance of the port, in which they kept them in a manner blocked up.

Hannibal had a great principle: which was, that * frequently, what was impossible to common men, was only difficult to those who knew how to employ perseverance and industry. He made use of his principle upon this occasion. By his order a great number of carts were got together, which were made fast to each other: machines were prepared for drawing ships out of the sea: the ways were made broader and more level, that the carriages might pass through them with the greater ease and speed: and a sufficient number of men and draught-beasts for such an undertaking, were provided. The high-street crossed the whole city, and ran from the port to the main sea at the other extremity. He caused the galleys to be drawn through it upon carriages. The work was began and carried on with so much zeal and ardor, that at the end of some few days a well equipped fleet was seen turning the point of the citadel, and anchoring at the very mouth of the port. Hannibal, after having put the affairs of the Tarentines into this condition, returned into his winter-quarters.

* Multa quæ impedita naturâ sunt, consilio expediuntur. Liv.

T H E
R O M A N H I S T O R Y.

B O O K T H E S E V E N T E E N T H.

S E C T. I.

Feriae Latinae. Time when the Consuls entered upon office. Origin of the games called *Ludi Apollinares*. The Consuls force Hanno's camp near Capua, whither he was carrying provisions. The people of Metapontum and Thurium surrender to Hannibal. The Consuls prepare to besiege Capua. Fulvius, Prætor of the Lucanians, betrays Gracchus his friend and guest. The Consuls receive a blow before Capua. Single combat between Crispinus a Roman, and Badius a Campanian. Battle between the Consuls and Hannibal with equal advantage. M. Centenius Penula defeated by Hannibal. Capua besieged in form. The siege is vigorously carried on by the two Pro-consuls. Hannibal comes to the relief of Capua, and retires after a rude battle. He marches against Rome, to make a diversion. The Pro-consul Fulvius receives orders to follow him with his troops for the defence of Rome. Great alarm amongst the People. Hannibal incamps near the Anio. Both sides prepare for a battle. A great storm prevents it two several times from being fought. Hannibal mortified by those two singular events, retires to the extremity of Brutium. Fulvius returns to Capua. Capua reduced to extremities. The garrison write to Hannibal, and reproach him warmly. Deliberation of the Senate of Capua. Eloquent discourse of Vibius Virius. Many Senators kill themselves. Capua surrenders at last. Terrible punishment

*punishment of the Senators and inhabitants. Death of
Taurea. Jubellius. Wisdom of the Roman People's con-
duct, in determining not to demolish Capua.*

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

A. R. 540.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

Ant. C.

212.

THE festival called Feriæ Latinæ kept the Con-
suls and Prætors at Rome till the twenty-sixth Liv. xxv.
12. of April. Having that day finished the usual sacri-
fices upon the Alban mountain, each set out for his
respective province.

I think I have already observed somewhere, that the Dion. Hal.
iv. 250. solemnity of the Feriæ Latinæ was instituted by Tar-
quinius Superbus. He established it to strengthen
the union between the Latines and Romans. Forty-
seven States shared in this festival. Their deputies
assembled annually upon a day fixed by the Consuls,
upon the Alban mountain in a temple consecrated to
Jupiter Latiaris, and offered a common sacrifice; this
was a bull, of which a piece was afterwards given to
each of the deputies. Every thing was equal amongst
them, except that the president was a Roman. The
festival at first continued but one day. A second was
added after the expulsion of the Kings: a third, when
the People who had retired to the sacred mountain,
returned to the city: and lastly, a fourth when the
disputes that arose in the time of Camillus between
the Senate and People concerning the Consulship,
were appeased. The Consul did not set out for the Plut. in
Camil. p.
151. field, or his province, till he had celebrated this fes-
tival.

The time, when the Consuls entered upon office
varied much. Not to speak of more ancient times,
when the variations were frequent enough, we find in
the 364th year of Rome, that the military Tribunes,
who supplied the place and had the authority of Con-
suls, enter upon office upon the Calends, that is to
say, upon the first of July. This custom seems to
have subsisted down to the Consuls M. Claudius Mar-
cellus,

A. R. 540. cellus, and Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who, according to
 Ant. C. the proofs alledged by Sigonius and Pighius, could
 212. not have entered upon office before the ides, or the
 15th of March in the 530th year of Rome, a little
 before the second Punic war. And this day is men-
 tioned in Livy, as that for entering upon the Consul-
 ship. Lib. xxii. n. 1. At length it was fixed for the
 Calends, that is to say, the first of January under the
 Consuls Fulvius Nobilior, and T. Annius Luscus, in
 the 599th year of Rome.

Liv. xxv. Upon the pretended predictions of a famous sooth-
 17. fayer, called Marcius, the games called Ludi Apol-
 linares, were instituted, and celebrated in the great
 Circus. The citizens wore crowns on their heads at
 these games: the Roman Ladies went to pray in all
 the temples: the citizens ate in public, each before
 his own door; and this day was solemnized with all
 the usual ceremonies of religion and great rejoicings.

Liv. xxv. Whilst Hannibal was in the neighbourhood of Ta-
 13, 14. rentum, the two Consuls were in Samnium, employed
 in making preparations for the siege of Capua. And
 though they had not yet invested that city, as they
 had prevented the inhabitants from sowing their lands,
 it already felt the effects of famine, which is com-
 monly only the consequence of a long siege. They
 therefore sent deputies to Hannibal, to desire him to
 cause corn to be carried from the adjacent places into
 Capua, before the Consuls took the field with the le-
 gions, and had made themselves masters of all the
 avenues. Hanno, whom Hannibal had ordered to
 do this, having hastily collected a great quantity of
 corn, gave the Campanians notice of the day when
 they should come and carry away those provisions;
 ordering them to assemble from all parts of the coun-
 try as many carriages and beasts of burthen as they
 possibly could. But the Campanians shewed on this
 occasion their usual sloth and negligence. They sent
 only about four hundred carts, with a small number
 of carriage beasts. Hanno reproved them in the
 strongest terms, and told them, that hunger, which
 rouses

rouzes the very brutes, was not capable of making them quit their natural stupefaction and indolence. He fixed another day for them to fetch away the rest of the provisions.

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Ant. C.
212.

The Consuls, who were at Bovianum, having been informed of this, Fulvius made his troops set out in the night. The Romans arrived a little before day at the enemies camp, in which they were informed trouble and confusion prevailed. They put it into such a terror and consternation, that if it had been situated in the flat country, it would inevitably have been taken on the first attack. The height of the ground, to which the ascent was steep on all sides, strengthened by the entrenchments which had been made, defended it. When it was day, a battle sufficiently obstinate ensued. The determinate valour of the Romans surmounted all obstacles. They got into the fossé and intrenchments in several places, which could not be effected without many soldiers being killed and wounded. The Consul, discouraged by that loss, conceived thoughts of quitting the enterprize. The officers and soldiers would not consent to it, and he was obliged to give into their cries and ardour. The Romans immediately renewed the attack with fresh courage, and threw themselves in emulation of each other into the enemies camp amidst a shower of darts discharged upon them from all sides. It was taken in a moment, as if it had been in a plain and without entrenchments. From that instant it was rather a slaughter than a battle. The Romans killed six thousand Carthaginians, took above seven thousand with the Campanian foragers, and all the carriages and beasts of burthen that they had brought with them. Besides which they took all the plunder Hanno had taken in the countries of the allies of the Roman People.

The two Consuls repaired to Beneventum, and sold or divided the booty. Those who had signalized themselves at the taking of the camp, were rewarded, Hanno, from Cominium, where he was employed in collecting

A. R. 540. collecting corn, and where he received advice of the
 Ant. C. defeat of his troops, fled into the country of the Brutii
 212. with a small number of foragers, whom he accidentally
 had along with him.

The Campanians, on their side, having been informed of the defeat of their countrymen and allies, sent deputies to acquaint Hannibal, "that the two Consuls were near Beneventum but one day's march from Capua: that in consequence, the Campanians were upon the point of seeing the enemy at their gates and before their walls. That if he did not speedily come to their aid, the Romans would make themselves master of Capua sooner and with more ease than they had taken Arpi. That he ought not to be entirely so engrossed, by the view of taking the citadel of Tarentum, as to neglect Capua, which he used to equal with Carthage, and abandon it without defence to the revenge of the Romans." Hannibal promised them that he should take care, that Capua should be safe. In the mean time, he sent with the deputies two thousand men, to prevent the ravages that the armies of the enemy committed upon the lands of the Campanians.

The Romans however, without neglecting their other affairs, took care to defend the citadel of Tarentum. They made some vessels laden with provisions enter the port, through the enemy. This supply came very opportunely, and revived the courage of the besieged. The garrison had been fortified some time, by the soldiers, that had been sent from Metapontum, and had entered the Citadel. Hannibal made a fleet sail from Sicily, to cut off their provisions. It did indeed shut up all the passages on the side next the sea: but by staying too long in the same place, it reduced its friends, still more than its enemies, to famine. At length the next year, the Carthaginian vessels sailed away, and their retreat gave the Tarentines more pleasure, than their arrival had done. But the benefit they received from it was little considerable, because

because as soon as the aid by sea was gone, provisions ceased to be brought into the city.

A. R. 540.

Ant. C.

212.

The People of Metapontum being no longer awed by the Roman garrison, which had been removed, as we have just said, into the citadel of Tarentum, immediately surrendered their city to Hannibal. Those of Thurium did the same, and what induced both to act in this manner, was the resentment they had conceived against the Romans for their cruel punishment of the hostages of Tarentum.

The Consuls marched their troops from Beneventum into the country of Campania, not only to destroy the corn, which was now well grown, but with design to besiege Capua. They were desirous to render their Consulship famous by taking so opulent a city, and to obliterate the shame and reproach which the Romans seemed to deserve for leaving the treachery and revolt of a People so near Rome so long unpunished. But not being willing to leave Beneventum, without defence, and being also desirous to strengthen themselves against Hannibal's cavalry, in case he came to the relief of Capua, they ordered Ti. Gracchus to march with his horse and light armed troops from Lucania to Beneventum, and to leave one of his Lieutenants at the head of his legions, to keep Lucania in awe.

Gracchus was preparing to execute the order of the Consuls when he was deprived both of the means and his life by treachery. The traitor's name was Flavius. He was the head of that part of the inhabitants of the country, that adhered to the Romans, whilst the rest had joined with Hannibal; and was then Prætor. This man having suddenly conceived the design of changing sides, believed, that in order to gain Hannibal's favour, it was not enough to offer him only his own person and party, if he did not seal the treaty, he desired to make, with the blood of his General and guest. He agreed upon the whole with Mago, and promised to bring Gracchus into a convenient place. After this conversation, the traitor went to

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

to Gracchus, and told him: "That he had projected an enterprize of the last importance, but that in order to its success, it was necessary that Gracchus himself should come into it. That he had persuaded the Prætors of all the Lucanian States, who, in this general emotion of almost all Italy, had declared for Hannibal, to return into the alliance and amity of the Romans. That he had given them to understand, that the fortune of the Commonwealth, which had been almost entirely ruined at the battle of Cannæ, daily resumed its superiority; whereas that of Hannibal insensibly declined, and his troops were almost reduced to nothing. That they might rely upon the clemency of the Romans, when they returned to them by a sincere repentance: that no nation was so easily induced, or so much inclined, to pardon injuries. That these were the reasons he had used for persuading them. That they had come into them: but that, for their better assurance, they would be very glad to hear them from Gracchus's own mouth, and to have his promise, in order to make report of it to their countrymen. He added, that he had appointed them a meeting in a by-place not far from the Roman camp. That if he would give himself the trouble to repair thither, the affair would soon be concluded, and by an happy treaty all Lucania would return to their obedience to the Romans."

Gracchus found so much probability in the scheme proposed to him, that without suspecting either the conduct of Flavius of infidelity, or his discourse of artifice, he set out from his camp with his Lictors, and a small number of horse, and threw himself into the ambuscade prepared for him by a perfidious friend. He was no sooner arrived there, than the enemy came out of their lurking places, and poured a shower of darts upon him and his attendants. Upon which that General leaped from his horse, and exhorted his people, as they had done so much, that they should at least make a glorious end. He told them, "That the only two things they had to chuse were, whether they had rather

rather suffer to be butchered like sheep without revenging themselves, or, by arming themselves with noble rage, and despising death now inevitable, to expire, covered with the blood of the enemy, upon the heaps of their arms and bodies sacrificed to their just vengeance. And that they should endeavour above all things to kill the traitor Flavius." Whilst he spoke to this effect, he covered his left arm with the end of his robe, (for they had not brought so much as shields along with them) and fell impetuously upon the enemy. Numbers prevailed over valour, and all fell with Gracchus. Mago immediately sent his body to Hannibal, and caused it to be set up before the tent of that General with the rods and axes, that care had been taken to bring off.

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The Consuls having entered the territory of Campania, began to plunder the flat country, and to lay waste the lands in the neighbourhood of Capua. The Campanians having made a sally upon them, seconded by Mago and the Carthaginian cavalry, put them into such a consternation, that they called in their troops, and retired in disorder with the loss of fifteen hundred men. This advantage filled the Campanians with such an haughty confidence, who were naturally proud and arrogant, that they continually harrassed the Romans: but the bad success of the battle in which they had rashly engaged, made the Consuls more vigilant and more upon their guard.

Liv. xxv.
18.

An event, inconsiderable in itself, did not a little contribute to abate the boldness of the Campanians, and to exalt the courage of the Romans; so true it is, that in war the least things have often great consequences. T. Quintius Crispinus a Roman was in union with Badius of Capua, both by the rights of hospitality, and a very strict friendship consequential of them. What had farther contributed to this amity was, that Badius had fallen sick at Quintius's house at Rome before his revolt at Capua, and had received from him all the kind offices, that could be expected from a good and generous friend. This Badius seeing the

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212.

the Roman troops incamped before the walls of Capua, advanced to the first guard, and with a loud voice demanded that Crispinus should be sent to him. The latter being told of it, believed, that Badius wanted to speak with him as an old friend, and went to him in a very pacifick disposition; remembering, notwithstanding the rupture between the two States, the personal and private tie between them. When Badius saw, that he was within hearing: "I challenge you to fight." said he to Crispinus, "Let us mount our horses, and shew whether you or I have most courage." Crispinus, who expected nothing so little, replied, "That they both had enemies enough, against whom they might make trial of their valour and strength. And as for me," added he, "if I should meet you by chance in battle, I should turn aside, that I might not imbrue my hands in the blood of my friend and guest;" and then was going back again to the camp. Badius, upon that, more proud than before, began to treat the moderation and politeness of Crispinus as meanness of spirit and cowardice; adding abundance of reproaches which he deserved himself. "You pretend, (said he) to be desirous of sparing my life, because you well know, that you cannot defend your own against me. But, if you believe that the war, which has dissolved the alliance between the two States, has not sufficiently abolished our private engagements; know, that Badius of Capua solemnly renounces all amity with Titus Crispinus the Roman: and I call to witness this declaration the soldiers of both armies, who hear me. I will no longer hold any thing in common with a man, who is come to attack my country, and household gods. If you have any courage, come and fight me."

Crispinus, little moved by these vain and frivolous unexpected insults, was long unwilling to accept the challenge; and it was only in effect of the warm and repeated instances of his comrades, who remonstrated to him, how shameful it was to suffer the Campanian

to insult him with impunity, that he did at last accept it. But first, knowing that all single combats were prohibited by the laws of war, he went to ask his Generals, whether they would permit him to fight an enemy that challenged him out of the line of battle : which they made no difficulty to grant.

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212.

Being then at liberty to act, he took his arms, mounted his horse, and calling Badius out by his name, he declared that he was ready to fight him. Badius came out immediately. They had no sooner clapt spurs to their horses, than Crispinus ran Badius above his shield through the left shoulder with his lance. That wound having made the Campanian fall from his horse, the Roman leaped off his, in order to dispatch him on foot. But Badius quitting both his horse and shield, fled and rejoined his own troops. Crispinus returned to the Romans with the horse and arms of his enemy ; and having shewn them those honourable spoils and his bloody lance, he was conducted in the midst of cries of joy and the applauses of all the troops to the tent of the Generals, who bestowed upon his valour the praises and rewards due to it.

Is there a single reader, in whom the relation I have just been giving, has not inspired a particular esteem and a kind of affection for the prudence and moderation of Crispinus, who respects, in an antient friend and guest, the name and obligations himself has renounced ; who patiently suffers himself to be reproached at the head of both armies with meanness of spirit and cowardice, with which military men usually are infinitely affected ; and who even in such a case does not believe it allowable for him to make use of his arms without the permission of his Generals ? On the other side, can we forbear detesting the savage brutality of Badius, who through a frantic desire of glory, forgets the strictest ties of nature ; ties, which form the greatest happiness of life ? But what then should we think of our modern duellists, who trampling under foot the laws of their country, and even the law of God, think themselves obliged, through a false point

A. R. 540. point of honour, unknown to all the Pagan world, to
 Ant. C. imbrue their hands in the blood of their best friend,
 212. for an unguarded word, that has perhaps escaped him
 at table, or in the company of familiar friends, with
 whom we talk without circumspection and reserve?
 To expose one's life for the defence of one's country
 and Prince, is an action of the highest generosity.
 But to brave death through a ridiculous vanity, and
 to fall in effect into the hands of an offended and om-
 nipotent God, is a folly, or rather so prodigious a
 phrenzy, that there is not a greater proof of the blind-
 ness of men, than their having been capable of annex-
 ing the idea of reputation to so absurd and senseless an
 action.

Liv. xxv. Hannibal in the mean time came to the aid of
 19. Capua, and having advanced very near that city, the
 third day after he drew out his troops in battle, well
 assured, that the Romans, overcome some days before
 by the Campanians, would find it much more difficult
 to sustain him and his victorious army. In the begin-
 ning of the battle, the Roman army, overwhelmed
 with the darts discharged upon them by the enemy's
 cavalry, began to give way, when the Consuls, having
 ordered theirs to charge the enemy, reduced the whole
 action to a battle of the horse. Things were in this
 state, when the army of Sempronius, under the com-
 mand of the Quæstor Cn. Cornelius, having been
 perceived afar off, made both sides believe, that they
 were going to have some new enemy upon their hands.
 In consequence, the two armies, as if by consent, re-
 treated, and returned into their respective camps,
 without any advantage of either side.

The following night, the Consuls, to oblige Han-
 nibal to remove from Capua, marched each a different
 way, Fulvius towards Cumæ, and Appius into Lu-
 cania. The next day, Hannibal being informed, that
 the Consuls had abandoned their camp, and were re-
 tired different ways, after having been uncertain how
 to act for some time, he determined at length to fol-
 low Appius. That General made him march and
 countermarch

countermarch a great many different ways, and then stealing a march upon him, returned to Capua by a different route.

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Ant. C.
212.

Hannibal made himself amends by the occasion he had in this place of gaining an advantage over a considerable body of Roman troops. M. Centenius, surnamed Penula, an old and highly esteemed Centurion, who had quitted the service, desired an audience of the Senate, and asked the command of five thousand men. He promised, that as he perfectly knew both the enemy and the country, where the war was carrying on, he should not be long without rendering the Commonwealth some important service. He added, that he should use against Hannibal the same arts and stratagems he had hitherto employed to ensnare the Roman General and armies. This * promise was believed as slightly, as it had been rashly made: as if there was no difference between the merit of a private Officer, and the talents of a General. Instead of giving him five thousand men, they granted him eight thousand; and many having voluntarily joined him on his march, he arrived in Lucania, with double the forces he had on setting out from Rome. Here he found Hannibal, who had halted after having ineffectually pursued Appius. As soon as the two armies came in view, they expressed the same ardor for coming to blows. The match was not equal. On the one side, Hannibal commanded: on the other, a Centurion: on the one side veteran troops, who counted their campaigns by their victories; on the other raw soldiers, raised in haste and badly armed. However, notwithstanding so great an inequality, the battle continued above two hours, the Romans making extraordinary efforts of valour, as long as Centenius was at their head. But, as he exposed himself without reserve to the darts of the enemy, not only to sustain the reputation he had acquired by his past actions, but to avoid the disgrace he should incur for the future, if he survived a defeat which could only be imputed to

* Id non promissum magis stolidè, quam stolidè creditum, tanquam eodem militaris, & imperatoriae artes essent. Liv.

A. R. 540. his own rashness; he soon found the death he desired,
 Ant. C. and the Romans immediately gave way. Hannibal
 212. knew so well how to shut them up on all sides with
 his cavalry, that of so great a multitude scarce a thou-
 sand escaped, all the rest perished either in the battle
 or flight.

A. R. 541.
 Ant. C.
 211.

Cn. FULVIUS CENTUMALUS.

P. SULPICIUS GALBA.

It was properly speaking this year, that the siege of Capua was carried on by the Romans with an ardor, or rather with a fury, that has few examples. The better to conceive the motives that animated the Romans in this enterprize, we must remember the manner, in which the Campanians, who had been antient allies of Rome, had acted in respect to them. The first defeats of the Romans by Hannibal had already much shaken their fidelity; when the blow received at Cannæ entirely put an end to it. They believed the power of the Romans entirely and irretrievably ruined by the loss of that battle. Flattered with a foolish hope of succeeding them in the Empire of Italy, they went over to Hannibal: and not contented with abandoning their antient allies in their misfortunes, they added cruelty to perfidy, and inhumanly put all the Romans in their city to death. Their example was in a manner the signal of revolt for most of the other States of Italy, who in like manner quitted the Romans, and joined the victor.

It is easy to judge the resentment, which the Romans conceived for a treachery so black in all its circumstances, and of which the consequences had been so fatal to them. Accordingly, as soon as they saw themselves a little reinstated in their affairs, they determined to besiege Capua, and not to quit it, till they had made themselves masters, and taken ample vengeance of it.

Liv. xxiv.
 4.

Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Ap. Claudius Pulcher had begun the siege during their Consulship, and the com-
 mand

mand had been continued to them under the title of Proconsuls, in order to terminate this important war. Besides the public interest, their glory was concerned in it, and they used all possible efforts to bring it to a speedy and happy end. The besieged on their side, who had continually before their eyes their inhuman treatment of the Romans, and what they ought to expect in their turn, defended themselves with courage, supported by a strong Carthaginian garrison, which Hannibal had left in their city under the command of Bostar and Hanno. They made frequent and vigorous sallies; in which, though much inferior in the actions of the foot, they had almost always the advantage with their cavalry, which was the weak side of the Romans. The latter, suffering with pain an inequality they could not disguise, conceived a means for partly remedying it. They chose out of the legions active and light-bodied men, whom they accustomed to mount behind the horse, and to dismount on the first signal. They gave them shorter shields than the horse, and to each seven javelins four feet long, with such fine and thin points, that they bent and lost their edges very easily; so that after being once discharged, they neither could be of use to the enemy, nor be returned against those who had used them first. When they came to blows with the enemy's cavalry, these light-armed troops leaping suddenly from their horses, discharged all their javelins one after another upon the cavalry of Capua; so that a body which seemed to be all horse, gave birth, to use the expression, on a sudden to an infantry, the Campanians did not expect. This unforeseen attack put the enemy into confusion; and the Roman cavalry compleated their disorder, and pursued them quite to the gates of the city.

Capua began to be reduced to extremities, and famine to be felt very sensibly in it. The common people and the slaves were absolutely in want of bread. Hannibal was actually employed in finding means to reduce the citadel of Tarentum, (for he was in possession of the city) when he received a courier

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

from Capua, which informed him, that the Campanians could hold out no longer against the Romans, if he did not come to their aid. * The desire of taking the citadel of Tarentum kept Hannibal some time in suspense: but at length the interest of Capua prevailed. He saw all the States of Italy, as well allies as enemies, were intent upon this, as upon a lesson, by which they were to judge the event, good or bad, with which the revolt of their own citizens would be attended. Having therefore left a great part of his baggage in the country of the Bruttii, and the main body of his heavy-armed troops, he took with him only the flower of his infantry and cavalry, which was in a condition to move with great diligence, and advanced by great marches to Capua. He however ordered thirty-three elephants to follow him.

When Hannibal arrived near Tifata, he halted on an eminence, that commanded Capua. From thence he gave the besieged notice of his arrival, and directed them to make a general sally at all the gates at the same time, that he should attack the Roman camp. The battle was rude: and even the lines were partly forced at first, and the Proconsul Appius dangerously wounded. But the Romans defended themselves with so much vigour, that at length both Hannibal and the Campanians were repulsed. This action according to some authors, cost them very dear.

Liv. xxvi.
7.

The Carthaginian General, seeing he could neither reduce the Romans to another battle, nor force their lines in order to enter the city, did not persist in an enterprize that he saw impracticable. He however did not yet abandon the care of Capua; and in order to deliver it, he formed a design worthy of his valour. To make a powerful diversion, he marched suddenly towards Rome. He did not despair of taking some

* Cum in hoc statu ad Capuam res essent. Annibalem diversum Tarentinæ arcis potiundæ Capuæque retinendæ trahebant curæ. Vicit tamen respectus Capuæ, in quam omnium sociorum hostiumque videbat animos, documento futuræ qualem cumque eventum defectio ob Romanis habuisset. Liv.

part of the city at the first surprize ; and at all events he flattered himself, that the danger of the Capital would oblige the Roman Generals to raise the siege of Capua, in order to fly with their troops to the aid of their country. Or lastly, he conceived that if, in order to continue the siege, they should divide their troops, their weakness might give either the besieged or himself some occasion of beating them.

A.R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

Only one thing gave him pain ; which was, lest the Campanians, losing all hope when they should see him remove, should surrender to the Romans. To obviate this inconvenience, he engaged a Numidian by great presents to charge himself with a letter, and to repair to the Roman camp as a deserter, and from thence to enter Capua. The letter to the Campanians was to the following effect : “ That he had chosen to retire and march towards Rome, only for their good, and to reduce the Romans to raise the siege from the necessity they would be in of aiding their country. That they should not lose courage ; and that some days patience would place them in perpetual security and repose.” He took with him provisions only for ten days ; and having caused a great number of barks to be got ready, he made his army pass the Volturnus in the night.

As soon as it was known at Rome, that Hannibal was upon his march, the Senate assembled immediately. A Senator, named P. Cornelius Asina, was for having all the Generals with their armies recalled from all parts of Italy, for the defence of Rome. Fabius, who was no less intrepid in great dangers, than circumspect to prevent them, opposed this motion strongly. “ He represented, that it would be shameful to quit Capua, and to take the alarm on the least motions of Hannibal. That it was utterly improbable, that a General, who had not dared to appear before Rome, after the victory he had gained at Cannæ, should flatter himself with taking it, after having been repulsed before Capua. That his design was not to besiege Rome, but to deliver the place

Liv. xxvi.
8.

A.R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

actually besieged. And that as for him, he believed that the troops in Rome sufficed for its defence." A third opinion, which was a medium between the other two, proposed by P. Valerius Flaccus, carried the question. This was to make Fulvius come to Rome with a part of the troops, that were before Capua, whilst his Collegue, with the rest of the army, should continue the siege. As soon as the Senate's orders arrived in the camp, Fulvius set out with the chosen troops of the three armies, which amounted to fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse. He knew that Hannibal had taken his route through the Latine way, and he took his through the Appian, after having sent orders to all the municipal cities on his march or in the neighbourhood, to have provisions in readiness for him. The soldiers, full of chearfulness and courage, exhorted each other to double their pace, by putting one another in mind, that they were going to defend their common country.

In the mean time Hannibal approached, and the consternation augmented in the city according to the different rumours that were spread, often without foundation, and always beyond truth. The Roman ladies filled all the temples, and bathed in tears, prostrating themselves before the altars, and lifting up their hands to heaven, implored the aid of the Gods. The Senators all placed themselves around the Magistrates in the Forum, to be in continual readiness to assist them with their counsels on any unforeseen events that might happen every moment. Those, who were capable of serving in person, came and offered themselves to the Consuls. The troops were distributed at the gates, around the walls, in the Capitol, in the citadel, and even without Rome upon the Alban mountain, and upon the eminence of Æsula, near Tibur (Tivoli).

In the midst of this general emotion arrived the Proconsul Fulvius. It was the custom for the Proconsuls to lose their authority and right to command the moment they set foot within the city. To dispense
with

with this law in respect to Fulvius, the Senate conferred upon him equal authority with the Consuls. He entered with his army through the gate Capena, crossed the quarters Carinæ and Esquilæ, and encamped between the gates Esquilina and Collina. His presence a little revived the city's courage.

At the same time, Hannibal incamped near the Anio, about three miles from the city. From thence he advanced with two thousand horse from the gate Collina to the temple of Hercules, and going on all sides he examined the walls and situation of the city as near as he could. Flaccus considered his daring to ride about so quietly in the sight of, and so near Rome, as an insult, and sent out a detachment of cavalry to drive him from the walls, and to make him return to his camp. As an action ensued between these two bodies of horse, the Consuls made twelve hundred Numidian deserters, who were upon the Aventine hill, cross the city, judging them the best troops for fighting in the midst of hollow ways, gardens, and sepulchres. The common People believed then, that these Numidians were a part of the enemy who had seized the Aventine hill. The alarm was so great, that if the camp of the Carthaginians had not been without the city not far off, the People would have abandoned it directly. The fear of Hannibal stopped them. Each of them retired into his own house, and from the roofs began to throw stones at the Numidian deserters, believing them the enemy. The tumult could not be appeased, nor the People undeceived by discovering the error to them, because the streets were full of the inhabitants of the country, who in the sudden terror into which the first rumour of Hannibal's approach had thrown them, had taken refuge there in multitudes with all their cattle. Happily the Romans had the advantage in the engagement between the cavalry, and obliged the enemy to retire. As every moment tumults arose in different parts of the city, the Senate for the more immediately remedying them gave authority and right to command,

A. R. 541. to all who had been either Dictators, Consuls, or Cen-
 Ant. C. fors. The rest of the day, and the night following
 211. were extremely tumultuous.

Liv. xxvi. The next day Hannibal having passed the Anio, offered the Romans battle. The Consuls and Fulvius did not decline it. Both sides prepared to do their duty well in an action, of which Rome was to be the prize; when a violent storm, with rain and hail, distressed both armies to such a degree, that the soldiers finding it next to impossible to keep under arms, and thinking of nothing so little as the enemy, retired hastily into their several camps. They had scarce re-entered them, than the weather became fine and serene. The same thing having happened the next day, Hannibal believed, that there was something supernatural in the event; and according to Livy, * cried out, that the Gods had “deprived him sometimes of the will, and sometimes of the power of taking Rome.” It was a general opinion amongst the Romans and their enemies, that Providence was in a peculiar manner intent upon the preservation of Rome: nor were they mistaken.

Two things highly mortified Hannibal. The first was his being informed, that at the very time he was incamped at one of the gates of Rome, recruits had been sent out at another for the army in Spain. The second, though not so important in itself, was still more offensive to him; which was, that the very ground on which he was incamped, had just been sold at Rome, without any abatement of the price. This last stroke affected him much, and he was so enraged, that there should be any one so bold at Rome as to buy land actually occupied by his army, that he also caused the goldsmiths shops round the Forum of Rome to be sold by auction.

After this bravado, Hannibal set out, and marched to the extremity of Bruttium in Italy, renouncing

* Audita vox Annibalis fertur, Potiundæ sibi urbis Romæ modò mentem non dari, modò fortunam.

the hope of saving Capua. Fulvius immediately returned to join his colleague, in order to compleat the enterprize, of which the success was now certain.

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Capua was then abandoned to itself, and destitute of all resources. The Campanians then felt all the evils into which they had plunged themselves in renouncing the amity of the Romans. They at that moment saw all the horror of their guilt, and were from thenceforth solely engrossed by that object. The Pro-consul, in consequence of a decree of the Senate, caused a proclamation to be made, by which a general pardon was granted for all such citizens of Capua as should go over to the Romans before a certain day. This was made known in the city: however, none took the benefit of so favourable, and so little merited, an amnesty. Solely engrossed, as I have already said, by the blackness of their treachery, and the horrid barbarity with which it was attended, they could not persuade themselves, that the offer made them was sincere and real, nor that so great a crime could ever be pardoned.

The city was now without counsel, as well as resource. The nobility had absolutely abandoned the care of affairs. None of the principal citizens appeared in public. The Senators, seeing their city not in a condition to resist the Romans, had shut themselves up in their houses, in expectation of certain death, and the ruin of their country. All power was in the hands of Hanno and Bostar, commanders of the Carthaginian garrison. The latter, more anxious for themselves than their allies, wrote to Hannibal, not only with great liberty, but with warm reproaches. "They complained, that he had not only abandoned Capua to the enemy, but delivered up themselves and the whole garrison to the most cruel punishments. That he had retired into Bruttium, as if to hide himself, and not to see the fate of Capua. That the Romans set him a quite different example. That the siege of Rome itself could not force them to quit that of Capua: so much more constancy did the Romans shew
in

A.R. 541. in respect to their enemies, than Hannibal in favour
 Ant. C. of his allies. That if he returned to Capua, and turned
 211. his whole forces on that side, themselves and the Campanians were ready to make a sally, determined either to conquer, or to perish. That the Carthaginians had not passed the Alps to make war upon the people of Rhegium and Tarentum. That wherever the Roman legions were, the armies of Carthage ought to be. That it was thus the successes at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ, had been acquired, that is, by seeking, attacking, and forcing the enemy to come to blows."

The Carthaginian commanders had intrusted this letter to some well-inclined Numidians, who, for the sake of a reward, went over to the camp of Flaccus as deserters. They were discovered, and upon being tortured, besides confessing the letter in question, they declared that there were many other Numidians in the Roman camp, who like themselves had fled thither under the appearance of deserters, but who in reality were spies. More than seventy were seized; and after having been scourged with rods, with those who had been lately taken, and had their hands cut off, they were all sent back to Capua.

Liv. xxvi. The People were in a consternation at the sight of
 13. these wretches, and by their cries and menaces forced the Senators to assemble, in order to deliberate upon what it was necessary to do in the present situation. The prevailing opinion was to send deputies to the Roman Generals, to endeavour to move them by their submission.

But Vibius Virius, who had been one of the principal authors of the revolt, when it came to his turn to speak, expressed himself to a quite different effect. "Those, (said he) who propose sending deputies to the Romans to treat of peace and to surrender to them, must hardly have reflected either upon what they would have done themselves, if they had been victorious over the enemy, or upon the treatment they are now to expect. How! do you then
 " hope

“ hope to be received in the present conjuncture, as
 “ you were heretofore, when, to obtain their protec-
 “ tion against the Samnites, we put ourselves, our
 “ children, our all into their hands. Have you al-
 “ ready forgot at what time, and in what circum-
 “ stances, we renounced the alliance of the Romans?
 “ How, instead of dismissing their garrison, we put
 “ them to death, by the most ignominious punish-
 “ ments and torments? How many times, and with
 “ what fury, we have sallied upon them and attacked
 “ their camp? How we called in Hannibal to de-
 “ stroy them? And which has but just passed, how
 “ we made him set out from hence to besiege Rome?
 “ Examine now what their hatred for you has made
 “ them undertake, that you may judge from thence,
 “ what you are to hope from them. Seeing Italy ac-
 “ tually a prey to a stranger; obliged to sustain the
 “ attacks of an enemy, come from the remotest parts
 “ of the universe, in the very heart of their domi-
 “ nions, and such an enemy as Hannibal, the Ro-
 “ mans quit every thing, quit even Hannibal him-
 “ self, to send the two Consuls with two Consular
 “ armies to besiege Capua. It is now almost two
 “ years, that they have kept us closely shut up on all
 “ sides; they are fiercely determined to subdue us
 “ by famine; suffering exceedingly themselves, and
 “ exposing themselves to the utmost dangers, and the
 “ rudest fatigues, often cut to pieces around their
 “ intrenchments, and lastly, almost entirely stormed
 “ in their camp. But I do not stop at all this: it is a
 “ common thing to suffer fatigues and dangers, when
 “ the city of an enemy is attacked. We have still
 “ more sensible marks of their implacable wrath and
 “ hatred. Hannibal, with numerous bodies of horse
 “ and foot, attacked their camp, and took part of it;
 “ so great a danger made no change in them. He passed
 “ the Vulturnus, and burnt the country of Cales: they
 “ saw the ruin of the lands of their allies unmoved.
 “ He marched his troops against Rome itself: so
 “ dreadful a storm, that raged so near their home,
 “ did

A. R. 541.
 Ant. C.
 211.

A. R. 541. " did not alter them. At length he passed the Anio,
 Ant. C. " incamped three miles from their capital; approach-
 211. " ed their very walls, and was upon the point of de-
 " priving them even of Rome itself, if they did not
 " abandon Capua. They still persevered. Was ever
 " fury so obstinate? The wildest fiercest beast will
 " quit its prey, if its young ones are attacked in its
 " den. But nothing can force the Romans from Ca-
 " pua; neither Rome besieged; the cries and groans
 " of their wives and children, which might in a
 " manner be heard hither, their altars, temples,
 " household-Gods, nor tombs of their ancestors pro-
 " faned, and destroyed; so determined are they to
 " punish us, and so much do they thirst after our
 " blood! And we ought not to be surprized at this;
 " for we had done as much, had fortune put it in
 " our power."

We have here a truth placed in its full light, and I do not know a more perfect model of eloquence in this kind: but the most difficult part of his design remains to be brought about: this was to make his hearers determine to kill themselves: he therefore continued, and concluded his discourse as follows.

" For this reason, as the Gods have so determined,
 " not having it in my power to avoid death, at least,
 " whilst I am free and master of my fate, I will, by
 " an honourable and easy death, spare myself the tor-
 " ments and ignominy the enemy flatter themselves
 " with inflicting upon me. No; * I will not see the
 " haughty

* Non videbo Ap. Claudium & Q. Fulvium victoria insolenti subnixos, neque vinctus per urbem Romam triumphî spectaculum trahar, ut deinde in carcere, aut ad palum deligatus, lacerato vergis tergo, cervicem securi Romanæ subjiciam: nec dirui incendique patriam videbo, nec rapi ad stuprum matres Campanas, virginesque, & ingenuos pueros. Albam, unde ipsi oriundi erant, à fundamentis prouerunt, ne stirpis, ne memoria originum suarum extaret: nedum eos Capuæ parafuros credam, cui infestiores quàm Carthagini sunt. Itaque quibus vestrum antè fato cedere, quàm hæc tot tam acerba videant, in animo est, iis apud me hodie epulæ instructæ paratæque sunt. Satiatis vino ciboque poculum idem, quod mihi datum fuerit, circumferetur. Ea potio corpus ab cruciatu, animum à contumeliis; oculos, aures, à videndis audiendisque omnibus acerbis indignisque, quæ manent

“ haughty victors insult my misery. I will not see
 “ myself a captive, laden with chains, dragged A.R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.
 “ through the streets of Rome as an ornament of my
 “ enemy’s triumph, then thrown into an hideous
 “ dungeon, or fastened to a stake, and cruelly scourged
 “ with rods, to end by a Roman ax. I will not see
 “ my country destroyed and in flames; nor the help-
 “ lessness of sex and age abandoned to the brutality
 “ and fury of the soldiers. They have destroyed the
 “ city of Alba, from whence they sprung, to the very
 “ foundations, that there may be no trace, no remem-
 “ brance of their first origin: judge, after this, whe-
 “ ther they will spare Capua, to which they are
 “ greater enemies than to Carthage itself. Those
 “ therefore amongst you who chuse rather to comply
 “ with their hard fate, than to experience such mis-
 “ fortunes, may find at my house an entertainment I
 “ have prepared for them. When our senses are
 “ bound up and suspended by wine and meats, I will
 “ order all my guests to be served with the same bowl,
 “ myself shall drink of the first. This cup shall pre-
 “ serve our bodies from torments; and our minds
 “ and courage from affronts and indignities: it shall
 “ spare our eyes and ears the cruel necessity of seeing
 “ and hearing all the injuries that are the portion
 “ of the conquered. A great fire shall be kindled
 “ in my court-yard, into which our bodies shall be
 “ thrown by those I have appointed to do us that last
 “ office. This is the only honourable method we
 “ now have to quit life. Our enemies themselves will
 “ admire our courage; and Hannibal know, he has
 “ abandoned and betrayed generous allies, that de-
 “ served to have been treated by him with more fide-
 “ lity.”

Amongst those who heard this discourse, there were Liv. xxvi.
 more that approved than had courage enough to put 14.

manent victos, vindicabit. Parati erunt, qui magno rogo in propa-
 tulo ædium accenso corpora exanima injiciant. Hæc una via & ho-
 nestæ & libera ad mortem. Et ipsi virtutem mirabuntur hostes, &
 Annibal fortes socios sciet ab se desertos ac proditos esse. Liv.

A. R. 541. it in execution. Most of the Senators, not despairing
 Ant. C. of obtaining pardon from the clemency of the Ro-
 211. mans, were for surrendering, and actually sent depu-
 ties to them. About twenty-seven of them however
 went with Vibius Virius to that fatal banquet. Whilst
 they were at table, they endeavoured to forget by
 wine and good cheer their cruel situation. At the
 end of the feast, they all took the poison; and then
 having embraced each other for the last time, and de-
 plored their own and their country's fate, they sepa-
 rated. Some stayed behind to be burnt in one com-
 mon funeral pile: others retired to their own houses.
 The quantity of wine and victuals, which they had
 taken, prevented the immediate effect of the poison.
 However they all died, before the Romans entered
 the city.

Liv. xxvi. The next day the gate called Jupiter's gate, which
 14. fronted the Roman camp, was opened by order of C.
 Fulvius Lieutenant-general. A Roman legion with
 a body of the allies entered the city under the com-
 mand of C. Fulvius the Lieutenant. The first thing
 he did was to order all the arms in Capua to be brought
 in. He posted guards upon all the gates of the city,
 to prevent any body from going out. He seized the
 Carthaginian garrison, and ordered the Senators to re-
 pair to the Roman Generals in their camp. When
 they came there, they were all put in irons, and were
 commanded to send all the gold and silver they had
 in their houses to the Quæstors. The gold amount-
 ed in weight to seventy pounds, which is about 2600
 or 2700 pounds of our money; and the silver to three
 thousand two hundred pounds in weight, about twelve
 thousand five hundred pounds sterling. Twenty-five
 Senators were put under a strict guard at Cales, and
 twenty-eight at Teanum: these were those who
 were known to have contributed most to the revolt of
 Capua from the Romans.

Liv. xxvi. Fulvius and Appius did not agree concerning the
 15. treatment of the Senators of Capua. The latter in-
 clined to lenity, the other to severity in excess. Ap-
 pius

pius was for having the affair left to the decision of the Roman Senate; and he added, that it was proper to enquire whether some municipal cities, or of the country of the Latines, had not entered into the conspiracy with Capua, and given its aid. As to this last article, Fulvius represented warmly, “that they ought to be far from thinking of any such thing: that it was to disturb faithful allies by doubtful accusations, and to make their fate depend on witnesses unworthy of belief, who had never known any rule but their passions or caprice either in their discourse or actions.” Appius, how strongly soever his Colleague spoke, persisted in being of opinion, that in an affair of that importance it was undoubtedly necessary to wait orders from Rome. He was mistaken. In the evening Fulvius commanded the principal officers to have two thousand chosen horse in readiness against midnight. With this detachment he set out in the night, and arrived early in the morning at Teanum. The People there were astonished to see him at that time. He repaired directly to the Forum, whither a great multitude of the inhabitants followed immediately. He there commanded the Magistrate to bring out the Campanians he had in his custody; and after having caused them to be scourged with rods, he ordered their heads to be struck off. From thence he proceeded on the spur to Cales, with the same detachment, in order to perform the like execution. He had already ascended his tribunal, and the Campanians were fastened to the stake, when a courier was seen to arrive in haste, who delivered a letter to Fulvius from the Prætor Calpurnius, and a Decree of the Senate. The joy of the place was universal upon the rumour, that the Senate reserved the cognizance of this affair to itself. Fulvius, who suspected it, caused the Campanians to be executed, before he opened the letter and decree. He then read the dispatches. The contents could not prevent what was passed, and of which the Proconsul had only hastened the execution to be beforehand with any obstacles.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

When

A. R. 541. When Fulvius rose in order to depart from thence,
 Ant. C. Taurea Jubellius of Capua, breaking through the
 211. croud, called to him by his name. That Magistrate
 Liv. xxvi. having resumed his place in great surprize, in order to
 15. know what he would have of him: "Command
 " also, (said he to him,) that somebody may cut my
 " throat, that thou mayest boast of having butchered a
 " braver man than thyself." As Fulvius only answered,
 " that the man had certainly lost his senses, and that
 his hands were besides tied up by a decree of the Se-
 nate," Jubellius resumed. " As (said he) after hav-
 " ing lost my country, relations, friends; after hav-
 " ing killed my wife and children with my own hand
 " to preserve them from the vile treatment they were
 " to expect: As I say, I cannot perish by the same
 " kind of death as my countrymen, whom I see here
 " before my eyes, let my courage be my refuge, and
 " deliver me from a miserable life I can suffer no
 " longer." Having spoke thus he stabbed himself,
 with a dagger he had concealed under his cloaths.

Some Authors tell all that has just been related
 otherwise, and observe particularly, that Fulvius had
 read the decree before the execution of the Campa-
 nians, and that he put them to death only in effect of
 the tacit permission given him by these terms of the
 decree: " That he should leave the cognizance of this
 affair to the Senate, IF HE JUDGED IT PROPER." And indeed is it probable, that a Magistrate should
 presume to insult the Senate in such a manner, by not
 opening its orders, till it was out of his power to put
 them in execution?

After the Proconsul was returned from Cales to
 Capua, Atella and Calatia surrendered to the Romans:
 those of the Senators who had induced their country-
 men to embrace the party of Hannibal, were punished
 there likewise with death. Accordingly, fourscore in
 all of the principal Senators had their heads cut off:
 more than three hundred Campanians were confined
 in the prisons, where they perished miserably: the rest
 of the citizens were either dispersed or sold. As to
 the

the city of Capua itself, however great and just the anger of the Romans was, reasons of interest prevailed over the desire of revenge. Instead of demolishing it, it was thought better to annex it, with its territory, the finest and most fertile of all Italy, to the Roman dominions. But it was deprived of all privileges, and of every thing that constitutes a free city. It was reduced to have neither Senate, nor Magistrates; and a Præfect was sent thither every year to administer justice in the name of the Roman People.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

Scarce any event more considerable, or more glorious for the Roman People, than the siege and taking of Capua, passed during the second Punick war. It was that city, which, after the battle of Cannæ, had, as I have already said, flung up the standard of rebellion, and drawn after it most of the allies of Rome. For that reason, it must have been infinitely dear to Hannibal, and odious to the Romans: Both which it was in effect. It is this city they attack, and make themselves masters of in the presence and before the eyes of that formidable enemy, who has the shame and mortification to see it taken from him, notwithstanding all the efforts he made to save it. We have seen with what amazing courage, and obstinate perseverance, the Romans acted during this siege. After it was over, they shewed no less wisdom and prudence in their manner of deciding the fate of that important conquest. This is an object well worth being considered at a nearer view, and with some care: Cicero will be principally my guide in this respect.

The manner in which it was proper to treat Capua, was much and long deliberated. Some Senators judged that it was absolutely proper entirely to demolish a powerful neighbouring city, at enmity with, and which had shewn an implacable hatred for Rome. * Every

Cic. deleg.
Agrar. ad
pop. n. 95.

* Campani semper superbi bonitate agrorum, & fructuum magnitudine, urbis salubritate, descriptione, pulchritudine. Ex hac copia atque omnium rerum affluentia, primum illa nata sunt; arrogantia, quæ à majoribus nostris alterum Capua Consulem postulavit: deinde ea luxuries, quæ ipsum Annibalem, armis etiam tum invictum, voluptate vicit. Cic.

A. R. 541. thing there seemed dangerous: the fertility of the
 Ant. C. lands, the abundance of all kinds of grain and fruits,
 211. the good situation of the city, the fineness and salubrity of the air, the beauty and conveniency of the buildings, the affluence of all kinds of riches, and of all things ministering to pleasure and luxury: fatal advantages, mortal baits, that had corrupted all the inhabitants from the first, and had inspired them with such arrogance, as to demand to share the Consulship with Rome, and had nurtured that luxury, which, with voluptuousness, had overcome Hannibal, till then invincible to the Roman arms. Now could a city, that was the cause of all these evils, to which it might one day give birth again, be suffered to subsist?

Ibid. n. 88. The majority of the Senators were determined by other views, and found a wise medium proper to conciliate every thing. "Our ancestors, says Cicero, judged, that if they deprived the Campanians of their lands, magistrates, senate, assemblies, and left them no image, nor trace, of a State, they should have nothing farther to fear from them. They resolved therefore not to destroy either the houses or the walls of Capua, but to make it in some measure the granary of Rome, by leaving none in it but husbandmen, who should there lay up their plows and other instruments for cultivating the land, and carry thither their harvests as to a place of safety." The Romans afterwards did not treat either Corinth or Carthage in this manner; but believed themselves obliged entirely to demolish both to their foundations: because had they only deprived those cities of their lands, senate, and magistrates; ill-designing people might have made settlements, and cantoned themselves in them, before Rome, in effect of the remoteness, could be informed of it, or at least provided against it. Nothing of this kind was to be feared from Capua, situated in the neighbourhood of Rome, and in a manner in the sight of the Senate and People. Accordingly, in all future wars, whether in Italy or abroad, Capua never

gave Rome the least umbrage; but was always a great support to it. A. R. 541.
Ant. C.

And how could any sedition arise there? There was no longer any Assembly, either of the People, in which seditious discourses might be held, or of the Senate, in which deliberations contrary to the repose of Italy might pass: there were no magistrates who by the abuse of their authority might excite public complaints. All ambition, all discord was extinct, because there was no offices to solicit, nor any honours to be disputed with each other. * “Thus our ancestors (it is still Cicero that speaks) by their great wisdom found means to reduce the Campanian arrogance, and turbulent pride, to tranquility and entire inaction. Thereby, they avoided the odious reproach of cruelty in destroying so fine and powerful a city; and they took secure precautions for the future, in cutting all its nerves, and leaving it in a state of weakness, that made it incapable of moving.” Ibid. 91.

Cicero mentions another advantage also, upon which he lays great stress; this is the profit, which Rome derived from the lands of Capua: a profit, which he prefers to all the other revenues, that the Roman people received from foreign countries. The slightest causes often stopped or suspended those other revenues; whereas that of Capua ran no risque, being defended both by strong cities and by troops in the neighbourhood; it could suffer nothing from wars; it was always equally sustained, and seemed in some measure from the goodness of the climate, secure against the injuries of seasons and storms. He remarks, that in the war of Italy, when the other revenues failed, the armies were supported with the Ibid. 80.

* Itaque illam Campaniam arrogantiam atque intolerandam ferociam ratione & consilio majores nostri ad inertissimum & desidiosissimum otium perduxerunt. Sic, & crudelitatis infamiam effugerunt, quod urbem ex Italia pulcherrimam non sustulerunt; & multum in posterum providerunt, quod, nervis urbis omnibus exsectis, urbem ipsam solutam ac debilitatem reliquerunt. Ibid.

A. R. 541. grain of Capua. Accordingly he calls * Capua the
 Ant. C. finest estate of the Roman people, the most assured
 211. source of their riches, the ornament of peace, the
 support of war, the most important of its revenues,
 the granary of the legions, and the common resource
 in times of famine.

Liv. xxvi.
 16.

I shall conclude these remarks upon Capua with
 the reflections made by Livy upon the same event,
 which are a kind of abridgment of all that I have col-
 lected from Cicero. Such, says he, were the disposi-
 tions made by the Romans in respect to Capua, with
 a wisdom and conduct highly laudable in every respect.
 A sudden and rigorous justice was executed upon the
 culpable. The multitude was dispersed without hope
 of return. A brutal revenge was not exercised upon
 the houses and walls, which were not guilty of the
 crimes of their inhabitants. And thereby, at the same
 time that the Romans acquired very considerable ad-
 vantages to themselves, they gained a reputation for
 clemency with their allies, by preserving so illustrious
 and opulent a city; the ruin of which would have
 been attended with the groans of all the States of
 Campania and their neighbours. And † lastly, they
 shewed by a very remarkable example, on the one
 side, how inevitable were the effects of their resent-
 ment against unfaithful allies, and on the other, how
 weak a resource Hannibal's protection was for such as
 adhered to his party and fortune.

S E C T. II.

*Affairs of Spain. The two Scipios divide their armies.
 Cn. Scipio marches against Asdrubal. He is abandoned
 by the Celtiberians, and defeated. P. Scipio, who had
 marched against two other Generals, is defeated and*

* Fundum pulcherrimum populi Romani, caput vestræ pecuniæ,
 pacis ornamentum, subsidium belli, fundamentum vectigalium, hor-
 reum legionum, solatium annonæ. Ibid.

† Confessio expressa hosti, quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendâs
 pœnas ab infidelibus fociis, & quàm nihil in Annibale auxilii ad re-
 ceptos in fidem tuendos. Liv.

Longitude reckoned from the Meridian of Paris, & according to the Graduation of y^e Earth suppos'd. Spherick.



killed in battle. The three Carthaginian Generals join, and march to attack Cneus, and defeat him. He dies. Noble disinterestedness of Cneus. Reflections upon the conduct of the two Scipios. L. Marcius, a private Knight, is chosen to command the army. He gains two victories over the Carthaginians. Manner in which Marcius's letter is received by the Senate. Cn. Fulvius is accused before the People, and sentenced. P. Scipio, only twenty-four years old, is chosen to command in Spain, in quality of Pro-consul. He goes to his province. Return of Marcellus to Rome. He triumphs by ovation. He exhibits abundance of statues and paintings in it. Reflection upon this new kind of pomp. Manlius Torquatus refuses the Consulship. Admirable wisdom of the youth of the century called Veturia. Treaty concluded between the Romans and Ætolians. Motions of the Ætolians, and of Philip King of Macedonia. Surprizing resolution of the people of Acarnania. Levinus besieges and takes Anticyra. He receives news of his being elected Consul.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS, III.

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

A. R. 540.

Ant. C.

212.

WE come now to resume the affairs of Spain, which we passed over, not to interrupt the relation of the siege and taking of Capua.

It was now two years, that nothing considerable had passed in Spain, and that both sides had kept upon the defensive, without undertaking any thing against each other. But, this campaign, the Roman Generals having quitted their winter-quarters, united all their forces, and after having held a council, they agreed unanimously, that after having confined themselves so long to prevent Asdrubal from going to Italy as he intended, it was time now to put an end to the war in that province. That they had a sufficient number of troops to effect it, as they had the winter before engaged thirty thousand Celtiberians to take arms for the Romans against the Carthaginians.

Liv. xxv.
32—36.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The enemy had three great bodies of troops in the country. Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago, had united the forces under their command, and were but five days march from the camp of the Romans. Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar, who had long commanded the armies in Spain, was incamped near Anitorgis, at a much less distance from the enemy. The designs of the two Scipios was to attack the first, and they conceived they had forces more than sufficient to overpower him. All they apprehended was, that after having defeated him, the two other Generals, terrified by his overthrow, would retire into inaccessible mountains and defiles, and thereby protract the war. To avoid this inconvenience, they believed that the best choice they could make, was to divide their troops into two bodies, and apply themselves at once to the whole war of Spain; so that P. Cornelius, with two-thirds of the army, composed of the Romans and allies, should march against Mago and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, whilst his brother Cneus, with the other third, composed of old troops and Celtiberians, should act against the other Asdrubal.

The two Generals set out at the same time with their armies, preceded by the Celtiberians, and incamped near * Anitorgis, in sight of the enemy, from whence they were separated only by the river. Cn. Scipio continued in this place, with the troops that had been assigned him; and P. Scipio went forwards, to carry on the war as had been concerted.

Asdrubal soon perceived, that there were but few Romans in the army of Cn. Scipio, and that the whole hope of that General was founded in the aid of the Celtiberians. As he knew the infidelity of those nations, amongst whom he had made war so many years, and there was no fraud or stratagem he did not know how to employ himself, he treated in secret with the Chiefs of the Celtiberians by the means of Spa-

* It is not known in what part of Spain Anitorgis was, nor consequently what river Livy speaks of here.

niards, that served in his camp; and engaged them, for a great reward, to retire with their troops into their own country. These officers did not think they committed a great crime in making this bargain. For it was not required of them to turn their arms against the Romans; and besides, they were paid for remaining neuter, what they could scarce have expected for exposing their lives to the fatigues and dangers of war. Add to this, that the soldiers were pleased with the sweets of rest, and with the pleasure of returning into their country, and seeing their relations. The multitude were thus as easily brought over as their leaders. Besides which, they had nothing to fear from the Romans; whose small number made them incapable of stopping them by force. The Celtiberians packed up their baggage, and began their march to return back; giving the Romans no other answer, who asked them the reason of this change, and conjured them not to abandon them, but that they were going to the aid of their country. Scipio seeing that his prayers made no impression on his allies, and that he could not keep them by force; and rightly judging also, that he was not in a condition without their aid to resist the enemy, and that it was no longer possible to rejoin his brother, he made the only choice, that seemed salutary in such a conjuncture: this was to march back as soon as possible, carefully avoiding to fight in the plains with an enemy entirely superior to him in number of troops, and who having passed the river, followed him at the heels, and pressed him very hard.

* It cannot be too much inculcated, says Livy, to the Roman Generals, to keep well upon their guard against the like perfidy; and the misfortune, that then happened to Scipio, is a lesson, which ought to teach them to confide in auxiliary troops, only when

* *Id quidem cavendum semper Romanis ducibus erit, exemplaque hæc verè pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis, ut non plus sui roboris suarumque propriè virium in castris habeant.*
LIV.

A. R. 540. the number of their own citizens shall exceed that of
 Ant. C. the strangers in their armies.
 212.

At the same time, P. Scipio was exposed to a danger still greater and more inevitable: He had to do with a new enemy, who harassed him continually: this was Masinissa, at that time the ally of the Carthaginians, but whom in the sequel, the amity he contracted with the Romans rendered so famous and powerful. That young Prince, from the moment Scipio arrived, advanced against him with the Numidian cavalry, and incessantly harassed him night and day to such a degree, that he not only fell upon such of the Romans, as straggled ever so little to fetch in wood or forage, but frequently insulted them even in their camp itself. He often threw himself into the midst of their guards, obliged them to quit their posts with abundance of tumult and disorder; and falling upon them during the night, when they least expected him, carried alarm and terror to their gates, and into their intrenchments. In a word, there was no place, nor any time, in which they were exempt from fear and trouble. He thereby obliged them to keep close within their works, deprived of all the necessities of life. They were almost in the same situation as people besieged in form. It even seemed, that they should be shut up closer still, as soon as Indibilis, who, it was said, was every moment expected to arrive with seven thousand men, should join the Carthaginians.

In this extremity, Scipio, otherwise a wise and prudent Captain, reduced by necessity, took a rash and desperate resolution. This was to set out during the night to meet Indibilis, and to fight him wherever he should find him. Accordingly he left a small body of troops in his camp, under the command of T. Fonteius his Lieutenant, and having begun his march about the middle of the night, he met the enemy he sought, and immediately attacked them. They fought in small parties, the troops not having time to form themselves in battle. The Romans began to have
 the

the advantage in this tumultuary battle: but the Numidian horse, from whom Scipio believed he had concealed his march, attacking him suddenly on the flanks, put his troops into great consternation. He had scarce began to come to blows with the Numidians, than he saw himself attacked by a third enemy. The Carthaginian Generals, who had followed the Romans, came up unexpectedly to charge him in the rear. Invested on all sides, they did not know on which to face, nor where to open themselves a passage. To compleat the misfortune, Scipio, fighting with abundance of bravery, and throwing himself wherever the danger was greatest, to animate his troops by his example, received a wound through his right side with a lance. As soon as he was seen to fall from his horse, the cries of joy carried the news of his death throughout the whole army. This accident compleated the defeat of the Romans, and enemy's victory. All those who had not fallen in the battle, immediately betook themselves to flight. They did not find it difficult to open themselves a way through the Numidians and light-armed soldiers: but the difficulty was to escape the pursuit of so many horse, and of foot, who equalled the horse in swiftness. In consequence, more of them were killed in flying than in battle; and not a single man of them had escaped, if night had not come on.

The two Carthaginian Generals, to make as much advantage of their victory as possible, hardly gave their troops some hours rest, and directly marched them towards Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar; not doubting but that, when they should have joined him, they should be in a condition to terminate the war by the total defeat of the Romans. As soon as they arrived there, the Generals and soldiers gave themselves up to the joy, with which so signal a victory over so great a General and his army inspired them; congratulating each other beforehand, upon that they were in hopes of gaining as soon as they came to act.

The news of so great a defeat had not yet reached the

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

A. R. 540. the army of Cneus Scipio: but the mournful silence
 Ant. C. that prevailed amongst the troops, and the gloomy
 212. surmise, with which every one was possessed, were already sad presages of the misfortune they were soon to know. Scipio himself, besides the desertion of his allies, and the augmentation of the enemy's troops, on reasoning and reflecting upon all the circumstances he saw, was much more inclined to fear than to hope. "For finally, (said he within himself) how could Asdrubal and Mago have brought their armies hither so soon, if they had not terminated the war on their side? Whence comes it, that P. Scipio has not opposed their march, or followed them close, in order that, if he could not prevent the Generals of the enemy and their armies from joining, he might at least join his troops with those of his brother?" In this cruel agitation of mind, he thought he could not act better in his present situation, than to retire as soon and as far as possible from the enemy. Accordingly, the following night he marched a considerable way, without the enemy's making any motion to prevent a retreat, of which they had no previous knowledge. But, as soon as day appeared, having perceived, that the Romans were gone, they set out in pursuit of them with great diligence, having sent the Numidians before, who came up with them before night, and continually harassed them, by attacking them sometimes in the rear, and sometimes upon the flanks. They were therefore obliged to face the enemy, Scipio commanding them to fight retreating, and without halting till the Carthaginian infantry should arrive.

But as they were frequently obliged to stop, they made but very little way in much time. For this reason Scipio, seeing that night approached, drew off his troops from the battle, and posted them upon an eminence; little safe indeed for troops entirely in a consternation, but where they were however less exposed than they would have been any where else. He placed the baggage and cavalry in the middle of the infantry, who at first repulsed the charge of the Numidians

dians with no great difficulty. But when the three
 Generals and their three armies were arrived, Scipio
 saw perfectly, that his soldiers could not resist so ma-
 ny forces, unless he opposed them with some intrench-
 ments, and that was impracticable. The eminence to
 which he had retired was so naked, and the ground so
 hard and dry, that besides having neither wood nor
 herbage, it was impossible to cut a trench in it, or to
 throw up any of the works necessary in the like case.
 Add to this, that the declivity which led to it, being
 very easy and almost insensible, there was nothing
 rugged and steep enough to keep the enemy from as-
 cending. However, to oppose them with the appear-
 ance at least of intrenchments, they placed around
 them the packs and harnesses of their carriage-beasts,
 tied and made fast together with the packs and bag-
 gage themselves, carrying up the whole as far as possi-
 ble, to the usual height.

When the Carthaginians were arrived, they easily
 mounted the eminence: but at first this new kind of
 intrenchments stopped them short. “Why don’t you
 “advance, (cried out their Generals) Why don’t
 “you remove those vain, ridiculous, obstacles,
 “scarce capable of stopping women and children?
 “Don’t you see, that the enemy are taken, and that
 “sculking behind that baggage they can escape you
 “no longer?” With whatever air of contempt the
 Generals made these reproaches, it was not easy for
 the soldiers either to cut or untie those harnesses and
 baggage, which were strongly bound and interwove
 together. After much time and pains they at length
 effected it; when they entered the Roman camp in
 several places at once. As they were much superior
 in number, and victorious, they did not find great
 resistance from an handful of terrified and defeated
 troops: and in consequence made a great slaughter of
 them. However, many having fled to the adjacent
 forests, got to P. Scipio’s camp, where T. Fonteius
 his Lieutenant commanded. As to Cneus, according
 to some authors, he was killed upon the eminence
 even

A. R. 540.
 Ant. C.
 212.

A. R. 540. even on the first attack. According to others, he
 Ant. C. 212. escaped with some few followers into a tower not far
 from his camp, to which the enemy, who could not
 force the gates, set fire, and that General perished in
 it with all that were with him.

This was the seventh year that Cn. Scipio com-
 manded in Spain, when he was killed about a month
 after his brother Publius.

Val. Max. Valerius Maximus, and Seneca tells us a very sin-
 IV. 4. gular circumstance in the life of Cneus, and which does
 Senec. de him great honour. That illustrious man pressed the
 Conf. ad. Senate to send him a successor, representing that he
 Hel. XII. had a marriageable daughter, and it was necessary that
 & Nat. he should go to Rome, to make provision for her
 Quæst. I. fortune, and to find her an husband. The Senate,
 17. not willing to deprive the Commonwealth of the ser-
 vices of such a General as Cn. Scipio, took his place,
 and acted as a father to his daughter. In concert
 with the wife and nearest relations of Cneus, they
 chose her an husband, and paid * eleven thousand
 asses out of the public treasury by way of fortune for
 her. † O happy bridegroom, cries Seneca, to whom
 the Roman People served as a father-in-law! Could
 we expect to find so generous a disinterestedness, that
 rises so high as the love of poverty, still subsisting at
 the time of which we are speaking, and in the most
 illustrious citizens of Rome? Poverty again must have
 been much in honour there, if we consider, that so
 small a portion, as that assigned by the Senate, was
 thought no shame. The ‡ daughters of the greatest
 men had often no other dowry but the glory of their
 fathers or families. Things were much changed in Se-
 neca's time. § Now, says he, the sum which the Se-

* Eleven thousand asses at that time were about 25 l. sterling.

† O felices viros puellarum, quibus populus Rom. loco soceri fuit!

‡ Paternæ hereditati, præter optimam gloriam, nihil erat quod acceptum referrent. VAL. MAX.

§ Jam libertinorum virgunculis in unum speculum non sufficit illa dos, quam dedit Senatus pro Scipione. Processit enim immodestius, paulatim opibus ipsis invitata luxuria, & incrementum ingens vitia acceperunt.

nate believed sufficient for the portion of Scipio's daughter, would not be enough to purchase one of our freed-men a single looking-glass : to such an enormous height has luxury, the growth of abundance and riches, risen ; and so much have vices, its inevitable consequence, augmented !

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The two Scipios were no less lamented by the Spaniards, than by the Romans themselves : with one difference however highly for the honour of their memories. The loss of the provinces, that of the armies, and the misfortune of the Commonwealth, had some share in the grief of their own country : but the Spaniards lamented and deplored them only and for their own sakes. They however regretted the loss of Cneus most. For, having come into Spain before his brother, he had governed them longer, and, to use the expression, had been beforehand with him in their affection, by giving them the first distinguished proofs of the justice and moderation of the Roman government.

The two Scipios were certainly Generals of great merit : on the one side, so brave and intrepid as to deserve to be called “two * thunderbolts of war ;” on the other, wise, prudent, experienced : they however form in concert and with deliberate design the plan of a campaign it is not easy to comprehend. Without any great skill in military affairs, it may easily be perceived, that as they had two different bodies of the enemy to fight, it was infinitely for their advantage to attack them separately one after the other, by falling upon each with their whole united forces. They renounce so great an advantage upon the slightest reason conceivable ; for fear, said they, lest the defeat of the first army should induce the other to retire into forests and inaccessible places, which would prevent the war from being so soon terminated. They committed another fault no less gross ; which was, to leave thirty thousand strangers in one of their armies, who pro-

* Cùm duo fulmina nostri Imperii subitò, in Hispania, Cn. & P. Scipiones, extincti occidissent, Cic. pro Corn. Balb. n. 34.

A. R. 540. bably composed two-thirds of it at least, and to con-
 Ant. C. 212. fide the preservation of the State to them. We see
 here what becomes of man's prudence and ability,
 when God abandons them to themselves.

The defeat of the two armies seemed to make the
 loss of Spain a necessary consequence, and to contri-
 bute much to that of Italy, by admitting the victorious
 troops to go thither to the aid of Hannibal. We are
 going to see in what manner Providence, that was
 watchful for the safety of Rome, delivers it from this
 danger by a method, which may in some measure be
 said to be miraculous, and which shews, that it is God
 who destroys and saves.

Liv. xxv. When the armies of Spain seemed to be entirely
 37---39. destroyed, and the province lost to the Romans, one
 man, little known till then, of an ingenuous though
 middling condition, reinstates their affairs there, con-
 trary to the opinion and hopes of all the world.
 Amongst those, who escaped the defeat of Cn. Scipio's
 army, was a brave officer, in the flower of his years,
 named L. Marcius, the Son of Septimus, only a Ro-
 man Knight, but whose courage and capacity were
 much above the condition, in which he was born.
 He had strengthened and improved an excellent genius
 by the instructions and example of Cn. Scipio, under
 whom he had learnt during many years all that relates
 to the trade of war. And this was a certain means
 for excelling in it. After the defeat and dispersion of
 both armies, he had drawn together all the soldiers
 that had escaped; and having added to them all he
 could draw out of the garrisons, he had formed a suffi-
 ciently considerable body of an army, with which he
 marched to join T. Fonteius, P. Scipio's Lieutenant.
 But the soldiers, then incamped on this side of the
 Iberus, in a place where they had intrenched them-
 selves, having resolved that a military assembly should
 be held for the election of the person that should
 command the army, they gave the preference of esteem
 and confidence to the Roman Knight against the Lieu-
 tenant-General in so distinguished a manner, that they
 relieved

relieved one another upon their posts in order to give their suffrages, without ceasing to guard their works, and unanimously chose L. Marcius.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

The little time that remained before the coming of the enemy, was employed in fortifying their camp, and in bringing provisions into it; the soldiers executing all the orders that were given them, not only with abundance of zeal and diligence, but with great courage and intrepidity. But when they were informed, that Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, had passed the Iberus, and approached with design to extirpate all the Romans that had escaped former defeats, and saw the signal of battle given by the newly elected General, remembering the Generals, who had commanded them before, under whose auspices and orders numerous armies used to march against the enemy, they all wept, some beating their heads, and lifting up their hands towards the Gods, whom they accused of their misfortune: others lying down upon the ground, and calling their antient Generals by their name. It was not possible to dry their tears, or silence their cries. The officers endeavoured to console them in vain; and Marcius himself made ineffectual remonstrances to them, mingled with kindness and severity, by demanding of them, "why they abandoned themselves in that manner to grief in lamenting like women, rather than to think of defending themselves, and the Commonwealth with them, and of avenging the deaths of the Generals they had loved so much."

They were in this disposition, when on a sudden they heard the sound of the Carthaginian trumpets and the cries of the enemy, who were upon the point of attacking them. Then, passing in an instant from grief to indignation, and in a manner transported with fury and rage, they fell upon the Carthaginians, who advanced with great security, and with an air of contempt. This unexpected charge put the Carthaginians into a consternation. They asked each other with surprise, "where it was possible for the Romans to have found so many soldiers after the defeat of their armies?"

who

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

who could have inspired troops defeated and put to the rout so few days before with so much confidence and boldness? What General could so soon supply the place of the two Scipios killed in the field of battle? And lastly, who had given them the signal of battle, and commanded in their camp?" Whilst so unexpected a change kept them in great surprize, and quite out of themselves, the Romans, without giving them time to recover, charged them with such fury, that at first they began to give ground full of fear and astonishment, and a moment after to betake themselves to open flight. The Romans, who pursued them with abundance of vigour, might have made a great slaughter of them: but, as they were exposed to some terrible dangers, in case the Carthaginians resumed courage, Marcius caused the retreat to be sounded immediately. And as they were animated by their success, and breathed nothing but blood and slaughter, he found no small difficulty to bring them back to their camp; having been obliged himself to stop those who carried the ensigns in front, and even to seize some of the most mutinous of them, who refused to obey. Such a conduct would do honour to a General long accustomed to command armies. History abounds with battles lost, or victories not compleated by the imprudent activity of Commanders too intent upon pursuing flying enemies, without foreseeing the consequences. We shall soon see, that Marcius was far from wanting courage.

The Carthaginians, who had been pushed a great way, and with abundance of vigour, imagined that fear had prevented the Romans from pursuing them, and returned into their camp without any confusion, like troops that rather despised, than feared, their enemy. They were no less negligent after they had entered it. For though the Romans were almost at their gates, they still considered them as the remains and ruins of two armies, which they had defeated some days before; and did not think it necessary to observe much discipline, or to keep themselves much upon

upon their guard. Marcius was apprized of this negligence, and formed a design, which, at first sight, seemed rather rash than daring: this was, to attack the Carthaginians in their lines, at a time when he had great reason to apprehend, they would attack him in his. And indeed, he judged with reason, that it was easier to make himself master of Asdrubal's camp, whilst he was alone, than to defend his own against the three Generals and three armies, when joined a second time. Besides which, he considered, that if his enterprize succeeded, he should reinstate the affairs of the Commonwealth in the province: and if it did not, that such a bold attempt would at least teach the enemy to fear him.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

However, to prevent the surprize of his soldiers, and the darkness of the night, from occasioning confusion in the execution of so dangerous an enterprize, he thought it necessary to prepare them for it. Accordingly having assembled them, he spoke to them in terms to the following effect. “ Brave soldiers, if
 “ you consider ever so little the singular veneration I
 “ had for the merit of our Generals, the Scipios, during their lives, and which I still retain for them
 “ after their deaths, and our present condition, you
 “ will agree, that if the office, to which you have
 “ raised me, is highly for my honour, it is also attended with great cares and anxiety. On the one
 “ side, my ever-reviving grief for their loss, on the
 “ other, the perplexity in which I am to find means
 “ for preserving to the Commonwealth the unfortunate remains of our two armies, hang heavy upon
 “ me, and leave me not a moment's repose. The
 “ images of the two Scipios are night and day before
 “ my eyes. They often awake me in my sleep. They
 “ seem to speak to me, and I to hear them complain,
 “ and exhort me to avenge them; to avenge with
 “ them the Commonwealth and your comrades continually victorious in this country for so many years;
 “ to imitate their example, to conform to their
 “ maxims, and the methods of making war, which
 “ they always followed. I wish, soldiers, that you
 Vol. IV. K “ they

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

“ would enter into my way of thinking: that you
 “ would not pretend to honour the deaths of those
 “ two great men by tears, but when their remem-
 “ brance recurs to your minds, that you would ima-
 “ gine you see them again at your head, that you
 “ hear them and march under their command to
 “ battle. It was undoubtedly this remembrance and
 “ image that animated you yesterday, when you put
 “ the Carthaginians to flight with an intrepidity, that
 “ made them know the Roman bravery had not ex-
 “ pired with the Scipios, and that no misfortune could
 “ depress a people, whom the defeat at Cannæ was
 “ not capable of overwhelming. When I checked
 “ your ardor yesterday, it was not my design always
 “ to oppose your boldness; but to reserve it for a
 “ more favourable occasion. That occasion is now
 “ arrived. I am well informed, that there are neither
 “ sentinels nor guards posted round the enemy’s camp,
 “ according to the rules of war; and that every thing
 “ there argues exceeding negligence. It is highly for
 “ our good fortune, that they are so little afraid of
 “ us, and even have us in contempt. They do not
 “ imagine, that troops so lately defeated, have any
 “ thoughts of attacking them in their intrenchments.
 “ I will lead you against them in the dead of the
 “ night, and deliver them all into your hands asleep
 “ and without arms. * I know the undertaking is
 “ bold. But when people have most to fear, and
 “ least to hope, bold counsels are the safest. For
 “ then it is necessary to seize the occasion the moment
 “ it offers, and not, by letting it escape, to hazard
 “ seeking it afterwards in vain. You have now only to
 “ deal with the army of our enemies that are near us.
 “ The two others are not far off. You have reason to
 “ hope, that you will overcome these first troops by
 “ attacking them without delay. They are not un-
 “ known to you. You have measured your strength

* Scio audax videri consilium. Sed in rebus asperis & tenui spe, fortissima quæque consilia tutissima sunt: quia, si in occasionis momento, cujus prætervolat opportunitas, cunctatus paulum fueris, nequicquam mox amissam quæras. LIV.

“ with them in an action, wherein the whole advan-
 “ tage was on your side. If we delay ever so little,
 “ our success of yesterday will be known, and we shall
 “ be considered as enemies capable of making them-
 “ selves formidable. All the Carthaginian Generals
 “ will then rejoin each other with all their forces.
 “ Shall we be able to sustain the weight of three ar-
 “ mies, which Cn. Scipio could not withstand with all
 “ his forces together? In the same manner as our
 “ Generals perished in effect of having divided their
 “ armies, may our enemy now be overpowered whilst
 “ they are separated. What I propose to you is the
 “ only choice we have to make in the present conjunc-
 “ ture. Prepare therefore to improve the opportunity
 “ this night affords you. Retire now to refresh your-
 “ selves with nourishment and rest, in order to march
 “ afterwards, under the protection of the Gods, to
 “ attack the enemy’s camp with the same vigour and
 “ courage you have defended your own.”

A. R. 540.
 Ant. C.
 212.

This new project, proposed by a new General, was heard with joy, and the bolder it was, the more it charmed them. They passed the rest of the day in preparing their arms, and taking nourishment. They rested a great part of the night, and set out three or four hours before day.

About two leagues beyond the camp of the Carthaginians, on the side next Marcius, there were another body of Carthaginian troops, separated from the former by a deep valley, covered with shady trees. Marcius, by a stratagem of the nature of Hannibal’s, had a Roman cohort with some cavalry in this valley. Having thus made himself master of the way by which the two Carthaginian armies could have communication, he led on his troops in silence against that which was nearest to him. As he found neither guards at the gates of the enemy’s camp, nor sentinels upon the intrenchments, he entered it without any opposition, and with as much ease as if it had been his own. At the same instant Marcius ordered the charge to be sounded, and the Romans with great cries dispersed themselves

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

themselves on all sides. Some killed the enemy half asleep in their beds: some set fire to their tents with dry stubble; and others seized the gates, to cut off their flight. The fire, cries, and slaughter, prevented them from hearing any thing, and from taking any salutary measures. Astonishment seized them, and they had neither sense, nor motion: and if they did move, they fell naked and without arms into the hands of well-armed enemies. Some ran to the gates, and finding them occupied by the Romans, leaped over the intrenchments, and threw themselves headlong into the fossés. All who could quit this camp, made all the haste they could to the other: but they were all stopt and killed, from the first to the last, by the cohort and horse that had been placed in ambush in the middle of the way. And though some had even escaped this slaughter, the victors made with such expedition and rapidity from the first to the second camp, that it had been next to impossible to escape their diligence. The Romans found still more negligence here than in the other army, because being more distant from the enemy, they believed they had nothing to fear; and because towards day-break most of them had quitted their camp to fetch in wood and forage, or to maraud. They only found the arms of the Carthaginians left in their guard-houses, and the soldiers either sitting or lying upon the ground, walking along their works or before the gates of their camp, all without arms. It was in this state of security, that they saw themselves suddenly attacked by the Romans, flushed with the victory they had just gained: so that they could not prevent them from entering their camp. However, they ran in crouds to the gates on the first cries and charge of the enemy, and a bloody engagement ensued. The action would have continued longer: but perceiving the shields of the Romans covered with blood, and judging from thence of the defeat of their comrades, they were seized with terror, immediately fled, and escaped where they could; leaving the greatest part of their people upon

upon the spot, and their camp in the hands of the victors.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

Thus in the space of one night and a day L. Marcius took two camps, and defeated two considerable armies of the enemy. Authors differ concerning the number of those who were killed in these two actions. The spoils were great. A silver shield, that weighed an hundred and seven pounds, upon which the portrait of Asdrubal, Hannibal's brother, was engraved, was particularly remarkable amongst them. This shield was placed in the Capitol at Rome, and was lost when that temple was burnt in the Consulship of Scipio and Norbanus.

After this expedition, Spain continued some time at peace, both parties not daring to venture a decisive battle, after the considerable losses they had mutually sustained.

I do not know, whether in all the Roman history there be one military exploit more compleat in all its circumstances, more singular and remarkable from unexpected events, more important in its consequences, and more advantageous to the Commonwealth, than this of Marcius which we have just related. The entire defeat of the two armies which the Romans had in Spain, joined with the deaths of the two illustrious Generals who commanded them, had occasioned so general a consternation amongst the few of their troops that remained in that province, that it seemed to leave neither hope nor resource. No obstacle could any longer oppose the passage of the Carthaginians into Italy, and if their victorious armies, that carried terror every where, could have joined that of Hannibal, as it had long been prepared to do, what would have become of Rome, and how would she have been able to make head against this new strength of so formidable an enemy?

A single, private man breaks all these measures, and almost in a moment dispels so terrible a storm. Marcius draws together the wrecks of the Roman armies, and forms one body of the fugitive troops, whom

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

fear had dispersed on all sides. He consoles, animates them; and fills them with such courage and confidence, that they seem to have entirely forgotten that they had just before been defeated. We see here in the conduct of this officer all the ability and prudence of a General most consummate in the art of war. He confronts danger in all its extent without being dismayed by it. He thinks of nothing but to remedy it. He makes use both of force and stratagem. He judiciously seizes the occasion as soon as it offers, and takes advantage of every moment. He gives his orders with a coolness and tranquillity capable of reviving the courage of the most fearful. He seems bold even to rashness, and yet knows how to contain himself in the very heat of action, and not to give way to the ardor of victory, which often gets the better of the wisest. In a word, if we examine his whole conduct attentively, we shall see, that it is guided by a profound knowledge in the art of war. A particular attention of the Divine Providence over the Roman empire is observable here.

Liv. xxvi.
2.

Such accomplished merit, attended with such great and unexpected success, should, one would think, acquire him great applauses, and an highly glorious reward at Rome. We are going to see in what manner this affair passed there. Immediately after the action, he wrote to the Senate, and gave them an account of the whole. He had taken the title of Proprætor in his letter. When it was read, the great and glorious service he had rendered the Commonwealth was praised, which is all that is said of it: *Res gestæ magnificæ Senatui visæ*. But the major part of the fathers took offence at his assuming the quality of Proprætor, without having been elected so either by the Senate or People. It was judged "of dangerous consequence for Generals to be chosen by the armies; and that the august authority of elections legally made by the suffrages of the People, and under the direction of the Gods themselves, consulted by the auspices, should be transferred into the provinces and camps, and

and abandoned to the rashness of the soldiers." Some were for having the Senate's opinion taken upon this head: but it was thought proper to defer that deliberation, till after the departure of the couriers, who had brought Marcius's letter. As to the recruits and provisions which he demanded, he was answered that the Senate would make provision in respect to them. But it was not thought proper to give him the title of Proprætor in the answer sent him. It does not appear that this affair was spoke of any more in the Senate. An assembly was afterwards held, in which the election of Marcius was not expressly condemned, but it was rendered void in fact by the nomination of Claudius Nero to command in Spain.

A. R. 540.
Ant. C.
212.

It does not suit me to censure the opinion of so wise a body of men so circumspect in their resolutions. I plainly perceive, that reasons of State obliged them to condemn the title which Marcius had assumed upon his own authority, and still more the liberty which the soldiers had taken of electing themselves a General: A liberty, which might have had fatal consequences, as it actually had under the Emperors, when the armies usurped a power of electing, without waiting the consent of either the Senate or People. But might not this censure have been attended with some mark of esteem, and some distinction of honour, after so highly considerable a service rendered the Commonwealth? The only word which the Senate says of it, is a very dry praise of an expedition acknowledged by themselves, *magnificæ*; of an action so prudently conducted, and so happily terminated. Marcius continued in the army in a distinguished rank, and we shall in the sequel see Scipio employ him honourably. This is perhaps all that brave Officer could desire.

Liv. xxvi.
2.

CN. FULVIUS CENTUMALUS.

P. SULPICIUS GALBA.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

Another affair, that concerned a person upon the spot, engrossed at that time the attention of the public.

Liv. xx.
2, 3.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

lic. The Tribune Cn. Sempronius Blæsus had cited Cn. Fulvius before the People, and accused him of having by his rashness occasioned the loss of the army he commanded the year before, as Prætor in Apulia. Of eighteen thousand men, of which it was composed, scarce two thousand had escaped. The Tribune declared, “ that other Generals, through imprudence, had suffered themselves to fall into ambuscades, where they had perished with their armies : but that Fulvius was the first, who had lost his legions by vices and licentiousness, before he exposed them to perishing by the enemy’s swords. That accordingly it might be said, that they had been defeated before they came to a battle, and were overcome not by Hannibal, but by their General himself. That those who gave their suffrages in the assemblies, did not sufficiently examine, whether he to whom they confided the command of armies, had the qualities necessary for so important a trust. What difference there was between Cn. Fulvius and Ti. Sempronius ! That the latter having been placed at the head of an army of slaves, had soon, by his good conduct and the exact discipline he had caused to be observed, made them, forgetting their birth and condition, become the resource and support of the allies, and the terror and scourge of the enemy. That Fulvius, on the contrary, had made Romans well born and bred, and worthy of the name they bore, when he took upon him the command of them, contract all the vices of slaves. That in consequence it was his fault, that they had become disorderly and turbulent amongst the allies, and abject and cowardly in the presence of the enemy ; and that, far from sustaining the charge of the Carthaginians, they had not so much as stood their first cries. That, after all, it was not to be wondered, that the soldiers had abandoned their post on the first charge, as their General had set them the example, by flying first himself. How many Generals in the present war, had chose rather to lose their lives in the field of battle, than abandon their armies in danger ? Was it not a shame, that the

the soldiers of Cannæ should have been banished into Sicily, and that the same punishment had but lately been decreed against Fulvius's Legions, whilst the rashness of Fulvius himself remained unpunished; tho' the loss of his army was solely to be imputed to him?"

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

The accused laid the misfortune, that had happened, to his soldiers, and represented, "that they had fled through inability to sustain either the courage of the enemy, or the terror of Hannibal's name. That himself had been forced along with them, against his will, by the press of his own troops, as Varro was at Cannæ, and many others on different occasions. What good could he have done the Commonwealth by undertaking to resist the victors alone; unless it was supposed, that his death would have been a consolation and remedy for the misfortune of the public? That his army had not perished by famine, and in effect of having fallen into some ambush, for want of knowing the enemy: that they had been defeated only by force of arms, and in a pitched battle: that lastly, neither the courage of his own soldiers, nor of the enemy, was in his power."

He was accused at two different times, and at each time the sentence rose only to a fine. But when the witnesses were heard on the third accusation, and many testified upon oath, that the terror and flight began by Fulvius himself, the People were highly enraged; and the Tribune, changing the prosecution, demanded, that he should be punished as guilty of treason; and in order to that, that the Prætor should call an Assembly by Centuries. For it was only in that kind of Assemblies, which was the most solemn and the most general amongst the Romans, that treason could be tried.

The accused seeing the turn which his affair took, tried another resource. His brother Q. Fulvius was in great consideration, as well from the glory he had already acquired, as by that he was upon the point of adding to it by making himself master of Capua, which was then reduced to extremities. He prevailed

upon

A. R. 541. upon him to write very moving letters to the Senate,
 Ant. C. in which he demanded permission to be present at his
 211. brother's tryal, and to solicit for him. But the Senate having replied, that his demand could not be granted, because his presence at Capua was necessary to the service of the public; Cn. Fulvius seeing that he had nothing farther to hope, did not stay till the day of the Assembly, and retired to Tarquinii into voluntary banishment. He was however sentenced, though absent, to suffer the banishment he had chosen.

Liv. xxvi. After Capua had been taken, as I have observed
 37. before, the Senate ordered Claudius Nero to chuse, out of the two legions he had commanded during the siege of that city, six thousand foot and three hundred horse, with the same number of Latin foot and eight hundred horse: to embark those troops at Puteoli, and to sail for Spain. When his fleet arrived at Tarraco, he landed his troops, and having drawn his ships ashore, he made the crews also take arms to augment his forces. Having afterwards advanced as far as the banks of the Iberus, he received from T. Fonteius and L. Marcius the troops they had commanded before his arrival.

Ibid. Asdrubal, son of Amilcar, was encamped at the Lapidés Atri in Aufetania between the cities of Illiturgis and Mentissa (cities of the country now called Andalusia.) Nero seized the entrance of a defile in that place. Asdrubal, who apprehended being shut up by the enemy's army, sent him a trumpet, with orders to promise, in his name, that in case he would suffer him to retire, he would entirely evacuate Spain with all his troops. Nero having received this proposal with great joy, Asdrubal demanded an interview with him the next day, in which the Romans were to settle the conditions upon which the citadels of the cities were to be delivered up, and the day fixed, when the Carthaginians should withdraw their garri-sons, and remove all that belonged to them, without doing any injury to the inhabitants. Nero had no
 sooner

sooner agreed upon this meeting, than Asdrubal ordered his troops to begin at the close of the day, and to continue all night, to draw off from the defile with the utmost expedition, the heavy baggage of the army. Good care was taken not to let any great number of men depart that night; a smaller being more proper both to deceive the enemy by silence, and to facilitate a retreat through the narrow ways it was necessary to pass. The next day both sides met at the place of the interview: but the Carthaginian, by purposely holding long discourses, and writing down many superfluous things, spent the whole day without determining any thing, so that it was necessary to put off the affair till the next day. Nothing farther was then decided; some new difficulties always arising, that required delay. In the mean time advantage was taken of all the nights. The greatest part of the infantry were already safe, when happily at the break of day, a thick fog covered the whole defile, and all the plains round about. The Carthaginian demanded and obtained a last delay, under pretext of a festival on which his nation were not permitted to treat of affairs. By the favour of the darkness he then quitted his camp with his cavalry and elephants; and without being incommoded in any manner by the enemy, he gained a post, in which he had nothing farther to fear from them. About ten in the morning the fog was dispersed, and discovered at once to the Romans both light and the fraud of the Carthaginians. Nero, ashamed of having suffered himself to be so grossly imposed upon, set out in pursuit of them. But Asdrubal did not think it proper to hazard a battle, and the whole terminated in some slight skirmishes of no effect. The Roman General ought to have known the Carthaginians better, and what was meant by the term *Punic Faith*.

Whether this beginning of Nero in Spain gave no great hopes from his commanding there; or, as is most probable, he was sent thither only till a General was chosen, that might be left a considerable time in that

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
211.

Liv. xxvi.
18, 19.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

that province; it is certain, that it was resolved at Rome to proceed to the election of a new Commander, to be placed at the head of the armies in Spain. This was a matter of great difficulty. All that was clearly conceived, was that too much care and attention could not be had in the choice of a Captain capable of supplying the place of two great Generals, who had been killed and defeated with their armies in the space of thirty days. The Senate deliberated concerning this choice, and not being able to determine about it, referred the affair to the People. The Assembly was appointed by the Consuls for the election of a Proconsul to command in Spain. It was expected, that before it was held, such as believed themselves worthy of so important an employment would offer themselves as candidates. This was a mistake. Nobody appeared; which revived all the grief for the fatal blow that had deprived the Commonwealth of two Generals, whose places it was so difficult to supply. The citizens, in the mean time, notwithstanding their affliction, repaired to the Forum, upon the day of the Assembly: and there, with their eyes fixed upon the Magistrates and principal persons of the city, who looked mournfully upon each other without speaking, they felt the utmost anguish to see the affairs of the Commonwealth in so desperate a condition, that nobody dared to accept the command of the armies in Spain. At this moment, P. Scipio, the son of him of the same name, who had been killed in Spain, about twenty-four years of age, got upon an higher place where he might be seen by every body, and declared that he would take upon him that employment, if they would repose so much confidence in him. Assoon as the assembly cast their eyes upon him, great cries of joy were heard on all sides, which seemed to foretel, that his command would be successful and glorious. They immediately proceeded to vote, and not only all the Centuries, but every individual of which they were com-

composed, from the first to the last, decreed, that P. Scipio should go to command in Spain.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

When the affair was over, and the first heat of their zeal cooled, a mournful silence was seen to succeed such universal applauses, and sad reflections upon a precipitate election, in which favour had more share than prudence and reason. What gave them the most pain was his great youth. Some even took the misfortune that had befallen his house as a bad omen, and could not see him set out, without trembling, from a family, that were still in tears and mourning, to command in a province, where he was to make war and give battle between the tombs of his father and uncle.

Scipio perceiving this coldness, made a speech to the People, so full of a noble confidence, and spoke to them of his age, the command that had lately been confided to him, and the war he was going to make, with so much elevation and greatness of soul, that he revived in them the ardor that had abated, and filled them with an assured hope, says Livy, superior to what men's promises, and the reasons, with which they support them, usually inspire, and which seemed to have something supernatural in it. And indeed Scipio did not only draw admiration upon himself by the talents and virtues which he actually possessed, but by the wonderful address he had from his earliest youth of exalting their splendor by an outside and behaviour highly capable of attracting respect. In almost all that he proposed to the multitude, he gave them to understand, that the Gods themselves had instructed him therein either in dreams or secret inspirations; whether this was the effect of weakness and * superstition in himself, or he had recourse to this artifice to render the citizens disposed to enter into his designs. It was in this view, that as soon as he had put on the robe of manhood, he took care never to do any action

* Polybius book X. proves, that it was not superstition, but address and policy in Scipio.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

public or private, before he had been at the Capitol, and had passed a considerable time there in the temple. This custom, which he regularly observed ever after, occasioned some to believe, that he was descended from the Gods. The absurd story that prevailed concerning the birth of Alexander was revived in respect to him; and it was talked, that he was begot in effect of a commerce between his mother and an enormous serpent. Scipio seemed willing to confirm this opinion by the mysterious air with which he affected never to deny the fact, and at the same time never to affirm it.

I do not in this circumstance discern the greatness of soul and elevation of sentiments, that usually appeared in Scipio's conduct. There seems to me, to be narrowness and meanness of spirit in endeavouring to recommend one's self by falsehood and dissimulation. There † is even impiety in inclining to cover deceit and imposture with the adorable name of the Divinity. I know, that Minos and Lycurgus amongst the Greeks, and Numa amongst the Romans, made use of the same artifice to acquire the esteem and confidence of the People. But an example, vicious in itself, with whatever great name it is authorized, may indeed blind those who follow it, but cannot justify them. *Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile.*

Horat.

However it were, the marvellous things related of Scipio, had given the Romans an esteem and admiration for that young man, that rose almost to veneration: and it was in effect of them, that they charged him at so early an age with so important an employment and so considerable a war.

Liv. xxvi.
19.

As soon as Scipio had been appointed Pro-consul, he prepared for his departure. To the old troops, who had remained in Spain of the two defeated armies, and those which had gone from Puteoli with

† In specie fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita pietas inesse non potest: cum qua simul & sanctitatem & religionem tolli necesse est. Cic. de nat. I. 3.

Nero, ten thousand foot and a thousand horse were added. M. Julius Silanus was also sent in quality of Proprætor, to assist Scipio in the functions of the command. When every thing was ready, that General set out of Ostia with a fleet of thirty galleys of five benches of oars. When he arrived at Tarraco, he held a kind of an Assembly of all the Ambassadors of the States of Spain in alliance with the Romans, who had repaired thither on the report of his coming. He gave them audience, and * spoke to them all with that confidence and greatness of soul, that solid merit inspires, in such a manner however that not a word escaped him, that could give room to suspect him either of pride or vanity; and that whilst he retained an air of sincerity which gained him their confidence, he gave his discourse all possible dignity.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

When he set out from Tarraco, he visited the cities of the allies, and the winter-quarters of the army; and gave great praises to the soldiers, who after two such cruel defeats upon the neck of each other, had by their valour preserved the province to the Roman People, and without giving the enemy time to take advantage of their victories, had obliged them to repass the Iberus; and lastly, by so faithful and generous a conduct, had defended the allies of the Commonwealth. He had Marcius always with him. The consideration which he had for that Officer, and the praises he gave his valour, plainly shewed, that he was exempt from mean envy, and that which he least feared, was to find a person, that might either fully or divide his glory. Silanus succeeded Nero, and the new troops were put into winter-quarters. Scipio having provided for every thing, and taken all the necessary precautions with as much diligence as wisdom, returned to Tarraco.

A division had arose between the three Generals of the Carthaginians, and had made them take quite different

Polyb. l.
ix. Ex-
cerpt. de
virt. & vit.
Liv. xxvi.
20.

* Ita claro ab ingenti virtutum suarum fiducia animo, ut nullum ferox verbum excideret; ingensque omnibus quæ diceret, cum majestas inesset tum fides. Liv.

A.R. 540. ferent winter-quarters; Asdrubal the son of Gisgo
 Ant. C. was on the side next Cadiz upon the coast of the
 212. ocean; Mago in the middle of the country, especially
 beyond the † forest of Castulon; Asdrubal the son of
 Amilcar near the Iberus in the neighbourhood of Sa-
 guntum.

Liv. xxvi.
 21.
 Plut. in
 Marc.
 310.

About the end of the same campaign, Marcellus re-
 turned from Sicily to Rome. The Prætor C. Calpur-
 nius assembled the Senate in the temple of Bellona,
 without the city, according to custom, to give him au-
 dience. Marcellus there gave an account of his ac-
 tions and victories; and after having modestly com-
 plained, as well in his own name, as in that of
 his foldiers, that after having driven the Carthagi-
 nians out of Sicily, and reduced the province again
 under the Romans, he had not been permitted to bring
 back his army; he demanded leave to enter the city
 in triumph. That honour was not granted him, not
 through any dissatisfaction, but because the war of
 Sicily did not seem to be terminated yet. He only
 obtained an Ovation, that is, the smaller triumph.
 The day before he was to enter Rome he had the ho-
 nours of the Great triumph upon the Alban mountain,
 a custom which had been established some years be-
 fore, in the 521st year of Rome.

When he entered the city, besides the picture that
 represented the taking of Syracuse, it was preceded
 by the Catapultæ, Balistæ, and all the other machines
 of war, which had fallen into his hands; by the su-
 perb ornaments, which the magnificence of the Kings
 had accumulated during a long peace in that capital
 city; by a great number of silver and brazen vases
 of exquisite workmanship, rich moveables of all kinds,
 and famous statues, with which Syracuse was more
 adorned than any other of the Grecian cities. Eight
 elephants were also led in the procession, as a proof of
 his victories over the Carthaginians. Sosius of Syra-
 cuse, and Mericus of Spain, walked before Marcel-

† In Andalusia.

lus with crowns of gold on their heads. They had much contributed to the taking of the city. The freedom of the city and five hundred acres of land were given to them both; to Sosius in the territory of Syracuse, with any house in the city he should choose; and to Mericus and the Spaniards, who had embraced the party of the Romans with him, one of the revolted cities of Sicily for their abode, and lands in the country, that had been confiscated by right of conquest.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

Cicero highly praised the moderation of Marcellus in respect to the paintings and statues of the Syracusans. * Having taken Syracuse by force of arms, says that Orator, he might have brought away all that he found in it: But he consulted less the rights of victory than the laws of humanity: or rather he knew how to unite them, by observing a wise medium between both. He carried many masterpieces of art to Rome, and left at least as many at Syracuse, to adorn the one, and console the other. He even made it a duty of religion, not to take away any statues of their Gods from the latter; and as to those he caused to be brought to Rome, he placed them all in the temples of Virtue and Honour, and in other the like places, but none in his own houses or gardens; convinced that his house in having none of those ornaments would itself become the ornament of the city.

Livy and Plutarch do not judge so favourably of the conduct of Marcellus. They observe that it made way, undoubtedly contrary to his intention, for a disorder which occasioned great evils in the Common-

* In ornatu urbis habuit victoriæ rationem, habuit humanitatis. Victoriæ putabat esse, multa Romam deportare, quæ ornamento esse possent: humanitatis, non plane spoliare urbem, præsertim quam conservare voluisset. In hac partitione ornatus, non plus victoria Marcelli populo Romano appetivit, quam humanitas Syracusanis reservavit. Romam quæ asportata sunt, ad ædem Honoris atque Virtutis itemque aliis in locis videmus: nihil ædibus, nihil in hortis posuit, nihil in suburbano. Putavit, si urbis ornamenta domum suam non contulisset, domum suam ornamento urbi futuram. Syracusis autem permulta atque egregia reliquit: deum vero nullum violavit, nullum attigit. Cic. Ver. de Sign. 120, 121.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

wealth. “ All † these fine works of painting and sculpture, says the first, were indeed spoils taken from the enemy, from whom the rights of war admitted them to be taken. But this was the unhappy beginning of that fatal taste, which the Romans conceived for the arts of Greece, that till then they had neither known nor esteemed; which soon induced them to plunder without scruple in the provinces, not only the houses of private persons, but the temples of the Gods; and at length to practise their sacrilegious thefts even in the temples of Rome, and particularly in those which Marcellus had so magnificently adorned. For, adds that Historian, we do not see at this time in the temples of Virtue and Honour the paintings and statues that Marcellus had placed there, and which formerly attracted the curiosity of strangers.”

Plut. in
Marc. 310.

Plutarch insists still more strongly upon this reflexion. “ Till then, says he, Rome had neither had, nor even known, these sumptuous and superfluous curiosities, and those fine ornaments of sculpture, which are now so much sought after, were not to be found in her. Full of arms taken from the Barbarians, and bloody spoils; crowned with monuments of trophies and triumphs, she presented to the eye a sight, which had a martial air, and perfectly agreed with a warlike and victorious State. The People, however, were highly pleased with Marcellus for having adorned the city with so many fine works, which in their variety, include all the beauty, delicacy, and fine taste of the Greeks. Judicious persons were of a different opinion, and infinitely preferred the conduct of Fabius Maximus, who brought nothing of the like nature from the city of Tarentum, which he took two years afterwards: for he contented himself with the gold and all

† Hostium quidem illa spolia, & parta belli juris: cæterum inde primum initium mirandi Græcarum artium opera, licentiæque hinc sacra profanaque omnia vulgò spoliandi, factum est: quæ postremò in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum, quod a Marcello eximiè ornatum est, vertit. LIV. XXV. 40.

the other useful riches; but left the paintings and statues of the Gods in their places. It was upon this occasion he said these memorable words: "Let us leave the Tarentines their offended Gods." Marcellus was reproached first, with having excited hatred and enmity against Rome, in causing not only men, but * Gods, to be led captives in his triumph: and next with having made of a people accustomed to make war, and to cultivate their lands, and who knew not what luxury and softness were, one that piqued themselves no longer upon any thing but refinement of taste for the arts, and conversed solely upon the beauty of these kind of works, and the excellency of the artists."

A. R. 541:
Ant. C.
211;

Polybius, that most judicious Historian, in a fragment come down to us, examines whether the Romans did wisely in carrying to Rome the ornaments of the cities they had subjected; and concludes in the negative. He supports his opinion with two or three principal reasons.

First, if the Romans had aggrandized and exalted their country by what are called the fine arts, and all that depends on them, it is evident that they would have done well to have brought into it what had augmented its power and glory. But if it was by a very simple or plain kind of life, and an infinite remoteness from luxury and magnificence, that they had subjected the States, in which these ornaments were found in the greatest number and perfection, it must be confessed, that they committed a great fault in taking them away; for to depart from the manners to which a people owe their victories, to assume those of the conquered, and to draw upon themselves in the consequence, the hatred that always attends violences of the kind we have been speaking of, is a conduct not to be excused.

Polybius has a second reason in this place, which is very strong. And indeed, to treat subjected cities in

* Cicero says the contrary. Deum verò nullum violavit nullum attingit.

A. R. 541. this manner ; to add to their afflictions for being con-
 Ant. C. 211. quered That of seeing themselves deprived of the pre-
 cious monuments, that were the objects of their attach-
 ment and religion ; to exhibit these foreign riches as
 a sight ; to display them with pomp to the view of
 all the world, and even of those from whom they
 have been taken ; and to make the calamities of others
 the ornaments of one's country, is in some measure
 to insult the misfortune of the conquered ; is being
 desirous to perpetuate their shame and grief, and at
 the same time to excite a secret indignation against the
 victors, which the view of such spoils must revive
 every day.

If the Romans had amassed only gold and silver in
 their conquests, their policy could not have been
 blamed on that account. In order to attain universal
 empire, it was necessary to deprive the conquered
 States of such riches, and to appropriate them to them-
 selves. But as for these wonders of the art, it would
 have been much more glorious to have left them
 where they were, with the envy they attract, and to
 have placed the glory of their country, not in the
 abundance and beauty of paintings and statues, but
 in dignity of manners, and nobleness of sentiments.

Cato, before Polybius, thought in the same manner,
 and complained vehemently of the dangerous taste,
 that had been introduced at Rome, and even began to
 gain ground exceedingly. * “ I already hear but
 too many persons, who praise with transports of ad-
 miration, these works, which constitute the ornament
 of Corinth and Athens, and laugh at the antiquated
 simplicity of the statues of our Gods. Believe me,
 when we introduced the statues of Syracuse into
 Rome, we brought in enemies, that sooner or later
 will occasion the ruin of the city.”

† Jam nimis multos audio Corinthi & Athenarum ornamenta lau-
 dantes mirantesque & ante fixa fictilia deorum Romanorum ridentes.
 --- Infesta, mihi credite, * signa ab Syracusis illata sunt huic urbi.

* The word Signa in this passage signifies statues, paintings, and military en-
 signs.

Experience shewed how just these reflexions were. Greece, conquered by the Romans, conquered them in her turn by imparting her taste for the delicacy of the works of art to that people, who had hitherto been gross and ignorant in respect to them.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

*Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, & artes
Intulit agresti Latio.*

Horat. Ep.
1. l. 2.

Greece conquer'd won her haughty victors hearts,
And rustick Latium fell before her arts.

In the time of Cicero, this passion rose even to excess, or rather to a kind of madness and phrenzy. The governors of provinces left no work of painting or sculpture, that were in any esteem, either in the houses of private persons, or even in the temples of the Gods, and committed robberies in them, which rendered the name of the Roman People odious and execrable to foreign nations, as we see in one of Cicero's orations against Verres, entituled *De Signis*. This was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the empire. Luxury, (of which this passion for paintings and statues constituted a part,) "more powerful and more fatal than all the armies of the enemy, subdued Rome, and avenged the conquered globe."

————— *Savior armis*
Luxuria incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem.

Juvenal.

After Marcellus had quitted Sicily, the Carthaginian fleet landed eight thousand foot and three thousand Numidian horse in that province. Those troops made some cities take arms in favour of the Carthaginians, and ravaged the lands of some of the allies of Rome. Besides which the Roman army, enraged at neither having been permitted to return to Rome with their General, nor to winter in the cities of Sicily, served with great repugnance and indolence; and the soldiers only wanted a leader for exciting a sedition in the province. The Prætor M. Cornelius

Liv. xxvii.
21.

A. R. 541. furmounted all these difficulties. He pacified the soldiers by sometimes treating them with kindness, and sometimes by speaking to them roughly; and he made the cities that had revolted return to their duty.

Ant. C.
211.

The two Consuls were in Apulia with their armies. But, as there was no longer so much to fear from Hannibal and the Carthaginians, they had orders to draw lots for Apulia and Macedonia. The latter fell to Sulpicius, whither he went to succeed Lævinus: Fulvius was recalled to Rome to preside at the election of the new magistrates for the following year. When the question was to nominate Consuls, the century of the youth called Veturia, to whom it had fallen by lot to vote first, chose T. Manlius Torquatus, and T. Otacilius. A croud of people, assured that the plurality of voices, as it seldom failed to happen, would confirm this choice, had assembled round Manlius, who was present, to congratulate him upon his promotion. Manlius then approaching the Consul's tribunal, desired the favour of being heard. Every body was eager to know what he was going to ask, when he excused himself for not accepting the command upon account of the weakness of his eyes. He added, "That * it would be an inexcusable rashness in a General, as well as in a Pilot, when he could not act but by the eyes of another, to think of letting others confide their lives, and all that was dear to them, to his care. That therefore he desired the Consul to make the century of the youth, who had given their suffrages, vote again, and to exhort them to consider attentively, before they elected Consuls, the nature of the war to be carried on in Italy, and the state in which the Commonwealth then was. That they had scarce recovered the alarm and terror, the approach of Hannibal had occasioned in Rome; when that formidable enemy had made his troops advance some few months before to the very gates of

* Impudentem & gubernatorem & imperatorem esse, qui, cum alienis oculis ei omnia agenda sint, postulet sibi aliorum capita ac fortunas committi, Liv.

the city." The century replied, that they persisted in their opinion, and should not depart from the choice they had just made.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

Torquatus then assuming a sterner tone: " If I am Consul, said he, I shall neither be able to bear the looseness of your manners, nor you the severity of my command. Go then, and vote again ; and remember we have a war in Italy against the Carthaginians, and that Hannibal is at their head."

The tone of authority which Manlius had assumed, and the admiration of his generosity signified by an universal applause, made the century sensible, that it was necessary to think of another choice. But, before they proceeded to it, they demanded permission of the Consul, to consult their elders, that is the old men that formed the other part of the century, called also Veturia. Time was allowed the seniors to confer with the youth in the inclosure or † Fold, (*in ovili*) into which each century went in its turn to give its suffrage. The seniors told them, " That there were three persons, of whom they might consider which to chuse ; two of them had already exercised the first offices of the Commonwealth with honour ; these were Q. Fabius, and M. Marcellus. And in case they thought fit to chuse a new General against the Carthaginians, that M. Valerius Lævinus had signalized himself by sea and land in the war in which he had commanded against Philip." The old men withdrew, and the youth, after having consulted together, chose M. Marcellus, all glorious from his late conquest of Sicily, and M. Valerius. All the centuries approved this choice.

* Livy, after having related this fact, cannot help exclaiming against those of his time, who derided the manners

† This place was surrounded with rails, or hurdles, like sheepfolds, from whence it took its name, Ovile.

* Eludant nunc antiqua mirantes. Non equidem, si qua sit sapientium civitas, quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt, aut principes graviores temperantioresque à cupidine imperii, aut multitudinem melius moratam censeam fieri posse. Centuriam verò juniorum seniores

A. R. 541. manners of the antients, and affected to turn their ad-
 Ant. C. mirers into ridicule. “ For my part, (says he,) I am
 211. convinced, that if there ever was a Commonwealth
 of wise men, such as the learned have rather ima-
 gined than known, (he alludes to Plato’s Common-
 wealth) it could not be composed either of chiefs
 more moderate, and less desirous of honours, or of
 a People better disciplined and more docile. But
 in particular, that the century of the youth should
 consult that of the seniors, concerning the choice
 they should make, is what scarce seems probable
 in these days, when the authority of fathers them-
 selves is so little respected by their children.” This
 last stroke shews how much Rome had degenerated
 from the manners of the ancient times, when chil-
 dren’s want of respect for their parents would have
 appeared something monstrous.

After the election of the Consuls, the Prætors were
 chosen. At that time, news came that T. Otacilius,
 for whom the Consulship had been intended, was
 dead in Sicily.

The games called Ludi Apollinares had been cele-
 brated the year before, and the Prætor Calpurnius
 having proposed, that they should be celebrated again
 Liv. xxvii. this year, the Senate decreed, that they should be ce-
 23. lebrated annually for the future, which however was
 not put in execution till four years after.

Liv. xxvi. At the same time M. Valerius Lævinus, who, as
 24. we have said above, had been sent with a fleet and
 some troops into Greece and Macedonia, in order to
 weaken Philip, endeavoured to debauch some of his
 allies from him. The † Ætolians at that time made
 a considerable figure in Greece. They were a fierce
 and brutal People, and had rendered themselves for-
 midable to all their neighbours by their violences,

nieres verè consulere voluisse, quibus imperium suffragio mandaret,
 vix ut verisimile sit, parentum quoque hoc seculo vilis levisque apud
 liberos auctoritas fecit.

† Ætolia, now called the Despotship, a small country of Turkey
 in Europe, is situated upon the coast of the Ionian sea.

and

and the more, as they were skilled in military affairs, and excelled especially in cavalry. Valerius began by founding the disposition of the principal persons of the nation in private conversations; and after having brought them over, he repaired with a fleet well equipped to the place, where the general assembly was to be held: it had been called expressly some time before. “ There, after having related in what flourishing condition the affairs of the Romans were, and proved it by the taking of Syracuse in Sicily; and of Capua in Italy; he highly extolled the generosity and fidelity of the Romans to their allies. He added, that the Ætolians might expect to be treated so much the better by them, as they would be the first people beyond sea, that had made an alliance with them. That Philip and the Macedonians were dangerous neighbours to them, from whom they had every thing to fear. That Rome had already very much humbled their pride, and well knew how to reduce them, not only to restore the places they had taken from the Ætolians, but even to apprehend for their own country. That as to the Acarnanians, who had separated themselves from the body and society of the Ætolians, she would make them comply with the same conditions, and return to the same dependence they had been under in former times.”

Scopas, who held the first dignity at that time amongst the Ætolians, and Dorimachus, the most popular of their Senators, very much supported the discourse and promises of Valerius, and went much farther than him in respect to the Roman greatness and power, because they were not obliged to be so much reserved as he upon that head: and every body was more disposed to believe them, than a stranger, speaking for the interests of his country. What pleased them most, was the hope of reducing Acarnania again under their power. The treaty in consequence was concluded between the Romans and Ætolians. A clause was added to it, by which the Eleans, Lacedæmonians, Attalus King of Pergamus, Pleu-
rates

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

A. R. 541. rates and Scerdiledæus, the first King of Thrace, and
 Ant. C. the other of Illyricum, were left at liberty to accede
 211. to it. The Ætolians engaged to declare immediately, and to make war upon Philip, and the Romans to supply them with at least twenty galleys *Quinqueremes*. All the cities from Ætolia to the island of Corcyra, with their dependencies, were abandoned to the Ætolians. All the spoils were to belong to the Romans, who obliged themselves to act in such a manner, as to re-instate the Ætolians in possession of * Acarnania. It was also stipulated, that the Ætolians should not make peace with Philip, but upon condition, that he should not attack the Romans or their allies; and that the Romans on their side should enter into the same engagement. Acts of hostility were immediately began. Some cities were taken from Philip: after which Lævinus retired to Corcyra, well convinced, that the King had affairs and enemies enough upon his hands to divert him from thinking of Italy and Hannibal.

Liv. xxvi. Philip passed the winter at Pella his capital, when
 25. he received advice of the treaty of the Ætolians. In order to be in a condition to march as soon as possible against them, he applied himself in putting the affairs of Macedonia in order, and to secure it against the insults of its neighbours. Scopas, on his side, prepared to act against the Acarnanians; who finding themselves incapable of making head at once against two such potent states as Ætolia and Rome, armed however, rather through despair and fury than reason, and resolved to sell their lives dear. Having sent into Epirus, upon which they bordered, their wives, children, and the old men above sixty, all the rest from fifteen to sixty took an oath not to return from the war except victorious, and not to receive into the city, their houses, or at their tables, any person whatsoever, that should abandon the field of battle, after having been defeated. They made the most terrible

* Hodie, La Carnia. It is part of the Despotship.

imprecations against themselves, if they failed in their engagement; and only desired of the Epirots to bury those in one grave, who should die in battle, with this inscription: HERE LIE THE ACARNANIANS, WHO DIED FIGHTING FOR THEIR COUNTRY AGAINST THE VIOLENCE AND INJUSTICE OF THE ÆTOLIANS. They set out that instant full of courage to meet the enemy upon their frontiers. Such a resolution terrified the Ætolians. Besides which they were informed, that Philip was already upon his march to aid his allies. This induced them to retire with precipitation, and Philip did the same.

A. R. 541.
Ant. C.
211.

At the beginning of the spring, Lævinus besieged † Anticyra by sea and land, which surrendered soon after. He evacuated it to the Ætolians, who had seconded him in the siege, and kept only the spoils, as had been agreed by the treaty. He there received advice, that he had been elected Consul in his absence, and that P. Sulpicius was set out to succeed him. But having been taken ill of a disorder rather long than dangerous, he did not go to Rome, till much later than he was expected.

Liv. xxvi.
26.

S E C T. III.

Marcellus enters upon office. Complaints of the People. Great fire at Rome. The Campanians, who set the city on fire, punished with death. Complaints of the Campanians against Fulvius. They follow Lævinus to Rome, in his return from Sicily. Complaints of the Sicilians against Marcellus. Consequences of that affair, which at length terminates happily. Severe sentence passed by the Senate against the Campanians. Decree in respect to the fleet, which occasions great murmurs. Salutary counsels of the Consul Lævinus. The whole people in emulation of each other, carry in their gold and silver into the publick treasury. Hannibal's cruel resolution

† A small city in the gulf of Lepanto, now called Suola. It was famous amongst the ancients for hellebore, which its soil produced in abundance.

in respect to the cities in his alliance. Salapia retaken by the Romans. Defeat of a Roman fleet by that of Tarentum. The garrison of the citadel of Tarentum gains an advantage over that of the place. Affairs of Sicily. Lævinus makes himself master of Agrigentum, and drives the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily. Affairs of Spain. Scipio forms a great design, and prepares every thing for the execution of it during the winter season. The army and fleet set out together, and arrive at the same time before Carthagera. Situation of that city. It is besieged by sea and land. Carthagera taken by assault and scaling. Its plunder considerable. Manner of dividing the spoils used by the Romans. Scipio harangues the victorious army, and praises the valour and zeal of the troops. Very warm dispute concerning the mural crown, terminated pacifically by Scipio. Scipio's generosity to the hostages and prisoners. His wise conduct in respect to the Ladies found amongst the hostages. He restores a young princess of exquisite beauty to Allucius. Warm gratitude of that Prince. Praise of Scipio. He sends Lælius to Rome, to carry the news of his victory. He exercises the land and sea forces. Scipio returns to Terraco. The Carthaginians conceal their grief for the loss of Carthagera.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS IV.

M. VALERIUS LÆVINUS II.

Liv. xxvi.
26.

Marcellus having entered upon office on the Ides of March (the fifteenth) assembled the Senate that day only for form-sake, having declared, " that he would enter upon no affair relating to the Commonwealth, or the provinces of the Generals, in the absence of his Collegue. That he knew there was a great number of Sicilians in the neighbourhood of Rome, in the houses of those who envied his glory ; and that far from preventing them openly to lay the accusations calumny had invented against him in Rome, he would immediately have given them audience in the Senate, if those strangers had not indus-
triously

triously given out, that they dared not speak against the Consul in the absence of his colleague. That as soon as Lævinus should arrive at Rome, he would introduce the Sicilians into the Senate, and not suffer any other affair to be brought on till they had been heard. That M. Cornelius (Prætor of Sicily) had in a manner caused a drum to be beat through the province, for accusers against him, and had sent as many as he could of them to Rome. And that, to fully his reputation, he actually wrote continually to his friends in the city, that the war was not terminated in Sicily."

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

The Consul having made every body admire his reserve and moderation, dismissed the Senate. It seemed as if nothing was to be done till the arrival of the other Consul. Idleness, as is usual, excited the murmurs of the People. "They complained of the evils occasioned by a long war. That all the countries, through which Hannibal had passed, were ruined, and made deserts. That Italy was exhausted by levies. That they lost some great battle every year; and that two Generals had been elected Consuls of an active restless disposition that breathed nothing but battle, and were so far from being of a temper to suffer the people to take any repose in war, that they were capable of disturbing the tranquility of the Commonwealth in times of entire peace.

A fire, which happened in several parts of the Forum at once in the night, interrupted these discourses. It continued burning an whole night and day, and consumed a great number of buildings. It appeared evidently to be the effect of malice, and not of accident. It was for this reason, that the Consul, by the authority of the Senate, declared in full Assembly, that whoever would discover the criminal, should, if free, have a sum of money, and his liberty, if a slave. This promise induced a slave named Mannus to accuse the Calavii his masters, with five other persons of the best families in Capua, whose fathers had been beheaded by the order of Q. Fulvius. They were
seized

A. R. 542. seized with their slaves. At first they denied the
 Ant. C. fact. But when they saw, that those whom they had
 210. employed for setting the city on fire, were put to the
 torture in the middle of the Forum, they confessed
 the whole. They were all punished with death, and
 their accomplices; and the informer for his reward,
 besides his liberty, received a sum * of money which
 amounted to very near fifty pounds sterling.

The Consul Lævinus passing through Capua on his
 return from Greece, was surrounded by a great throng
 of the Campanians, who conjured him with tears in
 their eyes, to suffer them to go to Rome, to throw
 themselves at the feet of the Senate, to implore its
 mercy if possible, and to beg, that they would not
 suffer Flaccus to extirpate them entirely, and to abolish
 the very name of Campanian, as he seemed to design.
 Flaccus to this invective replied, “ that he had no
 personal enmity for the Campanians : but that he hated
 them as the declared enemies of the Commonwealth,
 and that he should never cease to treat them as such,
 as long as he found them inclined as they were in re-
 spect to Rome. That there was not a people in the
 world, that had so confirmed an hatred for the Ro-
 man name. That the reason why he kept them
 within the walls, was because those of them, that
 could get out, dispersed immediately about the coun-
 try, like wild beasts, killing and destroying whatever
 came in their way. That some of them had taken re-
 fuge with Hannibal, and others gone to Rome, to
 set it on fire. That the Consul on his arrival in that
 city, would find recent traces of the guilt of those
 frantic wretches in the midst of the Forum. That as
 for him, he did not think it safe to let the Campa-
 nians enter Rome.” Lævinus, having obliged the
 Campanians to swear to Flaccus, that they would return
 to Capua five days after they should have received the
 Senate’s answer, commanded them to follow him to
 Rome.

* Viginti millia æris.

He entered Rome with this train, which was augmented by the Sicilians, who came to meet him; bringing along with him, to accuse two Generals, who had acquired immortal glory by taking two of the most famous cities in the world, the very people their arms had conquered.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

The first thing the Consuls brought on, was the dispositions it was necessary to make for the campaign, upon which they were entering. Lævinus gave an account of the situation of affairs in Macedonia and Greece; those of the Ætolians, Acarnanians, and Locrians; and of what he had done himself both by sea and land. The Senate afterwards regulated every thing in respect to the provinces as well of the Consuls, as of the other Commanders. And as to what regarded the Consuls in particular, it was decreed that one of them should remain in Italy against Hannibal; that the other should go to Sicily; and that the Commonwealth should have this year, only one and twenty Legions on foot.

After the Senate had entirely regulated what regarded the distribution of the Commanders and troops, the Consuls drew lots for their provinces. Sicily fell to Marcellus, with his command of the fleet; and Lævinus had the command in Italy against Hannibal. When the Sicilians, who were in the porch of the Senate-house, heard how the lots had fallen, they were so much afflicted, that a second taking of Syracuse could not have grieved them more. They raised mournful cries, that drew upon them the eyes of the whole assembly, and made way for different reflections. In their consternation they addressed their complaints to all the Senators in general, and to each of them in particular; protesting "that they would abandon their country and Sicily, if Marcellus returned thither with the supreme authority. That before they had given him any cause of discontent, he had acted with excessive rigour, and had shewn implacable wrath in respect to them: and what might they expect after the complaints, which he knew they had

Liv. xxvi.
29—32
Plut. in
Marc. 3114

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

had brought to Rome against him. That it would be more advantageous for that unhappy island to be destroyed by the flames of mount Ætna, or swallowed up by the waves of the sea, than to be abandoned to the revenge of its declared enemy."

These bitter complaints, often repeated in the houses of the Great, who were moved with them, in proportion either of their compassion for the Sicilians, or envy for Marcellus, came to be talked of in the Senate. The Consuls were desired to agree to consult the fathers in respect to the exchange of their provinces.

Marcellus replied, "that if the Sicilians had been admitted to audience in the Senate, he should perhaps have thought and acted in another manner, than he was disposed to do. But not to give any one room to say, that fear had prevented them from speaking with entire liberty against a man, to whose power they were upon the point of being subjected, he was ready, if his colleague did not think it inconvenient, to change provinces with him. That he only begged the Senate not to decide before-hand in favour of the Sicilians against him, by passing a decree for such exchange. As it would not have been reasonable, added he, to give Lævinus his choice of the provinces without leaving the determination to chance, it would be doing me a signal affront, to give him an employment fallen to me."

The Senate, after having expressed what they desired, but without decreeing it, withdrew. The Consuls then conferred together, and changed provinces: fate, says Livy, breaking through all obstacles, to oppose Marcellus to Hannibal; in order that, as he was the first of the Romans who had the glory of defeating him, he might also be the last that the Carthaginian should boast of having made fall in his snares; and that at a time when the Roman arms were successful, and resumed the superiority.

After the exchange of the provinces, the Sicilians having been introduced into the Senate began their harangue

rangue with the praise of King Hiero ; taking honour to the whole people of Syracuse for the services and faithful attachment of that Prince to the Commonwealth of Rome. They added, “ That the citizens of Syracuse had had no part in the infraction of the alliance and treaties, nor in any of the violences consequential of it. That Hieronymus first, and Hippocrates and Epicydes after, exercising a cruel tyranny over them, had in a manner kept them in chains : but that their hearts had always been for the Romans. That they had given undoubted proofs of this in all times. That seventy of the principal youth of the city had formed a conspiracy against Hippocrates and Epicydes, which had miscarried only through the fault of Marcellus. That the most considerable persons of Syracuse had continually gone to and fro between his camp and the city, to assure him, that they would deliver up the city to him when he pleased. That he had taken little notice of these advances, through the hope of acquiring great fame by taking the city by force. That not being able to succeed in that, he had chose rather to treat for the surrendry of the place with Sasis and Mercius, men of nothing, than with the principal citizens, who had so often made him the proposal, without having ever been hearkened to ; in order, no doubt, to have a more plausible pretext to plunder and destroy the most ancient of the allies of the Roman People. That accordingly Marcellus had treated them with the utmost inhumanity : that, except the houses stripped of every thing, there was nothing remaining in Syracuse. That they implored the Senate to take compassion of their misery, and to cause all to be returned, that could be restored to them.”

After they had made this heavy complaint, Lævinus ordered them to quit the house, in order to his taking the opinions of the Senators. But Marcellus taking the word : “ No, no,” said he, “ let them stay, “ that I may answer in their presence ; since our reward for making war for you, is to have those we

A.R. 542. " have subjected to your power for accusers. Let Capua
 Ant. C. " and Syracuse, taken the same year, have the satisfac-
 210. " tion of having cited their victors before your tribu-
 " nal."

The deputies accordingly returned into the house, and Marcellus resuming his discourse, said as follows :
 " I have not so much forgot the majesty of the Ro-
 " man people, nor the dignity of the office I am now
 " in, to make a Consul descend so low, as to answer
 " the accusations of these Greeks, if it were I that
 " should now appear as criminal. But the question
 " is much less to examine here into the treatment
 " they have had from me, than the punishment their
 " revolt deserved. If they have not been our ene-
 " mies, there is no difference in my having injured
 " Syracuse at present, or having done so in Hiero's
 " time. But if they have revolted against us ; if they
 " have pursued our Ambassadors sword in hand ; if
 " they have shut their gates against us ; if they have
 " defended the Carthaginian armies ; can they com-
 " plain of having suffered hostilities, they, who have
 " committed such cruel ones in respect to us ? The
 " concealing of those only with whom they accuse
 " me of having treated, is a proof, that I have not
 " rejected any persons, who have offered themselves
 " to serve the Commonwealth. Even before I be-
 " sieged Syracuse, I did my utmost to conclude a
 " peace with the Syracusans, sometimes by sending
 " Ambassadors, sometimes by going myself to hold
 " conferences with them. But seeing they carried
 " their insolence so far as to insult our Ambassadors,
 " and even myself, I found myself obliged against
 " my will to have recourse to arms. It is to Hanni-
 " bal, and the Carthaginians conquered with them,
 " that they should complain of the severity they have
 " met with ; and not in the Senate of the victors. As
 " for me, I aver, that I have done nothing contrary
 " to the laws of war, and the rules of equity. It is
 " for you to authorize the dispositions I have thought
 " proper to make ; that is more immediately the con-
 " cern

“cern of the Commonwealth, than mine. I have
 “done my duty. It is for you to take care, that by
 “disapproving and annulling what I have done, you
 “do not render other Generals less warm and zealous
 “for the service of the Commonwealth.”

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Marcellus, after having spoke thus, quitted the Senate, and went to the Capitol, in order to make the levies; and the Sicilian deputies also retired. Lævinus then brought the affair into deliberation. Opinions were divided for some considerable time. Most of them seconded T. Manlius Torquatus, who had expressed himself to this effect: “That the Generals of the Commonwealth had been appointed to make war against the Tyrants, who were equally enemies of Syracuse and Rome, and not against Syracuse itself. That it had been their duty to deliver it as an ally, and not to take it as an enemy; and after having taken it, to restore its laws and liberty, and not to plunder and ruin it. If Hiero, that most faithful friend and ally, should return to the earth, would any body have the boldness to shew him, on the one side Syracuse half ruined, and deprived of all the ornaments that adorned it in his time; and on the other, Rome enriched with the spoils of his unfortunate country?”

Notwithstanding these vehement declarations, which had for their principle, in some, compassion for the Sicilians, and in others, envy of Marcellus, the decree passed by the Senate was moderate enough, and sufficiently in favour of the Consul. Every thing he had done, and all the regulations he had made during the war, and since his victory, were confirmed, and orders given for their execution. The Senate declared, that it would take care of the interests of the Syracusans, and directed the Consul Lævinus to afford them all the redress and relief, that should not extend to the detriment of the Commonwealth.

Two Senators were immediately sent to the Capitol, to bring back Marcellus, and the Sicilians having also re-entered the Senate, the decree, that had just been

A. R. 542. passed, was read in the presence of the parties con-
 Ant. C. 210. cerned. The deputies of Syracuse were dismissed,
 after having been treated with all possible marks of
 amity and good-will. But before they withdrew, they
 threw themselves at the feet of Marcellus, desiring
 and conjuring him to pardon them for saying all they
 could, in order to excite some sense of compassion for
 their unfortunate country, and to vouchsafe to receive
 the city of Syracuse under his protection, and to con-
 sider its inhabitants as his clients. The Consul an-
 swered them with abundance of goodness and clemen-
 cy. The Syracusans, after the return of the depu-
 ties, paid Marcellus all the great honours they could
 imagine; instituted a festival, to which they gave his
 name, and which still subsisted in Cicero's time; and
 decreed by an express law, that as often as Marcellus,
 or any of his family, should come to Syracuse, the
 Syracusans should wear wreaths of flowers, and offer
 sacrifices to the Gods by way of thanksgiving. Mar-
 cellus, on his side, made it for his honour to protect
 them; and his descendants, as long as his name and
 family subsisted, were always the patrons of Syracuse.

Thus terminated, to the content and glory of both
 parties, an affair that began with so much warmth,
 but which seemed however less excited by the resent-
 ment of the people of Syracuse, than by the envy of
 some Romans, enemies to Marcellus, as Plutarch ex-
 pressly tells us.

Liv. xxvi. 33, 34. The Senate afterwards gave the deputies of Capua
 audience. Their complaints were still more lamentable
 than those of the Sicilians; but their cause was not so
 favourable. For they could not deny, but they had
 deserved to be punished rigorously; and they had not,
 like the others, a specious pretext for laying their re-
 volt to the charge of the Tyrants: but they believed,
 that so many Senators as had either been poisoned or
 beheaded, were a sufficient satisfaction. They added,
 "That only a small number of the nobility remained
 at Capua, whose consciences had not reproached them
 so much, as to induce them to deprive themselves of
 life;

life; and whom the victor had not deemed criminal enough to be punished with death. That they demanded liberty for them and theirs, with part of their fortunes. That they expected this grace from the Romans, most of whom were related to them by alliance or blood, since the many marriages contracted between the two States.”

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After these deputies had quitted the Senate, it was deliberated for some time, whether Q. Fulvius should be made to return from Capua, in order that this affair, which concerned him personally, and in which he must be better informed than any one else, might be treated in his presence. It was at length agreed, that it was not proper to make him quit his post, where his presence was necessary: and the less as there were several Senators present, who having served in the army during the siege of Capua, had been witnesses of all that had passed there, and could inform the Senate of it.

The affair was therefore brought upon the carpet. M. Atilius, the most distinguished of those who had served under Flaccus against the Campanians, having been desired to give his opinion, spoke to this effect.

“ I was of the council held by the Proconsuls after
“ the taking of Capua. After we had enquired what
“ Campanians had done our Commonwealth any ser-
“ vice, we found only two women, namely, Vestia
“ Oppia of the city of Atella, and Faucula Cluvia,
“ formerly a courtezan. The first did not let one day
“ pass without offering sacrifices to the Gods for the
“ safety and success of the Roman People: the other
“ secretly supplied such of our prisoners as wanted
“ them with provision. All the rest of the Campa-
“ nians have been actuated by an hatred for us equal
“ to that of the Carthaginians. And Q. Fulvius ra-
“ ther cut off the heads of the most illustrious, than
“ of the most criminal, of that people. For the rest,
“ I do not see, that the Senate can decide in respect
“ to the Campanians, who are Roman citizens, with-
“ out consulting the People.”

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Upon the remonstrance of Atilius, the People were consulted by one of their Tribunes, and they referred the affair entirely to the Senate.

In consequence of this decree of the People, the Senate began by restoring their estates and liberty to Oppia and Cluvia, adding, that if they desired to ask any other reward of the Senate, they had only to repair to Rome. How laudable is Oppia's zeal, who every day offered sacrifices for the Romans: but what a reproach is this for such persons as are now-a-days so little concerned for the good of the public!

Different decrees were made in respect to each family of the Campanians, which it would be too long to repeat. It was ordained, that none of those who were in Capua, whilst the gates had been shut to the Romans, should continue either in the city or territory after a certain day; and a place beyond and at some distance from the Tiber was assigned them to settle in. Others less criminal were placed at less distance from Capua. None of them were allowed to possess lands or houses at less than fifteen miles from the sea. The estates of all the Senators were sold at Capua, and of those, who had been magistrates, either in that city, Atella or Calatia, places in its neighbourhood. All the free persons, that had been reduced into slavery, were sent to Rome to be sold there. And lastly, it was decreed, in respect to the brass statues taken from the Campanians, that the college of Pontiffs should decide what ought to be considered as sacred, and what might pass for profane. When we recollect the excess of hatred, fury, and cruelty, with which Capua had acted against the Romans, we cannot be surprized at the severity of this punishment. The deputies returned in despair, complaining no longer against Flaccus, but of the injustice of the Gods, and the cruelty of Fortune.

• Liv. xxvi.
35, 36.

After the Sicilians and Campanians were dismissed, the levies for recruiting the armies were made: and the next care was to man the fleet with seamen. But as there were neither sufficient numbers in the Commonwealth

monwealth for this last occasion, nor money enough in the public treasury to hire men and pay them, the Consuls decreed, that private persons should supply, according to their ranks and incomes, as had been done before, a certain number of mariners, whom they should pay, and find provisions the moment of their embarkation for thirty days. This decree excited so universal a murmur, and so declared a discontent, that it would infallibly have occasioned a sedition, if there had been a leader capable of heading and supporting it. It was loudly complained, “That the Consuls, after having ruined the Sicilians and Campanians, were contriving to crush and destroy the Roman people themselves. That exhausted by the excessive taxes they had paid during so many years, they had nothing left but the soil of their barren and desert lands. That the enemy had burnt their houses, and the Commonwealth deprived them of the slaves whom they employed in husbandry, by forcing them to resign them, in order to their serving either as soldiers in the armies, or as seamen in the fleet. That the pay of the rowers, and the yearly taxes, had robbed them of the little money that still remained. That there was no authority, nor violence, that could make them give what they had not. That the Consuls then might sell the estates and effects of the citizens; that they might also make slaves of their persons; and that what they still had, did not suffice to pay their ransom.”

They held these discourses neither in secret, nor in small companies, but openly, and before the faces of the Consuls; who saw themselves in a manner invested by a multitude of exasperated citizens, whom those magistrates could neither appease by severity, nor gentle treatment. The Consuls wisely declared to the People, that they gave them three days to reflect upon what had been proposed; and themselves employed that interval in finding some expedient to extricate them out of this difficulty. The next day they assembled the Senate, in order to deliberate upon this

A. R. 542. Ant. C. 210. affair. After many speeches, they were obliged to confess, “That the People had some reason for murmuring, and refusing the aids demanded of them: but they however concluded, that it was absolutely necessary to lay this load upon particulars. For as there was no money in the public treasury, where else could they have seamen? and how could they preserve Sicily, keep Philip out of Italy, and defend its coasts, without having fleets in a condtion to act?”

In so unhappy a conjuncture, the Senators being highly embarrassed, and not knowing what to chuse, nor what advice to give, the Consul Lævinus represented to them, * “That as the magistrates were
 “above the Senators by their rank, and the Senators
 “above private citizens; so ought they to set them
 “the example, when the question was to aid their
 “country, and to take the heaviest and most oppres-
 “sive loads upon themselves. If you are for finding
 “in inferiors docility and submission in respect to
 “taxes and imposts; do you, and yours, contribute
 “first yourselves. The expence will be less felt by
 “the Small, when they see the Great impose more
 “upon themselves, than they would be obliged to
 “pay. If then we are for having the Roman people
 “supplied with fleets well equipped, and that parti-
 “culars should furnish rowers with a good will, let
 “us, as many of us as are Senators, begin the first
 “ourselves to furnish them. Let us to-morrow carry
 “in all the gold, silver, and copper money, that we
 “have, to the public treasury, retaining only our
 “rings, for us, our wives and children, and the Bullæ
 “(ornaments in the shape of an heart) worn by our
 “sons in their infancy. Such of us as have wives and
 “daughters, may keep an ounce of gold to serve as
 “ornaments for each of them. Those who have
 “served Curule offices, may keep the furniture of
 “their horses, and the quantity of silver necessary

* Magistratus Senatui, & Senatum populo, sicut honore præsent, ita ad omnia, quæ dura atque aspera essent subeunda duces debere esse. Si quid injungere inferiori velis, id prius in te actuos, si ipse juris statueris, facilius omnes obedientes habeas. Nec impensa gravis est, cum ex ea plusquam pro virili parte sibi quemque capere principum vident. LIV.

“ for making the vessels for salt, and libations, used
 “ in religious ceremonies. The other Senators shall
 “ keep only a pound of silver, and five thousand asses
 “ for the use of each family. Let us put into the
 “ hands of the Triumviri, or officers of the treasury,
 “ all the rest of our gold, silver, and copper money;
 “ and that without any decree of the Senate, in order
 “ that this voluntary contribution, and so laudable a
 “ passion for the service of our country, may first
 “ pique the Knights in point of honour, and next all
 “ the rest of the citizens, and inspire every one with
 “ an equal emulation for the public good. You
 “ have now the only expedient my colleague and my-
 “ self have been able to find, after having examined
 “ the affair with all possible attention. Go, fathers,
 “ and with the assistance of the Gods, be the first to put
 “ our counsel in execution. By saving the Common-
 “ wealth, we save our private interests; but by be-
 “ traying those of the public, we vainly should ima-
 “ gine our own secure.”

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This proposal was so well received, and executed
 with so much zeal and ardor, that the Consuls had
 the thanks of the Senate for making it. As soon as
 the Senators withdrew to their houses, they sent all
 their gold, silver, and copper money to the treasury,
 with so much emulation, that they seemed to contend
 who should be first upon the registers; and neither
 the Triumvirs sufficed to receive it, nor the clerks to
 write it down. The Knights imitated the ardor of
 the Senators, and the People that of the Knights.
 Thus, without any decree, or occasion to use the au-
 thority of the magistrates, the Commonwealth had
 its fleet manned with seamen, and had money to pay
 them. And now every thing being ready for open-
 ing the campaign, the Consuls repaired to their pro-
 vinces.

Since the war had broke out, the losses and suc-
 cesses had been so equal, that the Romans and Car-
 thaginians seemed to have actually as much to fear
 and to hope, as when the two States began hostilities.
 But what gave Hannibal most pain, was, that his in-
 dolent

Liv. xxvi.
 38.

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dolent and ineffectual endeavours to defend Capua, whilst the Romans attacked it with incredible vigour, had extremely hurt his reputation with most of the States of Italy, and much abated their warmth for his party. He could not put troops into the cities he had taken, capable of keeping them in awe, without dividing his army into many small bodies, which would by no means suit his views ; nor draw off his garrisons, without abandoning most of his allies. As he was equally avaricious and cruel, he determined to plunder and ravage the places he could not keep, and to leave them not in a condition of being of any advantage to his enemies. But this resolution was no less fatal to him in the event, than it was horrid in itself. For he thereby incurred the hatred, not only of those he had treated so inhumanly, but also of all the other states of Italy, who believed themselves threatened with the same fate. The Consul, on his side, was vigilant to improve all occasions of making the Italians

Liv. xxvi. return to their duty.

38.

Salapia (now called Salpe) was a city of Apulia, subject to Hannibal, in which he had a good garrison. Dasius and Blasius were the two principal citizens of that place. The latter was entirely in the interest of the Romans; and had often endeavoured, but always ineffectually, to bring Dasius over. This did not hinder him from soliciting the other continually ; till in effect of new instances, and remonstrating how advantageous that change would be to both, as well as to their country, he made him consent to deliver up the city to Marcellus, with the Carthaginian garrison, consisting of five hundred Numidians. But those soldiers, who were the flower of Hannibal's cavalry, sold their lives dear. Accordingly, though they had been surprized, and could make no use of their horses in the city ; however, having armed themselves in the midst of the tumult, they used their utmost efforts to get out of the place ; which not being able to effect, they fought like men in despair, resolving to quit their arms only with their lives ; so that not above fifty of them fell into the hands of the Romans alive.

The

The loss of those horse was more affecting, and did Hannibal more hurt, than that of the city of Salapia. From thenceforth, he did nothing considerable with his cavalry, which was the part of his forces that had acquired him most advantages over the enemy.

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At this time the Roman garrison, which defended the citadel of Tarentum, could scarce support any longer the famine, that distressed them; and M. Livius, the Governor of that place, had no resource, except in the provisions that came from Sicily. In order to secure their passage along the coasts of Italy, there was a fleet near Rhegium of twenty ships. D. Quintius, an officer of obscure birth, but who had advanced himself by his merit, commanded it. Having sailed from Rhegium, at about fifteen miles from that city, near the Sacred Port, he fell in with the fleet of Tarentum, consisting as well as his own of twenty sail, and commanded by Democrites. They immediately came to a battle. Never did two fleets, however strong and numerous, charge with so much ardor and fury. They boarded each other immediately, and the soldiers going from one ship into another fought in a firm front, as they might have done by land. The success was long doubtful. But Quintius, Commander of the Roman squadron, being killed, his death put the other galleys into a consternation; so that betaking themselves to flight, some were sunk, and others having made to the land by the help of their oars, were taken by the people of Thurium and Metapontum. Happily almost all the transports, that followed the fleet laden with provisions, escaped the pursuit of the enemy.

An advantage gained by the garrison of the citadel of Tarentum over the enemy, consoled it a little for the misfortune of the fleet. Livius, who commanded it, being intent upon taking advantage of all the occasions that offered, had no sooner been informed, that four thousand men had quitted the city, in order to forage in the country, and were dispersed about without precaution, than he sent one of his bravest officers, called C. Persius, against them, with two thousand

Liv. xxvi.
39.

Liv. ibid.

A. R. 542. thousand soldiers. The latter having found them
 Ant. C. straggling on all sides, made a great slaughter of
 210. them, and obliged the few that could escape them, to re-enter Tarentum in haste, of which the gates were but half opened; so much did the inhabitants fear, that Persius might throw himself into the place with those that fled.

Liv. xxvi. At this time the Consul Lævinus arrived in Sicily,
 40. where he was expected with equal ardor by all the allies of the Commonwealth, as well old as new. The first thing he did, was to put the affairs of Syracuse in some order, which the new peace they enjoyed, had not yet been capable of entirely reinstating in its antient tranquility.

He afterwards marched his legions against Agrigentum, the only city of importance of the province that remained in the hands of the enemy, and in which the Carthaginians had a strong garrison. He had the good fortune to succeed entirely in this enterprise. Hanno commanded in chief in it: but the Carthaginians relied most upon Mutines, the General of the Numidians. That officer over-running all Sicily with his troops, ravaged the lands of the allies of the Romans; and it was not possible, either to keep him out of Agrigentum, when he thought fit to re-enter it, or to prevent him from quitting it, as often as he desired to go out, and plunder the country. The glory Mutines had acquired by his great successes, beginning to give Hanno umbrage, excited that General's envy and hatred against him, who not being able to hear any longer without pain the advantages he continued to gain over the enemy, deprived him of his post, to give it to his own son. Envy, the basest of all vices, blinds those who are so unhappy to give themselves up to it. Hanno assured himself, that Mutines would cease to be esteemed by the Numidians, when he had no longer any authority over them. Directly the contrary happened. The injustice done that brave officer only augmented the affection and attachment of his Numidians for him; and Mutines, on his side, could not bear the affront he

he had received ; so that he privately sent a courier to Lævinus, in order to treat with him concerning the surrendry of Agrigentum. When they had agreed upon the conditions and manner, in which the place was to be put into the hands of the Romans, the Numidians seized the gate that led to the sea, and having either killed or driven away those that guarded it, they introduced into the city a body of the enemy, who had repaired thither expressly. They had already advanced towards the middle of the city, and as far as the public place, in order of battle, when Hanno, hearing the noise and tumult which they occasioned, but which he attributed to the mutiny of the Numidians, who had already rose more than once, ran thither to appease the sedition. Perceiving then by the number, which was greater than that of the Numidians, and hearing the language of the Romans more distinctly, which was not unknown to him, he thought proper to fly, and quitting the city with Epicycles through the opposite gate, they both repaired to the sea-side ; where happily for them finding a small vessel, they embarked for Africa, abandoning the possession of Sicily to the Romans, which they had disputed with them during so many years. The rest of the multitude, consisting of Carthaginians and Sicilians, without endeavouring to defend themselves, ran with as much precipitation as blindness and terror, towards the gates of the city, in order to escape. But having found them shut, they were all killed near the gates and places leading to them.

Lævinus seeing himself absolutely master of Agrigentum, caused the heads of the principal citizens to be cut off, after they had been whipped with rods, and sold all the rest with the plunder. The whole amount he sent to Rome. The rumour of the taking of Agrigentum, and of the revenge executed upon its inhabitants, having spread in Sicily, subjected all the rest to the power of the Romans. In a very short time twenty cities were delivered up to them, in effect of secret intelligence : six were taken by force, and more than forty surrendered voluntarily.

The

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The Consul having either punished or rewarded the principal persons of those cities, accordingly as they deserved, obliged the Sicilians at length to renounce war, and apply themselves solely to agriculture; in order that the island by its fertility, might be in a condition, not only to subsist its own inhabitants, but to supply the city of Rome and Italy with grain; as it had frequently done on many occasions. He carried away with him into Italy four thousand men, who were an herd of robbers driven out of different countries for their debts and crimes, and accustomed to live by rapine and theft, and who could not but disturb the still but weakly established peace Sicily began to enjoy.

Polyb. x.
576—
596.

As to the affairs of Spain, P. Scipio is going to make himself known there, and to give us by his conduct an idea of one of the greatest captains that the world perhaps ever produced. It is principally after Polybius, that we talk in this manner; and he was capable of judging well of the fact, as he relates nothing concerning that great man, but from the mouth of C. Lælius, who, from his earliest youth to Scipio's death, had attended him in all his enterprizes, and had always been the faithful confident of all his secrets.

Scipio being informed, before he left Rome, that his father had been defeated only through the treachery of the Celtiberians, and because the Roman army had been divided, did not give way to the universal terror, that the victories of the Carthaginians in Spain had excited amongst the People. Having afterwards been informed, that the allies on this side of the Iberus had not changed in respect to the Romans, that the Generals of the Carthaginians did not agree amongst themselves, and treated the people in subjection to them with cruelty, he set out full of confidence, and assured himself of great success.

Polyb.
580.

He was scarce arrived in Spain, than revolving already a great design in his mind, and taking advantage of the leisure the winter-quarters afforded, he in-

formed

formed himself with all possible exactness of the condition in which the affairs of the enemy were. Care and foresight of this kind prepare and assure great successes. He was informed, as we have already observed, that prosperity had soon been followed by a misunderstanding between the Carthaginian Generals: that they had separated their forces; that they were at a very great distance from each other; and that neither of them had less than ten days march from New Carthage.

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In consequence, he at first judged that it was not proper to come to a pitched battle. That in doing so, he must either fight all the enemy's armies together, and then it would be to hazard every thing, as well on account of the preceding losses, as because his troops were much inferior in number to the enemy, or attack only one of the three Generals, in which case he was afraid, that if he put him to flight, and the rest should come to his aid, he should be surrounded, and incur the same misfortune, as Cneus Scipio his uncle and Publius his father had done. He therefore directed his march another way.

Knowing that New Carthage was of infinite advantage to the enemy, and that it might prove a great obstacle to the successes he hoped, he informed himself during the winter-quarters from prisoners in all that related to it. They told him, that it was almost the only city of Spain that had a port fit to receive a fleet and naval army: that it was commodiously situated for the landing of the Carthaginians from Africa, and crossing the arm of the sea between them; that a great quantity of silver was kept there; that all the munitions of the armies, and the hostages of all Spain were there: and which was most important, that the garrison consisted only of a thousand men; because nobody could imagine, as the Carthaginians were masters of almost all Spain, that any one would dare to conceive thoughts of besieging that place: that the city was besides really well peopled, but with artificers, merchants, and other people of that kind, all
entirely

A. R. 542. entirely strangers in respect to war, and who would
 Ant. C. only serve to advance the taking of the city, if it
 210. were unexpectedly attacked.

He made himself as well acquainted with the situation of the city, the munitions it contained, and the disposition of the lake, with which it was surrounded. Some fishermen had informed him, that in general that lake was marshy, fordable in many places, and that the tide was very often down towards the evening. All this made him conclude, that if he effected his design, he should distress the enemy as much as he should advance his own affairs: that if this failed, it would be easy, keeping the sea, to retire without loss, provided only, that he secured his camp; a thing that was not difficult, considering the remoteness of the enemy's troops. Accordingly, quitting all other designs, he applied himself solely during the winter-quarters in making preparations for this siege; and, which is remarkable in one of his age at that time, he did not open himself concerning this enterprize, except to Lælius, till he believed it necessary to declare it.

Polyb. x.
 583.

Early in the spring Scipio made his fleet put to sea, and ordered all the auxiliary troops of the allies to repair to Tarraco. He afterwards made his fleet with the transports sail to the mouth of the Iberus, whither he ordered the Legions also to march from their winter-quarters. He set out himself immediately from Tarraco with five thousand allies; in order to put himself at the head of his army. As soon as he arrived, having assembled his troops, " he began by thanking the old soldiers for the zeal and affection they had expressed for his father and uncle during their lives, and since their deaths, and for the valour with which they had preserved a province for the Roman People, of which the loss seemed inevitable. He added, that these defeats ought not to discourage them. That it was not by the valour of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had been overcome, but by the treachery of the Celtiberians; upon the confidence
 in

in whom the Generals had too easily separated from each other. That the enemy were now actually in the same circumstances. That they were divided and in different countries. That the oppressions, which they exercised upon their allies, had exasperated them all against Carthage. That part of them had already treated with him by deputies: that the rest would do the same, as soon as they saw the Romans on the other side of the Iberus. That the Generals of the enemy not being in unity with each other, would not join to give him battle, and that fighting separately they could not be able to sustain the first charge of the Romans. That all these reasons ought to animate them to pass that river with confidence, and to expect from the Gods an assured protection."

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210. A

After this discourse, having left M. Silanus, who commanded under him, three thousand foot and five hundred horse to guard the country on this side the river, he passed to the other with the rest of the army, without discovering his design to any one, which was, as we have said, to take New Carthage by assault.

We must remember, says Polybius, after the whole account that we have just given, that Scipio was now but seven and twenty; and that the affairs he was charged with, were such as in effect of former defeats left no hopes of any success. Having engaged to reinstate them, he quitted the ways laid down and known to every body, and struck into new ones, that neither the enemy, nor his own army could conjecture. And he took these new measures in consequence only of the most solid reflections.

After having given secret orders to C. Lælius, who was to command the fleet, and to whom alone he had imparted his design, to steer towards New Carthage, now called Carthagena, he put himself at the head of the land troops, and advanced by long marches. His army consisted of twenty five thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse. After seven days march he appeared before the city, and incamped on

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

the side aspecting the North. He had ordered Lælius to take a compass with his fleet, and so to direct his course, as to enter the port at the same time that the army should appear on the land side: which was punctually executed. Scipio caused a fosse and double intrenchment to be carried on behind his camp. On the side of the city he raised no works, the situation of the post alone covering him from all insult.

Polyb. x.
583.
Liv. xxvi.
42.

Polybius, before he enters into the particulars of the siege, describes the situation of the city and country round about it. I shall copy it after him, without fear of mistaking; that author having been upon the spot to assure himself the better in respect to it.

New Carthage, says he, is situated towards the middle of the coast of Spain, in a gulf that lies toward the wind * Africus. This gulf is about twenty stadia in depth, (something more than a league) and ten broad at its entrance. It forms a kind of port, because there is an island, which on each side leaves only a narrow passage for coming in. The waves of the sea break against this island, which makes the whole gulf entirely calm, except when the wind Africus, blowing through those two openings, agitates the sea. This port is shut against all other winds by the continent that surrounds it. At the bottom of the gulf rises a mountain in the form of a peninsula, upon which stands the city, that on the East and South is defended by the sea, and on the West by a lake, which extends also to the North; so that the Isthmus, or space between two seas, which joins the city to the continent, is only two stadia, that is to say, something more than four hundred and sixteen yards. The city, towards the middle, is low and hollow. The way from the sea on the South is through a plain. The rest is surrounded by hills; two of them are high and rugged, and three others of much more easy ascent, but full of hollows, and difficult to pass. The circumference of the city was of old but twenty stadia.

* It blows South-west.]

By this situation of the place, the front of the Roman camp was secure, being defended on one side by the lake, and on the other by the sea. Only the middle, opposite to what I have above called the Isthmus, was exposed and without defence. Scipio did not judge it proper to fortify it, whether he intended thereby to terrify the besieged by a shew of confidence; or designing to attack the place, he thought it proper to have nothing to stop him in marching out of, or retiring into, his camp.

The fleet arriving in time, as we have said, Scipio assembled his army. In the speech he made to it, he used no other reasons to encourage it than had determined himself to undertake the siege, and which we have related. “After having shewn that the enterprize was practicable, and explained in few words how prejudicial it would be to the enemy, and advantageous to the Romans, if it succeeded; he promised crowns of gold to those who first should mount the wall, and the customary rewards to such as signalized themselves on that occasion. And lastly he added, that Neptune had inspired him with this design; that that God having appeared to him in his sleep, had promised him he would infallibly aid him, and in so evident a manner, that the whole army should perceive the effects of his presence.” The force and solidity of the reasons which he gave, the crowns he promised, and above all, the assured assistance of Neptune, inspired the soldiers with incredible ardor.

The next day, having supplied the fleet with darts of all kinds, he ordered Lælius, who commanded it, to attack the city on the side next the sea. As the siege was of no great duration, it does not appear that any great use was made of the fleet, except for seizing the ships in the port, after the taking of the city. On the land side, Scipio detached two thousand of his best soldiers, with people to carry ladders, and began the attack about nine in the morning. Mago, who commanded in the city, having divided his garrison, left five hundred men in the citadel, and with the

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Polyb. x.
585.
Liv. xxvi.
43.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C. 215. other incamped upon the hill on the East. Two thousand of the inhabitants, amongst whom he distributed the arms that were in the city, were posted at the gate, which led to the place where the sea washed the continent, and which consequently led also to the Roman camp: and the rest of the inhabitants had orders to hold themselves in readiness to assist, wherever the wall should be assaulted.

As soon as Scipio had ordered the trumpets to give the signal for the attack, Mago made the two thousand men who guarded the gate march, convinced that assault would terrify the enemy, and frustrate their design. Those troops fell with impetuosity upon the Romans, who were drawn up in battle at the end of the Isthmus. A warm engagement ensued there. On both sides, that is on that of the besiegers and the city, great cries were raised to animate the combatants. But the aids were not equal; the Carthaginians having but one gate to sally at, and almost two stadia to go; whereas the Romans were at hand, and came on from several sides. What made the battle so unequal was Scipio's having drawn up his troops near his camp, in order to leave the besieged more ground to make in coming on; rightly judging that if that first corps, which was the flower of the inhabitants, were once defeated, every thing would be in confusion in the city, and that afterwards none would have the boldness to venture out of the gate. As only chosen troops fought on both sides, the victory was for some time doubtful. At length the Carthaginians were obliged (to use the expression) to sink under the weight of the legionary soldiers, whose numbers continually increased, and were repulsed. Many lost their lives upon the field of battle and in retreating; but more of them were crushed to death in entering the gate, which put the inhabitants into so great a consternation, that the walls were abandoned. The Romans wanted but little of entering the city with the flying troops: but this flight however gave them opportunity to apply their ladders without danger.

Scipio was in the press, but as much as possible with safety to his person. Three able-bodied foldiers moved before him, and covered him with their shields against the darts discharged in showers from the walls. Sometimes he leaped upon the sides, and sometimes he got upon rising ground; so that, seeing all that passed, and being seen by every body, he very much contributed to the success of this attack, every one doing his utmost to deserve the praises and avoid the reproofs of such a spectator and judge. This attention of the General occasioned that nothing was omitted in this action, and that all orders were properly given and executed.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Those who got up the ladders first, did not find so much opposition from the courage of the besieged, as from the height of the walls. The enemy perceived the difficulty it gave them, and their resistance became the more vigorous from it. Accordingly, as those ladders were very high, the soldiers went up in great numbers at a time, and broke them in effect of their weight. If some did not give way, the first who got up to the end became giddy from the depth of the precipice; and if a little repulsed, they could not keep their standing, but fell from the top to the bottom. If poles were thrust against them through the battlements, or any thing else of the like nature, all together were thrown down and dashed against the ground. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Romans continued the scalado with the same ardor and courage. The first being thrown down, the next took their places, till the soldiers not being able to resist the fatigue any longer, the General caused the retreat to be sounded.

The besieged triumphed in some measure, believing they had averted the danger for ever, and flattering themselves at least with being able to protract the siege, till the Carthaginian Generals had time to come to their aid. They did not know how high the ardor and vivacity of Scipio rose. He waited till the tide was out, and posted five hundred men

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

with ladders on the sides of the lake. At the place where the action had passed he posted fresh troops, exhorted them to do their duty well, and supplied them with more ladders than before, to attack the wall from one end to the other: The signal was given, the ladders applied, and the soldiers got up along the whole length of the wall. A great confusion arose amongst the Carthaginians. They imagined that they had nothing farther to fear, and now a new assault brought them into the same danger again. On the other side their darts failed them, and the number of the dead damped their courage. Their perplexity was very great: however, they defended themselves as well as they could.

During the heat of the scalado, the sea began to ebb, and the waters to run out of the side of the lake; so that those who did not know the cause of that running off, could not sufficiently wonder at it. Scipio then, who had taken care to have skilful and experienced guides in readiness, commanded the troops he had posted on that side to enter into the lake, and fear nothing. One of his great talents was to exalt the courage of those he spoke to, and to fill them with confidence. The soldiers obeyed, and threw themselves into the lake in emulation of each other. It was about noon, and as the North wind, which blew the same way, drove out the tide with violence, which already flowed off of itself, the water was so low that it came no higher than the soldiers waists, and in some places not up to their knees. It was then the whole army believed, that some divinity directed the siege, and called to mind what Scipio, in his speech, had promised concerning the aid of Neptune; and this remembrance so enflamed the courage of the soldiers, that they could see danger no longer, believing they had that God at their head.

Polyb. x.
588.
Liv. xxvi.
46.

The attack was most vigorous towards the gate opposite to the Roman camp. In the mean time the five hundred men, who had passed the lake, came to the bottom of the wall, and from thence soon got up

up to the top without any resistance. For the inhabitants believing it impregnable on that side, had taken no care to fortify it, and had not thought necessary to place troops to guard it; the side, on which the Romans seemed to make the greatest efforts, engrossing their whole attention. The detachment of five hundred men, of which we have just been speaking, entered the city in consequence without any obstacle, and instantly ran to the gate where the two parties were at blows. The battle was so hot here, that it employed not only the minds, but the eyes and ears of the Carthaginians; so that nobody discovered what had passed on the other side, till they felt the blows they received from behind, and saw themselves between two bodies of the enemy. The Carthaginians then thought only of saving themselves by flight. The Romans having broke the iron bars that shut the gates, those who were without entered in crouds. The soldiers who had got upon the walls to a considerable number, dispersed on all sides to put the inhabitants to the sword by Scipio's order, who at the same time forbade plundering till the signal was given. Seeing that the enemy escaped at two different places; some upon the eminence towards the East, guarded by a body of five hundred men; others into the citadel, whither Mago himself had retired, with such of the soldiers as had abandoned the walls; he divided his troops also into two bodies. He sent the one to seize the eminence, whilst he marched himself at the head of a thousand men towards the citadel. The eminence was carried on the first attack. Mago at first prepared to defend himself: but seeing himself invested on all sides, without hope of its being possible to resist, he surrendered himself with the place and troops in it to the victor.

Hitherto all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, had been put to the sword. But Scipio put a stop to the slaughter, as soon as he saw himself master of the citadel. The city was then abandoned to be plundered. The spoils were very considerable. Ten thou-

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

land free men were made prisoners to the Romans. They remained masters of all the machines of war, which were many in number. Abundance of gold and silver was brought to the General: two hundred and seventy-six cups of gold, almost all of a pound weight, eighteen thousand three hundred pounds of silver, in money and plate, a little more than twenty-eight thousand five hundred and ninety-three * marks. These riches were put into the hands of the Quæstor C. Flaminius, after having been all weighed and counted in his presence. Polybius says, that all the money taken here from the Carthaginians amounted to above six hundred talents: which added to four hundred which he brought from Rome, made a thousand talents for carrying on the war.

Polyb.
593.

Polyb. x.
589, 590.

The night being come, those who had orders to remain in the camp, continued there. The General with a thousand soldiers posted himself in the citadel. He ordered the rest by the Tribunes of the army, to quit the houses, and to bring by cohorts to the market-place all the plunder they had taken, and to pass the night near it. The light-armed troops were brought from the camp, and posted upon the hill which fronts eastward. In this manner was New Carthage reduced by the Romans.

The next day, all that had been taken as well from the garrison as the citizens and artificers having been brought to the market-place, the Tribunes distributed it to their legions according to the custom established amongst the Romans. Now the manner of acting of that People when they took cities was this: they detached part of the troops, but never more than half, to plunder the place. Those who were to execute this purpose, were chosen out of the whole army, and each brought what he took to his cohort or legion. The booty was sold by auction, and the Tribunes divided the money into equal parts, which were given not only to those upon duty in the necessary

* The French weigh silver by marks, which is a weight of eight ounces.

posts to secure the execution of plundering, but to those who guarded the tents and baggage, the sick, and to others who had been detached upon any occasion whatsoever. And lest any fraud should be committed in this part of the war, the soldiers were made to swear before they took the field, and the first day they assembled, that they would not conceal any part of the spoils they should take, and should bring them all faithfully to the common heap. For the rest, continues Polybius, the Romans, by this wise custom, provided against the bad effects of the avidity of gain. For the hope of sharing in the booty not being frustrated to any, and being as certain to those who were upon duty in the posts, as those that plundered, the discipline was always exactly observed. This is not so amongst the nations, who hold it for a maxim, that what every man takes in the plunder of cities belongs to himself. For then, the part of the troops who are deprived of their share in the spoils, are deprived at the same time of a powerful motive to induce soldiers to do their duty, and despise danger, which is the attraction of gain. Every body knows, that David ordered, “that as his part is, which goeth down to the battle, so shall his part be that tarrieth by the stuff: they shall part alike. And it was so from that day forward, that he made it a statute, and an ordinance for Israel unto that day.”

A.R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

I Sam.
xxx. 24,
25.

The provisions laid up by the enemy remained still in the city: forty thousand bushels of wheat, and two hundred and seventy thousand bushels of barley. They took in the port an hundred and thirty ships, most of them laden with corn, arms, provisions, iron, sails, cordage, and other materials necessary for fitting out a fleet. Scipio also took eighteen ships of war, which considerably augmented his fleet: he had thirty-five before. Thus of all the gains the Romans acquired by the taking Carthagera, the place itself was the least considerable.

That day, Scipio having confided the guarding of the city to Lælius and the soldiers of the fleet, led
back

Liv. xxvi.
48.

A. R. 542. back the legions into the camp, and ordered them to
 Ant. C. refresh themselves with food and repose. The next
 210. day, having assembled the soldiers of the land and sea
 armies, “ he began by thanking the immortal Gods,
 not only for having reduced in one day the most opu-
 lent city of all the province into his power; but for
 having first brought all the rich things of Africa and
 Spain into it, to deprive the enemy of all their re-
 sources, and to give him and his troops abundance.
 He afterwards praised the soldiers, whose valour had
 surmounted so many obstacles, without being stopped
 either by the unexpected sally of the Carthaginians,
 the extraordinary height of the walls, the difficult
 passage of an unknown lake, or a strong citadel de-
 fended by a good garrison. He confessed, that he
 was obliged to them all for so glorious and unexpect-
 ed a success: but that the honour of the mural crown
 was in particular his due, who had first mounted the
 wall. That he who believed he had deserved so glo-
 rious a reward, had only to appear.”

Liv. xxvi. Two instead of one presented themselves: Q.
 48. Trebellius, a Centurion of the fourth legion; and
 Sext. Digitius, a soldier of the fleet. The dispute
 grew extremely hot, but still less between the two
 competitors, than between the land and the sea armies,
 who warmly espoused his side who was of their own
 body. Lælius, Commander of the fleet, spoke strong-
 ly for the sea-forces, and M. Sempronius Tuditanus
 supported the side of the legions. Scipio seeing that
 this contest was upon the point of terminating in an
 open sedition, nominated three commissioners, whom
 he ordered maturely to examine into the affair, and
 determine according to the testimony of credible wit-
 nesses, which of the two competitors had mounted the
 wall first. These commissioners were C. Lælius and
 M. Sempronius, both interested in the cause; with
 whom Scipio associated P. Cornelius Caudinus, who
 was neuter. They prepared to take cognizance of
 the cause. But this expedient, which seemed proper
 for appeasing the troops, did but inflame them more.

For

For Lælius and Sempronius, who each had with difficulty kept their party within bounds, were no sooner withdrawn by changing the quality of leaders into that of judges, than the soldiers observed measures no longer. Lælius then, quitting his colleague, went to Scipio upon his tribunal, and informed him of what passed. He told him that both sides were just upon the point of proceeding to the last extremities, and turning a dispute of honour into a civil war.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Scipio having praised Lælius's wife care, assembled the troops; and, to reconcile them, immediately declared, that Q. Trebellius and Sex. Digitius had mounted the wall at the same time; and that, to reward their valour, he granted them both the mural crown. He then gave praises and distributed rewards to others, in proportion to the courage each had shewn, and the service he had done during the siege. Lælius, the Admiral of the fleet, was the person upon whose merit he most expatiated. After having given him the greatest praises, and declared, that he was as much indebted to his prudence and valour as to himself for so glorious a success, he made him a present of a crown of gold, and thirty oxen.

The mural crown was usually of gold, and made at top with such battlements as the walls of fortified places have. The ardor we see upon this occasion between the two competitors, shews the wonderful effect that marks of honour and distinction have upon the minds of soldiers. And as much may be said of other military rewards. And in this manner troops are rendered invincible.

Scipio, after having praised and rewarded his troops in this manner, assembled the prisoners, who were, as we have said before, almost ten thousand, and ordered that they should be divided into two classes: the one of the principal persons and burghers of Carthage, with their wives and children; the other of artificers. After having exhorted the first to adhere to the Romans, and to bear in remembrance for ever the grace he was going to grant them, he sent them

Polyb. x.
591.
Liv. xxvi.
49.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

all back to their own houses. They prostrated themselves before him, and retired with tears in their eyes, but in tears of joy, which an event so little expected drew from them. As to the artificers, he told them they were now the slaves of the Roman people: but if they behaved with affection for the Commonwealth, and rendered him the services they ought, each according to his profession, that they might depend on being set at liberty, as soon as the war with the Carthaginians should be happily terminated. They were two thousand in number, who had orders to give in their names to the Quæstor; and they were divided into bands of thirty, over each of which a Roman was placed to take care of it.

Amongst the rest of the prisoners, Scipio chose such as had the best mien, and most vigour, to augment the number of his rowers. He made them the same promise as the artisans, and assured them, that after he should have overcome the Carthaginians, he would give them their liberty, if they served the Romans with zeal and affection.

This conduct in respect to the prisoners gained himself and the Commonwealth the amity and confidence of the citizens of Carthagera; and by the hopes of liberty which he gave the artisans, he inspired them with a great ardor for his service: not to mention the considerable re-inforcement of his sea-forces in effect of this very clemency to the prisoners.

He afterwards assigned Mago, and the Carthaginians taken with him quarters, two of whom were of the council of the elders, and fifteen of the Senate. He gave the guard of them to Lælius, enjoining him to take all possible care of them. Then having caused all the Spanish hostages to be brought to him, which were above three hundred in number, he began by soothing and caressing the children one after another, promising, in order to console them, that they should soon see their parents again. He exhorted the others not to abandon themselves to grief.

He

He represented to them, * “ That they were in the hands of a people, that chose rather to engage men by favour, than to subject them by fear; and to unite with foreign nations under the honourable name of friends and allies, than to impose upon them the shameful yoke of slavery.” After this, having chosen out of the spoils what best suited his purpose, he made presents to each of them according to their sex and age. To the little girls he gave toys and bracelets, and to the young boys knives and little swords.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C
210.

What goodness and wise care have we here ! Having asked each of the hostages their country, and been informed how many there were of each nation, he sent couriers to their parents, and caused them to be told to come and take back their children. As some cities had already sent deputies to demand their own, he immediately ordered them to be put into their hands, and commanded the Quæstor C. Flaminus to take great care of the rest, and to treat them with abundance of kindness and humanity.

Whilst these cares engrossed him, a very ancient lady, the wife of Mandonius brother of Indibilis King of the Ilergetes, came out of the crowd of the hostages, and throwing herself at his feet, she conjured him with tears in her eyes, to recommend to those who had the ladies in their keeping to have regard to their sex and birth. Scipio, who did not understand her thought at first, assured her, that he had given orders, that they should not want for any thing. But the lady replied : “ Those conveniencies are not what “ affect us. In the condition to which fortune has “ reduced us, with what ought we not to be content- “ ed ? I have many other apprehensions, when I con- “ sider on one side the licentiousness of war ; and on “ the other the youth and beauty of the Princesses, “ which you see here before us. For as to me, my

Liv. xxvi.
49.
Polyb. x.
592.

* Venisse eos in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit; exterarumque gentes fide ac societate junctas habere, quam tristi subjectas servitio. Liv.

A.R. 542. "age protects me from all fear in this respect." She
 Ant. C. had with her the daughters of Indibilis, and several
 219. others of the same rank, all in the flower of their youth, who considered her as their mother. Scipio then comprehending what the subject of her fear was :
 " My own glory," says he, " and that of the Roman
 " people, are concerned in not suffering, that virtue,
 " which ought always to be respected wherever we
 " find it, should be exposed in my camp to a treat-
 " ment unworthy of it. But you give me a new mo-
 " tive for being more strict in my care of it, in the
 " virtuous sollicitude you shew in thinking only of
 " the preservation of your honour, in the midst of so
 " many other subjects of fear." After this conversa-
 tion, he gave the care of them to some officers of expe-
 rienced prudence, and ordered them to treat the la-
 dies with all the respect they could pay to the
 mothers and wives of their allies and particular friends.

It was on this occasion, that his soldiers brought him a young lady of such perfect beauty, that she drew upon herself the eyes of every body. He desired to know who she was, and to whom she belonged : and having learned amongst other things that she was upon the point of being married to Allucius, Prince of the Celtiberians, he sent to him to come thither with the parents of that young prisoner. And being told that Allucius loved her to excess, that Spanish Prince no sooner appeared in his presence, than even before he spoke to the father and mother, he took him aside ; and to remove the anxiety which he might be in on account of the young lady, he spoke to him in these terms : " You and I are young, which
 " admits of my speaking to you with more liberty.
 " Those who brought me your future spouse, assured
 " me at the same time, that you loved her with ex-
 " treme tenderness : and her beauty left me no room
 " to doubt it. Upon which, reflecting, that if, like
 " you, I had thoughts of making an engagement, and
 " were not solely engrossed with the affairs of my
 " country, I should desire, that so honourable and
 " legitimate

“ legitimate a passion should find favour; I think
 “ myself happy, in the present conjuncture, to do
 “ you this service. She you are to marry, has been
 “ amongst us, as she would have been in the house of
 “ her father and mother. I have kept her for you,
 “ in order to make you a present worthy of you and
 “ of me. The only gratitude which I require of you
 “ for this gift, is that you would be a friend to the
 “ Roman people; and that, if you judge me a man
 “ of worth, as my father and uncle have been deemed
 “ by the states of this province, you may know, that
 “ there are in Rome many who resemble us; and that
 “ there is not a people in the universe, you ought
 “ more to fear as enemies, or to desire more to have
 “ for friends.”

A. R. 542.
 Ant. C.
 210.

Allucius, full of gratitude and joy, kissed Scipio's hands, and prayed the Gods to reward him for so great a beneficence, as himself was not capable of doing it in the degree he desired, and his benefactor deserved. Scipio caused the father and mother, and the other relations of the young lady, to come thither. They had brought a great sum of money with them for her ransom. But when they saw that he restored her without ransom, they conjured him with great earnestness to accept that sum as a present, and declared that by complying, that new favour would compleat their joy and gratitude. Scipio not being able to resist such warm and earnest sollicitation, told them, that he accepted the gift, and ordered it to be laid at his feet. Then, addressing himself to Allucius; “I add,” says he, “to the portion you are
 “ to receive from your father-in-law this sum, which
 “ I desire you to accept as a marriage-present.”

That young Prince, charmed with the liberality and politeness of Scipio, went into his country to publish the praises of so generous a victor. He cried out, in the transports of his gratitude, “That there was come into Spain a young hero like the Gods, who conquered all things, less by the force of his arms, than the charms of his virtue, and the greatness of his
 beneficence.”

A. R. 542. Ant. C. 210. beneficence." For this reason, having raised troops in his own dominions, he returned some days after to Scipio, with a body of fourteen hundred horse.

Allucius, to render the marks of his gratitude more durable, afterwards caused the action we have just related, to be engraven upon a silver buckler, which he presented to Scipio: a present, infinitely more estimable and glorious than all treasures and triumphs. This buckler, which Scipio carried with him when he returned to Rome, was lost in passing the Rhone, with part of the baggage. It continued in that river till 1665, when some fishermen found it. It is now in the King of France's cabinet.

I shall have occasion in the sequel to dwell upon what regards Scipio's character, and I have already done it elsewhere with sufficient extent: but I cannot help observing here in few words, that in the expedition of which we are speaking, he shewed all the qualities of a great General. We have seen that he formed of himself the boldest design it was possible to imagine, and so far from all probability, that the enemy did not so much as suspect the least thought of it. He passes the winter, not in idleness and inactivity, not in eating, drinking, and gaming, but to inform himself secretly of all that related to the enterprize he meditated, and without noise to prepare all that could contribute to the success of it. He kept a profound silence in respect to the whole, and communicated his designs only to a single person in whom he entirely confided, and who was necessary to him for the execution of them. As soon as the spring appears, the army and fleet set out without knowing for what they are intended. They arrive exactly at the appointed time and place, and Carthagena is besieged at once both by sea and land. Could the most consummate General in the art of war take more proper measures? Scipio was then only seven and twenty years old at most, and this may be called his first trial of skill, and the first fruits of his command. In the same siege, what valour and intrepidity, tempered however

however with great discretion, does he not shew? A.R. 542.
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What presence of mind, which foresees all things, and gives the necessary orders on all sides? But Scipio is still greater, and excels himself in what follows the taking of the place, both in the use he makes of the victory, in which he shews a greatness of soul, an elevation of sentiments, a talent in conciliating affection, and what is above all, a virtue, wisdom, and moderation, the more admirable, as an historian observes, as Scipio was then young, unmarried, and Val. Max.
iv. 3. victorious: *Et juvenis, Et cælebs, Et victor.*

After Scipio had regulated all things in concert with Lælius, he gave him a gally of five benches, and having embarked Mago in it, and the Carthaginian Senators taken with him, he sent him to Rome, to carry thither the news of his victory. He was convinced, as nothing was expected on the side of Spain, the advantages he had gained there would no sooner be known, than they would resume courage, and think more seriously than ever of carrying on that war vigorously. As to himself he continued some time in New Carthage, in order to exercise his naval forces, and to shew the Tribunes in what manner they were to exercise the land army. Polyb. x.
594.
Liv. xxvi.
51.

The first day, the legions filed off in his presence under arms, the space of four thousand paces. The second, he ordered them to clean and furbish their arms before their tents. The third, the troops presented to the eye the image of a real battle, the soldiers fighting with wooden swords, with a button at the ends of them, and darting at each other javelins Præpila-
tis. with buttons also at the end of them. The fourth was allotted to repose and diversion. The fifth, the exercise began again as on the first day. As long as the troops remained at Carthage, they observed this alternative of labour and rest.

He did not forget his cavalry, and made it perform before him the evolutions necessary on all different occasions, and conjunctures that might occur. He especially exercised it in advancing and retreating,

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

in such a manner that when it should be obliged to hasten its march, it might not quit its ranks, and always keep the same distance between the squadrons: nothing being more dangerous than to engage with a cavalry that has lost its ranks.

The soldiers of the fleet, on their side, standing out to sea, when it was smooth, tried the swiftness of their vessels in the representation of a sea-fight.

These exercises, continued without the city by sea and land, enured both the bodies and minds of the troops for real battles. By keeping their forces continually employed in this manner, the Romans rendered them indefatigable, and accustomed them to observe in all times and places the military discipline with the utmost exactness.

Whilst this passed, the city rang with the noise made by the artificers of every kind, in making arms of all sorts, and every thing in general necessary in war, in the public workshops. The General was present every where, assisting at the exercises both of the fleet and legions, and passing a considerable time every day in examining the works of all kinds, at which an infinite number of artisans worked in emulation of each other in the magazines and arsenals.

In all that we have hitherto related of the siege and taking of Carthagera, and of the events that succeeded, is there with respect to Scipio, any stroke, any tint wanting, to the portrait of an accomplished General? Polybius, in drawing this picture with a masterly hand, which certainly does not flatter, but is taken from nature, undoubtedly designed to instruct all succeeding times, and to propose to Generals and officers of armies a proper model for forming great men for war. For That is one of the principal ends of history.

Polyb. x.
594.
Liv. xxvi.
51.

When Scipio believed his troops sufficiently exercised, and the city covered from all insult by the fortifications he had added to it, and the garrison he left in it, he set out for Tarraco. Having met Ambassadors from several of the Spanish States on his way,

way, he dispatched affairs with some of them upon the spot, and deferred giving audience to others till he should arrive at Tarraco, whither he had ordered all the allies, as well old as new, to repair.

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210.

The taking of Carthagera occasioned a terrible consternation amongst the Carthaginians. At first their Generals suppressed that news. But afterwards, not being able either to conceal or dissemble it, they affected as much as possible to depreciate the merit of that success. They said, “It was a * single place surprized by a stolen march. That however so trivial an advantage sufficed to flush and puff up a young General, who, through the insolence of his joy, gave this slight success the air of an important conquest, and of a great victory. But that the moment he should be apprized, that the three Carthaginian Generals approached with their three armies, the misfortunes of his house would recur to his memory, and very much abate his pride and haughtiness.” And this is what they gave out to the people and soldiers. But at bottom they perfectly knew how prejudicial the loss of Carthagera was to them, and how great the advantage it gave their enemies for the future.

Liv. *ibid.*

* Nec opinato adventu ac prope furto unius diei——interceptam. Cujus rei tam parvæ præmio elatum, insolentem, immodico gaudio speciem magnæ victoriæ imposuisse.

D I G R E S S I O N

UPON THE

M E A L S of the R O M A N S.

THIS subject, upon which I have promised to speak, would require great extent, if it were my design to expatiate much upon it. I shall content myself, according to my custom, with giving a slight idea of it.

Lib. I.
Sat. 6.

The Romans, properly speaking, made but one meal: this was supper. About the middle of the day, they took some little nourishment, to refresh themselves, and enable them to stay for their evening's meal. *Præsum non avidè*, says Horace, *quantum interpellat inani ventre diem durare*. But this slight dinner cannot be called a meal, no more than the breakfast and nunchion or collation, which only children ate.

The supper-hour was the ninth and tenth of the day, that is three hours, or else two hours, before sun-set. Till then they applied themselves to serious affairs: but then they dismissed all care, and were at leisure to receive their friends. To anticipate the supper-hour, and to sit down to table before this time, Horace calls, *diem frangere*—*partem solido demere de die*; to abridge the day, to cut off and retrench a part of it. They also said, to express the same thing, *epulari de die*. To sit down so early at table, carried with it an air of debauch, which sober people avoided.

At Rome, bathing was always used before supper: which, on one side, was necessary for the sake of cleanliness, the Romans wearing no linnen; and, on the other, might serve to sharpen the appetite. The rich, and those who could afford such accommodations, had baths in their houses. Pliny the Younger, in the description which he gives us of his country-houses, tells us what care was taken in those days to build
baths

baths in them, which were supplied with every thing necessary to taking that refreshment commodiously. For the common people, there were public baths, some of which were very magnificent edifices, in which some Emperors seemed to have taken pleasure to signalize their magnificence.

On quitting the bath, before they sat down to table, they put on an habit more or less slight according to the season, and the master of the house often piqued himself upon supplying his guests with very magnificent ones.

The place where they ate their meals was called *Triclinium*, because the table was surrounded with three beds. The tables were of different forms, in different times; square, round, and semi-circular. I shall only speak of the first, which were most frequently used. One of the square sides was left vacant and open for serving the dishes.

In the early times, the Romans ate sitting upon plain benches, after the manner of the people of Crete and Sparta. In process of time the custom of lying down to eat was introduced amongst them: it is believed to have been derived from Asia or Greece. The ladies for a long time retained the ancient custom of sitting at table, which was most conformable to the modesty and decency of the sex. Valerius Maximus tells us, that at the religious feasts given to the Gods, the Goddeses sat and the Gods lay upon beds.

Val. Max.
II. 1.

A bed was laid on each of the three sides of the table. Each bed usually held three persons, and sometimes, but seldom, four or five. The beds were covered with carpets, and furnished with pillows or bolsters for the guests. In the beginning, both the substance and coverings of the beds were very plain: but luxury in process of time introduced extraordinary magnificence in them. * This luxury came from

O 3

Asia.

* *Luxuriæ peregrinæ origo ab exercitu Asiatico inuenta in urbem est. Ii primum lectos æreos, vestem stragulam pretiosam & abacos*
Roman

Asia. It was in the triumph of Cn. Manlius, that beds of brass, carpets and coverings of the richest and finest stuffs, and side-boards made with the nicest art, and at a great expence, were seen for the first time at Rome. And this was only the first beginning, and in a manner the seed of that pretended taste, which some time after † men of inventive geniusses, and wonderful sagacity for all the refinements of luxury, and at the same time of unbounded prodigality, carried to excesses, which are scarce credible.

We have already said, that the guests began by bathing, after which they put on cloaths intended for the table. Before they got upon the beds, they took off their shoes for the greater cleanliness. In parties of pleasure they made use of the most exquisite essences and perfumes, and wore wreaths of flowers upon their heads. In this condition they got upon their beds.

The meal always began with libations and prayers made to the Gods, by pouring a little wine on the table in honour of them; a custom derived from the most remote antiquity, as we find in Homer and Virgil. The latter speaks thus of Dido, who addresses her prayers to Jupiter, and afterwards makes libations.

Æneid I. *Jupiter, hospitibus nam te dare jura loquuntur, &c.
Dixit, & in mensa Laticum libavit honorem.*

Quintil. Declam. ccci. This ceremony was universally established: *Mensam adisti*, is said in one of the declamations ascribed to Quintilian, *ad quam cum venire cœpimus, deos invocamus*. The ancients always concluded their meals as they began them, that is, with prayers and libations, as we find in several passages of Plutarch's Morals. I cannot forbear inserting in this place the translation of a Greek passage from Heliodorus, which is very

Romam advexerunt.—Vix tamen illa, quæ tum conspiciebantur, femina erant futuræ luxuriæ. LIV. xxxix. 6.

† Prodigy & sagacity ad luxuriæ instrumenta ingenii. PLIN. ix. 11.

exprefs. “ It is time, (fays he) to difmifs the guefts: but firft let us not forget God. The cup for the libations was then carried round to all the guefts; and thus the feaft concluded.” This act of religion, by which meals began and ended, was a kind of public proteftation made by the Pagans, that they received the nourifhment they had from the bounty of the Gods. And it is for this reason that ancient authors always fpeak of the table as of a facred thing. Tacitus calls the ceremonies ufed at meals, *ſacra menſæ*.^{52.}

It is a very ſad thing, and argues great forgetfulneſs of God, to ſee that the cuſtom of conſecrating in ſome ſenſe the beginning and end of meals by prayer and returning thanks, obſerved in all times by the Pagans, is now entirely aboliſhed amongſt us at the tables of almoſt all great lords and rich perſons, and is no longer retained except amongſt tradefmen and the common people: it even begins to be neglected by them, of ſo much force is the bad example of the Great, and ſo contagious does it become.

After the duties of religion were ſatiſfied, a King of the feaſt was created, who preſcribed the laws that were to be obſerved in it, and the number of cups that each was to drink. Lots uſually determined this ſovereignty.

*Quem * Venus arbitrum dicet bibendi?*

Hor. Od.
vii. l. 2.

Nec regna vini ſortiere talis.

Od. iv. l. 1.

Sometimes, for inſtance, the gueſts were obliged to drink as many cups as there were letters in the name of the perſon whoſe health was drank. Cicero † obſerves that Verres, who had trampled upon all the laws of the Roman people, punctually conformed to thoſe of the table. To conclude, this ceremony of

* This word ſignifies here the moſt lucky caſt upon the dice, as three fixes is with us at raffle.

† Iſte prætor ſeverus ac diligens, qui populi Rom. legibus nunquam paruiſſet, iis diligenter legibus parebat, quæ in populis ponebantur.

joy and gaiety was observed at the table of the wisest persons. Cato † the Censor said, that this sovereignty of the table and kind of legislature instituted by an ancient custom, gave him great pleasure.

It is time to set the dishes upon the table. At great feasts or entertainments ‡ slaves neatly dressed, with white napkins round their waists, brought in the dishes in formality. They were followed by a § carver, who with great art and dexterity cut up the meat, and often to a certain time of music. There were other slaves that waited at the buffet, to serve the cups, pour out the wine, and change the plates. The side-board was the place of the eating-hall, where the master of the house displayed his magnificence with the utmost pomp, by exposing a great number of vessels and cups of gold and silver, of exquisite workmanship, and often set with jewels.

Their tables were covered several times, as with us. A singularity, which ought not to be omitted, was that new laid eggs were always a part of the first course: *ab ovo usque ad mala*, says Horace, to signify from the beginning to the end of the feast. It appears also that the fruit was served upon another table than that for the preceding part of the entertainment. From thence comes the expression of Virgil, *mensæ grata secundæ dona*, to express the desert, raw fruits, or sweetmeats, tarts, and other things of the like nature, which are called by a common name, *dulciaria*, or *bellaria*.

In the happy times of the Commonwealth, the meals, though plain, were dressed well, but without any studied delicacy. The gaiety and liberty that prevailed at them, with the pleasantry and solidity of the conversation, were their principal seasoning. Ca-

† Me verò & magisteria delectant à majoribus instituta, & is sermo qui more majorum à summo adhibetur in poculis. Cic. de Senect. n. 46.

‡ Agmen servorum nitentium, & ministrorum ornatissimorum turba linteis succincta. SENECA.

§ Alias pretiosas aves scindit, & per pectus & clunes certis ductibus circumferens eruditam manum, in frustra excutit. SENECA.

to the Cenſor, entirely auſtere as he was in other reſpects, laughed at himſelf, and renounced his ſerious character at table. He was not an enemy to mirth. He drank freely and often, but always moderately; and he ſays himſelf, that he loved little cups: *Me delectant pocula, ſicut in ſympoſio Xenophontis, minuta & rorantia.* When he was at his country house, he every day invited ſome of his friends in the neighbourhood, and he paſſed his time merrily with them, making a very kind and agreeable companion, not only to thoſe of his own age, but to young perſons; for he not only had a great experience of the world, but had ſeen himſelf, and heard from others, an infinity of curious things, which were very pleaſing in converſation. He was convinced that the table was one of the moſt proper means for giving birth to, and cultivating friendſhip. At his table the moſt uſual topicks were the praiſes of the good and brave citizens, but not a word was ever ſaid of the bad, and ſuch as wanted merit. Cato would not ſuffer the latter to be ſpoke of at his table either favourably or otherwiſe, and he was attentive and happy in averting the occaſion of it. * It was the pleaſure of the converſation that made the repaſts, which were very long, agreeable to him; and he was obliged, he ſaid, to old age, that, by leſſening his occaſion for eating and drinking, had as a reward increaſed his taſte for, and the pleaſure he took in, converſation. He makes a very ſenſible remark upon the difference of the name which the Greeks and Romans give meals. The firſt call it *συμπόσιον*, *compotatio*, which ſignifies *an aſſembly of perſons to drink and eat together*; † by which they ſeem to give the preference in repaſts to that which conſtitutes their leaſt merit. With the Romans the

Cic. de ſe-
neſt. n. 46.
Plut. in
Cat. 251.

Cic. de ſe-
neſt. n. 43.

* Ego propter ſermonis delectationem tempeſtivis quoque conviviiſ delector, nec cum æqualibus ſolùm, (qui pauci admodum reſtant) ſed cum veſtra etiam ætate atque vobiſcum: habeoque ſeneſtuti magnam gratiam, quæ mihi ſermonis aviditatem auxit, potionis & cibi ſuſtulit. Cic. de Senect. 46.

† Ut quod in eo genere minimum eſt, id maximè probare videantur.

repast is called *convivium*, an assembly of persons who *live together*, that is, who converse with, entertain, and keep up discourses equally sprightly and agreeable with each other: for that is properly *to live*. Accordingly Cato said, † that what pleased him most at table was not the good cheer, but the company and conversation of his friends. Are there many tables amongst us, where people live together in this manner? We do not seem to pique ourselves much upon being at any great expence of wit.

The luxury of Asia, when it was subjected, was soon brought to Rome, and infected the tables as well as every thing else. They || were usually accompanied with buffoons, comedians, players upon musical instruments, and women-dancers. The dishes were dressed with more art and expence. At that time, says Livy, a cook on whom the ancients set little value, and made little use of, became a man of consequence; and what had till then been a mean and contemptible office, was considered as an important art and employment. The evil perpetually increased, and rose to an excess that seemed scarce credible. The suppers of Lucullus are known to all the world. Their § taste became so perverted as to esteem the dishes served up at a feast only for their rarity and the enormous prices paid for them, not for their goodness and real qualities. One man alone is sometimes sufficient to spoil an whole nation; as has been said of the famous Apicius, * who setting up for a master in

† Neque ipsorum conviviorum delectationem voluptatibus magis, quam cœtu amicorum & sermonibus metiebar.

|| Tum psaltriæ, sambucistriæque, & convivalia ludionum oblectamenta addita epulis: epulæ quoque ipsæ & cura & sumptu majore apparari cæptæ. Tum coquus, vilissimum antiquis mancipium & æstimatione & usu, in pretio esse; & quod ministerium fuerat, ars haberi cæpta. LIV. xxxix. 6.

§ Appositas dapes non sapore, sed sumptu æstimabant. PACAT. in Panegyr. Theod.

* O miserabiles, quorum palatum nisi ad pretiosos cibos non excitatur! pretiosos autem non eximus sapor, aut aliqua faucium dulcedo, sed raritas & difficultas parandi facit. SENECA. de consolat. ad Helv. ix.

* Apicius, scientiam propinæ professus, disciplina sua seculum infecit. SENECA. ib. x.

the science of good eating, was so successful in his way as to corrupt the whole age he lived in.

Seneca, in his description of this Apicius, gives us the image of a sensual and voluptuous man, who greedily receives, and tastes pleasure in large draughts with all his senses. § Behold, says he, an Apicius, propped on his pillow filled with roses, contemplating the magnificence of his table, gratifying his ear with the most melodious concerts, his eyes with the most charming sights, his smell with the most exquisite perfumes, and his taste with the most delicious food.

At different times, many wise regulations were made, to put a stop to the excessive expence of the table. The first appeared in the 571st year of Rome, in the Consulship of Q. Fabius and M. Claudius, and was called Lex Orchia. But luxury, stronger than the laws, broke through all the barriers which pains had been taken to lay in its way at different times, and continued almost always victorious and triumphant. Tacitus tells us, that the luxury of the table, which had been carried to excess for above an hundred years, declined very much under Vespasian; and amongst many other reasons of that change he gives us one which does that Emperor much honour. As * Vespasian, says that author, observed at his table, and in his whole manner of living, the ancient simplicity of the Romans, many, to please the Prince, emulated each other in imitating him. Thus his example, more powerful than all laws and penalties, in a short time succeeded in reforming the public disorders. The effect will be the same in all States. When he who dispenses all rewards declares for virtue and ho-

§ Vide hos eosdem (Nomentanum & Apicium) è suggestu rosæ spectantes popinam suam, aures vocum sono, spectaculis oculos, saporibus palatum suum delectantes. Mollibus lenibusque fomentis totum laceratur corpus, & ne nares interim cessent, odoribus variis inficitur locus ipse, in quo luxuriæ parentatur. De vit. beat. xi.

* Præcipuus astricti moris auctor Vespasianus fuit, antiquo ipse cultu victuque. Obsequium inde in principem, & æmulandi ardor, validior quam pœna ex legibus & metus. TACIT. Annal. iii. 55.

nour ;

nour; hope, protection, and the example of the Prince, have an infinite force upon the minds of the subjects, and are capable of abolishing, or at least of making the most confirmed vices disappear.

I return to some circumstances relating to repasts, of which I have deferred speaking till now. The table, in the early times, was uncovered, and as one course was removed, care was taken to wipe it, and keep it very clean. It was afterwards covered with a cloth, which was called *mantile*. But what seems surprizing, it was not the custom, till long after the Augustan age, to supply the guests with napkins, *mappas*: they used to bring them from home. Catullus complains of one Asinius, who had carried away his, and threatens him with exposing him in verse, if he does not immediately send it back again.

*Marrucini Asini, manu sinistra
Non belle uteris in joco atque in vino.
Tollis linthea negligentiorum —
Quare aut Hendecasyllabos trecentos
Expecta, aut mihi lintheum remitte.*

Martial says almost the same thing of one Hermogenes.

*Attulerat mappam nemo, dum furta timentur.
Mantile è mensa sustulit Hermogenes.*

I shall not say much of a custom, common enough amongst the ancients, but very low and nasty, of making themselves vomit in order to create a new appetite, and to enable them to eat at new expences, as if they had not yet began to do so. For this purpose they drank a light nauseous wine, which did not fail to produce the desired effect. What a shame was this! “They * vomit, says Seneca, to eat, and

* Vomunt ut edant ut vomant, & epulas quas toto orbe conquirunt, nec concoquere dignantur. SENECA, de consol. ad HELV. ix.

they eat to vomit ; and do not give themselves time to digest the meats brought at great prices from the extremities of the world."

Neither shall I say more of the variety and excellence of the wines used by the Romans at their tables. Horace praises them in more than one place. He was voluptuous enough, and had a sufficiently good taste, to deserve to be believed on his word.

The custom of keeping wines for a great length of time is known to all the world. Pliny cites an amazing example of this. Wine had been kept to the age in which he lived, that had been made in the Consulship of L. Opimius, and consequently near two hundred years. Plin. xiv.
4.

I shall conclude this digression with a difficulty, that has always been not easily conceivable, and matter of doubt. Our habit of sitting at table makes it hard for us to comprehend, that the Roman manner of lying on beds to eat could be as commodious. It must however have been so, as the Romans, after having long followed the custom of sitting to eat, quitted it at last to adopt the other, which they observed ever after ; so that with them it was a sign of grief and mourning to eat sitting. Plutarch relates, that Cato never ate except sitting, after the breaking out of the war between Cæsar and Pompey. The exact time when this change began is not known : but it is very probable, that it was a consequence of the commerce of the Romans with the people of Asia. Every body knows, when those people were subjected by the Roman arms, that they communicated to the conquerors their taste of luxury and voluptuousness, and their attention in cultivating every thing that conduced to the ease and convenience of life. Let us now see in what manner they ate, drank, and conversed with the guests in this situation, which seems very incommodious.

I have already said, that there was usually three persons upon a bed. This bed was a little lower than the table. The upper part of the body was a little

raised

raised up and supported by bolsters, and the lower extended along upon the bed behind the back of him who lay next. Leaning upon the left elbow, they used the right hand, which was at liberty, for eating and drinking. Thus the head of the second was opposite to the breast of the first, and if he desired to speak with him, especially when the thing was to be secret, he was obliged to lean upon his breast, including under that name from the bottom of the face to the waist. What has been said here, may serve to explain the situation of St. John in the * Lord's Supper in respect to JESUS CHRIST, and in what manner the woman could pour her perfumes upon the feet of our Saviour. It is very probable that in conversation, when it was long, which usually happened, he who spoke, in order to be heard by the guests, kept himself sitting almost up right with his back supported by bolsters. I leave it to the reader to judge whether that posture was very commodious.

* The painting of the Lord's Supper by Poussin, of which there are many copies, and prints in great abundance, very well represents the disposition of the beds and guests, and the particular situation of St. John.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE EIGHTEENTH.

THIS book contains only the history of three years, 542, 543, and 544. It relates principally the several battles of Marcellus with Hannibal; the taking of Tarentum by Fabius Maximus; Scipio's advantages in Spain; the death of Marcellus; Asdrubal's march into Italy, and the entire defeat of that General by the two Consuls Livius and Nero.

S E C T. I.

Marcellus takes some cities in Samnium. Fulvius is defeated and killed in a battle with Hannibal near Herdonea. Battles between Marcellus and Hannibal without any thing decisive. Conspiracy of the Campanians discovered. The citadel of Tarentum supplied with provisions. Ambassadors from Syphax to the Romans, and from the Romans to Syphax. Embassy to the King of Egypt. The Roman fleet ravages Africa. Disputes concerning a Dictator. New dispute between the Dictator and the Tribunes. Lælius arrives at Rome. Distribution of the provinces. Valerius Flaccus, elected priest of Jupiter, amends his life, and re-establishes a privilege attached to his office. Complaints and murmurs of the Roman colonies. Twelve of them refuse to furnish their contingents. The Consuls warmly reproach them. The other eighteen colonies do their duty with alacrity. Gold taken out of the privy treasury for the pressing occasions of the State. Censors created. They exercise their office with due severity.

M. CLAUDIUS

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, IV.

M. VALERIUS LÆVINUS, II.

Liv. xxvii.
1.

THE affairs of Spain have for some time made us lose sight of those of Italy. The Consul Marcellus having made himself master of Salapia by intelligence in the place, as we have said, took Marona and Meles by force. He defeated in them about three thousand men, whom Hannibal had left as garrisons, and gave the whole plunder to his soldiers, which was considerable. He also found in them two hundred and forty thousand bushels of wheat, and one hundred and ten thousand of barley.

Liv. *ibid.*

These advantages did not give him so much joy, as he felt grief for the loss the Commonwealth sustained some days afterwards near the city of Herdonea, a place unfortunate to the Romans, who had been defeated there two years before by Hannibal. The Proconsul Cn. Fulvius, of the same names as the Prætor who had been beaten there in the action I have just repeated, was incamped near Herdonea, in hopes of re-taking that city, which had gone over from the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ. Hannibal, being informed that the Proconsul kept himself little upon his guard, marched towards Herdonea with so much expedition, that he was in view of the Romans, before they were informed of his march. He offered them battle, which Fulvius, full of audacity and good opinion of himself, made no scruple to accept. The action was warm, and victory continued long in suspense. In the heat of the engagement, Hannibal detached his cavalry, part of which fell upon the enemy's camp, and the rest attacked those who were at blows with the Carthaginians. The Romans then seeing themselves between two enemies, were put into disorder. Some betook themselves to flight; and the rest, after having made some vain efforts to defend themselves, were cut to pieces. Cn. Fulvius himself fell in the slaughter, with eleven legionary Tribunes.

Seven.

Seven thousand men, according to some, and thirteen thousand, according to others, perished in this action. The victor remained master of the field, and of all the spoils both of the field and camp.

R. A. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Marcellus, without being much discouraged by this loss, wrote to the Senate, to inform it of the misfortune of the Proconsul and army which had perished near Herdonea. He told them, "That he was marching against Hannibal; and that having known how, after the battle of Cannæ, to check the pride, which so compleat a victory had given him, he should also know how to damp the joy with which this new advantage might affect him." Accordingly he advanced against Hannibal, and offered him battle. The action was warm and long, and the advantage very near equal. However, Hannibal retreated in the night, and was followed by the Consul, who came up with him near Venusia. They passed several days in harassing each other by actions wherein the Romans had almost always the advantage, but which might rather pass for slight skirmishes, than real engagements. Hannibal usually decamped in the night, and watched the occasions for ensnaring his enemy: but Marcellus was cautious of following him only by day, and not till he had caused the places to be carefully viewed.

Liv. xxvii.

2.

In the mean time Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who still continued to command in Capua with the title of Proconsul, discovered a new conspiracy carried on by the Campanians. Apprehending that the too voluptuous abode of that city might corrupt his troops, as it had those of Hannibal, he had made them quit it, and had obliged them to build barracks without the walls. Most of these barracks were built with hurdles, planks, or reeds, and covered with stubble, all combustible materials. An hundred and seventy Campanians, at the instigation of two brothers of the family of the Blossii, one of the most considerable of the city, had conspired to burn the whole in the space of one night. The plot having been discovered by the slaves of the

Liv. xxvii.

3.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Blosii themselves, the Proconsul immediately caused the gates of the city to be shut, put the soldiers under arms, seized all the accomplices, and after having given them the question with abundance of rigor, they were condemned to die, and executed immediately. The informers were rewarded with their liberty, and had each ten thousand sestertii (about twenty-five pounds sterling) given him.

In the midst of the various successful and unfortunate events, which attracted the attention of the Romans, the citadel of Tarentum was not forgot. M. Ogulnius and P. Aquilius were sent into Etruria, to buy corn, and cause it to be carried by water to Tarentum. With these provisions set out a thousand soldiers, half Romans, half allies, draughted out of the army that guarded the city of Rome, who were to re-inforce the garrison of the citadel of Tarentum.

Liv. xxvii.
4.

The campaign was now almost over, and the time for the election of magistrates approached. But Marcellus having wrote to the Senate, that he was actually employed in pursuing Hannibal, who fled before him, and declined fighting, and that it was of the last importance not to lose sight of him, the Senators were at a loss how to act. For, on one side, they judged it improper to interrupt the Consul's military operations, by making him return to Rome at a time when his presence was most necessary in the army; and on the other, they were afraid that the Commonwealth would be without Consuls for the ensuing year. They believed, that the best resolution they could take, was to send for the Consul Valerius, though he was in Sicily, and had the sea to repass. Accordingly the Prætor L. Manlius wrote to him by order of the Senate, and sent him the letters of Marcellus, that he might know from them the reason the Fathers had for making him return rather than his colleague.

It was about this time, that Ambassadors came to Rome from King Syphax, with the news of the advantages gained by that Prince in the war subsisting between him and the Carthaginians. They declared,

“ That

“ That Carthage had not a greater enemy than Syphax, nor the Romans a better friend. That he had sent Ambassadors into Spain to the two Scipios. That he now sent to the fountain-head, to the capital of the empire, to demand the amity of the Romans.” The Senate did not content themselves with making Syphax a very obliging answer; they appointed L. Genucius, P. Petelius, and P. Popilius, Ambassadors to him, who were instructed to accompany those of Syphax on their return, to carry him a robe after the Roman fashion as a present, with a purple tunic, a curule chair, and gold cup of five pounds in weight. They had orders to take this occasion to visit the other petty Kings of Africa, and to present them in the name of the Senate with robes edged with purple, and with gold cups weighing three pounds.

M. Atilius and Manius Acilius were also made to set out for Alexandria to Ptolomy Philopator and Cleopatra, who reigned at that time. They were ordered to demand of them, that the treaty of amity and alliance, which subsisted between the Commonwealth and the Kings of Egypt should be renewed, and to present the King with a robe and tunic of purple, and a curule chair; and the Queen with an embroidered mantle, and a * kind of purple veil.

* Amiculum.
Liv. xxvii.
5.

M. Valerius, conformably to his colleague's letters, and the order of the Senate, set out from Sicily with ten galleys, to repair to Rome, after having appointed the Prætor Cincius to command the province and army, and sent M. Valerius Messala, Admiral of the fleet, with the rest of it, into Africa, as well to ravage the enemy's country, as to discover the motions and designs of the Carthaginians. As to himself, as soon as he arrived at Rome, he assembled the Senate, and gave an account of what he had done in Sicily. He told them, “ That after a war of near † sixty years continuance, during which they had frequently sustained very considerable losses both by sea and land,

† Fifty-five, from the 488th year of Rome.

A. R. 542. he had at length entirely subjected that island to the
 Ant. C. power of the Roman people : that there was not a single
 210. Carthaginian remaining in it ; and that all the Sicilians, whom fear had banished from their country, were returned to their cities and lands, where they employed themselves in agriculture and husbandry. That the island, which had been so long ruined by the war, was now happily re-peopled, and in a condition, by the re-establishment of tillage, not only to subsist its inhabitants, but abundantly to supply the Roman people with provisions, both in peace and war."

He afterwards introduced Mutines to the Senate, and others, who, like him, had deserved well of the Commonwealth. On Mutines they even conferred the freedom of Rome, in virtue of a law, which one of the Tribunes of the People proposed, with the authority of a decree of the Senate.

Liv. xxvii. Whilst these things passed at Rome, M. Valerius
 5. Messala, having arrived before day in Africa with fifty ships, made a descent in the country of Utica, where the inhabitants expected no such visit ; and after having ravaged it on all sides, he returned to his ships, with a great number of prisoners and a rich booty, and sailed immediately for Sicily, where he landed in the port of Lilybæum, having employed only thirteen days in this expedition. He then interrogated his prisoners concerning the situation of Africa, in order to give an account of them to the Consul. He was informed by them, " That there were five thousand Numidians at Carthage, under the command of Masinissa, the son of Gala, a young Prince of extraordinary valour, and that other mercenary troops were raising throughout all Africa, to be sent to Asdrubal in Spain ; and that the latter had orders to march as soon as possible into Italy with all the troops he could draw together, in order to join his brother Hannibal. That the Carthaginians placed their whole hopes in the execution of this design. And that they
 were

were also fitting out a great fleet to return to Sicily, which was expected to sail immediately."

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

When the Consul had read Messala's letters, which informed him of all these circumstances, the Senators were so much alarmed by those preparations, that they believed it necessary, that the Consul should not stay till the time of the elections, but should nominate a Dictator to preside at them, and return directly to his province. One difficulty gave them pause. The Consul declared, that when he was in Sicily, he would appoint M. Valerius Messala Dictator, who then commanded the fleet. Now the Senators affirmed, that a Dictator could be nominated only in the territories called Roman, and that those territories were included within the bounds of Italy. After many debates, the People, in concert with the Senate, decreed, that Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who then commanded at Capua, should be declared Dictator. The Consul, the night before this assembly of the People was to be held, set out secretly for Sicily. The Senate, disconcerted by his retreat, wrote to the Consul Marcellus, and desired him to assist the Commonwealth, abandoned by his colleague, and to declare the Dictator intended by the People. Marcellus created Q. Fulvius accordingly, who appointed P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, General of the horse.

When the election of the Consuls came on, a new difficulty arose. The Youth of the century called ^{Liv. xxvii.} 6. Galeria, who by lot were to give their suffrages first, nominated Q. Fulvius, then actually Dictator, and Q. Fabius, Consuls; and the rest of the centuries seemed determined to confirm this choice. Two of the Tribunes opposed it, affirming, that it was contrary to order to create the person who was Dictator, Consul, and to remove him in that manner, without any interval of time from one office to another; besides which, it was no less repugnant to decency and good order, to raise the very person to the Consulship, who presided in the election of Consuls. After

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

long disputes, the Dictator and Tribunes agreed to refer the affair to the Senate. As the thing was not without precedent, and it also seemed of great importance, that the most able and experienced Generals should be placed at the head of the armies, the Senate was of opinion, that it was necessary not to oppose the freedom of the suffrages. The Tribunes having acquiesced in these reasons, the assembly pursued their plan. Q. Fabius Maximus was elected Consul for the fifth time, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus for the fourth. L. Veturius Philo, T. Quintius Crispinus, C. Hostilius Tubulo, and C. Arunculejus were afterwards created Prætors.

Towards the end of this campaign, a Carthaginian fleet, consisting of forty sail, under the command of Amilcar, arrived at Sardinia, and made a descent in the country of the Olbii. But the Prætor P. Manlius Vulso marching against the enemy, they reembarked, and steering round the island, made another descent in the territory of Caralis (Cagliari) on the opposite side, and returned to Africa with a considerable booty of all kinds.

Liv. xxvii.

7.

About the same time, C. Lælius arrived at Rome, thirty-four days after his setting out from Tarraco. He entered the city with his prisoners, surrounded with a vast concourse of the People. They were not above fifteen or sixteen in number, but all persons of distinction. The next day, being introduced to the Senate, he related what Scipio had done in Spain. "That he had taken Carthagera in one day, the capital of the whole province: that he had retaken many cities which had revolted, and had brought over others into the party of the Commonwealth." The accounts given by the prisoners confirmed what M. Valerius Messala had wrote. What alarmed the Senate most, was the intended march of Asdrubal into Italy, at a time when it was not a little difficult to make head against Hannibal's forces only. Lælius was afterwards presented to the People, to whom he gave the same account as to the Senate. Thanksgiv-
ings

ings were decreed for one day for the good success of P. Scipio, and Lælius was sent back directly into Spain with the same ships that came with him.

A. R. 542.
Ant. C.
210.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS, V.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

Q. FVLVIVS FLACCVS, IV.

The two Consuls entered upon office, according to custom, upon the ides of March, that is, the fifteenth day of that month. Both had Italy for their province: Fabius the part next Tarentum, and Flaccus Lucania and Bruttium. Marcellus was continued in his command for one year. Crispinus was sent to Capua, C. Aurunculejus to Sardinia, and L. Veturius to Rimini. M. Valerius and L. Cincius remained in Sicily. No change was made in the army in Spain, except that Scipio and Silanus were continued in the command, not for one year, but as long as the Senate should judge proper.

C. Manilius Vitulus was created * Curio Maximus, the first of the Plebeians that was raised to that dignity.

At the same time, P. Licinius, the Pontifex Maximus, obliged C. Valerius Flaccus, against his will, to be consecrated Priest of Jupiter. This fact is very particular. This Valerius had much disgraced himself in his youth by his indolence and the irregularity of his life. Those failings had made him odious to his brother L. Valerius, and to all his relations. Licinius, who no doubt was a friend to his family, did not lose hopes of reclaiming him. He represented to him how great a misfortune it was, to afflict and dishonour his whole house in such a manner; and gave him to understand, that the certain means to recover his reputation, would be to take upon him the office of Priest of Jupiter, and so to discharge himself in it,

* There were thirty Curiaë at Rome, as we have said elsewhere. Each Curia had its head, called Curio, whose office it was to take care of all that related to the ceremonies of religion. The principal of them was called Curio Maximus.

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Ant. C.
209.

that the prudence of his conduct might cover and obliterate all the faults and indiscretions of his past life. The young man believed him, and gave into his advice. In effect of his application to the religious ceremonies, the care of the sacrifices, and the worship of the Gods, he renounced his former habits so effectually, that there was not one of the Roman Youth more generally esteemed by the principal Senators, nor more respected by his own family, and the whole city, than him.

It must be owned, that it is a great, and the most sensible affliction, that parents can suffer, to see their children depart from their duty, and abandon themselves to licentiousness. But this is an important lesson to them, to teach them, to make * a difference between the faults that arise from the heat and inadvertency of youth, which admit of remedy, and those which proceed from a disposition hardened in vice, and utterly incorrigible; not to despair of their reformation; to prepare them for it by mild and tender remonstrances; not to use excessive menaces, and rigorous methods, which only serve to inflame and exasperate their passions; and lastly, which is a means peculiar to Christianity, to deserve by their own conduct, that he, who is, the supreme Ruler of all hearts, should change and amend those of their children.

The young man, of whom we are speaking, acquired, in time, so great a reputation for probity and prudence, that he believed himself in a condition to resume a privilege formerly annexed to his office, and which those, who had exercised it, had forfeited for many years, by their want of merit. This privilege consisted in having a right to enter the Senate. Accordingly, in order to revive that prerogative, he went thither and claimed it. The Prætor L. Licinius having ordered him to depart, he demanded the

* Adhibenda est moderatio, quæ sanabilia ingenia distinguere à deploratis sciat. SENECA. de Clem. I. 2.

aid and support of the Tribunes. He maintained, that it was a right antiently granted to the Priests of Jupiter, with the robe bordered with purple, and the Curule chair. The Prætor objected, that such a privilege ought to be founded, not upon obsolete examples of unknown antiquity, but upon constant practice, and recent custom; and he affirmed that no priest of Jupiter had enjoyed that right in the days of their fathers or grandfathers for immemorial time. The Tribunes replied, that the bad conduct of the more modern Priests might affect their persons, but not their office. Upon which the Prætor persisted no longer in his opposition. Flaccus was admitted into the Senate with the unanimous consent of the Senators and People; and every body was of opinion, that he had deserved that distinction more by the purity of his manners, than the right of his office.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

An unexpected discontent occasioned great alarm at Rome this year; and might have been attended with very unhappy effects. The Latines and allies openly murmured in their assemblies, and complained, "That by the levying of men and money upon them for ten years past, their families and purses were entirely exhausted. That every campaign had been distinguished by some signal defeat. That battles and sickness had deprived them of almost all their People. That they considered those much more as lost, who had been lifted by the Romans, than those who had been taken by the enemy: as Hannibal sent home those he took without ransom, whereas the Romans sent them far from Italy, into countries where they lived much more like exiles, than like soldiers. That the troops of Cannæ had for eight years, suffered a disgrace in Sicily, which would only terminate with their lives; as the Carthaginians, whose expulsion alone was to deliver them, were now stronger and more formidable than ever. That if the old soldiers were not sent home, and they were continually obliged to furnish new, they should soon not have a man left. That therefore, before they were exhausted of men and money, they were resolved

Liv. xxvii.
9.

A. R. 543. resolved to refuse the Romans aid, which they were
 Ant. C. upon the point of being utterly incapable of supply-
 209. ing. That if the Romans saw all their allies in the
 same disposition, they would undoubtedly think of
 making peace with the Carthaginians. That other-
 wise, Italy would never enjoy peace, as long as Han-
 nibal lived." Such was the language in the Assem-
 blies of the allies.

Thirty of the * Roman colonies had actually De-
 puties at Rome. Of these thirty, twelve had plainly
 affirmed to the Consuls, that they had neither men
 nor money for them. The Consuls, struck with a
 declaration as fatal as it was new, believed, that to
 make them alter so pernicious a design, it was more
 necessary to use reprimands, than good words, which
 would only make them more insolent. They there-
 fore replied, " they had presumed to say That to the
 Consuls, which the Consuls themselves dared not re-
 peat to the Senate. That such discourse ought not
 to be considered as a mere refusal to contribute to-
 wards the support of the war, but as an actual revolt
 against the Roman People. That therefore they
 should return as soon as possible to their colonies, and
 deliberate again with their constituents, that so crimi-
 nal a declaration might be thought rather to have
 escaped their lips, than to have come from their
 hearts. That they should take care to represent to
 them, that they were not Campanians nor Tarentines,
 but Romans. That their fathers were born in Rome,
 and had been sent from thence to inhabit the lands
 taken from the enemy, and to augment and extend
 the Roman name. That the same duty children owed
 to their parents they owed to Rome, and that they
 could entertain no other thoughts without stifling all
 sense of gratitude in their hearts. That again, they
 bade them consult upon the affair, and remember,
 that the expressions which had escaped them, tended

* According to Sigonius there were fifty-three of them at this
 time.

to no less than the destruction of the Roman power, and to put victory and Rome into the hands of Hannibal." A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

The Consuls alternately used many arguments to no purpose to make the Deputies hear reason. Insensible to all their remonstrances, they replied: "That they had no representation to make from those who sent them; and that it was not necessary for their people to deliberate upon an affair already entirely determined, as they had neither money nor soldiers."

The Consuls finding them inflexible, made their report in the Senate. This news put every body into such a consternation, that most of the Senators cried out, "That the Commonwealth was ruined: that the other colonies would imitate so pernicious an example, and that all the allies had undoubtedly conspired to give up Rome to Hannibal."

The Consuls exhorted the Senate to take courage, Liv. xxviii.
10. and consoled them with the hope of finding more fidelity and submission from the other colonies. They added, "that even those who had departed from their duty, might return to it: and that if deputies from the Senate were sent to them, who should not use entreaties, but a stile of authority, they would make them resume sentiments of fear and respect for the Roman People."

The Senate referred the affair to their conduct, and empowered them to do all they should think proper for the good of the Commonwealth. Accordingly after they had sounded the disposition of the other colonies, they asked their Deputies, whether they were willing to furnish the Commonwealth with their contingents? M. Sextilius, deputy from Fregellæ, answered in the name of the rest: "That the soldiers, they were to furnish, were ready: that they would even supply a greater number, if necessary; and that they would do every thing else that the Roman People should direct, with zeal and passion. * That

* Ad id sibi neque opes deesse, animum etiam superesse. Liv.

A.R. 543. they did not want the means, and much less the
 Ant. C. will."
 209.

The Consuls also having applauded their zeal and fidelity, added : " That their generous offers deserved the thanks of the Senate ;" and they accordingly introduced them to it. The Senate, not contented with having answered them by a decree conceived in the most honourable terms, ordered the Consuls to present them to the Assembly of the People, and there to set forth all the services the Commonwealth had received from them on different occasions, and especially this last, by which they crowned all the rest.

In my opinion, the relation I have just made must sensibly affect every reader, even after so many ages, in respect to such faithful and generous people. It is not surprizing therefore, that Livy, all zealous as he was for the glory of Rome, gives a loose here to his joy, admiration, and gratitude in respect to these colonies. He * believed, as he says, that he should deprive them of the justice and glory they deserved, if he should pass over so noble an action in silence ; and he considered himself as obliged, both as a Roman and an Historian, to transmit to posterity, and in some measure to consecrate the names of these eighteen colonies, whose zeal upon this occasion may be said to have preserved the Roman name ; and he has repeated them all in the passage in question.

As to the twelve other colonies, who refused to obey, the Senate directed the Consuls to treat them with absolute neglect, without either dismissing their Deputies, keeping them at Rome, or speaking to them in any manner. * This silence by which it was thought proper to punish their refusal, seemed more suitable to the dignity of the Roman People, than any expressed resentment whatsoever.

* Ne nunc quidem post tot secula fiantur, fraudenturve laude sua, Signini fuere & Norbani, &c. ---- Harum coloniarum subsidio tum imperium Populi Romani stetit.

† Ea tacita castigatio maximè ex dignitate Populi Romani visa est.
 LIV.

Amongst the other means used by the Consuls to enable them to carry on the war, they took the † gold out of the privy treasury, which was carefully kept there as a reserve against the pressing occasions of the Commonwealth. It was to about the weight of four thousand pounds, and of that Sum the two Consuls, the Proconsuls M. Marcellus and P. Sulpicius and the Prætor L. Veturius, had equal parts. The Consul Fabius had an hundred weight more, which was to be carried into the citadel of Tarentum. The rest was employed in purchasing cloaths with ready money for the army in Spain, of which the General and soldiers had acquired so much glory.

Fulvius after this held the assemblies for the election of Censors. M. Cornelius Cethegus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus, who had not been Consuls, had this office conferred upon them. The People, with the authority of the Senate, commissioned the Censors to farm the lands of Capua for the use of the Commonwealth.

A dispute arose between the two Censors, in respect to the person who was to be nominated Prince of the Senate. He who was placed first upon the list of the Senators was called so; which was a great honour at Rome. Sempronius was to read this list, which function fell to him by lot; and consequently he was to nominate the Prince of the Senate. He had cast his eye upon Q. Fabius Maximus. His colleague Cornelius opposed that choice. He pretended, that in this respect the antient custom ought to be observed, which had always conferred that honour upon the oldest Censor living, who then was T. Manlius Torquatus. Sempronius replied, that the Gods who had given them that choice by lot, left it entirely at his discretion: that in consequence he should nominate Fabius, who even in the judgment of Hannibal him-

† This gold was called Vicesimarium, because it arose from a twentieth of the price a slave was worth, which was paid to the Commonwealth, when he was made free. This duty was established in the 398th year of Rome.

A. R. 543. self, was indisputably the principal, and most illustrious citizen of Rome. Cornelius, after having contended for some time, complied at last, and Sempronius declared Q. Fabius, then Consul, Prince and Chief of the Senate.

Ant. C.
209.

The list of the Senators was then read. Eight were left out ; which was degrading them. Of this number was L. Cæcilius Metellus, who, after the battle of Cannæ, had given the other officers the infamous advice to abandon Italy. The Knights were treated in the same manner, who were in the same case ; but those were very few. All of them, who were in the Legions at the battle of Cannæ, and who then had served in Sicily, had their horses taken from them, that is, were degraded from that rank : the number of these was very great. To this severity another was added, by declaring that the years they had served should not be allowed them, and obliging them to serve ten campaigns mounted at their own expence : which was the usual time the Knights served. Enquiry was also made after those, who being seventeen years old at the beginning of the war, ought to have entered the service, and had not done so. These were reduced to the lowest class of the citizens, retaining no other privilege annexed to that quality, except that of being kept upon the registers to bear the offices of the State. The Censors then agreed with workmen for rebuilding the edifices which had been consumed by fire.

S E C T. II.

Fabius prepares to besiege Tarentum. Marcellus offers Hannibal battle near Canusium. First battle with equal advantage on both sides. Second battle in which Hannibal has the better. Marcellus warmly reproaches his army. Third battle, in which Hannibal is defeated, and put to flight. Several cities in Calabria and the neighbouring countries go over to the Romans. Fabius besieges and takes Tarentum by intelligence in the place.

He

He carries away only one statue. Hannibal lays a snare for Fabius. His stratagem is discovered. Scipio makes the States of Spain return to the party of the Romans. Asdrubal and Scipio design to come to blows. Indibilis and Mandonius quit the Carthaginians, and join Scipio. Fine reflexion of Polybius upon the use of victory. Battle between Scipio and Asdrubal. The latter is defeated, and put to flight. Scipio refuses the title of King, offered him by the Spaniards. Massiva a young Numidian Prince sent home to his family by Scipio, without ransom and with presents. The three Carthaginian Generals join each other. Their Resolutions.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

THE Consuls having made an end of all the affairs that kept them at Rome, set out for the war. Fulvius went the first to Capua. Liv. xxvii.
12.

Fabius followed some days after, having desired his colleague by word of mouth, and Marcellus by letter, to act vigorously against Hannibal, in order to keep all his forces employed, whilst he should attack Tarentum with the same activity. He represented the importance of that siege to them, by telling them, that the Carthaginian General would no sooner be deprived of that place, than having no longer any friends or allies from whom he could hope for aid, he would infallibly be reduced to abandon Italy.

At the same time he sent a courier to the Governor who commanded the garrison of Rhegium, with orders first to lay waste the country of the Bruttii, and afterwards to attack the city of * Caulonia. That Commander executed his orders with zeal and vigour.

Marcellus, in conformity to the Consul's intentions, and because he was also convinced, that no Roman General was more capable of making head against Hannibal than himself, took the field as soon as the land could supply forage, and marched against him near Canusium. Hannibal was at that time endeavouring to induce the inhabitants of that city to re-

Liv. ibid.
Plut. in
Marc. 313.

* Castel-veteri in Calabria Ulterior.

A. R. 543. volt. But as soon as he was apprized of the approach
 Ant. C. of Marcellus, he decamped. The country was en-
 209. tirely open, and not proper for ambuscades; which obliged him to seek places full of woods, defiles, and eminences elsewhere. Marcellus followed him close, always encamped in view of him, and had no sooner compleated his works, than he offered him battle.

Hannibal contented himself with skirmishing by small detachments of horse, and slingers, and did not believe it for his interest to hazard a general battle. He was however reduced to come to one, whatever precaution he used to avoid it. For having decamped in the night, Marcellus, who never lost sight of him, joined him in a flat and open place, and by attacking his workmen on all sides, prevented him from intrenching himself. In this manner they came to blows, and fought with all their forces, till the approach of night parted them, victory not declaring on either side. They both intrenched very hastily, on account of the little day-light that remained, and passed the night at a very small distance from each other.

The next morning, at day-break, Marcellus drew up his army in battle. Hannibal accepted the defiance, and before the charge began, exhorted his soldiers to behave well: "He told them that they should remember Thrasymenus and Cannæ, and check the pride of an active enemy, who did not give them a moment's rest, who incessantly harrassed them in their incampments, and did not afford them time to breathe. That they must expect to see every day, at the same time, both the sun-rise, and the Roman army in battle. That to make them less eager for action, it was necessary to give them a new proof of the Carthaginian valour." Animated by these remonstrances, and exasperated besides by the fierceness of an enemy, that continually tormented them, they began the battle with extraordinary fury. After the action had continued above two hours, the Roman allies on the right wing began to
 give

give way. Marcellus, who perceived it, made the twelfth legion immediately advance to the front; but whilst the first were solely intent upon flying, and the latter took their place very slowly, the whole main body of the army was pushed and put into disorder, and fear prevailing over shame, all fled. About two thousand seven hundred Romans and allies were killed in the battle, and among the rest four Centurions, and two legionary Tribunes. The right wing of the allies, that fled first, lost four ensigns, and the legion sent to take their post, two.

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When the soldiers were returned into the camp, Marcellus reproached them with so much warmth and severity, that they were more affected with the expressions of their incensed General, than with the grief of having fought the whole day with disadvantage. “ I
“ thank the immortal Gods, said he, as much as is
“ possible after so bad success, that the victorious enemy did not come to attack us in our works, at the
“ time when you fled thither with so much precipitation; for the same fear, that made you quit the field of
“ battle, would undoubtedly have made you abandon
“ your camp. From whence could such terror and
“ consternation arise? What could make you so soon
“ forget yourselves, and the enemy? Are they not
“ the same you have so often defeated and pursued
“ during the whole preceding campaign; so often
“ harrassed night and day lately, and fatigued by continual skirmishes? But I am in the wrong to expect
“ from you, that you should sustain the glory of your
“ former advantages. I shall now only set before
“ your eyes your equality with the enemy in the battle
“ yesterday. That equality is no small shame to you.
“ Who could have believed you were capable of falling still lower, and of descending to a still greater
“ disgrace? What change has happened in the space
“ of one night and day? Are your troops diminished?
“ Are those of the enemy increased? As for my part,
“ I do not seem to talk to soldiers, or Romans. I see
“ the same men, and the same arms, but not with the

Liv. xxvii.
13.
Plut. in
Marc. 313.

A.R. 543. "same courage. If you had not degenerated from
 Ant. C. "yourselves, would the Carthaginians have seen you
 209. "fly like cowards? Would they have taken the en-
 "signs of a single company, or a single cohort? Hi-
 "therto they might boast of having cut Roman le-
 "gions in pieces: but you have this day given them
 "the new glory of seeing Romans turn their backs
 "before them."

Upon these words there was a general cry through-
 out the whole army. They entreated Marcellus to
 forget what had passed that day, and to put their va-
 lour to any proof he thought fit for the future. "Well
 "then, said he, to-morrow I will try you by leading
 "you on to battle, that you may obtain the pardon
 "you ask as victors, not as vanquished." In the
 mean time, he ordered, that barley bread should be
 given to the cohorts who had lost their ensigns, and
 that the centurions of the companies, to whom that
 dishonour had happened, should stand for a certain
 time in the most public part of the camp without belts,
 and with their swords drawn in their hands; which was
 a military punishment amongst the Romans. That they
 should also be under arms early the next morning, both
 horse and foot. He then dismissed them not a little
 mortified, but confessing that they had well deserved
 the reprimand they had received; that there was not
 a man, nor a Roman, in their army that day, except
 their General; and that to make him forget their fault,
 it was necessary either to conquer or die.

Liv. xxvii. The next day they were all under arms according to
 14. the order of Marcellus. That General applauded the
 Plut. in aspect and disposition in which he saw them; and de-
 Marc. 313. clared that he would place those who had fled first, and
 the cohorts who had lost their ensigns, in the front:
 all of them having earnestly desired it of him as a fa-
 vour. He told them farther, that it was necessary
 they should fight and conquer, that the news of their
 victory might arrive at Rome as soon as that of their
 defeat and flight. He then ordered them to refresh
 themselves with eating, that they might have vigour
 enough

enough to sustain the fight, if it should continue long. After having said and done all that could animate the soldiers, he led them to battle.

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When Hannibal saw they advanced against him, he said, * “ This Marcellus is a strange man ! He can neither bear good nor bad fortune. When victor, he pursues us to the utmost ; and when vanquished, he returns to battle with more haughtiness than before.” After having said these words, he ordered the charge to be sounded, and advanced to meet the Romans. The battle was much more obstinate than the day before ; the Carthaginians sparing no efforts to keep their advantage, and the Romans none to obliterate the disgrace of their defeat.

Marcellus had posted the troops who had behaved ill the day before, in the front of the two wings : they were commanded by L. Cornelius Lentulus, and C. Claudius Nero. He reserved the main body for himself, that he might be a witness of all that passed, and in a condition to animate his troops upon occasion. Hannibal had posted the Spaniards, who were the flower of his army, and its principal strength, in the front. But seeing that the battle continued too long doubtful, he ordered the elephants to be brought on, with the view of occasioning some disorder amongst the enemy. Accordingly some confusion ensued amongst the ensigns and front ranks ; and those beasts having at first trod down or put to flight all in their way, the disorder had been greater, if C. Decimus Flavus, a legionary Tribune, having seized the standard of the first company of the Hastati, had not ordered the troops of that company to follow him. He led them to the place where those enormous animals in one body did the most hurt, and commanded them to discharge their javelins against them. Not one but took effect, as they were thrown at so small a distance against such a number of vast beasts, crowded together. How-

* Cum eo nimirum, inquit, hoste res est, qui nec bonam nec malam ferre fortunam potest. Seu vicit, ferociter instat vestis ; seu victus est, instaurat cum victori bus certamen. Liv.

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ever, they were not all wounded: but those that felt the points of those darts deep in their bodies taking to flight, and being then no less terrible to their own side than the enemy, drew along with them those also which were not wounded. Upon this all the Roman soldiers who were at hand, after the example of the first, pursued that flying troop, and showered their darts upon all the elephants they could overtake. Those animals in consequence fell upon the Carthaginians with vast fury, and made greater havock amongst them, than they had amongst the Romans, as fear has much more effect upon them, and makes them much more fierce, than the voices or hands of those that guide them.

The Roman infantry immediately advanced against the Carthaginians, whose ranks the elephants had broken, and easily put troops to flight, who had lost sight of their ensigns, and could not rally. Marcellus then detached his cavalry after them, who pursued them to the gates of their camp, into which they entered with difficulty, full of terror and consternation. To augment their misfortune, two elephants had fallen dead in the middle of the gate; and as they closed the entrance, the soldiers were obliged to throw themselves into the intrenchment, and to climb over the pallisades, to escape. In consequence, the greatest slaughter was made there. About eight thousand men, and five elephants, were killed. This victory cost the Romans dear. The two legions lost about seventeen hundred men, and the allies above thirteen hundred, without including a great number of wounded, both of the citizens and allies. But the terror of Hannibal's name was at that time so great amongst the Romans, that it may be considered as a glorious exploit, to have reduced his troops to fly, though that advantage was attended with a considerable loss.

Hannibal decamped in the following night. Marcellus was very desirous to pursue him; but the great number of his wounded men prevented him. Those who were sent out to observe the enemy's march, brought

brought advice the next day, that Hannibal was retired into Bruttium. A. R. 543.
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At the same time the Hirpini, Lucani, and Vol-
scentes, went over to the Consul Q. Fulvius, and de-
livered up the Carthaginian garrisons in their cities. 209.
Liv. xxvii. 15.
That General received them with great lenity; praising
their present disposition, and gently reproaching them
for their past fault. The Bruttii shewed some dispo-
sition in favour of the Romans, but without any great
effect; probably because the presence of Hannibal kept
them in awe. Fabius, on his side, took the city of
* Manduria, in the country of the Sallentini: where
he made four thousand prisoners, with a very consider-
able booty.

From thence Fabius repaired to Tarentum, and in-
camped at the very mouth of the port. Cato the Cen-
sor, who was then very young, served under him this
campaign. Fabius prepared every thing for the siege. Liv. xxvii.
11, 16.
Plut. in
Fab. 187.
App. in
bell. An-
nib. 342.
The sea was open for the Romans, the Carthaginian
fleet having been sent to Corcyra (Corfu) to second
King Philip in attacking the Ætolians. Chance sup-
plied him with an occasion of terminating so import-
ant an enterprize soon, and without difficulty. Han-
nibal had put a body of the Bruttii into this place to
assist in defending it. He who commanded them, was
desperately in love with a woman, whose brother
served in the army of Fabius. Upon a letter wrote
by this woman to her brother, he, in concert with his
General, threw himself into Tarentum, as a deserter.
With the help of his sister's artful caresses, he ingra-
tiated himself very much with that officer; and at
length persuaded him to deliver up the quarter of the
city, of which he had the guard, to the Romans.
When they had concerted the means for executing this
design, the soldier secretly quitted the city in the
night, went to Fabius, and acquainted him with the
measures he had taken with the Bruttian. The Ro-
man General lost no time. After having given, at the
beginning of the night, the signal agreed on to those
who defended the citadel, and those who had the guard

* In the territory of Otranto.

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of the port, and had posted himself opposite to a certain part of the city, which the soldier had pointed out to him, the trumpets began to sound at once from the citadel, the port, and the ships that advanced from the open sea towards the place, and great cries and much noise were made in all the places, where the city had nothing to fear. Fabius in the mean time kept his troops well concealed in the post he had taken, and made them observe a strict silence. The General, who commanded the quarter of the city opposite to which Fabius lay in ambush, seeing that all was quiet on that side, whereas he heard a great noise every where else, apprehended, that whilst he kept still in his post, Fabius was assaulting the place on another side. He therefore marched with the troops he had towards the citadel, where he heard most noise and tumult. Fabius soon perceived his motion, and immediately caused ladders to be placed at the part of the wall, where the body of the Bruttii were posted, as he had been directed by the soldier who had managed this intelligence. The Romans began there to take the wall, and afterwards entered the city with the assistance of the Bruttii, who received the Romans as they came up. The nearest gate was soon after broke open, which made way for the soldiers of Fabius to enter in greater numbers. Then raising great cries towards break of day, they advanced as far as the market-place without any resistance, and drew all those upon them, that fought on the side of the citadel and port.

The battle began at the entrance of the market-place with considerable warmth, but was not maintained in the same manner by the Tarentines, who were much inferior to the Romans in valour, arms, experience, and force. Accordingly the latter had no sooner discharged their javelins, than almost before they came to close fight, they turned their backs, and made off through different turnings into their houses, or those of their friends. The Romans put all they met to the sword, without regard to soldier or burgher, Carthaginian or Tarentine. They did not spare.

spare even the Bruttii much, whether they did not know them, or to satiate their antient hatred, or to make it seem as if Tarentum had been taken by force of arms, and not by treachery. If it was by Fabius's order, as Plutarch tells us, that they acted in this manner in respect to the Bruttii, to whom they were indebted for taking the city, it would have been a puerile vanity, and an horrid perfidy in him; but in my opinion such a suspicion is very incompatible with the character of so great a man.

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After the soldiers had shed abundance of blood, they dispersed themselves about the city to plunder it. It is said that they took thirty thousand prisoners. They found in it a great quantity of silver, both coined and in plate, and fourscore and seven thousand pound-weight of gold; about two millions one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, without including the silver. This sum seems exorbitant. Plutarch speaks only of three thousand talents, that makes about four hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling: which makes an enormous difference.

They found also in Tarentum almost as many statues and paintings as had been taken in Syracuse. The statues represented the Gods of Tarentum as large as nature, each with their peculiar arms, and in the posture of combatants. The Quæstor asked Fabius what he should do with the Gods of the Tarentines; to which he answered, "Let us leave the Tarentines their Gods, who have served them so ill, and are angry with them." He took away only one statue of Hercules of extraordinary magnitude, and which Plutarch for that reason calls "the Colossus of Hercules." Strabo tells us it was of brass, and made by Lysippus, the greatest statuary of the antients. Fabius placed it in the Capitol, and his own statue close to it.

Whilst these things passed at Tarentum, Hannibal reduced those who had besieged Caulonia, to surrender to him; and having received advice that Tarentum was also attacked, he prepared to aid it, and

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marched night and day without giving his troops any rest. But being informed on his route, that the city was taken, he said: "The Romans too have their Hannibal. We took Tarentum by stratagem; and they have re-taken it in the same manner." He then confessed for the first time on this occasion, "That he had long perceived it would be very hard for him to make himself master of Italy with the forces he had; but that then he found it utterly impossible."

Liv. xxvii.
16.
Plut. in
Fab. 185.

Hannibal, not to seem to have fled, did not return directly, but incamped in the same place, where he received this bad news, about five miles from the city. After having remained there some few days, he retired to Metapontum, from whence he sent two of the inhabitants to Fabius, who was still at Tarentum, with counterfeited letters from the principal persons of the city, which promised the Consul to deliver up Metapontum with the Carthaginian garrison, upon condition that all which had passed should be forgot and pardoned. Fabius did not think with his usual prudence upon this occasion. He believed too lightly the discourses made him, and fixed a day with the deputies, when he would approach Metapontum, and dismissed them with letters for the principal persons of that city, which were immediately carried to Hannibal. That General, transported with having succeeded in over-reaching Fabius himself, laid an ambuscade near Metapontum. But the Consul, having found the auspices unpropitious, as well as the entrails of the victim which he had sacrificed, did not quit Tarentum. The people of Metapontum, who did not see him arrive on the day fixed, dispatched the same deputies to him to press him to come. He seized them, and the fear of the tortures with which he threatened them, made them discover the whole.

I have said before that Cato the Censor served under the Consul Fabius Maximus, when he besieged Tarentum. As this Roman will in the sequel make a great figure in the Commonwealth, it is not foreign to our subject

to inform the reader in what manner he had passed his youth.

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Plut. in.

Cat. 336.

Cato was born at Tusculum. Before he commenced soldier, he passed his early years at the estate left him by his father near the country of the Sabines. Continual labour, and a sober and regular life, had given him a very healthy and robust constitution, capable of sustaining the rudest fatigues.

Near his country-house was the little farm, which had belonged to Manius Curius. He often walked thither, and considering the smallness of the land, and the poverty and simplicity of the house, he could not sufficiently admire that great man, who, after he became the most illustrious of the Romans, had conquered the most warlike nations, and driven Pyrrhus out of Italy, cultivated that little spot with his own hands; and after so many triumphs inhabited so miserable a cottage. He found a true greatness of soul in this simplicity, and not contented with merely admiring it, he made it his model, and a duty and honour to copy it.

There lived at this time a man of the most noble and powerful families of Rome, who in effect of his profound sense and good disposition, was highly capable of discerning a rising virtue; and by his goodness, generosity and beneficence, was an highly proper person to cherish and produce it to the world: this was * Valerius Flaccus. He had lands contiguous to the small farm of Cato. He there often heard his slaves talk of the manner in which his young neighbour lived, and of the work he did in the field. He was told, that in the morning he went to the small adjacent cities to plead the causes of such as applied to him to defend them; that from thence he returned to his land, where throwing on a mean tunic he worked with his domesticks; and afterwards,

* This Valerius Flaccus, as it seems to me, could not be much older than Cato, as he was Consul and Censor with him. Plutarch however speaks here of him, as of a man already considerably important.

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209.

when they returned home, he sat at the same table, and ate the same bread and drank the same wine with them. He was also told many other things, that argued a wise and virtuous disposition, with discourses and sayings full of sense and ingenuity. He had a curiosity to see and converse with him, and invited him to supper. From that instant, he contracted a particular friendship with him, and discerned in the young man so much wisdom, and such happy talents for the city, that he rightly judged of him, as of an excellent plant, that deserved to be cultivated, and transplanted into a better soil. He advised him to go to Rome, in order to qualify himself for the administration of publick affairs.

He was not long there without acquiring friends and admirers, especially by the force and eloquence of his pleadings. For considering the talent of speaking, as a faculty, not only useful, but necessary, to those who were desirous not to pass their lives in obscurity, and to acquire distinction in the Commonwealth, he had cultivated it with great application.

Plut. in
Caton.
337.

At first he chose to follow and live with Q. Fabius Maximus, of all the antient Senators. Cicero puts these words into Cato's mouth upon this subject: * "Whilst I was very young, I loved that venerable old man, as much as if he had been of my own age, There was in him a gravity mingled with politeness, and his great age had not in the least diminished the amiable sweetness of his manners †." Young persons, who in any employment whatsoever, desire in this manner the acquaintance and friendship of those who are distinguished by their merit and probity, give great hopes of their own future behaviour. For there is good reason to presume, that delighting in their con-

* Ego Q. Maximum—adolescens ita dilexi senem, ut æqualem. Erat enim in illo viro comitate condita gravitas: nec senectus mores mutaverat. Cic. de Senect. n. 10.

† Facillime & in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes, qui se ad claros & sapientes viros, bene consulentes reipublicæ contulerunt, quibuscum frequentes sint, opinionem afferunt populo, eorum fore se imiles, quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. De Offic. ii. 46.

versation, being witnesses of their conduct, and considering them as their models, they will one day pique themselves upon imitating them.

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Cato was of a very antient, but Plebeian, family, that had never rendered itself illustrious by the Curule offices : which constituted Nobility at Rome. Persons of these families on rising to them, were called New Men (*Novi Homines.*) Cato*, who had not the advantage of birth, was studious to recommend himself in another light, that is, by merit and virtue, and to become the source and principle of the nobility of his family. It was at that time a custom in Rome, for the young persons of good dispositions, who aspired at offices, to make themselves accusers of some illustrious Citizen, who had acted contrary to his duty in some notorious manner ; in order to signalize their entrance into the world by so distinguishing a conduct, and to acquire the favour of the people. A young man, who acted in this manner really deserved the praise of all good men, because at the same time that he laboured to expel a bad citizen from the commonwealth, he entered into a kind of solemn engagement to be virtuous ; and to his common and general duty, added a particular and personal obligation to lead a wife and irreproachable life. For when a man has gone so far as to set himself up for a censor and accuser of the faults of others, could he be pardoned, if he departed in the least from the strict rules of justice and virtue ? And this was the method Cato used for the attainment of dignities ; and with that view, he was not afraid to draw upon himself the enmity of the most

* Venit mihi in mentem M. Catonis, hominis sapientissimi : qui cum se virtute, non genere, populo Romano commendari putaret, cum ipse sui generis initium ac nominis ob se gigni & propagari vellet, hominum potentissimorum suscepit inimicitias. Ver. ult. n. 180.

Hoc magis ab omnibus ejusmodi civis laudandus ac deligendus est, qui non solum à republica civem improbum removet, verum etiam se ipsum ejusmodi fore profitetur ac præstat, ut sibi non modo communi voluntate virtutis atque officii, sed etiam ut quadam magis necessaria ratione rectè sit, honesteque vivendum.—Nam qui sibi hoc sumpsit, ut corrigat mores aliorum ac peccata reprehendat, quis huic ignoscat, si qua in re ipse ab religione officiis declinârit. Ver. iii. r. 2.

A. R. 543. powerful citizens of Rome. His zeal might not al-
 Ant. C. ways evidence itself; but it was always laudable.

^{209.}
 De senect. Cato made his first campaign under Fabius, who
 10. was then Consul for the fourth time. Five years after,
 in his fifth Consulship, he followed him in his expe-
 dition against Tarentum: he might be, at this time
 about four and twenty years old: and the next year,
 Plut.inCa- he served in Sicily as legionary Tribune. In the army
 ton. 336. he never drank any thing but water, except sometimes
 when extremely thirsty, he used a little vinegar, or
 when weak with fatigue, or weary, he took a little
 wine.

Such was the youth of a man, who will soon act a
 great part in the Commonwealth.

Liv. xxvii. P. Scipio had employed the whole preceding winter
 17. in bringing back the Spanish States into the party of
 Polyb. x. the Romans, winning them, sometimes by presents,
 604. and sometimes by the restitution of their hostages and
 prisoners without ransom. In the beginning of the
 spring, one of the most illustrious of the Spaniards
 named Edesco, came to him. His wife and children
 were in the hands of the Romans. But besides that
 motive, he was in a manner induced by the general
 disposition of the nation to prefer the side of the Ro-
 mans to that of the Carthaginians. The same motive
 induced Mandonius and Indibilis, who were, un-
 doubtedly, the most considerable Princes of Spain, to
 retire with all their vassals to the eminences, that com-
 manded the camp of the Carthaginians, and from
 whence, by continuing to keep the hills, they might
 arrive at the Roman army, without apprehending any
 thing from Asdrubal, whom they abandoned.

Polyb. x. That General seeing, that the Roman affairs became
 607. exceedingly superior, whilst those of the Carthaginians
 Liv. xxvii. declined every day; and that the train things had
 87. taken, could be only checked by some distinguished
 blow, some signal advantage, he resolved to come to
 a battle immediately with the enemy. Scipio was as
 ardently desirous of That as Asdrubal; not only be-
 cause his success had exalted his courage, but because
 he

he chose rather to fight a single enemy, than to have them all at once upon his hands ; which could not but happen, if he gave them time to join each other. And though he could not have avoided fighting with more than one enemy, by a wise precaution, he had found means to strengthen his army, so as to be in a condition to apprehend nothing. For as he saw the service of his fleet unnecessary, after that of the Carthaginians had abandoned the coast of Spain, he laid up his ships in the port of Tarraco, and reinforced his land forces with those intended for the sea service. He was capable of supplying them all with arms, because he had found a great number amongst the spoils of the Carthaginians, and had also caused a prodigious quantity of them to be made by the workmen whom he had shut up in the arsenals and magazines of the city.

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It was with these forces Scipio, at the beginning of the spring quitted Tarraco, and marched in quest of the enemy with Lælius, who was returned from Rome, and without whom he could not attempt any important enterprize. He met with none upon his march but friends and allies, who came from all parts to join him, each at the entrance of their country, accompanied him afterwards, and augmented his army. It was upon this march that Mandonius and Indibilis came to join him with their troops. Indibilis spoke, and his discourse favoured in nothing of the grossness of a Barbarian. He spoke with great dignity and reserve, and rather excused his change of side as the effect of necessity, than taking honour from it to himself as a resolution taken out of wantonness, and executed on the first occasion that offered. He said, “ That he knew that the name of a deserter was as suspicious to new allies, as it appeared detestable to old ones. That he did not blame an opinion common to all men, provided that the name only of deserter were not considered, but the reasons every man might have for becoming so. He afterwards expatiated upon the important services which his brother and himself had rendered the Carthaginian Generals : to which he

Ibid.

opposed

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opposed the * insatiable avarice and insupportable arrogance, with which the Carthaginian nation had repaid them; and concluded with the ill treatment of all kinds they had made themselves and their subjects suffer. That in consequence himself and his brother had long only worn the outside of an attachment to the Carthaginians, but that their hearts and affections had been on the side of those, by whom they knew that right and justice were religiously observed. That they prayed the Gods, they might find protection against injustice and violence. That as to them, all that they asked of Scipio, was to make neither a merit nor a crime of their change: but that he would judge of them from the conduct he should see them observe for the future."

Scipio replied, "That was his very intent; and that he would not tax Princes with infidelity and desertion, who did not think themselves bound to observe treaties with a people that equally despised all laws human and divine." Their wives and children were then returned to them, whom they received with tears of joy; and the same day Scipio lodged and regaled them as his friends and guests. The next day he made a treaty with them, and sent them home into their own countries, to raise the supplies they had engaged to furnish.

Polyb. x.
606.

Polybius upon the occasion we have just related makes a very judicious reflection, and one of great importance in point of policy and government. It is good, says he, so to carry on a war, as to have the advantage over the enemy: but it requires greater ability and prudence to make a right use of victory. The Carthaginians knew how to conquer. After having defeated the Roman armies, and killed the two Generals, Publius and Cneus Scipio, flattering themselves, that Spain could no longer be disputed with them, they observed no measures with the States of that country.

Excerpt. e
Polyb. a-
pud Vales.
P. 29.

The manner in which they used Indibilis, that Polybius relates in another place, is a very evident proof

* We shall soon see a proof of this.

of this. He was one of the most powerful Princes of Spain, and most affected to the service of the Carthaginians. His fidelity was put to a severe trial, as it cost him the loss of his kingdom. He had been re-established in it afterwards by way of reward for his attachment and zeal for the interest of Charthage. Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, become haughty and insolent since his advantage over the Romans, and abusing his authority to gratify his avarice, demanded a considerable sum of Indibilis. As that Prince was in no haste to put so unjust an order in execution, Asdrubal, under a false pretext, and a calumnious accusation, obliged him to give him his daughter as an hostage.

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209.

The bad consequence of this ill treatment of the Spanish States by the Carthaginians was, that instead of friends and allies it made them enemies. And they could not avoid that misfortune, thinking, as they did, that in order to keep allies in dependance, it was necessary to treat them with haughtiness and rigour; and not knowing, that the best method for preserving dominion, is constantly to follow the maxims that have been used in acquiring it. Now it is evident, that the true means for acquiring the obedience and subjection of a people is actually to treat them kindly, and to do them good, and to give them hopes of still greater advantages for the future. But if, after having conquered them, they are oppressed and governed despotically, it is not to be wondered, if such a change of maxims in those who govern should induce a change of conduct in the people subjected. * Fear and terror are but weak ties to keep a people obedient: they hold only the hands, but have no power over the heart. The proof of which is, that they are no sooner thrown off, than hatred and revolt break out.

Polyb. x.
600.

The Romans did not act in this manner. † From the beginning of the Commonwealth, when they were

* Metus & terror infirma vincula caritatis: quæ ubi removeris, qui timere desierint, odisse incipient. TACIT. in Agric. cap. 32.

† Populo Romano jam à principio inopi, melius visum amicos, quam servos quærere; tutiusque rati violentibus, quam coactis imperitare. SALLUST. in bell Jugurt.

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Ant. C.
209.

very weak, their great maxim was to treat the conquered with favour and lenity, and to make them sensible of their authority by acts of beneficence, not by violence. Their aim was to keep them firm friends, not slaves; and they did not think, that dominion could be firm and permanent if the subjects only obeyed against their will, and not out of affection. And it was this that rendered them so powerful.

The desertion of Indibilis determined Asdrubal to give battle. He judged that a victory would put him into a condition to make the States of Spain return to their duty; and if he were defeated, he could retire into Gaul, with the troops he had drawn together, and from thence into Italy, to the aid of his brother Hannibal.

Polyb. x.
608, 610.
Liv. xxv.
18, 19.

Asdrubal's army was then in the country of * Castulon, near the city of * Bætula or Bæcula. When the Romans approached, he moved to post himself upon an eminence. on the top of which there was a plain of considerable extent. His rear was covered by a large river; and the rest, that is the front and flanks, were defended by a declivity of difficult ascent. A little below that plain, by a pretty easy descent, there was a second, which had some declivity, but terminated however at a kind of rivulet, and was no less difficult of access than the former. The next day, Asdrubal, seeing the Romans drawn up in battle before their intrenchments, made his Numidian cavalry, and the light-armed foot, both Balearians and Africans, march down into the second plain. Scipio rode through the several ranks of his army, and animated his troops, by representing to them, "That the enemy, despairing of being able to oppose them in the open country, and diffiding in their own courage, sought their safety in the situation of the place, where they had incamped.

In pace, beneficiis magis, quam metu, imperium agitare. SALUST. in bell. Catul.

† Geographers differ very much concerning the situation of Castulon, and Bætula or Bæcula.

Cellarius and La Martiniere place these two places near the source of the Bætis or Guadalquivir; and Castulon at the North of that river.

But

But that the Roman soldiers had scaled the walls of Carthagera, which were much higher than the post Asdrubal had occupied." He said no more, and immediately advanced at the head of a detachment of his light-armed troops and the flower of his army, to attack the Numidians and slingers, posted by Asdrubal upon the second plain. Besides the difficulty of the way, which was rough and steep, they had to sustain a shower of darts discharged upon them. But when they came to the level ground, and joined the enemy, they were put to flight at the first charge. The Romans made a great slaughter of them, and forced those who escaped to rejoin the main body of their army upon the higher eminence.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

Scipio then commanded the victorious troops to advance directly against the centre of the enemy, and divided the rest with Lælius: giving him orders, by inclining to the right round the hill, to find the easiest way he could to ascend it. As for himself, inclining to the left, after taking a small compass, he advanced to attack the enemy in flank. The Carthaginians were presently put into disorder, whilst they were endeavouring to face the enemy that advanced on different sides with great crisis. Whilst they were in this confusion, Lælius arrived. Upon which they immediately fell back to prevent their being taken in the rear: and the first line having given way, in conformity to this motion, the Romans who advanced in the centre, gained the eminence; which they could never have done, as long as the Carthaginians kept their ranks, and the front of their battle was covered by the elephants. The flight became general, and the slaughter was very great. They lost in this action about eight thousand men.

Asdrubal, before the battle, had taken care to send off the treasure: And afterwards, having made the elephants set out first, and drawn together as many of the flying troops as he could, he retired towards the Tagus, in order to reach the Pyrenees, and enter Gaul.

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Ant. C.
209.

Scipio did not think it proper to pursue him, as I shall soon observe. He abandoned the camp of the enemy to be plundered, and gave all the spoils of it to the soldiers, except the free persons, who were ten thousand foot and two thousand horse. The Africans he ordered to be sold, and dismissed the Spaniards without ransom.

Ibid.

They were so highly affected with this act of generosity, that those of them whom he had taken the preceding day, and who had surrendered to him before, assembled around him, and unanimously saluted him in a general acclamation with the name of King. Scipio, after having caused silence to be made by an herald, replied: "That he knew no title more glorious than that of Imperator, which he had received from his soldiers. That * the name of King, so much honoured and revered every where else, was detestable at Rome. That if they supposed him to have the qualities of that office, and considered them as what is greatest in man, they might think of him as they pleased; but he begged them not to call him by that name." Those people, barbarous as they were, discerned the greatness of soul there was in despising, and looking down in a manner from the elevation of his virtue, upon a title so much the wish and admiration of the rest of mortals. He afterwards made all the Spanish nobility presents, and out of a great number of horses, that were part of the spoils, he desired Indibilis to chuse three hundred for himself.

Liv. ibid.

Whilst the Quæstor was employed in selling the African prisoners, according to the order he had received, a youth was brought to him of such beauty and so noble an aspect, as distinguished him from all the rest. Being informed that he was of royal blood, he sent him to Scipio. That General asked him,

* Regium nomen, alibi magnum, Romæ intolerabile esse. Regalem animum in se esse, si id in hominis ingenio amplissimum ducerent, tacite judicarent; vocis usurpatione abstinere. Sensere etiam Barbari magnitudinem animi, cujus miraculo nominis alii mortales stupere, id ex tam alto fastigio aspernantis. Liv.

“ Who he was, and of what country, and how, being so young, he came to be in the battle ? He answered, That he was a Numidian, and that his name was Mas-siva. That having had the misfortune to lose his father, he had been educated in the palace of Gala, King of the Numidians, who was his mother's brother. That he had very lately arrived in Spain with his uncle Masinissa, when the latter came with his cavalry to the aid of the Carthaginians. That Masinissa, on account of his youth, had not suffered him to be present in any battle. That the day the last was fought between the Romans and Carthaginians, he had secretly taken an horse and arms, and had thrown himself into the midst of the action, unknown to his uncle : but that his horse having been killed under him, he had fallen with him, and was taken by the Romans.”

Scipio gave orders for somebody to take charge of the young Prince, and when the affairs which kept him upon his tribunal were over, he returned to his tent, and having ordered him to be brought to him, he asked him, whether he desired to return to Masinissa ? The boy answered with tears of joy in his eyes, that it was all he wished in the world. Upon which Scipio gave him a gold ring, and a robe called *Latus-clavus* by the Romans, a military coat in the Spanish fashion, with a gold clasp, and an horse with rich furniture : after which he dismissed him with a guard of cavalry to conduct him, who had orders to attend him as far as he should think fit.

Scipio having assembled the council of war, to con- Liv. xxvii, sider how it was necessary to act farther against the 20. enemy, some were of opinion, that he should pursue Asdrubal without loss of time. But he differed with them in that respect ; apprehending that Mago, and the other Asdrubal, might arrive time enough to join their colleague with their forces. For this reason, contenting himself with sending some troops to occupy the pass of the Pyrenees, he employed the rest of the campaign in receiving the States of Spain, that came over again into the alliance of the Romans.

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209.

Scipio's apprehension was well founded. For some days after the battle of Bœtula, he had scarce quitted the defiles of Castulon on his return to Tarraco, than he received advice, that Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, were come from the remotest part of Spain to join Asdrubal the son of Amilcar; too late to save him from the defeat he had already sustained, but soon enough to give him good counsel and useful aid for the time to come. The event shewed the prudence of Scipio's conduct in hastening the battle as he had done. A delay of some days might have ruined all his measures, and exposed him to great danger.

Liv. xxvii.
42.

Fabius, afterwards, reproached him as a fault with having let Asdrubal escape out of his hands, by not pursuing him after gaining this battle, and of having put it in his power to march to Italy, which might have occasioned the ruin of Rome, if he had joined his brother Hannibal. And it would really have been a great one, if it had been possible for him to have prevented that effect. But the faint terms in which Fabius, who was at that time extremely warm against Scipio, makes him that reproach, seems to me to imply, that he himself did not think it too well founded. For he contented himself with reproaching him with the fact, without giving any reason to prove the imprudence of it.

The three Generals united, held a council upon the different operations of the approaching campaign. Upon their considering the disposition of the several States of Spain, only Asdrubal the son of Gisgo flattered himself, that those who inhabited the extremities of the province next the ocean and Cadiz, knowing the Romans but little, were still in the interest of the Carthaginians, and that their fidelity might be relied upon. But the other Asdrubal, and Mago, gave a very different opinion in respect to the rest of Spain. They agreed, "That Scipio, by his beneficence, had won every body both in general and particular, and that the troops of the Carthaginians would be exposed to continual desertions, till all the Spanish soldiers were
either

either made to march to the extremities of the province, or even into Gaul. That for these reasons, even though the Senate of Carthage had not ordered it, Asdrubal should have marched into Italy of himself, where the weight of the war lay, and where the dispute between the two powers was to be decided. That this choice was necessary, if it were only to remove the Spaniards out of a country, where the name of Scipio was in such great veneration. That therefore the losses his army had sustained, either by bad success in battle, or desertion, should be made up with Spanish soldiers. That it was also proper, that Mago should leave the command of his army to Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, and go with a large sum into the islands Baleares to raise soldiers; and that the same Asdrubal, with his troops, should retire to the farthest part of Lusitania, (now Portugal) and avoid coming to a battle with the Romans. That the flower of the whole cavalry should be chosen, to form a body of three thousand horse, with which Masinissa should over-run Hispania * Citerior, to aid the allies of the Carthaginians, and ravage the countries of the enemy." After having formed these projects, they separated in order to put them in execution. And this is all that passed in Spain this year.

* This is speaking after the Carthaginians. It seems natural to understand by Hispania Citerior, what the Romans called Hispania Ulterior, that is to say, from the Iberus to the Ocean.

S E C T. III.

Marcellus accused by his enemies, defends himself with success. The new Consuls enter upon office. The Ludi Apollinares rendered annual. The inhabitants of Arretium are obliged to give hostages. The affair of the Tarentines is treated in the Senate. Affair of Livius. A detachment of the Romans fall into an ambuscade of Hannibal's. New ambuscade of Hannibal: Marcellus is killed in it. Contrast between Fabius and Marcellus. Hannibal is caught in his own snares at Salapia. He causes the siege of Locri to be raised. The Consul Crispinus writes to the Senate, to inform it of the death of Marcellus, and receives different orders from it. The Roman fleet beats that of the Carthaginians near Clupea. Affairs of the Greeks. Death of the Consul Crispinus. Claud. Nero and M. Livius Consuls elect. They are reconciled. Provinces of the two Consuls. Census. Place of the assemblies covered. The Consuls make the levies with unusual rigour. Asdrubal passes the Alps. He besieges Placentia. Rough answer of Livius to Fabius scarce probable. Body of Nero's army. He gains a first victory over Hannibal; and soon after a second. Letters from Asdrubal to Hannibal intercepted. Bold design formed by Nero. He sets out to join his colleague Livius. Alarm of Rome upon the news of Nero's departure. He declares his design to his troops. Nero arrives at the camp of Livius, and joins his troops with those of his colleague. Battle with Asdrubal. Total defeat of his army: himself is killed. Asdrubal's head thrown into Hannibal's camp. He retires to the extremity of Bruttium. Triumph of Livius and Nero. Reflections upon Nero's enterprize, and the conduct of Livius.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

IT seems, that as soon as Scipio began to appear in action, the glory of all the other Roman Generals was in some eclipse. That of Fabius still sustained itself however, and the taking of Tarentum, though
more

more the effect of stratagem than force, did not fail to do him honour. But the reputation of Fulvius fell entirely to the ground, and Marcellus was even in disgrace after having been defeated by the Carthaginians; besides which, people were displeased with his having put his troops into quarters at Venusia without waiting the end of the campaign, whilst Hannibal kept the field, and marched through a great part of Italy. C. Publicius Bibulus, Tribune of the People, was his declared enemy. By continually exclaiming against him in all the assemblies of the People from the day he had been worsted by Hannibal, he had already much hurt his reputation in the sense of the People; and they talked of nothing less than divesting him of his authority, when his friends prevailed, that he should leave one of his Lieutenants at Venusia to command there in his place, whilst he came to Rome to justify himself against the accusations formed against him in his absence.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

By accident Marcellus and Fulvius arrived at Rome the same day; the first to obviate the affront intended him; and the other, to preside in the assemblies, which were soon to be held for the election of Consuls.

The affair of Marcellus came on in the Flaminian Circus with a great concourse of the People, and in the presence of all orders of the Commonwealth. The Tribune of the People not only attacked him, but the whole nobility. “He said, that it was by their artifices, and designed delays, that Hannibal had continued ten years in Italy, and seemed to have taken possession of it by a longer residence than he had ever made at Carthage. That the Roman people were well rewarded for having continued Marcellus in command, whose army, twice beaten by the enemy, enjoyed themselves, and lived at their ease during the whole summer in the shade of the walls and houses of Venusia.” Marcellus replied in few words, and with great nobleness, contenting himself with modestly repeating his principal actions, the meer recital of which, without reflections or other proofs, was an entire apo-

Liv. xxvii.
21.
Plut. in
Marc. 314.

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
209.

logy for him. But the principal citizens took his defence upon themselves in an higher tone, and spoke in his favour with abundance of force and freedom. They admonished the people not to judge worse of Marcellus than the enemy himself, in accusing him of cowardice, who was the only one of all their Generals, that Hannibal had industriously shunned, and with whom he still persevered as carefully to avoid a battle, as he ardently fought it with all the rest.

The sentence was not ambiguous. Not only the Tribune's proposal for divesting Marcellus of the command was rejected, but the next day all the centuries unanimously elected him Consul. We cannot but feel a secret indignation against the excessive licence of a Tribune, who obliges so great a man as Marcellus to appear before the People as a criminal, and there to give an account of his actions. But it was this very licence, all vicious and blameable as it was, that had long preserved in Rome that liberty, which may be called the soul of the Commonwealth, in keeping the Generals and Magistrates within the bounds of their duty by a just subordination, and an entire dependance upon the authority of the People, and the sovereignty of the laws.

The People gave T. Quintius Crispinus, who was actually Prætor, to Marcellus for colleague. The next day they created Prætors, P. Licinius Crassus Dives, who was Pontifex Maximus; P. Licinius Varus, Sex. Julius Cæsar, and Q. Claudius Flamen.

At the same time that the assembly was held, the people were in some anxiety about Hetruria, where an insurrection was apprehended, and the Prætor upon the spot had sent advice, that the city of Arretium seemed to be at the head of that design. Marcellus was dispatched thither immediately, and his presence put an instant stop to the disorders that had began to break out.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, V.

T. QUINTIUS CRISPINUS.

A. R. 544.

Ant. C.

208.

These two Consuls entered upon office the eleventh year of the war with Hannibal. Both of them had Italy for their province, with the two armies that had served under the Consuls of the preceding year. The other Magistrates and Generals had each their employment and province assigned them. The whole forces of the Commonwealth this year consisted of twenty-one legions, that is, of an hundred and five thousand foot, and six thousand three hundred horse.

The plague, with which Rome was at that time afflicted, occasioned the people to vow and perpetuate the Ludi Apollinares, and to fix the day for celebrating them, which was the fifth of July.

The disquiet increasing every day in respect to the people of Arretium, the Senate wrote to the Proprætor Tubulus, to demand hostages of them immediately, and sent C. Terentius Varro thither to receive and bring them to Rome. As soon as the latter arrived with some troops, he posted guards at all the proper parts of the place, and having made the Senators come to the Forum, he ordered them to give hostages. Upon their demanding two days to consider of it, he declared, that if they did not comply directly, he the next day would take away all the children of the Senators. He then gave orders, that the officers should keep a good guard at the gates, that nobody might quit the city. The negligence with which this order was put in execution, gave seven of the principal Senators opportunity to quit the place before night, with their children. Their estates were confiscated and sold the next day; and from the remaining Senators six score hostages were taken, who were carried to Rome, and proper measures were taken to secure the city.

The affair of the Tarentines was afterwards canvassed in the Senate with abundance of warmth, in the presence of Fabius. That General, who had commanded

Liv. xxvii. 22.

Liv. xxvii. 23.

Liv. xxvii. 24.

Liv. xxvii. 25.
Plut. in Fab. 187.

A. R. 544.
Ant. C.
208.

manded in reducing them, used all his credit at this time to defend them. All the rest had declared against them, and maintained that as they were no less criminal than the Campanians, they ought to be punished with as much severity. After great debates, the Senate, in conformity to the opinion of Manius Acilius, decreed that a strong garrison should be kept in the place; that all the inhabitants should be kept within the walls; and that in time, when the peace of Italy should be restored, their affair should be examined anew.

They were no less divided in respect to the manner M. Livius the Governor of the citadel of Tarentum should be treated. Some were for having a note of infamy set upon him by a decree of the Senate, for having delivered up the city to the enemy through negligence. Others decreed him rewards, for having defended the citadel during five years, and affirmed it was owing to him, that Tarentum had been re-taken. "That's true, said Fabius smiling; for if he had not lost that city, I should not have retaken it." Nothing was determined in the affair.

The two Consuls had joined each other in Apulia, and incamped separately between Venusia and Bantia, at about a league from each other. Hannibal quitted the country of the Locrians, and approached their army. The Consuls, who were both equally active and warm, drew out their troops in battle almost every day, not doubting but they should terminate the war happily, if Hannibal should dare to venture a battle with the united armies of both the Consuls. The Carthaginian General was far from having any such design. He confined himself entirely to stratagem, the success of which he had experienced, and thought only of laying ambuscades for the enemy.

Liv, xxvii.
26.
Plut. in
Marc. 315.

As the two armies only skirmished with each other with various success, the Consuls believed, that during this kind of inactivity they might form the siege of Locri; and in order to that, they ordered part of the troops in garrison at Tarentum, to invest Locri by land,

land, whilst L. Cincius, the Prætor of Sicily, besieged it by sea. Hannibal, who had intelligence of what past, detached three thousand foot, and two thousand horse, with orders to post themselves in ambuscade in the way from Tarentum to Locri, in a valley under Petilia. The Romans, who had not sent out scouts, fell into this snare. The enemy killed about two thousand of them, and took two hundred prisoners. The rest having taken to flight, dispersed themselves into the country and the woods, and regained Tarentum.

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Ant. C.
208.

Between the camp of the Carthaginians, and that of the Romans, there was an eminence covered with bushes and full of hollows. The Romans were surprised, that Hannibal, who had arrived first at so commodious a place, had not occupied it: but That itself was a reason, why they should have suspected it. During the night he had sent some Numidian squadrons with orders to keep close in the day-time in the midst of the wood, without stirring in the least, that the Romans might not discover them, nor the brightness of their arms betray them. In the camp of Marcellus they thought and talked in a manner most capable of favouring the design of the enemy. They said openly, that it was necessary to seize that hill, and to intrench there, because if Hannibal prevented them, they would have the enemy over their heads. The Consul Marcellus was struck with these reports; and addressing himself to his colleague: "Let us go to the place ourselves," said he, with a small number of horse. "When we have examined the post with our own eyes, we shall be more certain, in respect to the choice it is proper we should make." Was this then a function for Generals and Consuls? Crispinus consented to it, and they immediately set out with two hundred and twenty horse, all Hetrurians except forty, who were of Fregellæ. M. Marcellus, the Consul's son, and other officers, attended them. The enemy had posted a soldier, so as, without being seen by the Romans, he could perceive all the motions made in their

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Ant. C.
208.

their army. That centinel having made his signal, those who were in ambuscade suffered Marcellus to approach as far as the foot of the little hill. They then rose up, and all together, raising great cries, came on to charge the detachment of the Romans. The Consuls, seeing it equally impossible to gain the eminence possessed by the enemy, or to return back, being surrounded on all sides, chose to defend themselves courageously. And they would have disputed the victory longer, if the flight of the Hetrurians had not put the rest into a consternation. In the mean time, the Fregellani, abandoned by their companions, did not cease to fight, as long as the Consuls were at their head, and animated them by their discourse and example. But when they saw, that they were both wounded, and that Marcellus himself, after having been ran through with a lance, fell dying from his horse, the few that remained fled with Crispinus, who had been ran into the body with two javelins, and young Marcellus, who was wounded. Aulus Manlius the legionary Tribune, and M. Aulus, one of the commanders of the allies, were killed in the action : L. Arennius, the other, was taken prisoner. Five of the Consul's Lictors fell alive into the enemy's hands : the rest were either killed, or fled with the Consul. Forty-three of the horse perished, either in the battle, or in flight. Eighteen remained prisoners. The camp began to make some motions in order to go to the Consul's aid, when Crispinus, with his colleague's son, and the mournful remains of so unfortunate an expedition, were seen returning.

Plut. in
Fab. 185.
Id. in Marc.

We cannot refuse Marcellus the honour of having been one of the greatest of the Roman captains. Fabius and he equally contributed to preserve the Commonwealth : and it is with reason, that the one was called " the Buckler," and the other " the Sword," of Rome. Fabius, of a firm and determinate disposition, never departed from the plan he had first formed, which was absolutely necessary, at least in the beginning, for re-instating affairs, and reviving the confidence

dence by degrees of the discouraged troops ; and like a river, which runs without noise, and continually encroaches upon the shore, he made it his care, and succeeded in it, insensibly to undermine the strength of an enemy, whom the victories he had gained had made haughty and daring. Marcellus, on the contrary, who was of an active and shining valour, made an impatience to fight succeed the consternation with which the Romans had long been seized, and so exalted their courage, as to make them capable, not only of not yielding the victory easily, but of disputing it obstinately ; so that Hannibal met Marcellus every where in his way, like an impetuous torrent, that frustrated all his designs, and ruined all his enterprises. Thus the resolution and constancy of the one, in keeping always upon the defensive, with the audacity and activity of the other, who risked every thing, were the preservation of Rome.

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Ant.C.
208.

But it must be owned, that if the glory of their lives was almost equal, though in a quite different species of merit, the fate of Marcellus seems to give the advantage to the wise slowness of Fabius. His * death, deplorable in every light, is particularly so, as it leaves room to accuse him of having exposed his own person and that of his colleague, and at the same time the whole Commonwealth, to the danger of perishing, by an activity that suited neither his age (for he was then above sixty) nor the prudence he ought to have acquired in the great number of years he had been in the service. When a General's presence is either necessary, or of great moment for the success of an important and decisive action, he ought not to spare his own person. But when the advantage resulting from an action is not considerable, or he hazards every thing in exposing himself, this is not properly bravery, but rashness and extravagance. He ought to remember, that

Liv. xxvii.
27.
Plut in
Marc.

* Mors Marcelli, cum alioqui miserabilis fuit, tum quod nec pro ætate (major jam enim sexaginta annis erat) neque pro veteris prudentia ducis, tam improvidè se, collegamque & prope totam rempublicam in præceptis dederat. Liv.

A. R. 544. there is a wide difference between a General and a private foldier : and ſhould expoſe himſelf only as becomes a General ; as the head, not the hand ; as him who is to give orders, not as thoſe who are to put them in execution. Euripides ſays in one of his pieces, “ that if it be neceſſary for a General to die, it ought to be when he lays down his life in the arms of Virtue ;” to ſignify that there is no true valour without wiſdom and prudence ; and that only virtue, and not a vain deſire of glory, has a right over the life of a General : becauſe the firſt duty of valour is to ſave him, who ſaves others. Accordingly Appian obſerves, that Hannibal praiſed him as a foldier, but blamed him very much as a General.

Plut. in compar.
Pelop. & Marc.

App. in bell. Annib. 342.

Liv. xxvii. 28.

App. 343.

Hannibal, to take the advantage of the terror, which he well knew the death of Marcellus, and his colleague's wounds, muſt have ſpread amongſt the Romans, marched immediately, and incamped with his army upon the eminence, at the bottom of which the battle had been fought. He there found the body of Marcellus, and cauſed it to be interred. As to Crispinus, terrified by his colleague's death and his own wounds, he retreated the following night to the tops of the neareſt and higheſt mountains, where he fortified his camp ſo as to make it impoſſible to be attacked on any ſide.

On this occaſion both Generals ſhewed abundance of addreſs and prudence, the one in laying ſnares for his enemy, and the other in avoiding them. The ring of Marcellus had fallen into the hands of Hannibal with his body. Crispinus, apprehending that he might uſe it to deceive the allies of the Commonwealth, wrote advice to all the neighbouring cities, that his colleague had been killed, and that Hannibal had the ſeal Marcellus uſed in his life in his hands ; that in conſequence, they ſhould give no credit to any letters that ſhould come in the name and under the ſeal of Marcellus. This precaution was wiſe, and not uſeleſs. The courier from Crispinus was ſcarce arrived at Salapia, than a letter was received there from Hannibal,

nibal, but wrote in the name of Marcellus, to tell them, that he would come to Salapia the next night; and that the soldiers of the garrison should hold themselves in readiness to obey his commands, in case he should have occasion for them. The people of Salapia presently perceived the cheat; and well assured, that Hannibal, enraged by their treachery, sought occasion to revenge it, as well as the loss of his cavalry, they dismissed Hannibal's messenger, who was a Roman deserter, in order that they might take proper measures unobserved against the deceit of their enemy.

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Ant. C.
208.

The officers posted the inhabitants upon the walls of the city, and in all the places that required guards; ordered the sentinels and posts to watch with the utmost attention that night; and placed the best troops of the garrison near the gate, where they judged Hannibal would arrive, as he did towards the end of the night. The Roman deserters formed the advanced guard, armed in the Roman manner; and all talking Latin, called upon the centinels, and ordered them to open the gate to the Consul, who was upon the point of arriving. The centinels pretending to move at their bidding, made a great noise and stir in opening the gate. As the portcullis was down, they partly made use of levers and partly of cords for drawing it up. The deserters no sooner saw it high enough for them to go under it upright, than they came in crouds to enter. But when about six hundred of them had passed, the guards loosing the cords that kept the portcullis suspended, let it fall with a great noise. The inhabitants immediately fell upon the deserters who had entered, and who carried their arms negligently made fast behind their backs, like persons who march with nothing to fear amidst friends and allies: and others beat down those who remained without the gate with stones, clubs, and darts. Hannibal, having been thus caught in his own net, retired in great confusion, and marched towards Locri, in order to raise the siege of that city, which Cincius carried on vigorously with machines

R. A. 544. machines of all kinds, that he had brought from
Ant. C. Sicily.

208.
Liv. xxvii. 28. Mago, who defended the place, was almost in despair of being able to keep it, when the news of the death of Marcellus gave him some hope. That was soon increased by a courier from Hannibal, with advice that he had detached the Numidian cavalry, and was advancing himself to his aid with his infantry, that marched with the utmost diligence. For this reason, as soon as he knew that the Numidians were upon the point of arriving by the signal given him by them from an eminence, he immediately caused the gates of the city to be opened, and attacked the besiegers with a boldness and vigour that amazed them. That surprize, and not the equality of forces, at first kept the advantage in some suspense. But the Numidians no sooner arrived, than the Romans were terrified and made to their ships, leaving the machines they had used in battering the walls of Locri in the possession of the Carthaginians. The siege of that city was raised by Hannibal's arrival only.

Liv. xxvii. 29. When Crispinus received advice that the Carthaginian General was set out for the country of the Bruttii, he ordered M. Marcellus the legionary Tribune, who apparently had received only a slight wound, to march the army his colleague had commanded to Venusia. As for himself, he set out with his legions for Capua in a litter, the motion of which he could scarce support on account of his wounds, which were very considerable. On his departure he wrote to the Senate, to inform it of the news of the death of his colleague, and his own danger. He told them, "That he could not come to Rome to preside at the election of magistrates, because, besides the bad state he was in, in effect of his wounds, he apprehended for the city of Tarentum, upon which Hannibal, who was in the country of Bruttium, might make some attempt. That he desired some of the most able Senators might be sent to confer with him."

The reading of this letter occasioned at once great grief for the death of one of the Consuls, and no less pain for the life of the other. They sent Q. Fabius the son of Maximus to the army at Venusia, and three deputies to the Consul, who were Sext. Julius Cæsar, L. Licinius Pollio, and C. Cincius Alimentus, who had been returned some days from Sicily. They had orders to tell him, That if he could not come to Rome to preside at the elections, he should create a Dictator to hold the assemblies in his stead.

A. R. 544.
Ant. C.
208.

During this same campaign, M. Valerius went from Sicily to Africa, with a fleet of an hundred sail; made a descent near Clupea, and ravaged all the country around it, without any resistance. But he was soon obliged to return on board his ships, because he was informed, that the Carthaginian fleet of fourscore sail, was upon the point of arriving. He gave it battle in the neighbourhood of Clupea, and defeated it; and having taken eighteen ships, and put the rest to flight, he returned to Lilybæum with great spoils.

Liv. xxvii.
29.

There was at the same time great movements in Greece, excited and fomented by the Romans, to find Philip employment at home. The Ætolians on one side, supported by the Romans, and Philip with the Achæans, were the principal actors in them. I have related these events in the Ancient History, to which they more particularly belong. In the sequel I shall speak of what has most relation to the Roman History.

Liv. xxvii.
30—32.

At the end of this year, the Consul T. Quintius Crispinus, after having created a Dictator to hold the assemblies, died of his wounds. This Dictator was T. Manlius Torquatus, who appointed Cn. Servilius General of the horse.

Liv. xxvii.
33.

As the two Consular armies were without Generals so near the enemy, the first care of the Senators, every thing else being postponed, was to elect Consuls as soon as possible, whose prudence, as well as valour, might make them proof against Hannibal's stratagems. They considered, "That all the losses, which had been sustained during this war, were solely to be imputed to

Liv. xxvii.
33, 34.

A. R. 544. the rash and impetuous characters of the Generals,
 Ant. C. who had commanded: but that particularly this last
 208. year, the Consuls, from having abandoned themselves too much to their ardor for coming to blows with Hannibal, had thrown themselves into the precipice. But that the Gods, through an effect of their goodness and mercy, had spared the armies, who had not shared in this fault, and had made the punishment due to their temerity fall only upon the Consuls."

The Senators, on enquiring upon whom they should cast their eyes for the Consulship, were of opinion, that C. Claudius Nero merited that honour preferably to all others. But as, whilst they confessed his excellent qualities, he seemed of a disposition too warm and enterprizing for the present conjunctures, and such an enemy as Hannibal, they thought it necessary to give him a colleague, whose coolness and prudence might be capable to qualify his ardor.

M. Livius, some years before, had been condemned by a sentence of the People, on the expiration of his Consulship. He had resented this affront so highly, that he had retired into the country; and he had been eight years without setting foot in Rome, refusing to have any commerce with unjust and ungrateful citizens. At the end of that time, the Consuls M. Marcellus and M. Valerius had at length prevailed upon him to return to the city. But, confining himself within his domestic affairs, he had no share in those of the public; always retaining a sad and dejected outside, and suffering his beard and hair to grow. The Censors L. Veturius and P. Licinius obliged him afterwards to quit all these signs of affliction, and to come to the Senate. He complied with their authority; but whatever affair was treated, he never opened his mouth, except to express his assent or dissent to a question. He at length threw off so tenacious a silence, to defend one of his relations in an affair of honour: this might be the M. Livius Governor of Tarentum, of whom we have spoken at the beginning of this year. This new conduct drew upon him the eyes and attention of the

the whole Senate. Every body made their own reflections upon it. It was said, "That the People had passed sentence upon him unjustly. That it had been a very considerable loss to the Commonwealth, to have been deprived during so important a war of the aid and counsels of a man capable of being so useful to it. That the sole means for making him amends for that fault was to elect him colleague to Nero."

A. R. 544.
Ant. C.
208.

The People readily gave into this proposal. Livius alone opposed the unanimous consent of the whole city. He reproached them with their inconstancy. "You would not suffer yourselves to be moved, said he to them, by my entreaties, nor the mourning outside that suited the unhappy condition of an accused person; and now you offer me the purple against my will. You load the same man with honours, and disgrace. If you thought me a man of worth, why did you pass sentence upon me? If you believe me criminal, why do you confide a second Consulship to me, after having been deemed so bad in the first?" The Senate endeavoured to persuade him, "by setting before him the example of Camillus, who, when condemned to an unjust banishment, had returned from it to save Rome from the Gauls. They * represented to him, that only mildness and patience were to be returned to the ill treatment a man receives from his country, as to that from one's father or mother." At length they overcame his resistance, and obliged him to accept the Consulship with Nero.

Three days after came on the election of Prætors. Liv. xxvii. The distribution of the provinces was then made. T. 35. Manlius had orders to cross the sea with the character of ambassador, to inspect into what passed in Greece: and as the Olympic games were to be celebrated during this † campaign, at which a great concourse of all the people of Greece were usually assembled, he was

* Ut parentum sævitiam, sic patriæ; patiendo ac ferendo leniendam esse. Liv.

† Dodwell affirms and proves, that these games had been celebrated the year before.

A. R. 544.
Ant. C.
208.

directed, if he could pass with safety through the quarters of the enemy, to repair to that assembly; and there, to declare to the Sicilians, whom the war had obliged to quit their country, and to the citizens of Tarentum, whom Hannibal had banished, that the Roman people permitted them to return to their respective countries, and to re-possess the estates which had belonged to them before the war.

As the year upon which they were entering threatened the Commonwealth with the greatest dangers, and as there were no Consuls actually in office, all eyes were turned upon those elect; and it was ardently desired, that they might draw lots as soon as possible, in order that each of them might know in good time, which was to be his province, and the enemy with whom he should have to deal.

Liv. *ibid.*
Val. Max.
iv. II.

It was also thought necessary to reconcile them fully to each other before they took the field, which proposal was made by Fabius. The cause of their division was, Nero's having given evidence against Livius at the trial, wherein the latter was sentenced. Livius had always shewn himself the most irreconcilable, because he conceived, that he had been despised at the time of his disgrace; and contempt, in such circumstances, is much most offensive. Accordingly he opposed all instances made to him; even affirming that their division would be of advantage to the Commonwealth, as each of them would discharge his functions with more zeal and application, and keep himself more upon his guard, in order not to give his enemy an advantage. At length however he submitted to the authority of the Senate, and they were sincerely reconciled on both sides, as appeared in the sequel. Great praise for both Consuls, but especially for Livius! * Never was cause of enmity greater, or more affecting. However the view of the public good, and regard for the request of so many grave Senators, not only effaced

* Quæ fuerunt inimicitiae graviores in civitate? quas in viris fortissimis non solum extinxit reip. dignitas & ipsorum, sed etiam ad amicitiam consuetudinemque traduxerunt. Cic. de provinc. Consul. 22.

in them all remembrance and resentment of the past, but established such an union and good understanding between them, as seemed the effect of an old and constant friendship, that had never known any interruption.

A. R. 544.
Ant. C.
208.

Neighbouring provinces were not allotted the Consuls, (as had been done the preceding years) in which they might act either together, or in concert with each other: but they were sent to the two extremities of Italy, so that the one had the country of the Bruttii and Lucania for his province, where he was to make head against Hannibal; whilst the other marched into Gallia Cisalpina, to meet Asdrubal: for advice had been brought, that he was upon the point of passing the Alps, and this news gave abundance of disquiet to the Romans.

This year the Censors P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Cornelius Cethegus compleated the Census, and that for the first time since the entrance of Hannibal into Italy. In this Census the number of the citizens were an hundred and thirty-seven thousand, one hundred and eight, that is, almost less by one * half than they were before the war. For the year before Hannibal's entrance into Italy, the number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and seventy thousand two hundred and thirteen.

Liv. xxvii.
36.

This year the part of the Forum called Comitium was covered with a roof; the tribunal for harangues was in this place near the Curia, where the Senate assembled.

M. CLAUDIUS NERO.

M. LIVIUS, II.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

After the several religious duties were discharged, the Consuls thought only of levying the soldiers; which they did with more exactness and severity than had been used the preceding years. The arrival of a new

Liv. xxvii.
38.

* Minor aliquanto numerus. We see here that aliquantus sometimes signifies multus: as also in this passage of Cicero. Auri navem evertat gubernator, an paleæ; in re Aliquantum, in gubernatoris inscitia nihil interest. Parad. iii. 1.

A. R. 545. enemy in Italy had greatly increased the fear and an-
 Ant. C. xiety of those Generals, and the considerable diminu-
 207. tion of the number of the youth rendered the levies
 much more difficult.

Every body was of opinion, that the Consuls should take the field immediately. For it was judged necessary that the one should be in a condition to oppose Asdrubal, as soon as he came down from the Alps, to prevent him from joining the Cisalpine Gauls and the Hetrurians, who only waited the occasion to declare against the Romans; and that the other should find Hannibal so much employment in the country of the Bruttii, where he was, that he should not be able to march to join his brother. To hasten their departure, and remove all difficulties, the Senate gave them full power to chuse out of the armies such troops as they thought fit, to make such exchanges as they should judge necessary, and remove the officers and soldiers from one province to another, as they should deem most proper for the good of the Commonwealth. The Consuls used this permission with great unanimity, and in concert.

Some authors observe, that Scipio sent very considerable aids from Spain to Livius, viz. eight thousand Spaniards and Gauls, two thousand Romans detached from one of his legions, and about eighteen hundred horse, half Spaniards half Numidians; and that M. Lucretius was appointed to carry this reinforcement to Italy by sea. And also that C. Mamilius sent him about four thousand slingers and archers from Sicily.

Liv. xxvii. The letters received at that time by the Senate from
 39. the Prætor Porcius, who was actually in Cisalpine
 App. 343. Gaul, much increased the disquiet occasioned by the
 approach of Asdrubal. They said, that he had quitted
 his winter-quarters, and was actually passing the Alps.
 That the Ligurians had formed a body of eight thousand men, who would not fail to join his army as soon as it should arrive in Italy, unless troops were sent to keep them employed in their own country. That as for him, he would advance as much as possible with-
 out

out exposing so weak an army as his. These letters obliged the Consuls to hasten their levies, and to repair to their provinces sooner than they intended, in order that each of them might keep his enemy in his province, and to hinder the two brothers from joining.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

What contributed most to the success of this design, was the opinion of Hannibal himself. For, though he was in hopes that his brother would arrive this campaign in Italy, yet, when he reflected upon all he had suffered himself for five months together, during which he had the places as well as the people to overcome, he did not suppose, that he would pass with so much ease as he did. And these thoughts kept him the longer in his winter-quarters.

But Asdrubal found much fewer difficulties and obstacles in passing those mountains, than had been generally expected, and he had apprehended himself. For not only the people of Auvergne, and soon after all the other States of Gaul and of the Alps received him, but also followed him to the war. And besides his brother's having levelled the ways, which were before impracticable, the inhabitants of the country themselves, in effect of seeing bodies of men pass through the midst of them during twelve years, were become more tractable, and less savage. For before that time, having never seen any strangers upon their mountains, and not quitting them themselves to visit other countries, they had no commerce with the rest of mankind. And at first, not knowing Hannibal's design, they had imagined, that it was against their forts and huts, and that he was come to take away their cattle, and make slaves of their persons. But during the twelve years that Italy had been the theatre of war, they had had time to comprehend, that the Alps was only a pass: that two powerful nations, separated by an immense tract of sea and land, were disputing empire and glory with each other. And this opened and facilitated Asdrubal's passage over the Alps. He brought with him forty-eight thousand foot, eight thousand horse, and fifteen elephants.

Appian.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

But his forming the siege of Placentia, made him lose all the advantage he might have derived from his diligence. He believed, that he should easily make himself master of a city situated in the midst of a plain; and that, by the ruin of so illustrious a colony, he should spread terror throughout all the rest. And this vain attempt was not only prejudicial to himself, but to Hannibal. For the latter, seeing that Asdrubal, after having arrived much sooner in Italy than there was reason to expect, amused himself before Placentia, did not think it proper to quit his winter-quarters so immediately; and besides he remembered the little success of his designs upon Placentia after the victory at Trebia.

The Romans, when they saw their Consuls take quite different routes on quitting Rome, were also divided in their disquiet, as between two wars, which they had to sustain at the same time. “ They remembered the calamities which Hannibal alone had occasioned in Italy. Could they hope that the Gods would be so propitious to grant them victory over two such enemies at once? They reflected, that hitherto they had supported themselves only with an alternative of losses and advantages, which had reciprocally balanced each other. That the Commonwealth, crushed by their defeats at Thrasymenus and Cannæ, had been in a manner reinstated by the good success of her arms in Spain. That the loss of the two Scipios defeated and killed immediately after each other with their armies in the same country, had been followed very close by several advantages gained by Rome in Sicily and Italy. Besides which, the distance of Spain from Italy, where this misfortune had happened, had given the Romans time to breathe. But that they had now actually two wars to sustain at the same time in the very heart of Italy: that they had upon their hands two formidable armies commanded by the two most illustrious Generals of the Carthaginians; and that the weight of the danger, which was separate before, fell now entirely upon one and the same place. That of
two

two brothers he who should first be victorious, knew how to join the other immediately." The very recent deaths of the two last Consuls still augmented their consternation, and presented to their minds only sad presages for the time to come. Such were the anxious reflections made by the Romans in accompanying the Consuls, according to custom, at their departure.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

Livy tells us that Fabius, always intent upon the public good, and never losing sight of the plan he had so happily followed in making war with Hannibal, thought it incumbent upon him to advise the Consul Livius before he set out, to hazard nothing, till he knew the genius and force of the enemy he was going against. "I shall give battle, replied Livius abruptly, the moment I see the enemy." And upon Fabius's asking, what might be his motive for such great precipitation: "I shall either, says the Consul, have the glory of overcoming the enemy, or shall have the grateful, though perhaps not the allowable pleasure, of avenging myself upon my fellow-citizens." Such dispositions, if they came really from the heart of Livius, must have given the Romans reason to apprehend every thing, and a very bad idea of him. But his conduct will resemble this discourse in nothing, and make it more than probable that it never escaped him. And indeed the advice seems to have suited Nero much better, who was of a warm and impetuous genius, than his colleague, who had been expressly chosen to temper the other's vivacity.

Liv. xxvii.
40.

Before Nero arrived in his province, the Prætor C. Hostilius attacked Hannibal upon a march, killed almost four thousand men, and took nine ensigns.

Hostilius, on his way to Capua, met the Consul Nero near Venusia. There, that General out of the best troops of the two armies formed a body of forty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, to act against Hannibal.

The latter, having drawn his troops out of their winter-quarters, and the cities of Bruttium, where they had been in garrison, marched to Grumentum in Lucania,

Liv. xxvii.
41, 42.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

Lucania, in hopes of retaking the cities of that country, which fear had obliged to return to the party of the Romans. The Consul also repaired thither from Venusia, having caused all the places through which he passed to be viewed, and incamped fifteen hundred paces from the enemy. Between the Roman camp and that of the Carthaginians, there was a plain, commanded by an hill entirely uncovered, which the Romans had on their right, and the enemy on their left. This eminence gave no umbrage to either side; because as it had neither wood nor hollow upon it, it was not fit for ambuscades: some slight skirmishes passed on both sides of it in the midst of the plain. Nero seemed to have no other end, but to keep back Hannibal, and to prevent him from getting away: Hannibal, on the contrary, being desirous to open himself a free passage, used all possible endeavours to bring Nero to a battle. The Consul at that time employed the Stratagems against Hannibal, which he had so often used against the Romans, and detached a body of infantry from his army, consisting of five cohorts and * ten companies, and ordered them to go up the hill during the night, and from thence down into the valley behind it, and to lie hid there; a stratagem which he thought the more likely to succeed, as so naked and uncovered a hill gave less room to fear a surprize. He fixed a time with the two officers, who commanded the detachment, when they should quit their ambuscade, and attack the enemy.

As to him, at sun-rise, he drew up all his troops in battle, both horse and foot. At the same moment, Hannibal also gave his the signal of battle. They immediately flew to their arms, and hastily quitted their intrenchments, crossing the plain to charge the enemy. Nero seeing that they advanced with more heat than order and discipline, commanded C. Aurunculejus to

* Additis quinque manipulis. The Maniples formed two companies. The cohort consisted of three maniples. Every maniples was composed of six score men of the Hastati and Principes, and sixty only of the Triarii.

make the horse of the third legion move forwards, of which he was Tribune, with as much impetuosity as was possible against the Carthaginians, being assured, that dispersed as they were in the plain, it would be easy to break and defend them, before they could draw up in order.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

Hannibal had not quitted his camp, when he heard the cries of the soldiers engaged, and immediately advanced with all his troops. The horse, whom Nero had caused to act from the beginning, had already spread terror throughout the foremost of the Carthaginians. The first legion and almost an equal body of the allies began also to fight. The Carthaginians in disorder came to blows with the Roman horse and foot, as chance brought them on on both sides. The reinforcements sent continually to support the most advanced, insensibly augmented the engagement and the disorder. Notwithstanding the confusion and terror of the Carthaginians, Hannibal, as an old and experienced captain, could have drawn up all his troops in battle, who were themselves capable of seconding his ability, from their long experience of war, if the cries of the Roman cohorts and companies, who charged him descending from the hill in the rear, had not made him apprehend that they would cut off his communication with his camp. And this entirely disconcerted the Carthaginians, and obliged them to fly on all sides.

The slaughter was the less, because the nearness of their camp afforded them an immediate refuge against the Roman cavalry, who pursued them with great vigour at their heels, whilst the troops that came down from the hill of an easy descent, had charged them in flank. However, they killed above eight thousand, and took seven hundred prisoners, with nine ensigns: and though the elephants had been of no use in a confused battle, as this was, four of them were killed and two taken. The victors lost only five hundred men, citizens and allies.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

The next day Hannibal lay still in his camp. Nero drew up his army in battle : but seeing no enemy appear, he ordered them to gather the spoils of the enemy, and to lay the bodies of their fellow-soldiers in an heap, in order to their interment. Several days successively the Consul advanced to the gates of the Carthaginian camp with so much boldness, that he seemed to intend to attack it ; till at length Hannibal, having caused abundance of fires to be kindled, and several tents to be pitched, in the part of his camp next the enemy, retired about midnight ; leaving a small number of Numidians, with orders to shew themselves at the gates and upon the intrenchments, whilst he with the rest of the army marched towards Apulia.

The next morning, the Roman army, as usual, advanced in order of battle. The Numidians having appeared for some time upon the works, as they had been ordered, to amuse the Romans, set out full speed to rejoin the gross of their army. The Consul perceiving a great silence in the camp of the Carthaginians, and that even those he had seen in the morning, going to and fro at the gates, had also disappeared, he sent in two of the horse, who having carefully examined all parts of it, brought back advice, that Hannibal had abandoned it entirely. The Consul then entered it with all his troops, and having given them only time to run over and plunder it, he made them return to his own camp before night.

Liv. xxvii.
42.

The next day, early in the morning, he set out ; and following the route of the enemy by forced marches, he came up with them near Venusia, where he gave them battle again, and killed two thousand of the Carthaginians. Hannibal decamped from thence, and marching during the night only upon eminences, to avoid coming to blows with the enemy, got to Metapontum. He immediately made Hanno, who commanded in that country, set out with a small detachment to make new levies in the country of the Bruttii ; and having joined the rest of that officer's troops with his own army, he returned the same way he came to Venusia,

Venusia, and from thence advanced as far as Canusium. Nero had continued to pursue him ; and when he marched towards Metapontum, he had made Q. Fulvius enter Lucania, not to leave that country without defence.

A.R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

Hannibal now makes but a sad figure, very different from that he had made in the first year of the war. He had no resource left but the arrival of his brother, and he expected news from him with impatience.

Asdrubal, after having been obliged to raise the siege of Placentia, had dispatched four Gaulish and two Numidian horse, with letters to Hannibal. Those soldiers, having successfully passed through the whole length of Italy, though always in the midst of enemies, when they were just upon the point of arriving, in endeavouring to join Hannibal, who was then retreating towards Metapontum, they were carried by ways they did not know as far as Tarentum. There, they were taken by some foragers of the Roman army in the country, and brought to the Proprætor Q. Claudius. They at first endeavoured to elude his questions by evasive answers : but the fear of the torments, which he shewed to them, having soon forced them to speak the truth, they confessed, that they were carrying letters to Hannibal from his brother Asdrubal. Claudius immediately sent these horsemen to the Consul Nero under a good guard, and made them deliver the letters to him sealed as they were. He found by them that Asdrubal intended to join his brother in Umbria ; and was further informed of the designs of that General by the questions he asked the prisoners, and their answers. But he was convinced that, in the present conjuncture, the Consuls ought not to content themselves with making war after the customary manner, by each keeping within the bounds of his own province, in order to oppose the enemy prescribed him by the Senate. That it was necessary to form some great, bold, new, and unforeseen design ; which would give no less terror to the Romans than to the Carthaginians ; but of which the successful execution might change

Liv. xxvii.
43.

A.R. 545. change the alarms of the first into a joy no less great
 Ant. C. than unexpected. This design was to deceive Hanni-
 207, bal, by leaving his camp near him always in the same
 appearance, so that he might believe the Consul pre-
 sent; to march in person the whole length of Italy in
 order to join his colleague, and overpower Asdrubal;
 and afterwards to return into his camp, before Han-
 nibal should discover his absence.

Liv. xxvii. Nero sent Asdrubal's letters to the Senate, with ad-
 44. vice of what he had resolved to do. He added several
 App. 343. other precautions, which he thought proper to be
 taken in the present conjuncture. At the same time
 he dispatched some horse into all the countries through
 which his army was to pass, with orders in his name
 to the inhabitants of the towns and countries, to pre-
 pare provisions for the subsistence of his troops, with
 horses and other carriage-beasts for the soldiers, who
 should be fatigued and incapable to march. As for
 him, he chose the best troops of his whole army, and
 of them formed a body of six thousand foot and a
 thousand horse, to whom he gave out, that his design
 was to attack a city of Lucania in the neighbourhood
 of his camp, and surprize the Carthaginian garrison in
 it; and ordered them to be ready to march on the first
 notice. He set out in the night, and took his route by
 the way of Picenum, having left Q. Cadius one of his
 lieutenants to command in his absence.

The news of the Consul's design and departure oc-
 casioned no less consternation at Rome, than it had
 been in some years before, when Hannibal incamped
 before the gates of the city. They did not know whe-
 ther to praise or blame so bold an undertaking. They
 thought, it was only to be judged of from the event;
 which is an evident injustice, but usual amongst men.
 " They exaggerated the dangerous consequences of an
 enterprize, which seemed to give up a camp left with-
 out a General or forces as a prey to Hannibal; an en-
 terprize which could succeed only in effect of deceiving
 the most vigilant and penetrating General, that ever
 was. What would happen, should Hannibal be ap-
 prized

prized of Nero's march, and should either resolve to pursue him with his whole army, or attack his camp left as a prey and without defence. They called to mind the dreadful defeats, which had brought the Roman power to the very brink of ruin; and that at a time, when they had only one General and one army to oppose; whereas now they had two Punic wars upon their hands, two great armies, and in a manner two Hannibals. For they equalled Asdrubal with his brother, and were even studious to find reasons for giving him the preference *. And, following the impressions of fear, which is always ingenious in placing things in the worst light, they magnified every thing in their thoughts that was in favour of the enemy, and on the contrary lessened all that might give themselves hopes of success."

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

In the mean time Nero had began his march. At first he had not informed his soldiers, whither he was leading them. When he was far enough on his way to make known his design to them without danger, he acquainted them with it, adding, "That no enterprise ever was more dangerous in appearance, nor more safe in reality. That he led them to certain victory; as his colleague's army, being already formidable in itself, could not fail, with the addition of a small reinforcement, to be an over-match for the enemy. That the surprize only which the unexpected news of the arrival of a second Consul with an army in the moment of battle, sufficed to secure them the victory. That † in war all things depend upon report, and that the slightest circumstances often determine the resolution or fear of an army. That as for the rest, they would have the whole glory of a success, which mankind, according to their usual manner of judging, always entirely ascribe to those who come last to the aid of others. That they themselves saw,

Liv. xxvii.
45.

* Omnia majora etiam vero presidia hostium, minora sua, metu interpretæ semper in deteriora inclinato, ducebant. Liv.

† Famam bellum conficere, & parva momenta in spem metumque impellere animos. Liv.

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with what ardour the several states through which they passed came out to meet them : That they heard the praises they gave their valour, and the vows they made for their prosperity."

Liv. xxvii.
46.

And accordingly, all the ways through which they passed were lined with crouds of men and women from all the adjacent countries, who mingled vows and prayers with praises ; extolling the bravery of the enterprize, and imploring the Gods for their success. There was a kind of dispute in point of generosity between the people and the soldiers ; the former desiring to give with abundance, and the latter to receive nothing more than was necessary. In consequence, the courage and ardour of Nero's troops increasing perpetually, they arrived in six or seven days by forced marches near the camp of Livius. Nero had sent couriers before, to inform Livius of his approach, and to ask him, whether he thought it proper for him to join him in the day or in the night, and if they should incamp together, or separately. His colleague thought it best, that he should join him in the night. The better to amuse the enemy and conceal the arrival of this reinforcement, it was resolved, that the camp of Livius should have no greater extent than before ; and that Nero's officers, horse and foot, should be received and lodged each with those of their own rank.

Nero's troops entered the camp with the favour of silence and the night. The joy of the two armies was mutual. The next day a council of war was held, at which the Prætor L. Porcius was present. He was incamped in the neighbourhood of the Consuls ; and even before their arrival, keeping his army upon eminences, he had sometimes faced the enemy in the narrow defiles to dispute their passage, sometimes attacked them in flank or rear, and had used all the methods the art of war suggests for a weaker enemy to harass one stronger and more powerful.

In the council most were of opinion, " that the battle should be deferred for some days, to give Nero and his soldiers time to rest after their fatigue. But

Nero

Nero not only advised, but earnestly requested, that an enterprize, which expedition would render infallibly successful, might not be rendered void, and rash, by delay. He represented, that Hannibal, lulled by a kind of charm, which could not continue long, had neither followed him, nor attacked his camp. That if they acted with diligence, they might hope, that Asdrubal would be defeated, and himself returned to his camp, before Hannibal made any movement. That to give the enemy any time, was to abandon to Hannibal the camp opposed to him, and to open him a way for joining his brother. That therefore it was necessary to give battle immediately, and to take advantage of the error both of the absent and present enemy, who were equally ignorant of the numbers and strength of those they had to deal with: the former believing them greater, and the latter less, than they really were."

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This opinion took place, and they quitted the camp in order of battle. Asdrubal also on his side prepared to engage. But as an able General, whose vigilance nothing escapes, having observed old shields, which he had not seen before, and some horses more fatigued and lean than the rest, and judging even by his eye, that the number of the enemy was greater than ordinary, he caused the retreat to be sounded, and returned into his camp. He omitted nothing for clearing up his doubts, and from the accounts brought in by those he sent to scout, he knew, that the Consul's camp was not actually of greater extent than before, nor that of the Prætor Porcius; and this gave him some perplexity. But being informed, that the signal had been given but once in the camp of Porcius, and twice in that of the Consul; that experienced captain, who had been accustomed to make war with the Romans, no longer doubted, but that the two Consuls had joined each other.

Liv. xxvii.
47—49.

This gave him dreadful anxiety in respect to what had befallen his brother. He could not imagine, what was however very real, that so great a captain as Han-

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nibal could be amused to such a degree, as not to know where the General and the army he had to deal with, were. He concluded, that his brother must certainly have received some considerable blow, and he was much afraid, that he had come too late to his aid.

In these sad thoughts, he caused all the fires in his camp to be put out, and ordered his troops to decamp. In the disorder of a precipitate march in the night, his guides made their escape; so that the army, which did not know the country, wandered at first at a venture through the lands; and soon after most of the soldiers, overwhelmed with sleep and fatigue, abandoned their colours, and laid themselves down on both sides along the way. Asdrubal halting till it was light, ordered his troops to continue their march along the Metaurus, and did not advance far in effect of following the winding banks of that river, which he intended to pass as soon as he could; but he could find no ford, which gave the enemy time to come up with him with their three armies.

All the united troops were drawn up in battle. Nero commanded the right, Livius the left, and the Prætor the main body. Asdrubal had began to seize an eminence not far from the river, with design to intrench himself there: but seeing it impossible to avoid a battle, he did all that could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great Captain. He immediately occupied an advantageous post, and drew up his troops on a narrow ground, giving them more depth than breadth. He posted the elephants in the front, and placed the Gauls, who were the weakest part of his troops, on the left, where they were sustained by the eminence of which I have spoke. He took upon himself the command of the right wing with the Spaniards; old troops, in whom he reposed most confidence. And lastly, he posted the Ligurians in the centre immediately behind the elephants.

Asdrubal began the attack, fully determined to conquer or die on this occasion, and marched against the

the left wing of the Romans commanded by Livius. The battle was hottest here. On both sides old and very valiant troops, animated by the presence of the two Generals, fought with invincible obstinacy; and it was long before victory declared on either side.

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The elephants had at first put the front of the centre of the Romans into some disorder; but afterwards, the cries raised by both sides, when the battle became more hot, terrified them to such a degree, that it was no longer possible to govern them, and they turned equally against the two armies.

Nero having made ineffectual endeavours to ascend the hill, which he had in front, and finding it impossible to come at the enemy on that side: "How! said he to his troops, not being able to bear this inactivity any longer, are we come so far, and with so much diligence, to stand with our arms across, and to be meer spectators of a battle?" Upon this he immediately set out with the greatest part of the right wing, moving behind the rear of the army quite round it; charged the right wing of the Carthaginians obliquely; and soon, extending his front, took the enemy in the rear. Hitherto the battle had been doubtful. But when the Spaniards, and soon after the Ligurians, saw themselves attacked at once in front, flanks, and rear; the defeat was total, and they were cut to pieces. The slaughter soon extended to the Gauls, who made still less resistance. Overcome with sleep and fatigue, under which all ancient writers observe that nation apt to sink easily, they could scarce support the weight of their bodies and arms: and as it was about noon, parched at once with heat and thirst, they suffered themselves to be killed or taken, without giving themselves the trouble to defend their lives or liberty.

More elephants were killed by their guides themselves than by the enemy. Those guides were each of them provided with a sharp-pointed knife and a mallet; and when they saw those beasts grow mad, and they could manage them no longer, they drove in that

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207.

knife with the mallet between the two ears in the place where the neck is joined to the head. This was the most certain and immediate way for killing them, when they became ungovernable; and it was Asdrubal's invention.

That General this day added the highest glory to all the other great actions of his life. He led on his dismayed and trembling soldiers to a battle with an enemy that exceeded them both in number and resolution. He animated them by his words, he sustained them by his example, he employed prayers and threats to rally those who fled, till finding at length that victory declared entirely for the Romans, and not being able to survive so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow him, he threw himself into the midst of a Roman cohort, where he fell worthy of the son of Amilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This battle was the bloodiest of all this war, and both by the General's death, and the slaughter made of the Carthaginian troops, it was a kind of reprisal for the defeat of Cannæ; and Appian observes that it was to console, and make the Romans amends for that terrible loss, that God granted them so considerable an advantage on this occasion. Fifty-six thousand of the enemy were killed in this battle, and five thousand four hundred taken prisoners. Above four thousand citizens, who were prisoners to the Carthaginians, were re-taken; which was a consolation for the loss of those who had been killed in this battle. For this victory cost the Romans dear enough, as they bought it by the loss of eight thousand of their troops, who were killed upon the spot. The victors were so weary of killing and shedding blood, that the next day, when somebody told Livius, that it was easy to cut a body of the enemy that were flying to pieces: "No, no, replied the General, let some of them be left to carry home the news of their defeat, and our victory."

Liv. xxvii. 50. Nero, the night after the battle, set out to return to his army; and returning with more diligence than he

he came, after six days march, he re-entered the camp he had left near Hannibal. He did not find so many people upon his route, because he had sent no couriers before him. Those who met him, were transported with a joy they could not contain.

But what is difficult to express, or almost to imagine, is the various passions of the Roman citizens as well during their uncertainty of the event, as when they had received the news of the victory. As soon as they were informed of the departure of Nero, the Senators went early every day into the Senate with the Magistrates, and the People filled the Forum; and nobody returned home till night, so much were they engrossed by their concern for the public affairs. The Ladies expressed their zeal for the good of their country, by crowding all the temples, and continually offering prayers and vows to the Gods. These Pagans teach us, how much and in what manner we ought to concern ourselves for the preservation of the State.

Whilst the whole city was thus divided between hope and fear, a report, confused and uncertain enough, spread at Rome, that two of the horse who had been in the battle, were arrived in the camp which had been pitched at the entrance of Umbria, and had brought advice of the defeat of the enemy. This news seemed to be too important to be believed on slight grounds, and nobody dared flatter themselves, that it was true. Soon after a letter arrived from L. Manlius Acidinus of the camp at Umbria, which confirmed the arrival of the two horse. and their report. This letter was carried across the public place to the Prætor's tribunal; and every body ran with so much ardor to the gates of the Senate, that the courier could not approach it, every one stopping him to ask questions, and demanding with great cries, that the letter should be read in the tribunal of harangues before it was carried to the Senate. The Magistrates found it difficult to disperse the throng, and to make the eagerness and ardor of the People give place to the order and decency it was necessary to observe. The letter was read first

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in the Senate, and then in the Assembly of the People ; and it made different impressions upon the citizens, according to the difference of their dispositions. For some, without waiting in the least, gave themselves up to all the transports of excessive joy : others refused to give credit to it, till they should see the Consul's messengers arrive, and heard their letters read.

At length news came, that those deputies were upon the point of arriving : Upon which all the citizens, old and young, ran with equal ardor to meet them, * every one ardently desiring to be the first in knowing such grateful news, and to be assured of it by the evidence of his own eyes and ears. They filled the ways as far as the bridge † Milvius. The deputies arrived in the Forum surrounded with an infinite multitude of all orders of the People, who addressed themselves either to them, or their followers, to know what had passed : and in proportion as they were informed, that the General of the enemy was killed, and his whole army cut to pieces : that the Consuls were alive, and that their legions had sustained no very considerable loss ; they immediately ran to impart the excess of their joy to others. The deputies arrived not without sufficient difficulty at the Senate ; and it was still with greater, that the People were prevented from entering along with them, and mingling with the Senators. The letters having been read before them, were carried into the Assembly of the People, to whom they also read them. L. Veturius, one of the deputies, afterwards gave a particular relation of what had passed ; and his account was followed with such cries of joy and applauses of the whole People, as it would be difficult to express.

The citizens immediately quitted the Forum ; some to thank the Gods in the temples for so great a blessing ; and others to go home to inform their wives

* *Primus quisque auribus oculisque haurire tantum gaudium cupientes.* Liv.

† Now called Ponti Mola, at about a league from Rome.

and children of so extraordinary and unexpected a success. The Senate decreed public thanksgivings for three days, in gratitude for the signal victory gained over the Carthaginians by the Consuls Livius and Nero. The Prætor C. Hostilius proclaimed these processions in the Assembly of the People, at which were present great multitudes of both sexes.

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207.

This victory occasioned a salutary revolution in the Commonwealth, and from thenceforth the citizens began again to make contracts, to buy, sell, borrow, and pay, as is customary in times of profound peace. It was in this year, according to Pliny, that gold species were first coined at Rome.

Plin.
xxxiii. 3.

Whilst all this passed, the Consul Nero arrived in his camp. Asdrubal's head, which was thrown into that of the Carthaginians, informed that General of his brother's fate. Two of the prisoners, whom the Consul had caused to go to his camp, gave him a particular account of what had passed at the battle of the Metaurus. Hannibal, terrified with news equally fatal to his country and family, cried out, that "by this blow he knew the fate of Carthage." Horace puts words into his mouth, which very well express his sentiments. * "It is over : I shall now send superb couriers no more to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I lose all hope, and all good fortune." He decamped that moment, and retired to the extremity of Bruttium, where he drew together all the troops he had, being no longer in a condition to keep them separate from each other, as before. At the same time he ordered all the people of Metapontum to quit their city, and all the Lucanians who were in his party, to abandon their country, and to join him in that of the Bruttii.

Liv. xxvii.
51.

Though there had been some interval between the victory and the triumph of the Consuls, I shall repeat

Liv. xxviii.

* Carthagini jam non ego nuncios
Mittam superbos. Occidit, occidit
Spes omnis & fortuna nostri
Nominis, Asdrubale interempto.

HOR. Od. iv. l. 4.

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297.

at large what relates to this triumph, to avoid interrupting the thread of so affecting a part of history, and which we clearly perceive Livy has laboured with particular attention, and, if we may be allowed to use the expression, with a kind of complacency.

Towards the end of the campaign, the two Consuls were permitted to return to Rome, with this difference however, that Livius marched back his troops, which were no longer necessary in Gaul; whereas those of Nero had orders to remain in the province, to oppose the designs of Hannibal. The two Consuls, by letters to each other, agreed, that in order to keep up to the end the good understanding they had hitherto observed with each other, they should regulate their departure from two provinces so remote, so as to arrive at Rome at the same time, and that he who should first come to * Præneste, should stay there for his colleague. They happened both to come thither the same day. From thence they dispatched a courier to Rome, with an order to the Senate to assemble three days after in the temple of Bellona.

Having set out on the day fixed, they found, on approaching the city, that the People were come in a body to meet them. They advanced towards the temple of Bellona, surrounded by that infinite multitude, each, not contented with saluting, but eagerly pressing to approach them, and to kiss their victorious hands. Some congratulated them upon their victory: others thanked them for the important service they had rendered the Commonwealth, in delivering it from the exceeding danger which had menaced it. After they had given an account to the Senate of their conduct, according to the custom of all their Generals, they first demanded, “that solemn thanksgivings should be paid to the Gods for the valour with which they had inspired them in this war, and for the good success they had vouchsafed them; and in the second place that they should be permitted to enter the city in

* Now called Palestrina, a city in the territory of the Church.

triumph.” All the Senators replied with one voice, “ that it was with extreme joy they granted their demand, being full of the warmest gratitude for so glorious a success, for which Rome was indebted in the first place to the protection of the Gods, and next to them, to the courage and wisdom of the Consuls.”

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We are going to see in these two Generals an uncommon example of union and concord. As they had acted in perfect concert in the battle and after the victory, they would also shew the same concert in the triumph. But, because the action had passed in the province of Livius ; and the auspices and command had been his upon the day of battle ; and his army had returned to Rome with him, whereas Nero had left his in the province ; they agreed that the first should enter the city in a triumphal chariot drawn by four horses, attended by his army, and the latter should be only on horseback without any train.

The triumph thus regulated still augmented the glory of both Consuls ; but especially of him who, though superior in merit, so generously gave up all the honours to his colleague. Accordingly the people were unanimous in bestowing the whole praise upon Nero. They said, “ that he, whom they saw on horseback without pomp or train, had in six days marched the whole length of Italy, and had fought Asdrubal in Gaul at the very time that Hannibal believed him incamped near himself in Apulia. That * thus the same Consul on one day, and at the two extremities of Italy, had made head against the two most formidable enemies of the commonwealth, by opposing one with his prudence, and the other with his person. That on one side the name of Nero had sufficed to awe Hanni-

* Ita unum Consulem pro utraque parte Italiæ adversus duos duces, duos imperatores, hinc consilium suum, hinc corpus opposuisse. Nomen Neronis satis fuisse ad continendum castris Annibalem : Asdrubalem vero, qua alia re, quam adventu ejus, obrutum atque extinctum esse ? Itaque iret alter Consul sublimis curru multijugis, si vellet, equis. Uno equo per urbem verum triumphum veli : Neronemque, etiam si pedes incedat vel parta eo bello, vel spreta eo triumpho gloria, memorabilem fore. Liv.

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207.

bal : and who could doubt, on the other, but that the victory gained over Asdrubal was to be ascribed to the reinforcement of the same Nero, who by his sudden arrival had daunted, and crushed the Carthaginian General ? That the other Consul might cause himself to be drawn in a magnificent chariot, with a still greater number of horses ; that it was that single horse which carried the true triumpher ; and that Nero, though he should even go on foot, would be for ever memorable, as well by the glory he had acquired in this war, as by that he had despised in the triumph." During the whole time of the march to the Capitol, the People held discourses of this kind in respect to Nero, and incessantly kept their eyes upon him.

The money which had been taken from the enemy, and amounted, according to Polybius, to above three hundred talents (about four hundred and fifty thousand pounds) was carried into the public treasury. Livius gave each of his soldiers fourteen sesterces (about eighteen-pence) and Nero promised as much to his, when he returned to his army.

It was observed, that on the day of triumph, the soldiers, which were those of Livius, celebrated Nero in their songs much more than their own General : that the cavalry gave a thousand praises to L. Veturius and Q. Cæcilius, the Consuls lieutenants, and exhorted the People to elect them Consuls for the ensuing year. The Consuls themselves confirmed this favourable testimony of the Horse, by extolling in the Assembly of the People, the services of those two officers, whose valour and zeal had greatly contributed to the victory.

In the important action which we have just related, that is, in the defeat of Asdrubal, which had such great consequences, and which, probably speaking, determined the fate of the second Punic war, both the Consuls make a very great and glorious figure ; and in my opinion, if we were to take party with either the one or the other, it would be very difficult to know to which to give the preference. The boldness of the design formed by Nero, the singularity of the enter-
prize,

prize, with the good success that followed it, carry with them a lustre, that strikes, amazes, and forces all suffrages in his favour. Accordingly we see in their triumph, though Livius appeared alone in the show, the army and people declared for Nero; all eyes were fixed upon his person, and the praises and applauses were principally lavished in his favour.

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But is this bold project, which so much excites admiration, really laudable in itself, and separately from the dazzling lustre that surrounds it after the event? The alarm of the Romans, whilst Nero was upon his march to join his colleague, were they ill-founded, and were they in the wrong to incline to accuse a General, who in some measure gave up his army and camp a prey to the enemy, by leaving them without an head, and deprived of the best part of their strength? And was it probable, that so active and vigilant a warrior as Hannibal, should continue for above twelve days dozing to such a degree, as not to perceive in any manner the departure and absence of the Consul?

We must own that, if there was any temerity in this, the success, however happy, could neither cover nor excuse the fault of the General. But this judgment cannot be passed on Nero's enterprize. It is not so wonderful, that Hannibal did not know of the departure of the Consul's troops, or was not much moved with it. A General every day sends out greater or smaller detachments from his army, which have no consequence. This was not very considerable. Seven thousand men out of an army of above forty thousand, could not weaken it so much, as to make it incapable of defending itself. He left officers there, whose ability and courage he knew, and whom he also knew to be highly capable of commanding in chief. Besides which three or four bodies of Roman troops, that surrounded Hannibal on all sides, sufficed to prevent him from making any great progress in the Consul's absence, even though he had discovered it. Add to this, that that General, who saw his forces much diminished by the several blows, which he had received, seemed

A. R. 545. seemed to be become less active and bold in respect to
Ant. C. attacking. It was therefore with reason, that the enterprize of Nero, which so much contributed to the victory, was generally admired. I should be highly in the wrong, if I took upon me to justify several other actions of his life.
207.

On another side, the conduct of Livius is no less worthy of admiration. Every body knows, how jealous the Roman Generals, even the wisest of them, were of the glory of terminating alone, and by themselves, an enterprize or war which they had began, and how much they apprehended the coming of a rival to deprive them of it, or even to share it with them. Livius lets nothing of this weakness usual to the greatest men appear, or rather of this delicacy in point of glory and honour. He was in a condition to stop and conquer Asdrubal by himself, or at least he might flatter himself that he was. However, he sees his colleague without jealousy, a little before his declared enemy, come to divide the honour of the victory. His reconciliation must have been very sincere, and his zeal for the good of his country very warm and predominant, entirely to suppress in his heart a sensibility so natural to man, and especially to a soldier. We also see from this, how little probability there is for the rough answer to Fabius put into his mouth.

T H E

R O M A N H I S T O R Y.

B O O K T H E N I N E T E E N T H.

THIS book contains the history of four years: 545, 546, 547, 548. Its principal subjects are the expeditions of Scipio in Spain, the first war of the Romans against Philip king of Macedonia, the election of Scipio for Consul, and the design he forms of carrying the war into Africa.

S E C T. I.

State of the affairs of Spain. Silanus defeats two bodies of enemies one immediately after the other, and takes Hanno one of the Generals prisoner. Oringis in Bætica taken by L. Scipio. P. Scipio retires to Tarraco. The Roman fleet, after having ravaged Africa, beats that of the Carthaginians. Treaty concluded between the Romans and some other States against Philip. Philip gains some advantages against the Ætolians. Sulpicius flies before that prince; and the latter, in his turn, flies before Sulpicius. The Romans and Philip take the field. Attalus and Sulpicius attack and take Oreum. Sulpicius is obliged to raise the siege of Chalcis. Description of the Euripus. Attalus is almost surprized by Philip. That Prince returns into Macedonia. The Ætolians make peace with that Prince, in which the allies

allies on both sides are included. Provinces of the new Consuls. The sacred fire in the temple of Vesta extinguished. Cultivation of the lands reinstated in Italy. Praise of Hannibal. Praise of Scipio. Reflection of Livy upon the affairs of Spain. Scipio gains a great victory over the Carthaginians commanded by Asdrubal and Mago. Scipio returns to Tarraco. Masinissa joins the Romans. Scipio seeks the amity of Syphax, goes to him in Africa, and meets Asdrubal there. Scipio besieges and takes Illiturgis, and entirely demolishes it. Castulon surrenders, and is treated with less severity. Games and combats of Gladiators given by Scipio, in honour of his father and uncle. Horrid resolution of the inhabitants of Astapa. They are all killed. Enterprize against Cadiz. Sicknes of Scipio, which gives occasion for a sedition. Revolt of the Romans incamped at Sucro. Scipio uses infinite address in appeasing and punishing the sedition.

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C. CLAUDIUS NERO.
M. LIVIUS II.

Liv. xxviii.
1.

WE have seen the effect produced by the death of Asdrubal, in Italy: we now come to the situation of the affairs of the Romans and Carthaginians. Asdrubal the son of Gisgo had retired into Bœtica. The coasts of the Mediterranean. and all the eastern part of the province, were occupied by Scipio's troops, and subjected to the Romans. Hanno, who was come from Africa with a new army to succeed Asdrubal the son of Amilcar, having joined Mago, entered Celtiberia, which is in the middle of the country, where he soon saw himself at the head of a powerful army.

Liv. xxviii.
1, 2.

Scipio detached M. Silanus against him with ten thousand foot and four thousand horse. The latter marched with so much diligence, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ways, that he arrived very near the enemy before they had any news of his march. He was but ten thousand paces from them, when he was informed

informed by Celtiberian deserters, who had served him as guides, that he was not far from the way, through which he must pass by two armies of the enemy : the one upon the left, commanded by Mago, and composed of nine thousand new-raised Celtiberians, who scarce observed any discipline ; the other upon the right, entirely consisting of warlike and well disciplined Carthaginians, commanded by Hanno. Silanus was not long in resolving. He ordered his troops to incline as much as possible to the left, and to avoid shewing themselves to the enemy's advanced guards. They were but a thousand paces distant, when the Celtiberians at length saw them, and began to move, but with abundance of consternation and disorder. Silanus had made his army refresh themselves with eating, and drew them up in battle. Mago, on the first noise he heard, ran immediately, and drew up the troops in battle as well as he could. They came to blows. The Celtiberians made no great resistance, and were cut to pieces. The Carthaginians, who upon the news of the battle, were come from the other camp, and had made exceeding haste, in order to arrive in time to their aid, had the same fate. Hanno their General was taken with such of the Carthaginians who arrived last, and found their companions defeated. Almost the whole cavalry, and what remained of the old infantry, followed Mago in his flight, and in ten days joined Asdrubal in the province of Cadiz. But the Celtiberian new-raised forces dispersed themselves in the forests, and from thence returned home.

By this victory, opportunely gained, Silanus put a stop to intrigues which were not considerable in their birth, but might be the source of a very dangerous war, if the Carthaginians, after having armed the Celtiberians, had been given time to make the other neighbouring nations also take arms. It was for this reason Scipio gave him all the praises which his diligence and valour deserved ; and not to frustrate the hope this success gave him of soon terminating the war, he set out immediately for the extremities of Spain in quest of

A. R. 545. of Asdrubal, the only enemy that remained for him
 Ant. C. to conquer.
 207.

That Carthaginian General was then incamped in Bœtica, to keep the States of that country, who were the allies of the Carthaginians, in their party. But having received advice of Scipio's design, he decamped with a precipitation which rather resembled a flight than a retreat, and took refuge upon the coast of the ocean near Cadiz. And as he was assured, that as long as he kept his troops in one body, he should be exposed to the attacks of the enemy, he distributed his soldiers into different cities, the walls of which would defend their persons, as their persons would the walls.

Liv.
 xxviii.
 3, 4.

Scipio judging that the places, in which the enemy had shut themselves up, would cost him little pains indeed to take them, but much time, resolved to march back into Hispania Citerior, that is, on this side of the Iberus. However, not to leave this country absolutely at the discretion of the Carthaginians, he sent his brother L. Scipio with ten thousand foot and a thousand horse, to besiege Oringis, the most opulent city of the country. It did not make a long defence. The inhabitants, fearing that the Romans, if they took the place by storm, would put all to the sword, without regard either to Spaniards or Carthaginians, opened the gates. All the Carthaginians were put in chains, with three hundred of the inhabitants, who had used their utmost endeavours to frustrate the design of their countrymen. Their city, estates, and liberty were restored to the rest. At the taking of this place about two thousand of the enemy were killed: the Romans did not lose above ninety men.

This conquest gave great joy to L. Scipio and his troops, and did them great honour when they rejoined their General and his army, with a croud of prisoners before them, whom they had taken in this expedition. P. Scipio gave his brother all the praises he deserved, speaking in the most honourable terms of the taking of Oringis, the glory of which he equalled to what he
 had

had acquired himself in the conquest of Carthageria. A. R. 545.
Ant. C. 207.
But as winter approached, and he had not time enough to attempt Cadiz, or to march in pursuit of the dispersed parties of Asdrubal's army, he returned with all his troops into Hispania Citerior; and having put them into winter-quarters, and made his brother set out for Rome with Hanno and the most considerable of the Carthaginian prisoners, he went himself to Tarraco.

This same year the Roman fleet, commanded by the Proconsul M. Valerius Lævinus, sailed from Sicily Liv. xxviii. 4. to Africa, and made great ravages in the territory of Carthage, and even round the walls of Utica. As it returned to Sicily, it met that of the Carthaginians, composed of seventy ships of war. This fleet it attacked, and took seventeen gallies and sunk four. The rest were put to flight. The Roman General having beaten the enemy in this manner both by sea and land, returned to Lilybæum, with considerable spoils of all kinds. And as there was no longer any enemy upon that sea, he sent very considerable convoys of corn from Sicily to Rome.

In a preceding book, we have spoke of a treaty, concluded between the Romans and the Ætolians, Polyb. ix. 561—571. against Philip King of Macedonia. Several other States and Kings had been invited to accede to it. Attalus King of Pergamus, Pleurates and Scerdiledes, both Kings, the one of Thrace, and the other of Illyricum, accepted this invitation. The Ætolians exhorted the Spartans to do the same. Their deputy represented in a lively manner to the Lacedæmonians all the oppressions, with which the Kings of Macedonia had loaded them; and especially the design they had always had, and still retained, of subverting the liberty of Greece. He concluded with demanding, that the Lacedæmonians should persevere in the alliance they had anciently made with the Ætolians; that they should enter into the treaty concluded with the Romans, or that they should continue neuter.

A. R. 545.
Ant. C.
207.

Lyciscus, deputy from the Acarnanians, spoke next, and declared openly for the Macedonians. He expatiated upon the services “that Philip, Alexander’s father, and Alexander himself, had done Greece in attacking and ruining the Persians, who were its most ancient and most inveterate enemies. He dwelt upon the shame and danger of suffering Barbarians to enter Greece; so he called the Romans. He added, that the wisdom of the Spartans ought to foresee the storm at a distance which began to gather in the West, and would undoubtedly break out; at first upon Macedonia, and afterwards upon all Greece, of which it would occasion the ruin.”

The fragment of Polybius, in which this deliberation is related, does not mention the consequence of it. The sequel of the history shews, that Sparta joined the Ætolians, and entered into the common treaty. It was at that divided into two factions, whose intrigues and contests, that rose to the utmost violence, occasioned great troubles in the city. The one was hot for the interests of Philip, and the other openly declared against him. The latter prevailed. We find Machanidas at the head of the latter; and that, taking advantage of the disorders of the Commonwealth, he made himself master of it, and became its tyrant. The allies were intent upon making immediate use of the augmentation of forces, which the new treaty gave them by the union of several states.

Attalus I. King of Pergamus, did the Romans great service in the war against Philip. This little sovereignty had been founded somewhat above forty years before the time of which we speak, by Phileterus, an officer highly esteemed for his valour and conduct. Lyfimachus, one of the successors of Alexander, intrusted him with the treasure he had laid up in the castle of Pergamus. After the death of Lyfimachus, he continued in possession of the treasure and city. At his death, he left them to his nephew, Eumenes I. who augmented his principality with some cities that he took from the Kings of Syria. Attalus I.
his

his cousin, succeeded him, of whom we now speak. A. R. 545.
Ant. C. 207.
He assumed the title of King, after having conquered the Galatians, and transmitted it to his posterity, who enjoyed it to the third generation.

I am going to relate the whole of this war of the Romans and their allies against Philip, in resuming it from the Consulship of Marcellus and Crispinus, where we left it, till the peace concluded in the Consulship of Scipio and Crassus. I shall, in consequence, not be obliged to interrupt the history of the war with Hannibal, which is our principal object, with facts of much less importance.

Machanidas was one of the first that took the field. A. R. 548.
Ant. C. 204.
Liv. xxvii. 30.
He entered the territory of the Achæans with his troops, which bordered upon those of Sparta. The Achæans and their allies sent deputies to Philip, and pressed him to come into Greece to assist and defend them. The Ætolians under Pyrrhias, who had been this year elected General jointly with Attalus, advanced to meet him as far as Lamia. Pyrrhias had with him the troops that Attalus and Sulpicius had sent him. Philip beat him twice, and the Ætolians were obliged to shut themselves up within the walls of Lamia. Philip retired to * Phalara with his army.

He set out from thence to repair to Argos, where the Nemæan games were upon the point of being solemnized, and at which he was very well pleased to be present. Whilst he was employed in celebrating these games, Sulpicius having set out from † Naupactus, and landed between Sicyon and Corinth, ravaged the whole flat country. Philip, upon this news, left the games, marched immediately against the enemy, and coming up with them laden with booty, he put them to flight, and pursued them to their ships. Liv. xxvii. 30—31.
On returning to the games, he was received with general applause; and the more, because he quitted his diadem and purple robe, and mingled

* A city of Thessaly.

† In the gulph of Corinth, now called Lepanto.

A. R. 548
Ant. C.
204.

with the common citizens; a sight highly grateful and soothing to free states. But it was not long before his enormous debauches rendered him as odious as his popular behaviour had made him amiable.

Plut. in
Philop.
360.

Some days after the celebration of the games, Philip advanced as far as the city of * Elis, which had received an Ætolian garrison. The first day he ravaged the adjacent country: he then approached the city in order of battle, and made some bodies of horse advance to the gates, to induce the Ætolians to make a falley. They accordingly did so. But Philip was surprized to see Roman troops amongst them. Sulpicius having set out from Naupactus with fifteen galleys, and landed four thousand men, had entered the city of Elis in the night. The battle was rude. Demophantus, the General of the Elean cavalry, having perceived Philopœmen, who commanded that of the Achæans, advanced out of the ranks impetuously against him. The latter waited his coming on, and with his spear laid him at his horse's feet. Upon the fall of Demophantus, his cavalry fled. On another side, the Ælean infantry fought with advantage. The King seeing his troops began to give way, spurred his horse into the midst of the Roman infantry. His horse, wounded with a javelin, threw him. The battle then became exceeding hot, both sides exerting themselves in an extraordinary manner; the Romans to seize Philip, and the Macedonians to save him. The king signalized his courage on this occasion, having been obliged to fight a great while on foot in the midst of the horse. A great slaughter was made in this battle. At length having been brought off by his troops, and remounted, he retreated, and incamped five miles from thence. The next day he attacked a castle, to which a great multitude of peasants had retired with their cattle, and took four thousand prisoners, and twenty thousand great and small cattle: a poor advantage, that could not make him amends for the disgrace he had just received at Elis.

* A city of Peloponnesus.

At this instant he received advice, that the Barbarians had made an irruption into Macedonia. He set out immediately to defend his country, leaving two thousand five hundred men of his armies with his allies. Sulpicius retired with his fleet to * Ægina, where he joined King Attalus, and passed the winter.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

As soon as the spring began, the proconsul Sulpicius and King Attalus quitted Ægina, and repaired to † Lemnos with their fleets, which together made sixty sail. Philip, on his side, in order to be in a condition to face the enemy both by sea and land, advanced to ‡ Demetrias. The ambassadors of the allies came thither from all parts to implore his aid in their present great danger. He heard them favourably, and promised them all to send them aid, according as time and occasion should require. In consequence he did so, and sent different bodies of troops into different places, to cover them against the attacks of the enemy: after which he returned to Demetrias. And, in order to be in readiness to assist such of his allies as should be attacked, he established beacons in Phocis, Eubœa, and the small island of § Peparethus, and on his side placed guards on Tifæus, a very high mountain of Thessaly to watch them, in order to be speedily apprized of the march of the enemy, and of the places they intended to attack.

I have repeated elsewhere, with some extent, what Polybius writes concerning signals by fire; which is very curious.

The Proconsul and King Attalus advanced towards Eubœa, and formed the siege of Oreum, which is one of the principal cities. It had two citadels very strongly fortified, and could make a long defence: but Plator, who commanded in it for Philip, surrendered it treacherously to the besiegers. He purposely

* A small island in the gulf of Saronica.

† Stalimene now, an island of the Archipelego.

‡ A city of Thessaly, in Magnesia.

§ A small island in the Ægean sea, near Thessaly.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

made the signals too late, that the succours might not arrive in time. It was not the same at Chalcis, which Sulpicius had besieged immediately after the taking of Oreum. The signals there were made in time, and the Governor, who would not hearken to the Proconsul, prepared for making a good defence. Sulpicius saw plainly that he had made a vain attempt, and he was so prudent to renounce it that instant. The city was very well fortified of itself, and, besides, situated upon the Euripus, the famous strait, where the sea does not ebb and flow seven certain and periodical times a day, says Livy, according to vulgar report; but where that alternate motion is much more frequent, and the waves are tossed sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, with such violence, that they seem like torrents falling from the tops of mountains, without order and innumeraibly; so that ships can at no time have either rest or safety there.

Liv. xxviii.
7.

Attalus besieged Opuns, a city of the Locrians, situated not far from the sea. Philip used extraordinary diligence to aid it, having marched in one day above sixty miles. The city was just taken when he approached, and he would have surprized Attalus, who was plundering it, if the latter, being apprized of his arrival, had not retired with precipitation. Philip pursued him to the sea-coast.

Attalus having retired to Oreum, and being informed that Prusias king of Bithynia had entered his dominions, he returned to Asia, as Sulpicius did to the island Ægina. Philip, after having taken several small places, and frustrated the design of Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, who intended to attack the Eleans, whilst employed in preparing for the celebration of the Olympic games, repaired to the assembly of the Achæans, which was held at * Egium, where he expected to find the Carthaginian fleet, and to join it with his own; but he that commanded it having been advised that Attalus and the Romans were set out

* A town of Achaia properly so called.

from Oreum, he retired, for fear they should come to attack him.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.

Philip † saw with great anguish, that whatever diligence he used, he never arrived in time to execute his designs; fortune, said he, taking pleasure in eluding all his endeavours, to frustrate all occasions even before his eyes, and to deprive him of all advantages just when he was upon the point of seizing them. He however hid his grief from the assembly, and spoke in it with an air of resolution and confidence. Having called the Gods and men to witness, that he had not let slip any occasion for marching on all sides in quest of the enemy; he added, ‡ that it was hard to judge, whether he had shewn more boldness in seeking them, than they had speed in flying from him. That this was tacitly owning on their side, they thought themselves inferior to him in strength; but that he was in hopes of gaining a complete victory over them soon, which would be an evident proof of it. This discourse very much revived the courage of the allies. After having given the necessary orders, and performed some slight expeditions, he returned into Macedonia, to carry on the war there against the Dardanians.

204.
Liv. xxviii.
8.

P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.

P. LICINIUS CRASSUS.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

A year had passed, during which the Romans, intent on more important affairs, had but little regarded the affairs of Greece. The Ætolians, seeing themselves neglected on that side, which was their sole resource, made their peace with Philip. The treaty was scarce concluded, when the Proconsul P. Sempronius arrived with ten thousand foot, a thousand horse, and five and thirty ships of war, which was a considerable

Liv. xxix.
12.

* Philippus mærebat & angebatur, cum ad omnia ipse raptim isset, nulli tamen se rei in tempore occurrisset; & rapientem omnia ex oculis elusisset celeritatem suam fortunam. Liv.

† Vix rationem iniri posse, utrum ab se audacius; an fugacius ab hostibus geratur bellum. Liv.

A. R. 547. aid. He was highly displeased at their having concluded this peace without the consent of the Romans, contrary to the exprefs sense of the treaty of alliance.
Ant. C. 205.

Liv. xxix. 12. However, he did not insist upon continuing the war; and the people of Epirus, who also desired an end of it, being informed of his disposition, sent deputies to Philip, who was returned into Macedonia, to induce him to conclude a general peace, giving him to understand, they were in a manner assured, that if he would consent to have an interview with Sempromius, they would easily agree upon the conditions. The King accepted this proposal with joy, and repaired to Epirus. As both sides desired peace, Philip, to put the affairs of his kingdom in order, and the Romans to be in a condition to carry on the war with more vigour against Carthage, the treaty was soon concluded. It was agreed, that three or four cities, or little states, of Illyricum, should continue in the hands of the Romans, and * Atintania in those of Philip, in case the Senate should consent to it. The King caused Prusias, King of Bithynia, the Achæans, Bæotians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, and Epirus, to be included in the treaty; the Romans, on their side, included in it the people of Ilium, King Attalus, Pleurates, Nabis (tyrant of Sparta) who had succeeded Machanidas, the Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians. The Roman people ratified the treaty, because they were glad to rid the Commonwealth of all other difficulties, in order to turn their whole forces against Africa. Thus terminated this war of the allies by a peace, which was not of long duration.

I resume the thread of the history of the war with Hannibal, which I have interrupted a little to relate the sequel of that with Philip.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C. 206.

L. VETURIUS,
Q. CÆCILIVS.

We are now in the thirteenth year of the second Punic war. The two Consuls had Bruttium (Calabria

* In Macedonia, near Epirus.

Ulterior) for their province, and were both to act against Hannibal. All those who were to command had their provinces also assigned them.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

Liv. xxviii.

All the prodigies, which were then very numerous, did not occasion so much dread and alarm, as the going out of the fire in the temple of Vesta. The Vestal, by whose negligence this misfortune had happened, was scourged with rods by order of the Pontifex Maximus P. Licinius, and particular prayers were made to the Gods upon this occasion to expiate their wrath.

11.
Liv. ibid.

Before the Consuls took the field, the Senate instructed them to recal those who had abandoned their lands in the countries, and to re-instate agriculture. What rendered this re-establishment difficult, was the war's having carried off most of the free people who applied themselves to husbandry; there not being a sufficient number of slaves to supply their places; and the cattle having been taken away, and the farms either ruined or burnt in many places. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the authority of the Consuls replaced a great number of inhabitants in their countries.

Liv. ibid.

As soon as the spring began, the Consuls set out to take upon them the command of their armies. They marched into Lucania, which they reduced to return to its obedience to the Roman people, without being obliged to employ the force of arms.

This year passed without any action between them and Hannibal. For that General, after having so lately seen his family and country receive so great a blow, in the death of his brother Asdrubal, and the entire defeat of his army, did not think it proper for him to march against victorious enemies. The Romans, on their side, seeing that he lay still, thought it adviseable to leave him so; so formidable was his name only, even whilst every thing around him was declining. Here Polybius, and Livy after him, make a reflection highly capable of giving us a great idea of Hannibal. That great man seemed, say they, to shew himself still more worthy of admiration in bad, than

Liv. xxviii.
12.
Polyb. xi.
637.

A.R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

than in good fortune. And, indeed, is it not a kind of prodigy, that during thirteen years, which he had made war in a foreign country (far from his own, with very different success, at the head of an army composed, not of Carthaginian citizens, but of a mixed body of different nations, not united amongst themselves either by the same laws or language; and whose habits, arms, ceremonies, sacrifices, and even Gods, were different;) he should know how to unite them so effectually, that, during so long a series of years, no discord between the troops, or sedition against their General, should arise, though they often wanted both provisions and money in an enemy's country; which in the first Punic war had occasioned so many disorders between the Generals and soldiers? But, from the time he had lost his only resource by the death of Asdrubal, and the defeat of his army, and he had been reduced to retreat into a little corner of Bruttium, and to abandon all the rest of Italy; who would not think it surprizing that no disorder should happen amongst his soldiers, in a conjuncture when he was in want of all things? For the Carthaginians, who found it highly difficult to find means to maintain their ground in Spain, sent him no more supplies than if he abounded in every thing in Italy. And this is one of those great points that distinguish a man's superior genius, and shew how high Hannibal's abilities rose in the art of war.

That of Scipio was no less admirable. The wise activity of that very young General entirely re-instated the Roman affairs in Spain, as the tenacious protraction of Fabius had before done in Italy. Such happy beginnings were sustained by an uniform conduct, that never departed from itself in any thing, and by an uninterrupted series of great and noble actions, that exalted his glory to the highest point, and successfully terminated the most dangerous war the Romans were ever engaged in.

Livy observes here, that the affairs of Spain, in respect to the Carthaginians, were almost in the same situation as those of Italy. For the Carthaginians
having

having been defeated in a battle, wherein their General was taken, had been obliged to retire to the extremities of the province and the coasts of the ocean. All the difference was, that Spain, as well from the genius of the natives, as the nature and situation of places, was far more proper for reviving a war, not only than Italy, but than any other part of the universe. Accordingly, though this was the first province upon the *terra firma*, into which the Romans entered, it is, however, the last they entirely reduced into subjection: which did not happen till the reign of Augustus.

At the time of which we are speaking, Scipio gave great proofs of his ability and valour. Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, the most illustrious of the Carthaginian Generals next to those of the Barcinian family, being returned from Cadiz, entered Hispania * Ulterior. With the assistance of Mago, Hannibal's brother, he made great levies throughout the country, and set on foot an army of † fifty thousand infantry, and four thousand five hundred horse. The two Carthaginian Generals encamped near ‡ Silpia, in a vast plain, with design to come to a battle, if the Romans offered it.

Scipio rightly judged, that he was not in a condition to withstand such numerous forces with only the Roman legions; and that it was absolutely necessary to oppose them, at least in shew, with the aids of Spain itself; avoiding, however, to place any confidence in those Barbarians, and to take so great a number of them into his army, that in case of treachery might occasion its ruin, as they had occasioned that of his father and uncle. The account of the battle that ensued, will shew, with what wisdom he executed this project. Having set out from Tarraco,

* That was called Hispania Citerior, which was on this side of the river Iberus, in respect to the Romans; and that on the other Hispania Ulterior. The latter included Lusitania (Portugal) and the countries on the south.

† Polybius makes this army amount to seventy thousand foot.

‡ Some authors believe, that it is a city of Hispania Tarraconensis, called by Polybius, Helingos.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

and received a reinforcement under Silanus on his route at * Castulon, he advanced as far as the city of Bæcula * with all his forces, which amounted to forty-five thousand foot, and three thousand horse.

When the two armies came in view, some slight skirmishes passed. After both sides had sufficiently tried their force in many small engagements, Asdrubal was the first that drew up his troops in battle. The Romans immediately did the same. Both armies were posted before the intrenchments of their camps, where they staid, in expectation that the other would begin the charge. The evening being come without either having moved, Asdrubal first, and then Scipio, made his troops re-enter their camp. The same passed several days, without coming to an action.

Both parties continued to draw up in the same manner. On the one side the Romans, and on the other the Carthaginians, mixed with Africans, formed the main body. The Spaniards, who were allies either of the Romans or Carthaginians, were upon the wings of both armies. Two and thirty elephants, placed in front of the Carthaginians, appeared at a distance like castles or bastions. It was expected in both camps, that the troops would engage in the order they had hitherto been drawn up: but Scipio was resolved to change the whole disposition of his army upon the day they should actually come to a battle. Over night, he gave orders, that both men and horses should eat before day, and that the cavalry should hold themselves in readiness to move on the first notice.

It was scarce day, when he detached all his horse, with the light-armed soldiers, to attack the posts of the Carthaginians. A moment after he set out himself with all his infantry; posting, contrary to the opinion of the enemy and his own troops, the Roman

* These two rivers were near the source of the Boëtis or Guadalquivir; Castulon to the north of the river.

soldiers upon the wings, and the Spaniards in the centre. Asdrubal, awakened by the noise of this unforeseen attack, immediately quitted his tent. He no sooner perceived the Romans before his intrenchments, the Carthaginians in disorder, and the whole plain covered with the enemy, than on his side he sent his whole cavalry against that of Scipio, and quitted his camp himself at the head of his infantry, without changing any thing in the order he had used before the battle. It was long doubtful between the horse; and it was not easy for it to be decisive on their side; because those who gave way (which happened alternately on both sides) found an assured retreat with their infantry.

A.R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

But when the two main bodies were not above five hundred paces from each other, Scipio put a stop to this action, ordering the legions to open, and receive the cavalry and light-armed soldiers into the midst of them, of which he formed two bodies, that he posted with the corps de reserve behind the two wings: and when he was upon the point of charging the enemy, he commanded the Spaniards, who were in the centre of his battle, to march in close order and softly. As to himself, he sent from the right wing, which he commanded, to tell Silanus and Marcius to extend the left wing, at the head of which they were, as they should see him extend the right, and to make the most speedy of their horse and foot advance against the enemy, in order to begin the charge, before the battalions in the centre could come to engage. Having lengthened the two wings in this manner, they marched fiercely against the enemy, each with three cohorts of foot, three squadrons of horse, and the light-armed troops, whilst the rest followed, forming an oblique line with the main body, in order to attack the Carthaginians in the flanks.

There was an hollow in the centre, because the Spaniards marched slowly, according to the order they had received; and the wings were already engaged, when the Carthaginians and Africans, who
formed

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

formed the enemy's principal force, were not within the discharge of darts. Besides which, they dared not advance to the wings, to assist those who were at blows, lest they should break their centre, and expose it uncovered to the enemy, who were upon the point of charging it. Thus the wings had two enemies to deal with at once: the cavalry and light-armed troops, who had taken a compass, in order to charge them in flank, and the cohorts, who attacked them vigorously in front, to separate them from the main body. We see from all that has been said, what the ability of a great Captain can do.

The wings fought for some time with much bravery: but the heat of the day becoming greater, the Spaniards, who had been obliged to quit their camp without refreshment, were too weak to support their arms, whilst the Romans, full of spirit and vigour, had the farther advantage over them, that, by the conduct of their General, what was strongest in their army had only to deal with what was weakest in that of the enemy. The strength and courage therefore of the latter being exhausted, they gave way; keeping their ranks, however, as if the whole army had retreated by order of their General. But the victor then having began to press them on all sides with the more vigour, as he saw them lose ground, it was no longer possible for them to resist; and, notwithstanding all the endeavours and remonstrances of Asdrubal, fear prevailing over shame, they broke, and fled with abundance of terror into their camp. The Romans would have pursued them into it, and made themselves masters of it, but for a violent storm, during which so much rain fell, that it was not without great pains, that the victors themselves regained their own camp.

Asdrubal seeing that the Turdetani had abandoned him, and that all the rest of the allies were upon the point of doing the same, he decamped the following night, to prevent the evil from spreading further. At day-break, Scipio being informed of the enemy's

retreat, ordered his cavalry to pursue them. Though through the mistake of his guides, their march was lengthened ineffectually, they however came up with the enemy, and charging them sometimes in the rear and sometimes in flank, they harassed them continually, and retarded their flight sufficiently to give the legions time to arrive. From that moment it was no longer a battle, but a real slaughter; till the General himself exhorting his troops to fly, escaped to the neighbouring mountains with a body of about six thousand men half unarmed. All the rest were either killed or taken. Asdrubal, seeing his troops went over continually to the enemy's camp, abandoned the remains of his army, got to the sea-coast during the night, and embarked on board ships that carried him to Cadiz.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

Scipio having received advice of Asdrubal's flight, left ten thousand foot and a thousand horse with Silanus, entirely to disperse the remains of this army. As for himself, in seventy days, he returned to Tarraco with the rest of his troops, examining every where on his route the conduct which the cities and petty princes had observed in respect to the Romans, and distributing rewards or punishments according to their merits.

Liv. xxviii.
16.

After his departure, Masinissa having taken secret measures with Silanus, in order to be admitted into the alliance of the Romans, went to Africa with a small number of his subjects, with design to make his whole nation enter into it. Livy gives us no reason for this change of Masinissa, and contents himself with saying, that the constant fidelity with which he persevered in the amity of the Romans to the end of his life, that was very long, leaves room to judge that he did not act without sufficient motives.

Liv. ibid.

But from the account which we shall give elsewhere of the revolutions that happened about this time in Numidia, it will appear that the Carthaginians had joined Masinissa's enemies. It was probably this, which induced that Prince to quit their alliance. And after-

See Liv.
xxix. 29.

R. A. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

afterwards the marriage of Sophonisba, who had been promised to him, and was given to Syphax, made him entirely irreconcilable in respect to them.

Mago followed Asdrubal to Cadiz, with the ships the latter had sent back to him. Flight or desertion dispersed all the rest of the Carthaginian party, abandoned by their leaders, into the neighbouring cities. Nothing farther appeared, at least considerable either by number, or strength. In this manner Scipio drove the Carthaginians out of Spain, six years after he took upon him the command of the armies in that province, and thirteen after the beginning of this war between the two nations.

Silanus, having no longer any enemy to oppose, returned to Scipio at Tarraco, and informed him, that the war was entirely terminated.

Some time after, L. Scipio arrived at Rome, whither his brother sent him with a great number of illustrious prisoners, with the news of Spain's being totally reduced. This spread universal joy throughout the city. The wisdom and valour of that young Hero was extolled to the skies. But as to himself, insatiable of glory, he considered all he had hitherto done but as a slight sketch of the great enterprizes he meditated. Intent on the design of carrying the war to the walls of Carthage, he judged it necessary to concert some intelligence and support in Africa.

Liv. xxviii.
17, 18.
App. Bell.
His. 271.

Syphax reigned then in the best part of Numidia, over the People called Masæsyli. He was a powerful Prince, but one who piqued himself but little in point of faith and constancy to his engagements. He had formerly entered into a treaty of alliance and amity with the two Scipios, father and uncle of him we are now speaking; and afterwards he had gone over again to the party of the Carthaginians. Scipio, who believed he should have occasion for him in order to succeed in his great design, endeavoured to regain him, and sent Lælius to him with considerable presents. Syphax did not wait much pressing. He saw at this time the affairs of the Romans prosperous on all sides; and,

and, on the contrary, those of the Carthaginians declining continually both in Spain and Italy. He however declared, he would conclude nothing but with the Roman General in person. Lælius returned, having only made Syphax engage for the safety of Scipio's person, in case he should determine to come to him.

That Prince's amity was of the last importance to Scipio's views upon Africa. He was the most opulent King of the country. He had already been at war with the Carthaginians. His dominions were very commodiously situated in respect to Spain, from which they were only separated by an arm of the sea narrow enough. Scipio judged that such an advantage was well worth exposing himself even to a considerable danger, and without hesitating set out from Carthagera with two ships, in order to have an interview with Syphax. At the same time Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, the Carthaginian General, who had lately been reduced to abandon Spain, retired to the same Prince with seven ships. He was in the port, when he perceived the two Roman galleys out at sea. He took some pains in order to attack them. But the wind, which blew hard, having soon brought Scipio into the port, Asdrubal did not dare to insult him, and thought of nothing but going to Syphax, whither Scipio soon followed him.

Syphax was highly pleased to see court made to him by two Generals of the two most powerful States of the Universe, who came in one day to demand his aid and alliance. He invited them both to lodge in his palace. He even took pains to persuade them to terminate all their differences by an interview. But Scipio excused himself, by declaring, that he had no personal interests to adjust with Asdrubal, nor any powers for treating of affairs of state with an enemy. However, at the King's request, he consented to eat with Asdrubal, and even to lie upon the same bed with him.

Scipio's conversation had so many beauties, and his address in giving the bent to people's minds was so

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

great, that, during the entertainment, he not only charmed Syphax, a Barbarian Prince, and the more easy to win by a politeness and complacency entirely new to him, but even Asdrubal, the inveterate enemy of the Romans, and of Scipio in particular. That Carthaginian owned afterwards, that this conversation had given him an higher idea of Scipio than all his victories. He added, that he did not doubt, but that Syphax and his kingdom would for the future be entirely devoted to the Romans ; such wonderful art had Scipio to insinuate, and gain the confidence of all those with whom he treated !

But another thought engrossed Asdrubal, and gave him the most cruel anxiety. “ He rightly perceived, that it was not for the sake of diverting himself along the coasts of the sea, nor to gratify his curiosity, that a captain of such great reputation had come to Africa with two galleys, abandoning his troops in a province newly conquered, and had exposed himself in an enemy’s country to the discretionary faith of a Prince, upon which he had no great reason to rely. That the end of this voyage undoubtedly was the design Scipio had formed to attack Africa. He knew, that General had long meditated that conquest, and openly asked, why as Hannibal had the boldness to carry the war into the heart of Italy, Scipio should not go, and make it at the gates of Carthage ? ” He concluded, from all these reasonings, that the Carthaginians for the future were not to think of recovering Spain, but of preserving Africa ; and he was not mistaken.

It might be asked, whether it was consistent with prudence in Scipio to undertake the voyage of which we are speaking, and to expose himself without necessity to all the dangers which might result from it. Some moments sooner, Asdrubal might have seized his person : and what a misfortune would that have been to Rome ! Neither did he hazard less in respect to Syphax, a Prince, who was not a slave to his engagements, and actually the ally of the Carthaginians, and who seeing himself master of the person of their
most

most formidable enemy, might very naturally be tempted to deliver him up to them. We shall see Fabius in the sequel reproach him with this action as rash, and contrary to rules. But the authority of Fabius, who was extremely prejudiced against Scipio, ought not to be of any great weight here. For my part, I dare not venture to determine in such a doubtful case: and must leave that to the reader. If the event is to determine in such a case, the answer were easy: but the wise Fabius observes, that events teach only fools: *Eventus stultorum magister est*. However it be, Scipio had no reason to repent his voyage, and did not return into Spain, till after having made a league offensive and defensive with Syphax against the Carthaginians. Having re embarked on board of his galleys, he returned in four days to the port of Carthage; and immediately applied to the affairs of the province.

A. R. 54⁶.
Ant. C.
206.

Liv. xvii.
39.

The Romans, indeed, had nothing farther to fear from the Carthaginians in Spain: but there were still some cities, whose inhabitants remembering the animosity they had evidenced against the Romans, remained quiet only through fear, and not inclination. The greatest, as well as the most criminal, were Illiturgis and Castulon. The latter, after having been the ally of the Romans in the time of their prosperity, had quitted them for the Carthaginians, soon after the defeat of the Scipios and their armies. The people of Illiturgis had even signalized their revolt by egregious cruelty, in massacring such of the Romans, as, after the loss of the battle, had come to take refuge amongst them. Scipio, as soon as he came to Spain, well knew what those people had deserved: but to punish them was not proper then. Now when the tranquility of Spain was reinstated, he thought it time to take vengeance of the guilty.

Accordingly having made L. Marcius come to him from Tarraco, he ordered him to besiege Castulon with the third part of his troops; and he moved himself with the rest of the army against Illiturgis, where

Liv. xxviii.
19, 20.
App. Bell.
His. 272.

A.R. 546. he arrived after five days march, attended by Lælius.
 Ant. C. 206. The inhabitants, instructed beforehand by the reproaches of their consciences of what they had to fear, had made all the necessary preparations for a good defence. Convinced that they could not escape punishments and death, they were determined to sell their lives dear. This resolution had been generally taken in the place. Men and women, old and young, all were soldiers. Fury and despair served them instead of courage, and rendered all exhortations superfluous. The besieged defended themselves with so much ardour, that this army, which had subjected Spain, had more than once the shame of being repulsed far from the walls by the burghers of a single city. Scipio apprehending, that this bad success might discourage his troops, and increase the boldness of the enemy, thought it incumbent upon him to share in the danger. For this reason, after having reproached the soldiers with their want of vigour, he caused scaling ladders to be brought, and declared, that he would mount in person to attack the place, if others refused to do so. He was already at the bottom of the wall, when all the soldiers, terrified with the danger to which they saw their General exposed, cried out with one voice to him to retire; and at the same time planted their ladders in several places at once, and went up them with great intrepidity.

Lælius on his side did not push the attack with less ardour. It was then, that the besieged began to lose courage, and those who defended the walls having been beat off, the Romans made themselves masters of them immediately. The citadel at the same time, in effect of the tumult excited in the city, was taken on the very side supposed impregnable, some African deserters, who served in the Roman army, having climbed with abundance of difficulty to the top of the rock, by ways that seemed impracticable.

The slaughter was horrible, and then was seen what rage, hatred, and revenge, are capable of doing. No body thought of taking prisoners or plunder, though the

the effects of the inhabitants were at the discretion of the foldiers. The victors put all to the fword that came in their way, and killed indifferently men and women, old and young, even to infants at the breast. They afterwards fet fire to the houfes, and deftroyed all that efcapèd the flames, fo inveterate were they to obliterate the leaft trace of a city that had made itfelf fo deteftable to them.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

Scipio marched his army from thence to Caftulon, which was defended not only by the Spaniards of the place, but by fome Carthaginian troops, the remains of Afdrubal's army, who had fled thither. The news of the taking and deftroying of Illiturgis had preceded the arrival of Scipio, and filled the place with terror and defpair. As the cafe of the Carthaginians, who were within it, was different from that of the inhabitants, and every one thought only of his own intereft without regard to thofe of others, their mutual diftruff foon degenerated into open difcord. The befieged delivered up Himilco, the Carthaginian commander, with his troops, and the city to Scipio. This victory was lefs bloody than the former: and indeed the inhabitants of Caftulon were lefs criminal than thofe of Illiturgis, and their voluntary furrender had very much appeafed the rage of the Romans.

After this expedition Marcius was detached to reduce fuch of the Barbarians as were not entirely fubjected under the power of the Romans; and Scipio returned to Carthagera, in order to thank the Gods for the advantages he had obtained by their protection, and to celebrate Games there and exhibit combats of Gladiators, for which he had caufed preparations to be made, in honour of his father and uncle.

He ufed in thefe combats neither flaves, nor mercenaries accuftomed to traffic with their blood, but all persons, who voluntarily offered themfelves, and without any motive of intereft. Some had been fent to him by the country, who were glad of an occafion to make known the valour of their fubjects: fome came of themfelves, to make their court to Scipio:

Liv. xxviii.
21.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
296.

others out of bravado and through emulation had either given or accepted challenges, in consequence of which they fought. There were some who agreed to decide quarrels by the sword, which they either could not, or would not, determine otherwise. Amongst these were persons of illustrious rank, as Corbis and Orsua two cousin-germans, who agreed to decide their disputed right to the principality of the city of Ibis by the sword. Corbis was the eldest: but Orsua was the son of the last possessor; to whom the elder brother had bequeathed that sovereignty at his death. Scipio endeavoured to accommodate the affair amicably, and to reconcile them: but they declared, that their nearest relations had already made them the same proposal, which they would not hearken to; and that they would acknowledge no other arbiter of their difference but the god Mars. The fury with which they fought, chusing rather to die than to be in subjection to each other, was at once an affecting spectacle to the army, and a lesson highly proper to intimate how great an evil the desire of reigning is amongst mankind. The eldest was victorious, and remained peaceable possessor of the city. The battles of the Gladiators were followed by funeral games as magnificent as they could be in the province and in a camp.

Liv. xxviii.
22. 23.
Ann. Bell.
Hisp. 273.

In the mean time Scipio's lieutenants acted conformably to his orders in the places to which he had sent them. Marcius having passed the river Bœtis, received two opulent cities by capitulation, without having been obliged to employ the force of arms. It was not the same at Astapa. The Roman army having approached that place in order to attack it, the inhabitants, who knew that, by their depredations and murders committed in cold blood, they had incensed the Romans against them to such a degree, that they had no pardon to hope; and besides, relying little upon the goodness of their walls, or the force of their arms, they formed a strange and savage resolution against themselves. They piled up in the middle of the public place the richest of their moveables, with all their gold

gold and silver, placed their wives and children upon the top of them, and surrounded the whole with dry and immediately combustible wood. They afterwards ordered fifty of their strongest young men, well armed, to guard in this place, as long as the success of the battle should be doubtful, both their treasures, and the persons infinitely dearer to them; and when they should perceive, that all hopes were lost, to set fire to the pile, and to leave nothing confided to their care upon which the enemy could exercise their fury. That as to themselves, if they could not save the city, nor avoid being overcome, they would all perish in battle. They added the most horrid imprecations against those, whom want of courage, or the hope of saving their lives, should prevent from executing this design.

After having taken these measures, they suddenly opened the gates of the city, and charged the Romans with the utmost fury. Such a sally was not expected. Some squadrons, with the light-armed, quitted the camp that moment to meet them: but they were vigorously repulsed, and the Romans had been obliged to fight near their intrenchments, if the main body of the legions had not drawn up in battle as soon as possible, and marched against the enemy. Upon that the people of Astapa, throwing themselves desperately into the midst of arms and wounds, put the front ranks of the Roman infantry into disorder for some time. But those old soldiers opposing a determinate bravery to the boldness and temerity of those furious people, by the slaughter of the foremost quelled the violence of those that followed them. Seeing however that none gave way, and that being determined on death, they suffered themselves to be killed, without quitting their posts, they opened in the centre, as it was easy to do in effect of their great number, and having surrounded the enemy in the middle, they obliged them to close up into an orb, and killed them all together to the last man.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

The murder committed in the city was more horrid. For it was fellow citizens that slaughtered a multitude of women and children, incapable from their sex and tender years to make any defence; and afterwards threw their bodies, most of them still alive, upon a pile purposely set on fire, whilst the flames were almost extinguished by the abundance of blood, that streamed on all sides; and at length, tired with killing, they leaped with their arms into the same flames, to be consumed with their own people, whom they had massacred in so deplorable a manner.

Every thing was executed when the Romans entered the place; who at first were struck with horror and astonishment at so dreadful a sight. But, presently after, when they perceived the gold and silver glittering through the other things, which the fire was destroying, their natural avidity had its effect. They threw themselves so eagerly into the middle of the flames to take out those valuable things, that several perished in them, and others were much hurt by the smoke and steam, those who were foremost not having it in their power to fall back, because they were pushed on by those behind them, who were desirous to share in the booty. Thus the city of Astapa was entirely consumed by fire and sword, without the soldiery being able to make any advantage of the plunder.

Marcus had no farther occasion to use force for reducing all the rest of the country, and having entirely restored tranquility by the terror of his arms alone, he led back his victorious troops to Carthagera, where Scipio expected him.

I do not know that history has a more terrible example of the fury and rage, to which despair can drive mankind: the odium of it is not to be ascribed to the Romans; the enemy, with whom they had to deal, being obstinately determined to die, and neither to ask nor receive quarter.

Liv. xxviii.
23.

At the same time, deserters came from Cadiz, who offered Scipio to deliver up that city, with the Carthaginian garrison, and the General who commanded it.

it. Mago had retired thither after his defeat, and having drawn together some ships upon the ocean, had received some supplies from the coasts of Africa beyond the Straits, and from the nearest quarters in Spain, by the assistance of Hanno, a Carthaginian officer. Scipio accepted the promise of the deserters, and gave them his own; and having sent them back, he made Marcius set out with a body of troops to attack Cadiz by land; whilst Lælius, in concert with him, was to act against that city by sea with seven galleys of three, and one of five benches of oars.

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Ant. C.
206.

Scipio in the mean time was taken very ill, and rumour made his sickness much more dangerous than it really was, as it usually happens through the natural propensity of mankind to exaggerate and magnify what they hear with new circumstances. The whole province, and especially the most distant quarters, were filled with trouble and confusion in effect of this news compounded of true and false: and we may perceive what consequence the reality of that General's death would have had, as a groundless rumour of it was attended with such dreadful effects. The allies became unfaithful, and the soldiers seditious. Mandonius and Indibilis, having made their subjects and a great number of Celtiberians take arms, made incursions into the territories of the allies of the Roman people. But the most unhappy circumstance of this revolt was, that even the Roman citizens themselves forgot their duty to their country.

Liv. xxviii.
24—29.
App. Bell.
Hisp. 273.
—275.

Near Sucro there was a body of eight thousand Romans, who had been made to encamp there, in order to awe the people on that side of the Iberus. Those troops had begun to mutiny, before the news of Scipio's illness had spread. Long ease, as usually happens, had insensibly produced licentiousness. Accustomed, during the war, to live at large in the enemy's country, they suffered themselves with great reluctance to be kept within bounds in time of peace. At first they only murmured in secret. "If there be still any enemies in the province," said these soldiers, "why

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Ant. C.
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“ why do they keep us in a country at peace, where we stay with our arms a-cross in a state of inaction. Or, if the war be terminated, why don't they let us return to Italy ?” The news of Scipio's sickness, followed immediately with the rumour of his death, exceedingly increased their bad disposition. They demanded their pay with more insolence than became well-disciplined soldiers. Upon the guards they were so insolent as to insult the tribunes, when they walked the rounds, and many went out to maraud in the neighbouring villages, whose inhabitants were allies of the Romans. And lastly, in open day, and without regard to orders, they quitted their colours, and went where they pleased, without asking permission of their officers. They had no longer any regard in the camp either to the laws of war, or the authority of the officers: the caprice and will of the soldiers were their sole rule and director.

They however still retained an appearance of a Roman camp, solely with the hope of rendering their tribunes the accomplices of their sedition and disorder. With this thought, they suffered a council of war to assemble in the great parade, they gave the watchword, and kept guard in their turns as usual. Thus, though they had in reality entirely thrown off the yoke, they however made it a law to themselves to retain the outside of obedient soldiers. But at length, when they perceived that their tribunes disapproved their conduct, that they were determined to reform it, and refused to join in the revolt, and enter into their conspiracy, they no longer observed any measures, and the sedition broke out openly. They drove their officers out of the camp, and unanimously transferred the command to two private soldiers, the authors of the sedition, who were C. Albius of Calæ, and C. Atrius of Umbria. These two insolent persons did not content themselves with the ensigns of legionary Tribunes; they had the impudence to assume the marks of supreme power, and to cause the rods and axes to be carried before them; without

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considering, that the superb equipage they employed for keeping others in respect and awe, would soon be the instruments of the punishment their crime had deserved.

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Ant. C.
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The mutineers expected every moment couriers with the news of Scipio's funeral. But several days having passed without any confirmation of the report of his death, they began to enquire out the first authors of it, every one shifting it from himself, and chusing rather to seem to have believed too lightly the news, than to have invented it. It was then that the ringleaders of the mutiny, seeing themselves no longer supported with the same ardour as had been expressed at first, began to look on the Fasces, which they had foolishly assumed, with terror, and to tremble at the effects of a legitimate authority, upon the point of letting fall upon them the whole weight of a just vengeance.

The sedition was now, if not extinguished, at least much damped, when couriers, upon whom they might rely, brought advice, first that Scipio was alive, and next, that he was absolutely out of danger. Soon after, seven legionary tribunes, sent by Scipio, arrived in the camp. The sight of these officers at first incensed the soldiers, but their obliging and familiar behaviour, attended with an air of kindness and good will, soon made every body quiet. They intruded themselves into the knots of soldiers discoursing together, and shared in the conversation; and without reproaching them in the least with their past conduct, they only seemed curious to be informed of the occasion of their discontent and alarms. The soldiers complained of not having been paid upon the fixt days. They added, that it was by their valour the glory of the Roman name had been preserved, as well as the province, which the deaths of the two Scipios, and the defeat of their armies, had exposed to the utmost danger. The Tribunes replied, that their complaints were just, and their demands reasonable; and that they should not fail to inform the General of them. That they were infinitely pleased, that nothing worse
had

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had happened; that it was easy to give them satisfaction: that Scipio and the commonwealth were in a condition, and intended, to bestow upon their services and valour the rewards they had deserved.

Scipio was at no loss when the question was to make war; that was his trade: but never having experienced sedition before, it gave him some difficulty. He was terrified with excesses in his army, that left no room for clemency: and he was afraid of carrying severity too far. He resolved to act with prudence and moderation, as he had already begun. In order to this, he sent those to the tributary cities who collected the revenues of the commonwealth; and that gave the soldiers hopes that they should immediately be paid their arrears. Some days after, he published a decree, by which they were commanded to come to Carthage to receive their pay, separately by companies, or altogether, if they chose it. The sedition was already much weakened: but when it was known that the people of Spain, who had taken arms, had laid them down, it was entirely extinguished. For Mandonius and Indibilis had no sooner received advice that Scipio was in perfect health, than they abandoned their enterprize, and returned into their countries. In effect, there was neither Roman, nor stranger, that the Soldiers of Sucro could associate in their revolt.

After many reflexions, they made the only choice that offered; which was to put their fate into the hands of their General, whether he thought fit to use a just rigour in respect to them, or should incline to clemency, of which they did not entirely despair. "They represented to themselves, that he had frequently pardoned enemies conquered by the force of arms: that in their sedition there had not been a single sword drawn, nor a drop of blood shed. That having been far from carrying their crime to the last excess, they did not deserve to be treated with the excess of rigour." They flattered themselves with these thoughts, according to the natural propensity

of mankind to palliate and excuse their faults. They were only in doubt whether they should go for their pay all together, or by separate companies. They chose to do what they thought safest, which was not to separate.

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Ant. C.
206.

Scipio on his side deliberated on the conduct it was necessary to observe in respect to them. Some were for confining the punishment to the ringleaders, who were about thirty-five: others believed so criminal a sedition required a more general punishment. The opinion for lenity prevailed. At the breaking up of the council, the soldiers who were in Carthage, were ordered to hold themselves in a readiness to march against the revolted Spaniards, and to provide subsistence for several days. And it was given out, that the council lately held was upon this expedition.

When the rebels were near Carthage, they were informed, that all the troops Scipio had in that city, were to set out under the command of Silanus. This news did not only deliver them from the dread and anxiety the remembrance of their crime gave them, but occasioned great joy amongst them. They imagined, that their General was upon the point of remaining alone with them, and that they should be more in a condition to give him law, than to receive it from him. They entered the city towards the close of the day, and saw the troops of Carthage making all preparations for their departure.

During the night, those who were to be punished were seized. Good measures were taken to do it without noise. Towards the end of the night, the baggage of the army, which, as it was pretended, was to set out, began its march. At the break of day the troops advanced out of the city, but stopped at the gate, and guards were posted at all the other gates, to prevent any one whatsoever from coming out.

After these precautions, those who arrived the night before came to the assembly, to which they had been summoned, with an air of haughtiness and arrogance, as people who by their cries were upon the point

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point of giving the General terror, and far from fearing any thing from him. Scipio then ascended his tribunal; and at that instant the troops who had been made to march out of the city, having re-entered under arms, surrounded the unarmed soldiers assembled round their General, as was their custom. At that moment all their insolence forsook them, as they owned afterwards; and what terrified them most, was the vigour and healthy look of Scipio, whom they expected to find languid and weak with long sickness, and a visage more fierce and enraged than they had observed him to have in the day of battle. He continued sitting for some time without saying any thing, till he was informed that the authors of the sedition had been carried to the public place, and that all things were ready.

Then causing silence to be made by a Licitor, he spoke in terms to this effect: “ I never thought, that
“ when I was to speak to my soldiers, I could have
“ been at a loss for what to say. However, at this
“ time, both thoughts and expressions fail me. I do
“ not know what name to give you. Shall I call you
“ citizens; you, who have revolted against your
“ country: you, who have thrown off your obedience
“ to your General’s authority, and violated the reli-
“ gion of the oath in which you had bound yourselves
“ to him? Or shall I call you enemies? You have
“ the outsidcs, the aspects, the habits of citizens:
“ but your actions, language, and conspiracies shew
“ you to be enemies. And accordingly, wherein
“ have your intentions and hopes differed from those
“ of the Spaniards? You are even more criminal,
“ and more frantic than them. For, after all, they
“ followed, as the leaders of their phrenzy, Mando-
“ nius and Indibilis, Princes of the blood royal:
“ whereas you have had the baseness to acknowledge
“ an Atrius and an Albius for your Generals, both
“ the vile, the infamous dregs of the army. Deny that
“ you have had any share in so detestable, so extrava-
“ gant, a design. Affirm, that it was the contri-
“ vance

“ vance of a small number of frantic abandoned
 “ wretches. I shall be glad to believe you ; and it is
 “ my interest so to do.

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 Ant. C.
 206.

“ As to me, after having driven the Carthaginians
 “ out of Spain, I did not imagine, considering the
 “ conduct I have observed, that there was a single
 “ place in the whole province, where my life was
 “ hateful, or a single man that could desire my death.
 “ How much was I deceived in this hope ! The mo-
 “ ment the report of my death spread in my camp,
 “ my soldiers, my own soldiers, not only heard it with
 “ indifference, but even expected the confirmation of
 “ it with impatience. I am far from thinking, that
 “ the whole army thought in the same manner. If I
 “ believed that, I could no longer support a life be-
 “ come so odious to all my country, and to all my
 “ soldiers, and should sacrifice it here before your
 “ eyes.

“ But not to speak of what concerns me : Let us
 “ suppose, that you believed my death with more pre-
 “ cipitation than joy, and that I did not deserve your
 “ attachment and fidelity so much as I imagined ; what
 “ had your country done to you, that you should be-
 “ tray it by joining Mandonius and Indibilis ? What
 “ had the Roman people done to you, that you should
 “ turn your arms against them ? What injury had
 “ you received from them, to deserve such a revenge ?
 “ What ! did your not being paid a few days, during
 “ the illness of your General, seem a sufficient reason
 “ for violating all laws human and divine ? In for-
 “ mer times, an unjust sentence and an unhappy ba-
 “ nishment induced Coriolanus to besiege Rome. But
 “ the respect alone that he owed his mother, wrested
 “ his arms out of his hands, and obliged him to re-
 “ nounce his enterprize.

“ And after all, what was the end of yours ; and
 “ what advantage did you expect from so frantic and
 “ criminal a conspiracy ? Were you in hopes of de-
 “ priving the Roman people of the possession of Spain,
 “ and

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“ and of making yourselves masters of it? But,
“ should I have died, would the Commonwealth have
“ ended with my life? Would the sovereignty of the
“ Roman people have expired with me? May the
“ Gods forbid, that the duration of a State, founded
“ under their auspices to subsist eternally, should be-
“ come equal, and be limited, to that of a frail and
“ perishable body like mine. The Roman people
“ have survived the loss of Paulus Æmilius, Marcel-
“ lus, the two Scipios (my father and uncle) and the
“ many illustrious Generals who have perished in the
“ same war; and will survive a thousand others, whom
“ the sword or disease may carry off. You certainly
“ lost all reason and sense, when you abandoned your
“ duty; and you can be considered only as people
“ seized with phrenzy and distraction.

“ But let all that is past be buried, if possible, in
“ eternal oblivion, or at least in profound silence. For
“ my part, I shall reproach you with it no more: and
“ may you forget, as entirely I shall, the excesses you
“ have ran into. As to what regards you in general,
“ if you repent of your crime, I am satisfied. As to
“ Albius, Atrius, and the other wretches, who have
“ corrupted you, they shall expiate their crime with
“ their blood. If you have recovered the use of your
“ reason, their punishment will not only give no pain,
“ but even be agreeable to you: for they have wrong-
“ ed none so much as you.”

As soon as Scipio had done, all that was capable of giving terror to their souls was exhibited, as had been concerted, to their eyes and ears. The soldiers of the other army, who had surrounded the assembly, began to strike their swords upon their shields, and at the same instant, the voice of the herald, summoning those who had been condemned, into the council. After having been divested of their cloaths, they were dragged into the middle of the assembly, and the instruments of their punishment were immediately brought out. Whilst they were fastening to stakes, whipt with rods, and their heads were cut off, their

accomplices remained without motion, and so struck with dread, that not a single complaint, nor so much as a groan, escaped them.

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Ant. C.
206.

The executed bodies were afterwards removed from the middle of the place, which care was taken to cleanse; and the soldiers having all been called one after another, took a new oath in Scipio's name to the Tribunes, and at the same instant all their arrears were paid them.

Something would have been wanting to Scipio's glory, if his address in giving the due bent of mind, and his ability in transacting the most delicate affairs, qualities absolutely necessary in government, had not been put to a trial. The affair of which I am speaking, that is to say, the open revolt of a body of eight thousand men, was one of great difficulty. To treat an whole army with excessive rigour was improper; and such a crime ought not to pass unpunished. Rigour and indulgence in excess, were equally dangerous. Accordingly our General took the wise mean between those two extremes, by making the punishment fall only upon a few of the most criminal, and pardoning all the rest; but after a reprimand the more lively and sensible, as it was tempered with mildness and lenity, and seemed only strong in effect of reason and truth. We have seen, and admired, the precautions which he took to enable himself to perform so terrible an execution without any danger or risque. It, no doubt, cost Scipio's good heart abundance of pain; and we shall presently see him explain himself upon that head. A General does not resolve to cut off and destroy some mortified members, but with intent to save the whole body. According to Plato, quoted by * Seneca, the wise man does not punish, because men have offended; for the past is not susceptible of

* Nam, ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim præterita non possunt: futura prohibentur; & quos volet nequitiae malè cedentis exempla fieri, palam occidet, non tantum ut pereant ipsi, sed ut alios pereundo deterreant. SENECA. De Ira, l. 16.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

correction; but that they may not transgress for the future: and this is effected by exemplary punishment, which prevents others from falling into the like misfortune. All this requires great wisdom; and we must allow, it appears here evidently in the conduct of Scipio. Thus terminated the revolt of Sucro.

S E C T. II.

Ineffectual attempt of Lælius and Marcius upon the city of Cadiz. Sea-fight between Lælius and Adherbal in the Straits. Lælius and Marcius return to Scipio. That General marches against Mandonius and Indibilis, and defeats them entirely. Indibilis sends his brother Mandonius to Scipio, who pardons them. Interview of Scipio and Masinissa. Mago receives orders to join Hannibal in Italy. He makes an ineffectual attempt upon Carthagenà. He returns to Cadiz, where they shut the gates against him. Mago goes to the islands Balears. Cadiz surrenders to the Romans. Scipio returns to Rome. He is created Consul. Deputation from the people of Saguntum to the Romans. Dispute concerning Scipio's design of carrying the war into Africa. Fabius's discourse against Scipio. Scipio's answer to Fabius. Reflection upon the discourse of Fabius. Scipio, after some suspense, refers the affair to the Senate, who give him permission to go to Africa. Fabius opposes Scipio's enterprize, as much as possible. Wonderful zeal of the allies for the latter. He sets out for Sicily, and his colleague for Bruttium. Mago lands in Italy, and seizes Genoa.

Liv. xxviii.
30.

LET us now go back to Lælius and Marcius, who had set out, as we said above, the first with a squadron of eight ships, and the latter by land to besiege Cadiz, of which they expected to make themselves masters easily, in effect of a secret correspondence carried on by the Romans in the place. They were deceived in their hopes. Mago, who was then

in the place, had discovered the conspiracy, seized all the accomplices, and made the Prætor Adherbal carry them to Carthage. The latter, in consequence, having put them on board a galley of five benches of oars, made it set out foremost, because it was the heaviest, and followed it close with eight galleys of three benches. When the galley of five benches entered the Straits, Lælius, quitting the port of Carteia with a galley of the same burthen, and followed by seven others of three benches, vigorously attacked Adherbal and his ships. The action began immediately, but had no resemblance of a sea-fight. The dexterity of the pilots, the efforts of the rowers, and the orders of the commanders were all useless. The rapidity of the current in these straits solely determined all the operations of the fight, and carried away the galleys sometimes to one side and sometimes to the other. However, in the midst of this disorder and confusion, the quinqueremis of the Romans sank two triremes of the enemy, and broke all the oars on one side of a third, along side of which it passed with impetuosity. It would have treated all the rest in the same manner, if Adherbal, with the five that remained, had not got out to the main sea with the help of his sails.

Lælius returned victorious to Carteia, where he was informed of all that had happened at Cadiz: that the conspiracy had been discovered, that the conspirators had been sent to Carthage, and that the officer had entirely miscarried. Seeing that no farther hope remained of its succeeding, he wrote to L. Marcius, that the only choice they had to make was to return to their General: which both did some days after, and rejoined Scipio at Carthage.

Their departure delivered Mago from great uneasiness; and the news he heard of the revolt of the Illergetes, made him conceive a great design. He sent deputies to the Senate of Carthage, who, exaggerating exceedingly the revolt of the Illergetes, and the sedition that had happened in the Roman camp, concluded,

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cluded, that aids should be sent to Mago, adding, that by that means, he flattered himself with re-instating the Carthaginians in the possession of Spain, which they had received from their ancestors.

Mandonius and Indibilis being returned into their country, remained quiet some time, expecting to hear what the Roman General could do in respect to the sedition, and not despairing, if the citizens were pardoned, to obtain the same grace themselves. But, when they were informed of the rigour with which the guilty had been punished, they concluded, that they should not be treated with less severity themselves. For this reason, having made their subjects take arms again, and having drawn together the auxiliary troops, which they had before, with an army of twenty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, they entered the country of the * Sedetani, where they had incamped in the beginning of the sedition. We find, that they soon after repassed the Iberus, and returned into their own dominions.

Liv. xxviii.
31, 34.

Scipio having easily regained the affection of his soldiers, both by paying them their arrears without regard to guilty or innocent, and the good reception he gave them all indiscriminately, thought it incumbent on him to speak to them, before he led them against the enemy. He therefore assembled the army, and after having expressed himself warmly against the revolt and perfidy of the rebel Princes, he added, "That he was going to set out in order to revenge their crime with dispositions highly different from those he had when it was necessary for him to bring over citizens to their duty, who had departed from it. That it had been to him like tearing his own entrails, to see himself reduced to expiate, by the death of thirty wretched men, a fault, whether of imprudence or malignity, that affected eight thousand soldiers; and that that execution had cost

* This people inhabited the southern part of Arragon, on this side of the Iberus.

many tears and groans. But that at present he was going with express intent to shed the guilty blood of a foreign nation, which, through detestable perfidy, had lately broke through the only ties between them and him, that is to say, those of faith and alliance. That, as to his army, besides its being composed only of citizens and Latin allies, he saw with pleasure, that there was scarce any soldiers in it, who had not been brought out of Italy into Spain either by his uncle Cn. Scipio, his father, or himself. That the name of Scipio was dear to them; that they had all been accustomed to fight under their auspices; that on his side, he was in hopes of leading them back to Rome to share in the triumph they had acquired him by their valour; and that he also flattered himself, that when he should stand for the Consulship, they would interest themselves as much for him, as if the honour of the whole army were in question. That, as to the expedition they were going upon, they must forget their past exploits, if they considered it as a real war. That the Illergetes, against whom they were to march, were to be regarded as robbers, who were fit only for pillaging lands, burning houses, and driving off the cattle of their neighbours: that when the question was to fight in order of battle, they placed their whole resource, not in the force of their arms, but the lightness of their heels. That therefore, with the protection of the Gods, they should follow him to punish rashness and perfidy."

He dismissed them after this discourse, giving them orders to hold themselves in readiness to march the next day. Accordingly, he set out as he had said, and in ten days arrived upon the banks of the Iberus. He passed that river without loss of time, and after four more days march, incamped in sight of the enemy. The rebels were drawn into an ambuscade first, and defeated with great loss. This blow only served to irritate them; and the next morning they appeared in order of battle. The action passed in a valley not

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Ant. C.
206.

very spacious. The Spaniards were entirely defeated. Their cavalry, and two-thirds of their foot, were cut in pieces. The other third, which had not acted in the battle, because the ground was too narrow, escaped from the victors with the two Princes, who were the authors of the revolt. The Romans made themselves masters of the enemy's camp, where they took three thousand prisoners, besides the plunder of all kinds which fell into their hands. They lost on this occasion, twelve hundred men, both citizens and allies, and had above three thousand wounded. The victory had not been so bloody, if the battle had been fought on a more extensive ground, and one from which it had been easier to fly.

Liv. xxviii.
34.

Indibilis renouncing a war in which he had been so unsuccessful, believed in the bad state of his affairs, that he had not a more assured resource than in Scipio's clemency, of which he had already made an happy trial. He therefore sent his brother Mandonius, who having prostrated himself at the victor's feet, "ascribed all that had passed to an unhappy fatality, which had every where diffused the poisonous contagion of revolt, and had infected, in a manner against their wills, not only the Illergetes and Lacedæmonians, but the Romans themselves. That after the crime they had committed, himself, his brother, and all their subjects, had absolutely determined either to resign to Scipio, if he required it, the lives they held from his goodness, or to devote the rest of them to his service, if he was so generous to preserve them a second time. That they entirely submitted their fate to the victor, and expected nothing but what his mercy should vouchsafe them."

Scipio, after having warmly reproached as well the present as the absent brother with their perfidy, added, "That they had merited death by their crime, but that his goodness, and that of the Roman people, gave them their lives. That he should not disarm them, as it was usual to treat revolted States, it not being necessary to take that precaution against a re-

volt he did not fear. That he would neither exact hostages from them to secure their fidelity, because, if they failed in it, his indignation should fall upon them, and not upon the innocent. That having experienced what the lenity and wrath of the Roman People could do, it was for them to chuse the one or the other, and whether they had rather have them for friends or enemies."

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

After having spoke thus to Mandonius, he dismissed him, demanding of him only a certain sum, which he intended for the payment of his troops. As for himself, after having ordered Marcius to march into Hispania Ulterior, and to wait for him there, and sent Silanus back to Tarraco, he continued some time in the same place; to receive from the Illergetes the money he had demanded of them: after which he rejoined Marcius, at no great distance from the ocean, with great diligence.

Various reasons had successively deferred the negotiation between Scipio and Masinissa, because that prince would treat only with the General in person. This obliged Scipio at that time to undertake so long a journey, that removed him so far from the province of Tarraco, where he intended to embark in order to return to Rome. Masinissa was at Cadiz. As soon as he was informed by Marcius of Scipio's arrival, to have a pretext for removing, he told Mago, that his horses were destroyed by remaining in the island, that they were a great burthen to the inhabitants, at the same time that they suffered much themselves from the general scarcity of provisions; besides which, that a long inaction had enervated his troops. By these remonstrances, he induced the Carthaginian General to permit him to go to the continent, to ravage the adjacent countries of the Spaniards. From thence, he sent three of the principal Numidians to Scipio, to settle the time and place for an interview, with orders to two of them to remain with him as hostages. The third was sent back to Masinissa, to

Liv. xxviii.
35.
App. 275.

A. R. 546. bring him to the place assigned by Scipio, and they
 Ant. C. both repaired thither attended only by a small train.
 206.

The Numidian prince had already conceived an high idea of Scipio's merit from the rumour only of his great exploits; and had formed to himself the image of an hero in his person. But the sight of him rose much upon his imagination, and exceedingly increased the esteem and veneration with which he was already prejudiced in favour of Scipio. * And in effect, the noble and majestic air which he naturally had, was exalted by the length and beauty of his hair, and the manly and military choice of his dress, which had nothing affected, or that favoured of luxury, in it. Besides which, he was then in the vigour of life, and the healthy plight of body he had recovered after a long and dangerous illness, had in a manner renewed the flower of youth in him, which still exalted his figure. Masinissa, struck with astonishment at the first sight of him, began by returning him thanks for sending him back his nephew without ransom. He assured him, "that from thenceforth he had ardently desired the occasion of an interview with him, and that he had seized it with joy, the moment the goodness of the Gods had made it practicable. That he passionately desired to do him and the Roman people such services, as never foreign Prince had rendered them before. That though he had always had that desire, hitherto he had not had it in his power to put it in execution in Spain, which, in respect to him, was an unknown and foreign country: but that he assured himself, he should be able to effect it in his native land Africa, where by the right of birth he was called to the throne. That if the Romans would send Scipio thither at the head of an army, he was certain, that the power of Carthage would soon be at an end."

* Præterquam quòd suapte naturâ multa majestas inerat, adornabat promissa cæsaries, habitusque corporis, non cultus munditiis, sed virilis verè ac militaris; & ætas in medio virium robore, quod plenius nitidiusque ex morbo velut renovatus flos juventæ faciebat.
 Liv.

This interview and discourse gave Scipio great joy. He knew that Masinissa and his Numidians formed the whole strength of the enemy's cavalry. Besides which, he thought he saw marks of a noble and exalted courage in the visage and eyes of that young Prince. Having given each other their promise, Scipio returned to Tarraco, and Masinissa to Cadiz, after having, in concert with the Romans, carried off some plunder from the adjacent countries, in order that he might not seem to have made an useless voyage to the continent.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

Mago seeing the hope he had founded principally upon the sedition of the Roman soldiers, and afterwards upon the revolt of Indibilis, had vanished, and that the affairs of Spain were absolutely desperate, he prepared to repass into Africa, when he received orders from the Senate of Carthage to repair to Italy with the fleet which he had at Cadiz; to take into his pay as many Gauls and Ligurians as he could, and to go and join Hannibal, in order to keep up the spirit of a war which had been begun with so much ardour, and of which the first successes had been so glorious. In order to execute this command, besides the money that had been sent him from Carthage, he took great sums from Cadiz, having plundered not only the public treasury of that city, but the temples of the Gods, and forced every individual to bring him all the gold and silver they had.

Liv. xxviii.
36.
App. 275.

With these aids he put to sea: as he coasted along Spain, having landed his soldiers at no great distance from Carthagera, he plundered the neighbouring countries, and afterwards made his fleet approach the city itself. There having kept his soldiers in their ships during the day, he made them land in the night, and led them to that part of the wall, by which the Romans had attacked and taken the place, believing that the garrison, which had been left in it, was not sufficiently strong for its defence, and that the inhabitants perhaps, dissatisfied with the present government, might make some commotion, of which he might

Liv. ibid.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

might take the advantage. He was entirely mistaken in his hopes. On the first approach of the Carthaginians, the Romans, having opened the gate of the city, fell upon them with great cries, and having made a great slaughter of them, pursued them as far as the coast.

Mago having re-embarked, went to Cadiz, in order to re-enter it. But not being received, he came to an anchor with his fleet at Cimbis, a small port not far from that place. From thence, he sent deputies into the island, to complain to the inhabitants, that they had shut their gates against him, who was their friend and ally. They laid the blame upon the populace, who, as they said, intended thereby to revenge themselves for some plunder his soldiers had committed before they embarked. He demanded to speak with the principal magistrates. They were no sooner come to him, than he caused them to be crucified after having fayed them with scourges. It was in this manner he treated the chief persons of a city not only in alliance with Carthage, but which had one common origin with it. For Cadiz was also a colony of Tyre. From thence he sailed to the island Pityusa, situated an hundred miles from the Continent, and inhabited at that time by the Phœnicians. His fleet was very well received there; and they supplied him not only with provisions in abundance, but also with men and arms, to make up the loss he had sustained before Carthage.

Liv. xxviii.
37.

Mago sailed afterwards to the islands Baleares fifty miles from thence. There are two islands of that name; now called Majorca and Minorca. The greatest, which was also the most considerable by the number of its inhabitants and soldiers, had a port, where he was in hopes of passing the winter commodiously, into which he was upon the point of entering. But as soon as the Carthaginians approached, the Balearians poured so dreadful a shower of stones upon them, that far from daring to come into the port, they made to sea with the utmost haste. Every body knows, that the Balearians

Balearians were the most expert people in the world at using the sling. They were formed to this exercise from their earliest infancy, and were not suffered to breakfast, till they had hit a mark with the sling. Mago went to the least of these islands, which was fertile enough, but less populous and warlike than the other. Here he was more successful, and raised two thousand auxiliary troops, and having sent them to Carthage to pass the winter, he caused his ships to be drawn on shore. It appears, that it was from this Mago, that the port of Minorca was called Port-Mahon, Portus Magonis. As soon as Mago had abandoned the coasts of the ocean, the people of Cadiz surrendered to the Romans.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206,
Strab. III.
168.

After Scipio had entirely driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, he set sail from thence with ten ships to return to Italy, giving the government of the province to L. Lentulus, and L. Manlius Acidinus, who had been sent thither to command in quality of Proconsuls. The Senate gave him audience without the city in the temple of Bellona, where he related all that he had done in Spain: how many times he had fought in line of battle: how many places he had taken from the enemy, and how many nations he had subjected to the Roman people. He added, that on his arrival in Spain he had found four Generals at the head of four victorious armies, and on quitting it, had not left a single Carthaginian in the whole province. He expressed some desire of a triumph, by way of reward for all these services rendered his country: but he did not insist upon it, because he knew, that hitherto that distinction had been granted only to those, who held some magistracy at the time they had commanded. Now Scipio went to Spain merely as Proconsul, which was not an office. When his audience of the Senate was over, he entered the city; causing fourteen thousand three hundred and forty-two pounds of silver in weight, and a great quantity of coined money to be carried before him, which was put into the public treasury.

A. R. 546.
Ant. C.
206.

L. Veturius Philo afterwards held the assemblies for the creation of Consuls: and all the centuries, with unanimous consent and extraordinary marks of esteem and favour, nominated P. Scipio, and gave him P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, for his colleague. It was remarkable, that this assembly was more numerous than ever had been since the war began. The citizens came thither from all parts, not only to give their suffrages for Scipio, but also to have the pleasure of seeing him. There was an amazing concourse of people round his house. That multitude attended him, when he went to the Capitol to offer the hundred oxen to Jupiter, which he had vowed in Spain to sacrifice after his return. Every body were assured, that, as Lutatius had terminated the first war with Carthage, P. Scipio would terminate the second, and drive the Carthaginians out of Italy, as he had out of Spain. With this view, Africa was allotted him for his province, as if there was no longer any enemies in Italy. They afterwards proceeded to the election of Prætors.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.

P. LICINIUS CRASSUS.

It was in the fourteenth year of the second Punic war that P. Scipio and P. Licinius Crassus took possession of the Consulship. Scipio first proposed to the Senate, and obtained leave, to celebrate the games, which he had engaged to do by a vow at the time the soldiers had revolted in Spain, and to take out of the money he had carried into the public treasury, the sums that were necessary for this expence.

Liv. xxviii.
39.

He then introduced the deputies of Saguntum into the Senate, where the oldest of them began in these terms. " Though it be not possible, Fathers, to add
" any thing to the evils we have suffered in order to
" retain an inviolable fidelity to you, however, after
" the benefits we have received from you and your
" Generals; we shall not complain of our fate." They then

then made a long enumeration of all that had been done for them, first by the two Scipios, and afterwards by him who had lately been elected Consul. “ It is
“ to thank you for these benefits, so great, that we
“ could not have presumed to hope them from the
“ Gods themselves, that the Senate and People of Saguntum have sent us to you ; and at the same time
“ to congratulate you on the glorious successes your
“ arms have had for some years in Spain and Italy ;
“ that in the first, you have pushed your conquests
“ not only to the Iberus, which formerly bounded
“ your dominions, but to the coast of the ocean, that
“ is to the extremities of the earth ; and that in the
“ other you have left Hannibal only the space he occupies with his camp, in which you keep him in a
“ manner besieged. We are ordered not only to render the thanks to great Jupiter, which such great
“ blessings deserve, but also to offer him, with your
“ consent, this crown of gold, and to place it in his
“ temple, in gratitude for the victories he hath
“ granted you over your enemies. We implore you
“ to permit us This, and that you would ratify the
“ benefits we have received from your Generals, with
“ your authority.”

The Senate answered the deputies of Saguntum,
“ That the ruin and re-establishment of Saguntum
would be an authentic proof to all nations of the inviolable fidelity which both people had observed to each other. That the Generals of the Commonwealth, by re-establishing Saguntum, had acted conformably to the desire of the Senate. That they with joy confirmed all the advantages they had granted them, because by acting in that manner they had only conformed to the will of, and executed the orders which they had received from, the Senate. That they permitted them to offer to Jupiter the gift they had brought.” Orders were afterwards given, that the deputies should be lodged and entertained at the expence of the Commonwealth as long as they should continue in their territories, and that each of them should have a present
sent

A. R. 547. sent of ten thousand * Asses. Immediately after the
 Ant. C. Ambassadors of other nations were introduced to the
 205. Senate, and audience was given them. Those of Saguntum having demanded permission to visit as many of the different parts of Italy as they could with safety, guides were assigned them, with letters of recommendation to all the magistrates of the cities to which they should go, with orders to receive them with distinction.

Liv. xxviii. After they had gone through these affairs, which
 40. were of least consequence, they deliberated upon those of the Commonwealth, and principally upon levying of new troops, and the provinces it was proper to assign to the Generals. All the citizens openly allotted Africa to Scipio : and himself, believing that to confine himself to following Hannibal step by step in Italy, was an employment little glorious, and which suited rather an old man worn out with years, than a young and active warrior like him, did not dissemble, that he thought himself elected Consul, not to continue the war, but to terminate it, which he could not execute unless he went to Africa, and carried the terror of the Roman arms to the walls of Carthage. He even was not afraid to make known, that, if the Senate opposed his design, he would spare no pains with the people to obtain that permission.

Liv. xxviii. The principal Senators disapproved this project ;
 40, 42. but most of them dared not explain themselves openly, either through fear of the Consul, or the desire of making their court to him. Fabius Maximus, believing himself above these timid reserves, was the first that opened the opinion contrary to the desires of Scipio. Livy puts the following speech into his mouth. “ I
 “ am sensible, Fathers, that there are many amongst
 “ you, who believe, that the subject of our present
 “ deliberation is an affair already decided, and that it
 “ is lost time to give one’s opinion upon the project of

* Ten thousand asses were worth near five and twenty pounds.

“ making our armies go to Africa this year. But I
“ do not see how any body can think so, as neither
“ the Senate nor People have yet authorized that de-
“ sign: or, if the Consul relies upon the province of
“ Africa as a thing certain, I cannot help saying, that
“ it is on his part not only mocking every Senator in
“ particular, but the whole Senate, to pretend to con-
“ sult it upon a matter already concluded and resolved.

“ I know, that in opposing this extraordinary ardor
“ for going to Africa, I shall infallibly draw two re-
“ flections upon myself. It will be said, in the first
“ place, that such an opinion is the effect of that slow-
“ ness which is pretended natural to me, and which
“ I give young people leave to call timidity and stu-
“ pefaction, provided persons of sense allow, that if
“ the counsels of others have appeared more specious
“ at first, the event hath shewn hitherto, that mine
“ were most solid, and salutary. On another side, I
“ shall perhaps be accused of envying a Consul of
“ great merit, and of being jealous of the glory he
“ acquires every day, of which I am not capable of
“ bearing an increase.

“ But if it does not suffice to exempt me from so
“ injurious a suspicion, to consider either my past life
“ and conduct, the honour of having been Dictator
“ and five times Consul, or lastly, all the glory I have
“ acquired, as well in war as peace, and which might
“ rather give me disgust and satiety, than leave room
“ for new desires; my age, at least, ought to acquit
“ me of such a reproach. For indeed can any one
“ imagine, that I could be susceptible of jealousy for
“ a young man, who is not so old as my own son?
“ During my Dictatorship, when I was in the vigour
“ of life, and in the most important and most glori-
“ ous career, I returned the insults of my master of
“ the horse only with patience and moderation; and
“ I made no opposition either in the Senate, or before
“ the people, to the equality, as injurious as unpre-
“ cedented, that they were desirous to make, and did
“ actually

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

“ actually make, between him and me. I chose rather to use actions than words, to oblige him, whom all the citizens had equalled with myself in command, to place me of his own accord above him. Is it likely then at this time, that, full and satiated with honours, I should desire to enter the lists, and to dispute with a young man, who, all estimable as he is in other respects, is but entering upon the career of honour and glory? Will any body imagine, that weary as I am, not only of public affairs, but of life itself, I have thoughts of supplanting him, to obtain in his stead a commission for carrying the war into Africa? No, no! I must live and die with the glory I have acquired. I stopped the course of Hannibal’s victories, to enable the youth who were to come after me, to go farther, and overcome him.

“ But you must excuse me, Scipio, if having never had more regard to the esteem of mankind and my own reputation than to the public utility, I likewise do not prefer your glory to the good of the State. Though after all, do I in any wise impeach your glory? Undoubtedly, if we had not a war here, or not to do with an enemy, whom it were not highly glorious to conquer, to keep you in Italy, even with the view of the public good, would be depriving you, with the war, of the means of acquiring honour. But Hannibal being actually in Italy at the head of a considerable army, with which he has kept it in a manner besieged during fourteen years, will you have cause to be dissatisfied with yourself, if during your Consulship, you effectually drive an enemy out of Italy, who has caused us such calamities, and given us so many bloody defeats; and if you have the honour to terminate this second war with Carthage, as Lutatius had that of putting an end to the first?

“ I appeal to your own judgment. Can you think it more for your honour to have driven the Cartha-

“ ginians

“ ginians out of Spain, than it will be to deliver Italy
“ from the war which has destroyed it for so many
“ years? Hannibal is not yet in a condition to make
“ it believed, that a person, who is for going to make
“ war elsewhere, avoids him more out of contempt
“ than fear. You say, that you are only desirous to
“ go to Africa to draw him thither, and give him
“ battle there. But why is it necessary to go so round
“ about a way to work? why not attack him directly
“ where he is? Does not the order of nature require,
“ that you should provide for the safety of your own
“ country, before you attack that of the enemy? that
“ peace should be established in Italy, before you
“ carry the war into Africa; that we should be deli-
“ vered ourselves from all fear, before we undertake
“ to carry the terror of our arms to the enemy’s doors?

“ If you can do your country this double service,
“ why do it: after having conquered Hannibal here,
“ go and attack Carthage. But if the one of these two
“ advantages must necessarily be reserved for new Con-
“ suls, reflect that the first, besides being the most
“ considerable and most glorious in itself, naturally
“ leads on to the second, is the real cause of it, and
“ consequently, includes all the honour of it.

“ I do not mention our impossibility of finding suf-
“ ficient funds for keeping up two armies at once in
“ Italy and Africa, for fitting out fleets, and for fur-
“ nishing provisions and all the munitions necessary
“ for troops by sea and land. Independently of that
“ difficulty, which is no small one, there is nobody
“ amongst us, that does not conceive to what danger
“ such an enterprize exposes us. For in a word,
“ should Hannibal be victorious, and march a second
“ time against Rome, (the Gods avert so great a mis-
“ fortune from us; but what we have seen already
“ may happen again :) if then we were in so imminent
“ a danger, could we recall you from Africa, as we
“ did Q. Fulvius from Capua?

“ But are you sure that fortune will favour you in
“ Africa? The unhappy deaths of your father and

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“ uncle defeated and killed with their armies in the
“ space of thirty days after such glorious successes,
“ shews you what you may, and what you ought to,
“ fear.

“ I should never have done, if I should enumerate
“ all the Kings and Generals, who, in effect of hav-
“ ing rashly entered the countries of their enemies,
“ have been entirely defeated with their armies. The
“ Athenians, that wise and prudent Commonwealth,
“ leaving the war they had in their own country, went
“ to Sicily with a numerous fleet under the command
“ of a young warrior, equally illustrious by his birth
“ and valour. What was the consequence of so bold
“ an expedition? A single sea-fight entirely ruined
“ the power of that Commonwealth, which was the
“ most flourishing then in the world.

“ I am in the wrong to quote foreign and ancient
“ examples. The same Africa, of which we now
“ speak, and the celebrated Regulus, are a sad, but
“ salutary lesson, which ought to teach us the great
“ inconstancy of fortune.

“ Believe me, Scipio. When from your ships you
“ shall behold that potent and warlike country, you
“ will own that your Spains were only play in compa-
“ rison with Africa. And indeed, who does not see
“ the infinite difference between these two expedi-
“ tions? After having, without any danger, or meet-
“ ing a single ship of the enemy, crossed the sea,
“ which washes the coasts of Sicily and Gaul, you
“ anchored at * Emporia, a city in alliance with the
“ Commonwealth, you landed your troops there
“ quietly, which you marched to Tarraco, another
“ allied city, without meeting any obstacle or danger
“ upon your route, continuing upon the lands of
“ friends and allies. On quitting that city, you were
“ received in countries guarded and occupied by our
“ troops. You found on the banks of the Iberus the
“ armies of your father and uncle, which even their

* A city of Spain in Catalonia.

“ misfortune, and the desire of avenging the death of
 “ their Generals, had rendered more formidable than
 “ ever. They had L. Marcius at their head, chosen
 “ indeed tumultuously, and by the suffrages of the
 “ soldiers to command them, but who, except in
 “ point of birth, and the advantage of having passed
 “ through the great offices, might be ranked with the
 “ greatest Captains. You besieged Carthageria en-
 “ tirely at your ease, whilst neither of the three
 “ Carthaginian armies made any motion to defend it.
 “ All those actions, and those which followed, of
 “ which I am far from intending to depreciate the
 “ merit, are by no means comparable in point of dif-
 “ ficulty to the obstacles and dangers, which will oc-
 “ cur in the war of Africa. We have no port where
 “ our fleet can anchor, no country inclined to receive
 “ us, no city in our alliance, no King who is our
 “ friend, nor any place where we can either incamp
 “ or march, without having the enemy immediately
 “ upon our hands. Can you rely upon Syphax and
 “ his Numidians? It is well for you to have confided
 “ in him for once with impunity: Rashness is not al-
 “ ways successful; and fraud usually seeks to acquire
 “ confidence in things of little consequence, in order
 “ to make itself amends afterwards by deceiving with
 “ more advantage on some occasion of importance and
 “ worth the trouble: your father and uncle were not
 “ overpowered by the arms of the enemy, till after
 “ they were abandoned by the treachery of the Celti-
 “ berians their allies; and yourself have not had so
 “ much to fear from Asdrubal and Mago, with whom
 “ you were at war, as you had from Mandonius and
 “ Indibilis, with whom you had contracted an alliance.
 “ Can you rely upon the fidelity of the Numidians,
 “ you who have experienced the revolt of your own
 “ soldiers?

“ It is true, that Syphax and Masinissa had rather
 “ possess the empire of Africa themselves, than that
 “ the Carthaginians should; but they had rather see
 “ the Carthaginians rule there, than any other nation.

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“ Jealousy at this time, and different views of interest, animate them against each other, and divide them, because they have nothing to fear from without. But shew them the arms of the Romans, and foreign armies, and they will instantly unite, and run from all parts as to extinguish a conflagration, that menaces them all alike. You know that the Carthaginians have defended Spain with sufficient obstinacy, though at length they have been overpowered. They will shew a much other kind of zeal and courage, when the question shall be to defend their walls, the temples of their Gods, their altars and fire-sides: when marching to battle, they shall be followed by their weeping wives, and little children imploring their aid.

“ And further. May not the Carthaginians, relying upon the strength and goodness of their walls, upon their union with the States of Africa, and the faith of the Kings their allies, send a new army from Africa into Italy, as soon as they shall see us deprived of your aid, and of that of your army? May it not happen, that without detaching their forces from Africa, they may order Mago, who has quitted the islands Baleares with his fleet, and is actually coasting Liguria, to join Hannibal? We shall then be in the same alarm, in which we lately were, when Asdrubal entered Italy; that Asdrubal, whom you suffered to escape out of your hands in Spain; you who rely upon blocking up all ways not only from Carthage, but from all Africa. You will tell me, that you conquered him. And it is for that very reason, that I am sorry, as well for your own honour as the interest of the Commonwealth, that you left the way to Italy open to a General, whom you had lately defeated.

“ I cannot speak more to your advantage than to ascribe to your good conduct all the successes you have had, since you have commanded our armies, and to attribute our disgraces to the inconstancy of fortune. The more valour and ability you have in
“ war,

“ war, the more interest have Rome and all Italy to
 “ keep so good a defender for themselves. You can-
 “ not deny but that the weight of the war is greatest
 “ where Hannibal is ; as you declare, that you only
 “ go to Africa with the design of drawing him thi-
 “ ther. Consequently, it is against him that you are
 “ to make war either in this country, or that to which
 “ you would go. Will you have more advantage
 “ over him in Africa, where you will be alone with
 “ your army, than in Italy, where you will be se-
 “ conded by your Collegue, and his troops ? Does
 “ not the victory still quite recent of the Consuls
 “ Claudius and Livius, shew us of what importance
 “ it is for the two Consuls to act in concert ? Will
 “ Hannibal not be more formidable, when he fights
 “ under the walls of Carthage, supported by the forces
 “ of all Africa, than in a small neck of Bruttium, in
 “ which he is now shut up, and where he has so long
 “ expected new reinforcements ? What a design is it,
 “ to choose rather to fight in a place, where your
 “ forces will be less by one half, and those of the
 “ enemy much more numerous, than here, where
 “ you will have two armies to employ against one,
 “ already weakened by so many battles, and fatigued
 “ with so long and so laborious a war ?

“ Consider what difference there is between your
 “ conduct, and that of your father. After having
 “ been elected Consul, he set out to command in
 “ Spain : but when he received advice, that Hanni-
 “ bal was passing the Alps to enter Italy, he returned
 “ immediately to give him battle on his descent from
 “ those mountains. And you, who see Hannibal in
 “ Italy, you think of removing from it ; not that you
 “ believe this enterprize advantageous to the Com-
 “ monwealth, but because you imagine, that it will
 “ be more for your honour : as when you abandoned
 “ your province and army, without being authorized
 “ either by an order of the people, or a decree of the
 “ Senate ; and when putting to sea with two galleys
 “ only, you exposed with your person both the safety

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“ of the Commonwealth, and the majesty of the Ro-
“ man people, who had confided the command of their
“ armies to your conduct.

“ As for me, Fathers, I think, that P. Scipio was
“ elected Consul, not for himself, but for us and the
“ Commonwealth; and that the troops which he com-
“ mands were raised for the defence of Rome and Italy,
“ and not in order that our Consuls, assuming a des-
“ potic authority, as if they were Kings, might trans-
“ port them where they think fit, and make them sub-
“ servient to their own ambitious designs.”

Fabius, by this discourse, which he had prepared with care, brought the greatest part of the Senate into his opinion. The Seniors in particular were persuaded by the authority of that great man, and did not hesitate to prefer his consummate wisdom and experience to the impetuous valour of a young Consul. Scipio had gone too far to go back: and besides, convinced with reason of the beauty and utility of his project, and personally piqued with the little reserve with which Fabius had treated him, he was far from being inclined to sacrifice his own opinions to him. He therefore spoke in his turn to the following effect:
“ Fabius himself, Fathers, rightly perceived, as he
“ owned at first, that his opinion might be suspected
“ of jealousy. As for me, I dare not tax so great a
“ man with any such thing: but, either for want of
“ his not having well explained himself, or because he
“ really has the truth against him, he does not seem
“ to me to have entirely purged himself of that suspi-
“ cion. For, to persuade us, that he did not act
“ from envy, he enlarged in magnificent terms upon
“ the honours through which he has passed, and the
“ reputation he has acquired by his exploits; as if I
“ was to put myself upon a foot with only common
“ persons, and that, if I was to apprehend jealousy
“ from any one, it could not be from him, who, hav-
“ ing attained to the highest point of glory, to which
“ I own I aspire as well as he, could not be sorry that
“ I should one day become his equal. He mentioned
“ his

“ his age, and makes me younger even than his son ;
 “ as if the desire of glory were confined to this mortal
 “ life, and did not extend its views to the latest poste-
 “ rity. I am persuaded that great souls compare them-
 “ selves not only with the illustrious men of their own
 “ times, but with the heroes of all ages. As to me,
 “ I will not dissemble with you, Fabius, I have con-
 “ ceived the design not only of equalling, but if I can
 “ (permit me to say it) of surpassing you : and may it
 “ not please the Gods, that either you, in respect to
 “ me, or I in respect to those that shall succeed me,
 “ should fear that any citizen might resemble us. Such
 “ a disposition would be injurious not only to those
 “ whom we should envy, but also to the whole Com-
 “ monwealth, or, to speak more properly, to all the
 “ human race.

“ Fabius has very much exaggerated the dangers
 “ to which I shall expose myself, if I go to Africa ;
 “ inasmuch that he seemed to fear for me, as well as
 “ for the Commonwealth. But from whence on a sud-
 “ den proceeds this anxiety for my life and reputation ?
 “ After my father and uncle had been killed, their ar-
 “ mies almost entirely defeated, the Spains lost, and
 “ four Carthaginian Generals at the head of four armies
 “ kept the whole country in subjection ; and lastly,
 “ when in the assembly for the election of a General
 “ to command in that province, no body, except my-
 “ self, offered themselves, so that the Roman people
 “ were obliged to confide the care of a war so much
 “ despaired of to me at the age of four-and-twenty :
 “ why was there no body then, that represented the
 “ weakness of my years, the strength of the enemy,
 “ the difficulties of the war, and the recent deaths of
 “ my father and uncle ? Have we had at this time any
 “ loss more bloody than that we had then sustained in
 “ Spain ? Are there in Africa more able Generals and
 “ more numerous armies, than there was then in
 “ Spain ? Had I then more experience and capacity for
 “ making war than I am capable of having at this time ?

A. R. 547. " Are the Carthaginians more formidable enemies to
 Ant. C. " us in one country than in another ?
 205.

" It is very easy, after I have defeated and put to
 " flight four Carthaginian armies ; after I have taken
 " so great a number of cities either by force, or capi-
 " tulation ; after I have subdued so many Princes,
 " Kings, and fierce and barbarous nations ; and car-
 " ried my conquests as far as the coasts of the ocean ;
 " in a word, after having reduced all Spain under our
 " power, so that there does not remain the least sha-
 " dow of a war in it : it is, no doubt, very easy to de-
 " preciate my actions. It will also be as easy, when I
 " have conquered and subjected Africa, to lessen the
 " objects which we now magnify, and which, in terms
 " full of emphasis and exaggeration, we represent as
 " dreadful things ; and all to keep me in Italy.

" Fabius affirms, that we have no means of land-
 " ing in Africa ; that we have no port open to us upon
 " the coasts : and at the same time he tells us of the
 " defeat and prison of Regulus, as if that General had
 " miscarried on his entrance into that province. And
 " he will not remember, that the same Regulus, as
 " unfortunate as he was afterwards, found means how-
 " ever to enter Africa ; that the first year he obtained
 " very considerable advantages over the enemy, and
 " that he was always invincible, as long as he had only
 " the Carthaginians to deal with. It is therefore in
 " vain, Fabius, that you endeavour to deter me by
 " his example. Though his misfortune had happened
 " very lately, and in the present war, and not in the
 " First above forty years ago ; why should the defeat
 " and captivity of Regulus prevent me from going to
 " Africa, after that the defeat and deaths of the two
 " Scipios have not prevented me from going to Spain ?
 " Why should I not pique myself upon rendering my
 " country the services which the Lacedæmonian Xan-
 " thippus was capable of rendering Carthage ? His ex-
 " ample can only serve to augment my confidence, in
 " shewing me, that a single man may cause such amaz-
 " ing revolutions.

" You

“ You also cite the Athenians, who, leaving the
 “ enemy in the heart of their own country, went rashly
 “ to Sicily. But since you have leisure enough to tell
 “ us these Greek stories, why don’t you rather speak
 “ of Agathocles, King of Syracuse, who to deliver Si-
 “ cily from the ravages which the Carthaginian troops
 “ had long committed there, went to the same Africa,
 “ and carried the war into the very bosom of a country
 “ from whence it had before come to infest Sicily ?

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“ But why should we search into antiquity, and
 “ amongst strangers for examples to prove how much
 “ advantage there is in being the invader, in removing
 “ the danger from our own country, and carrying it
 “ into that of the enemy ? Does not Hannibal himself
 “ supply us with the most immediate and strongest
 “ proof of this ? There is a wide difference between
 “ ruining foreign territories, and seeing our own de-
 “ stroyed. He who attacks has more courage than he
 “ who defends. Besides which, unknown objects, and
 “ such as we consider only at a distance, always seem
 “ most to be dreaded. In order to judge of what we
 “ are to hope or fear from an enemy, we must enter
 “ his country, and see it with our own eyes. Hannibal
 “ was never in hopes of making all the States of Italy
 “ revolt against the Romans, that went over to him
 “ after the battle of Cannæ. How much less zeal and
 “ attachment will the Carthaginians find from the
 “ States of Africa ; they, who are no less perfidious in
 “ respect to their allies, than rigid and cruel in respect
 “ to their subjects ?

“ Besides which, there is a wide difference between
 “ Rome and Carthage. Abandoned by our allies, we
 “ supported ourselves with our own forces, and by
 “ the valour of Roman soldiers : whereas the Cartha-
 “ ginians employ only mercenary troops, Africans and
 “ Numidians, the most inconstant and most perfidious
 “ in the universe.

“ Provided I am not detained here, you will hear at
 “ the same time of my arrival in Africa, the ravaging
 “ of the whole country, the precipitate retreat of Han-
 “ nibal,

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“nibal, and the besieging of Carthage. Expect to
“receive news from Africa, both more frequently
“and more agreeable than you did from Spain. I
“have not conceived these hopes at a venture. They
“are founded upon the fortune of the Roman people,
“upon the protection, which we have reason to ex-
“pect from the Gods, the witnesses and avengers of
“the infraction of the treaty by the Carthaginians, and
“upon the alliance of the Kings Syphax and Masinissa,
“in whose amity I shall so confide as to keep myself
“well upon my guard against their inconstancy.

“The circumstances of times and places will dis-
“cover many advantages to me, which I cannot dis-
“cern at this distance; and it is the part of a wise and
“able General, to seize the favourable occasions that
“offer, and to turn accidents to his advantage by his
“good conduct.

“I shall have Hannibal for my antagonist, as you
“desire, Fabius: but I shall draw him after me into
“his own country, rather than he keep me in mine.
“I shall force him to fight at home, and Carthage will
“be the reward of the victor, not some half-ruined
“forts in Bruttium.

“You say that Rome and Italy will be in danger,
“whilst I am crossing the sea, landing my troops in
“Africa, and advancing towards Carthage. But have
“a care, Fabius, that you do not affront and injure
“my illustrious colleague, in believing him not capa-
“ble of defending his country against Hannibal,
“weakened, and almost reduced as he is at present,
“as you were capable of stopping his rapid progress
“at a time when he had all his forces, and when, ex-
“ulting from three successive victories, he marched
“with an high hand into all parts of Italy as into a
“conquered country.

“After all, though the design I propose were not
“the most proper for speedily terminating this war,
“it would, however, be for our honour to make
“known to foreign kings and States, that we have
“courage enough, not only to defend Italy, but to
“attack

“ attack Africa. It would be shameful for the Ro-
 “ man people, that it should be said, none of their
 “ Generals dared form a project like that of Hanni-
 “ bal; and that Africa having been so many times
 “ attacked and ravaged by our fleets and armies dur-
 “ ing the first war, which had only Sicily for its
 “ occasion; now, when the safety of Italy is the
 “ question, it should enjoy a perfect tranquillity. It
 “ is time that Italy should have rest, after having suf-
 “ fered such a series of fire and sword. It is time,
 “ that Africa in its turn should feel the scourge
 “ which war brings along with it. Before Rome,
 “ from the top of her walls, sees the enemy’s army
 “ incamped at its gates a second time, let us shew the
 “ Carthaginians from their ramparts, the Roman
 “ legions, menacing their country with impending
 “ ruin. Let Africa be from henceforth the theatre
 “ of war. Let us repay it all the calamities it
 “ has made us suffer: terror, flight, ravaging of
 “ countries, desertion of allies, and all the other ills,
 “ which we have experienced during fourteen years.

“ And this is what I had to say upon the affairs of
 “ the commonwealth, and of the project of the ap-
 “ proaching campaign. I should be afraid of tiring
 “ you with useless and ill-timed discourse, if, after
 “ the example of Fabius, who has taken pains to de-
 “ preciate my successes in Spain, I should undertake
 “ to exalt my own reputation upon the ruins of his.
 “ But I shall do nothing of that kind, Fathers; and
 “ young as I am, I will have the additional honour of
 “ outdoing a man of his years in moderation and re-
 “ serve. You may have observed in my whole con-
 “ duct, that, without seeking to set myself off, I
 “ have always been satisfied with the esteem I might
 “ have given you occasion to conceive for me, rather
 “ from my actions than my words.”

This is a warm dispute, a kind of trial between two
 great men, who each pleaded their own cause with
 abundance of eloquence. I leave the reader to deter-
 mine finally upon it. Livy does not explain himself
 in

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in respect to the secret motive that animated Fabius in this place : but he puts a speech into his mouth, which sufficiently makes it known. It would be no wonder (and so Plutarch judges of it) that a person of this wise protractor's character, should condemn so hazardous an enterprize, as that of transferring the war into Africa seemed to be, and that he should set all the dangerous consequences he conceived he saw in it, in their full light. But his warm manner of undervaluing in all things the great successes of Scipio, and of lessening the glory of his exploits, and magnifying, with an evident malignity, his pretended faults, is very like the language of jealousy and envy. The violent ardor with which we shall soon see him on all occasions labouring to prevent Scipio's enterprize, seems to evidence the sentiments of his heart. Fabius was certainly a great man ; but he was a man. We have admired his moderation and patience in his dispute with Minucius. He was at that time sustained by the inward sense and conviction of his superiority of merit over his rival. But here, the sight of a rising merit, which he cannot dissemble, and of which the lustre, that will continually augment, may obscure the reputation, which a long series of years and services have acquired him, give him an uneasiness, of which he is no longer master, and breaks in upon that calm situation of soul, in which he was in effect of the possession of a glory no body had yet disputed with him.

Liv. xxviii.
45.

However it were, the Senate were not satisfied with the discourse of Scipio, because a report had spread, that if he did not obtain their permission to go to Africa, he would demand it of the people. It was for this reason Q. Fulvius, who had been four times Consul and Censor, called upon the Consul to declare, in presence of the Senators, whether he would refer the distribution of the provinces to them, or would lay the affair before the People. And as he answered that he should act as he thought most for the advantage of the Commonwealth : “ If I have asked
“ you

“ you this question,” replied Fulvius immediately,
 “ it was not because I did not know beforehand what
 “ your answer would be, and what you intended to
 “ do. For you yourself have sufficiently shewn, that
 “ you only intended to found, not to consult, the Se-
 “ nate; and that if we did not immediately grant you
 “ the province you desire, you have a proposal ready
 “ drawn up to present to the people. Therefore,
 “ Tribunes, I desire your aid in the refusal I make
 “ of giving my opinion, solely for this reason, that
 “ though it should be followed by the whole Senate,
 “ the Consul would not conform to it.” A dispute
 arose upon this, Scipio pretending that the Tri-
 bunes had no right to authorize a Senator to refuse to
 give his opinion, when demanded by the Consul.
 But the Tribunes, without paying any regard to his
 representations, decreed in these terms: “ If the Con-
 “ sul refers the distribution of the provinces to the
 “ Senate, we decree, that he shall abide by what shall
 “ be decided, and do not permit that the affair shall
 “ be brought before the People. If he does not re-
 “ fer it to the Senate, we are ready to aid those who
 “ shall refuse to explain themselves upon this article.”
 The Consul demanded a day to consider of it with his
 Collegue.

The next day, Scipio declared that he submitted
 to the judgment of the Senate. In consequence, the
 Senate made the distribution of the provinces between
 the two Consuls without drawing lots, because the
 dignity of Great Pontiff did not permit Licinius
 Crassus to quit Italy. Sicily was decreed to Scipio,
 with the thirty gallies commanded by C. Servilius the
 year before; and he was permitted to go to Africa, if
 he judged it for the service of the Commonwealth.
 Licinius was charged with the war against Hannibal
 in Bruttium, with the army of one of the Consuls of
 the preceding year, at his own choice. The other
 provinces were also distributed. The Games, which
 Scipio had vowed, were then celebrated. The con-
 course of the people was great, and he was present at
 those

A. R. 547. those Games with great satisfaction. Presents were
 Ant. C. sent to Delphi, to give Apollo part of the spoils taken
 205. from Asdrubal.

Liv. xxviii. Fabius not being able to prevent permission being
 45. given Scipio to go to Africa if he thought proper,
 Plut. in employed his whole credit to traverse him in the
 Fab. p. execution of his design. Permission to make new
 188, 189. levies having been refused Scipio, through the secret
 intrigues of his adversary, he confined himself to de-
 manding, that he should at least be allowed to carry
 with him all the volunteers, that he could engage to
 join his army. Fabius opposed this with his whole
 power. He exclaimed in the Assemblies both of the
 Senate and people, "that it did not suffice Scipio to
 fly from Hannibal, if he did not also carry away with
 him all the forces that they had left in Italy, feeding
 the youth with false hopes, and persuading them to
 abandon their fathers, wives, children, and city, at
 the gate of which he saw a powerful enemy, hitherto
 always invincible." Notwithstanding this warm cla-
 mour, Scipio obtained what he demanded, and seven
 thousand volunteers joined him.

Fabius had prevented the funds necessary for his
 armament to be assigned him. Scipio, not to disgust
 the Senate, did not insist much upon this article. He
 contented himself with demanding that he might be
 permitted to receive the different succours from the
 allies, with which they should be willing to supply
 him for building new ships: this could not be refused
 him. We see here how necessary it is to a General to
 acquire the affection of the world. The question was
 to set twenty gallies on foot (*quinquiremes*) and ten of
 four benches of oars; the zeal of the Allies was so
 great, that, piquing themselves in emulation of each
 other to assist the Consul speedily, and each according
 to their power, forty-five days after the wood had
 been brought from the forests, the ships were put to
 sea entirely equipped and armed.

Liv. xxviii. Every thing being ready, Scipio set out for Sicily,
 46. and Licinius for the country of the Bruttii. Of the

two armies which he found there, he chose that which had served under the Consul L. Veturius; Metellus kept the command of the other. The Prætors also set out for their provinces.

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As money for carrying on the war was wanting, the Questors were ordered to sell part of the territory of Capua, which had been confiscated for the benefit of the Commonwealth. The Prætor of the city had orders to take care that the Campanians should inhabit no places but those assigned them, and to punish such as did otherwise.

During this campaign, Mago the son of Amilcar, Liv. xxviii. quitted Minorca; where he had staid during winter,^{46.} and carried with him about twelve thousand foot, and about two thousand horse, all chosen youth, whom he had embarked on board thirty galleys, accompanied with a great number of transports. And as there was no hopes to guard the coasts, he first took the city of Genoa; and from thence, endeavouring to excite some revolt, he took the advantage of the occasion of a war between two States of Liguria, to make an alliance with one of them against the other, and then entered upon action. But he was obliged considerably to diminish his forces by sea; and having left his plunder at Savo, with ten ships to guard it, he sent the rest of his fleet to Carthage, to defend the maritime coast against the enterprizes of Scipio, who was said to be upon the point of going to Africa. The army of Mago increased from day to day; the Gauls, whom his reputation had attracted, coming in to join him.

This news very much alarmed the Senators. They ordered M. Livius, the Proconsul, immediately to march the army under his command in Etruria to Ariminum; and the Prætor Cn. Servilius to make the legions of the city quit Rome, if he believed that the service of the Commonwealth required it. He gave the command of them to M. Valerius, who led them to Arretium.

At

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At the same time, Cn. Octavius took around Sardinia, of which he was Prætor, about fourscore Carthaginian barks, laden with corn for Hannibal's army.

Nothing passed this year in Bruttium that merits being related. Contagious diseases made great havoc both amongst the Roman and Carthaginian troops; and to increase the misfortune, the latter had abundance to suffer from famine. Hannibal passed the whole campaign near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where he erected an altar, which he consecrated, and upon which he caused to be engraved in Greek and Punic characters, and in magnificent terms, an ample enumeration of his military exploits.

S E C T. III.

Scipio arms three hundred Roman Knights at the expence of a like number of Sicilians. He chooses out of the legions the oldest and most experienced soldiers. He takes all the necessary measures for his great design. He regulates some affairs of Sicily. Indibilis renews the war in Spain. Battle, in which Indibilis is killed, and his army defeated. Mandonius, and the other author of the revolt, are delivered up to the Romans. Lælius ravages Africa with his fleet. Alarm of Carthage, measures taken by the Carthaginians for putting themselves into a state of defence. Masinissa comes to Lælius, and complains of the delay of Scipio. Lælius returns to Sicily. Mago receives convoys from Carthage. Locri retaken from the Carthaginians. Avarice and cruelty of Pleminius and the Romans in the city of Locri. Combat in that city of the Romans with each other. Pleminius treated cruelly by two Tribunes. The latter causes the Tribunes to be put to death with unheard-of cruelty. Disease in the army of the Consul Licinius. The mother of the Gods, called Idæa Mater, is brought from Pessinus to Rome. Scipio Nefica is declared the best and most worthy man of Rome. Decree of the Senate against the twelve colonies, who had refused to pay

pay their contingents. The sums lent the Commonwealth by private persons are ordered to be repaid. Deputies from Locri sent to Rome. The mournful complaint of the Locrians against Pleminius. Fabius speaks with abundance of virulence against Scipio. The Senate appoints commissioners to examine the affair of Pleminius, and the complaints against Scipio. The commissioners set out for Locri. Pleminius is condemned, and sent to Rome. The commissioners arrive at Syracuse. Scipio is fully vindicated. Return of the Commissioners to Rome. Death of Pleminius. Scipio highly praised in the Senate. Reflection upon the conduct of Fabius in respect to Scipio.

P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.

P. LICINIUS CRASSUS.

A. R. 547.

Ant. C.

205.

Liv. xxix.

SCIPIO was no sooner arrived in Sicily, than he formed many corps of the volunteers who had followed him thither. But he reserved three hundred of the handsomest, youngest, and most vigorous men, which he kept about his person without arms. They could not imagine what this distinction meant, nor for what they were intended. In the mean time, he chose amongst the Sicilians, most considerable by their birth and fortune, three hundred horsemen, to go with him to Africa; and assigned them a day when they were to assemble, and appear before him mounted and equipped as he had ordered. This war, which was to tear them from the bosom of their country, and expose them, both by sea and land, to labours and dangers to which they were not accustomed, gave them extreme anxiety, as well as their families. On the day fixed, they presented themselves before Scipio with their arms and horses. “ I understand (said that General to them) that there are some amongst you, who are very averse to going with me to Africa. Those who are of this mind, will do me a pleasure in declaring it now. They may be assured, that I shall not take it ill of them in the least; liking much

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Ant. C.
205.

“ better, that they should explain themselves here,
“ than that they should defer their complaints when
“ we shall be upon the spot, where they will be
“ only useless soldiers to the Commonwealth.” One
amongst them was bolder than the rest, and made no
difficulty to own to Scipio, that he would remain in
Sicily, if he might be allowed that liberty. “ Young
“ man (said Scipio) as you speak your mind so inge-
“ nuously, I am going to supply you with a soldier
“ who shall take your place, and to whom you shall
“ deliver your arms, horse, and all your other equi-
“ page of war. Carry him home with you immedi-
“ ately, and take care that he is taught to do the ex-
“ ercise, manage an horse, and handle his arms.”

The young Sicilian having accepted this condition with joy, Scipio gave him one of the three hundred, to whom he had not yet given arms. All the rest, seeing their comrade discharged without having displeased the General, excused themselves as the first had done, and gave their place to him that was presented to them. In this manner, three hundred Roman horse were equipped at the expence of as many Sicilians, without costing the Commonwealth any thing. The Sicilians took upon themselves the care of instructing and exercising them; and it was said, that they became an excellent body of cavalry, and did the Commonwealth great service in several battles.

He then reviewed the legions, and chose out the oldest soldiers, especially those who had served under M. Marcellus, because he believed them the best disciplined and fittest for besieging cities, from the experience they had of that of Syracuse, which had continued so long. For Scipio proposed nothing less at this time than to attack and destroy Carthage.

The winter approaching, he distributed his army into the cities, ordered the several States of Sicily to supply him with corn, in order to spare that which he had brought from Italy; caused the old ships to be careened, and sent them under the command of C. Læ-
lius

lius to plunder the coasts of Africa, laid the new ones upon their sides near Palermo, because having been built in haste with green wood, it was necessary that they should remain dry during the winter.

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Ant. C.
205.

Having taken all the measures necessary for putting himself into a good condition for opening the approaching campaign, he came to Syracuse, which had not yet well recovered the rude shocks she had undergone during the war. The inhabitants coming to him to request, that he would cause estates to be restored which some Italians had taken from them during the war, and kept with the same violence even since the Senate had decreed their restitution, he thought himself principally obliged to cause the public faith to be observed. It was for this reason that he reinstated the Syracusans in the possession of their estates, first by an edict, and then by giving judgment against such as persisted obstinately in retaining their prey. This act of justice gave a sensible pleasure, not only to those who had the advantage of it, but to all the other States of Sicily, who, out of gratitude, made the greatest efforts to aid Scipio in this war. It was this goodness and justice of the Generals and Governors of provinces, which caused the Roman government to be revered.

During this same campaign, a dangerous war broke out in Spain, at the instigation of Indibilis, Prince of the Illergetes, who had no other reason for revolting than his esteem alone for Scipio, which rose so high as to inspire him with contempt for all the other Captains of the Commonwealth. He was convinced, "that he was the only General that remained of the Romans, all the rest having been killed by Hannibal. That it was on that account only, that after the defeat of the two Scipios in Spain, they could find none but him, that they could send to succeed them; and that afterwards, seeing themselves extremely pushed in Italy, they had been obliged to recal him to oppose Hannibal. That, besides that those who actually commanded in Spain, were Captains only in name, all the

Liv. xxix.
2.
App. 276.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

veteran troops had been drawn from thence. That the soldiers who had been left there, were only raw troops, who would be terrified at the sight of the least danger. That there never would be so favourable an occasion for delivering Spain from the yoke of the Romans. That the Spaniards had been slaves till then, either to the Carthaginians or the Romans, and sometimes to both nations at once. That the Carthaginians had been driven out of the country by the Romans: that, if the Spaniards would unite, and act in concert, it would be easy for them to drive out the Romans also, and to resume the manners, laws, and customs of their forefathers, by delivering themselves for ever from all foreign subjection." By such discourse, he made not only his own vassals, but the Aufetani, and other adjacent States, take arms. In very few days, he assembled thirty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, in the country of the Sedetani, where he had ordered them to rendezvous.

On another side, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, who commanded for the Romans, did not think it proper to neglect these first motions, that might have important consequences. Having joined their forces, they entered the country of the Aufetani, and crossing it without putting it to fire and sword, they arrived in view of the enemy, from whom they were not above three miles distant. They tried at first the method of negotiation, to induce them to return to their obedience, and to lay down their arms. But the Spaniards made no answer, but sending out their cavalry against the Roman foragers, to whose aid that of the Romans came; which occasioned a battle of the horse, in which nothing memorable passed on either side.

Liv. xxix.
2.

The next day a battle ensued in all the forms. Both sides fought with great courage. The victory was long doubtful, till the King (Indibilis) having received many wounds, and afterwards a mortal one with a javelin, those who fought round him fled, and drew after them the rest of the army. The Romans pursued

purſued them with vigour, and made a great ſlaughter of them. Thirteen thouſand Spaniards were killed, and eight hundred taken. The Romans loſt hardly two hundred men, as well citizens as allies.

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Ant. C.
205.

The Spaniards who eſcaped, diſperſed firſt into the country, and then retired to their reſpective cities. They were afterwards ſummoned by Mandonius to hold an aſſembly: in which, weary of the war, they complained bitterly of thoſe who had induced them to renew it, and were of opinion, that Ambaſſadors ſhould be ſent to the Romans to deliver up their arms, and to ſubmit again to their power. When thoſe deputies arrived in the camp of the Romans, after having aſcribed the revolt to Indibilis, and the other great perſons, moſt of whom had been killed in the battle, they ſubmitted themſelves, and their whole nation, to the victors. The Roman General answered, that they would accept their offer only upon condition, that they would deliver up Mandonius, and the other authors of the revolt; that otherwiſe, they were going to march their armies into the country of the Illergetes, Aufetani, and the other revolted States.

The deputies having reported this answer in the aſſembly, Mandonius and the other chiefs were ſeized immediately, and delivered up to the Romans. The Spaniards were granted peace, but double taxes were laid upon them for this year; corn was demanded of them for ſix months, and habits for the army; and thirty of the States were obliged to give hoſtages. The revolt of Spain having been quelled in this manner, in a very ſhort time, and without much difficulty, the whole forces of the Commonwealth were turned againſt Africa.

C. Lælius having approached Hippo in the night, Liv. xxix. made the ſoldiers of the fleet quit the ſhips at day-break, and led them to plunder the country. As they found no reſiſtance from the inhabitants, who were as quiet as in time of peace, they put all to fire and ſword. The news of it, when carried to Car-

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

thage, filled the city with terror and consternation. It was given out, that the fleet of the Romans, commanded by Scipio, was arrived: for it was known that he was already in Sicily. As, on this first landing, they could not exactly know either the number of the ships, of which the enemy's fleet consisted, or of the soldiers who ravaged the country, fear, always ingenious in augmenting the evil, magnified the danger. They, in consequence, abandoned themselves at first to terror and a kind of despair, then to sad and gloomy reflections, in considering "that fortune had so changed face in respect to them, that, after having seen their victorious army incamped at the gates of Rome, after having defeated so many armies of the enemy, and subjected all the States of Italy either by treaty or force, they themselves were upon the point of seeing, by a most fatal reverse of fortune, Africa ravaged, and Carthage besieged by the Romans; with this difference, that they had much fewer resources than the Romans for sustaining the like calamities. That the people of Rome, and the country of the Latines, supplied them with a Youth, that seemed to spring up again out of their own ruins, and to multiply in some measure after their great defeats. That, as to them, neither Carthage, nor the country, could furnish them with soldiers: that they employed only the mercenary troops of Africa, always ready, upon the least hope of more gain, to change masters, and to break their faith. That of the two Kings, who were formerly their allies, Syphax had no longer the same attachment for them, since his conference with Scipio, and Masinissa had openly abandoned them, and was become their greatest enemy. That they had no longer either hope or resource. That, besides, Mago had not succeeded in arming the States of Gaul against the Romans, and had not yet been able to join Hannibal. And, lastly, that the reputation of Hannibal himself declined every day, as well as his forces."

The same terror which, upon the first news of the arrival of the Roman fleet, had damped and discouraged them, roused them afterwards, and they began to deliberate upon the means of defending themselves against the danger that threatened them. It was resolved, that levies should be immediately made both in the city and country; that officers should be sent into different parts of Africa, to fetch auxiliary troops; that the city should be fortified; that provisions and arms, as well offensive as defensive, should be brought into it; and that a fleet should be fitted out to be sent to Hippo against that of the Romans.

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Ant. C.
205.

At the time that they were employed in these preparations, they were at length informed, that it was Lælius, and not Scipio, who had arrived; and that he had brought no more troops than were necessary for making incursions into the country, but that the weight of the war was still in Sicily. This news gave them time to breathe; which did not prevent them from sending Ambassadors immediately to Syphax, and the other Kings of the country, to put them in mind of the alliance that subsisted between them and the Carthaginians. They sent some also to King Philip, with orders to offer him two hundred talents of silver (two hundred thousand crowns) to induce him to go to Sicily or to Italy. They also sent deputies to Italy, by whom they recommended it to their Generals, to employ, in order to keep Scipio there, all possible means for striking terror in the Romans. As to Mago, with the deputies they sent him five and twenty ships of war, six thousand foot, eight hundred horse, seven elephants, and very considerable sums of money, to be employed in raising the auxiliary troops, with which he might be in a condition to approach Rome, and to join Hannibal. Such were the measures which the Carthaginians took to secure themselves against the designs of the enemy.

In the mean time, Lælius took immense spoils in the country, which he had found without defence or troops, when Masinissa, who had received advice of

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

the arrival of a Roman fleet, came to him with a small number of horse. He complained to him of the slowness of Scipio, representing to him, "That he ought already to have come to Africa with his army, whilst the Carthaginians were in a consternation, and Syphax was employed in a war with him (Masinissa). That that Prince was actually at a loss, and fluctuating between an alliance with the Romans, and one with the Carthaginians. But, that if time were given him to put his affairs in order, he would not observe any part of the engagement he had entered into with the Romans. That he should therefore use all possible instances with Scipio to induce him to come as soon as possible to Africa. That as for himself, though he had been obliged to abandon his dominions, he should not fail, however, to join the Romans with considerable aids of infantry and cavalry. For the rest, he exhorted Lælius to remove from Africa; adding, that it was very probable, that the fleet of the enemy was sailed from Carthage, and advised him not to give it battle in Scipio's absence." After this conference, Masinissa took his leave of Lælius; and the latter set sail the next day with his ships laden with plunder, and returned to Sicily, where he imparted to Scipio the advice given him by Masinissa.

Liv. xxix.
5.

Almost at the same time, the ships which had been sent from Carthage to Mago, arrived in Italy, near Genoa. Mago, in consequence of the orders which he had received, raised as many troops as was possible. The Gauls did not dare to supply him with any openly, because the Roman army was actually either in their territory, or the neighbourhood. M. Livius made the army he commanded, march from Etruria into Gaul, and joined Sp. Lucretius, with design either to advance to meet Mago, in case he quitted Liguria to approach Rome; or, if the Carthaginians remained quiet in the corner of the Alps, to continue in the country, in the neighbourhood of Ariminum, for covering Italy.

When

When Lælius returned into Sicily, Scipio, animated by the remonstrances of Masinissa, had no less impatience to go to Africa, than the soldiers to follow him thither, when they saw the immense plunder Lælius had brought from thence. But this great project was still retarded by a less important enterprize, of which the occasion offered itself indirectly. The question was to retake the city of Locri, which, in the general defection of Italy, had quitted the Romans, to go over to the Carthaginians.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

Upon advice which Scipio received at Syracuse, of an intelligence secretly carried on for putting Locri again into the hands of the Romans, he caused three thousand soldiers to move thither from Rhegium, and charged the Proprætor Q. Pleminius with that enterprize. Himself advanced to Messina, to be ready at hand to receive news of all that passed. The three thousand men being arrived in the night at Locri, were received into the citadel, from whence they fell upon the Carthaginian sentinels, whom they found asleep. In the trouble and confusion of so unforeseen an attack, the Carthaginians, struck with terror, and without thinking of defending themselves, took refuge in the second citadel: for there were two at no great distance from each other. The inhabitants were masters of the city, that being placed between the two enemies, was upon the point of becoming the prey of that which should remain victorious. Every day skirmishes passed between those who sallied from the two citadels. Q. Pleminius commanded the Romans, and Amilcar the Carthaginian garrison, and both calling in aid from the neighbouring places, gradually augmented the number of their soldiers. At length, Hannibal himself marched to the aid of his troops, and the Romans would have been overpowered, if the people of Locri, exasperated by the pride and avarice of the Carthaginians, had not declared for their ancient allies.

Liv. xxix.
6—8.

As soon as Scipio was informed of what passed at Locri, and that Hannibal in person was upon the point

A.R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

point of arriving there, that he might not suffer the troops to perish, whom he had sent into a danger, out of which they could not extricate themselves without help, he set out instantly from Messina, where he left his brother Lucius in his place. Hannibal was already arrived upon the banks of a river, which was not far from Locri, and, from thence, had sent a courier to his troops, to order them to draw the Romans and Locrians on to a battle as soon as it was day, and to continue it till he should come to attack the city on one side, whilst every body should be attentive to what passed on the other. The Roman fleet, however, arrived at Locri some hours before night. Scipio landed what troops he had brought, and before sun-set entered the place with them. The next day, the Carthaginians, having quitted their fortrefs, began the battle; and Hannibal, having resolved to scale the city, already approached the walls, when, on a sudden, the Romans, having caused the gates to be thrown open, made a vigorous salley that very much surprized him, for he did not know that Scipio had entered the place. They killed two hundred men. Hannibal made the rest retire into his camp, as soon as he knew that the Consul was at the head of the enemy; and having caused those who were in the fortrefs to be told to take care of themselves, he decamped the following night. The Carthaginians, seeing themselves abandoned, chose the next day to set fire to the houses, which were in their power, in order to stop the enemy by the tumult which the flames would occasion; and having quitted the citadel, they rejoined Hannibal before night.

Scipio, seeing that the enemy had abandoned their citadel and camp, assembled the Locrians; and having given them a severe reprimand upon the subject of their revolt, he punished those with death who had been the authors of it, and gave their estates to the heads of the opposite faction, by way of reward for their inviolable fidelity. He added, in respect to the Locrians in general, “ that he would not take upon
him

him either to grant favour to, or inflict punishment upon, them. That they should send deputies to the Senate, to whom alone it belonged to determine their fate. That in the mean time, what they might be assured of was, that notwithstanding their infidelity to the Roman People, they would find it better to be under the Romans justly incensed, than they had been under the Carthaginians whilst their friends and allies." Afterwards, having left Pleminius as his lieutenant to guard the city with the troops he had brought thither, he returned to Messina with those that came with himself.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

Whilst the Locrians had been under the Carthaginians, they had been treated with such haughtiness and cruelty, that one would think they might have borne moderate oppressions, not only with patience, but almost with a kind of joy. However, (who would believe it) Pleminius, and the Roman soldiers, who guarded the city under his command, so far exceeded Amilcar and the Carthaginian garrison in all kinds of excessive avarice and inhumanity, that it might be said, they proposed to themselves less to excel the enemy by arms than by audacity in committing the greatest crimes. In the bad treatment which the commandant and soldiers made the unfortunate inhabitants suffer, they omitted nothing that makes the poor and the weak hate and detest the power of the great and the strong. There were no kinds of infamy and cruelty that they did not inflict upon them, their wives, and children. Their avarice did not spare even sacred things; and, not to mention the plunder of other temples, it rose so high as to take away the treasure of that of Proserpina, upon which, hitherto, no one had presumed to lay hands, except Pyrrhus only, who afterwards thought with horror of that sacrilege, and believing himself pursued by the divine vengeance, brought back into the temple all the treasures he had taken out of it.

Liv. xxix.

The storm which Pyrrhus suffered after his crime, was considered as a punishment from heaven: and

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

Livy accordingly ascribes in this place to the wrath of the Gods the fury and rage with which all those were seized, who had shared in this last sacrilege, and which armed the commanders against the commanders, and the soldiers against the soldiers, to destroy each other with a barbarity that hath no example.

Liv. xxix.
9.

Pleminius had the principal command in the city, and the troops under him which he had brought from Rhegium, and Scipio had sent two legionary Tribunes thither from Sicily, who in like manner commanded the soldiers he had given them. One day, as one of Pleminius's soldiers was making off with a silver cup, pursued by the people of the house where he had taken it, he accidentally met in his way the Tribunes Sergius and Matienus, who took the cup from him which he had stolen. He upon that began to cry out, and call his comrades to his aid, who ran to him that moment, as well as the soldiers of the Tribunes; so that their numbers insensibly increasing on both sides with the tumult, a battle at last ensued in form, between the troops of Pleminius and those of the Tribunes. The soldiers of Pleminius having been worsted, ran to their leader, shewing him their wounds and the blood with which they were covered, raising great cries, exaggerating the violence of their adversaries, and even imputing to them the having called Pleminius by the vilest names during the battle.

That commandant thereupon, in excessive rage, quitted his quarters instantly; and having summoned the Tribunes before him, after having ordered them to be stript, he commanded them to be whipt with rods. Some time passed before this order could be executed, because the Tribunes defended themselves, and implored the help of their soldiers. Accordingly, the latter having been apprized of what passed, ran from all parts of the city, as if the signal had been given for a battle with the enemy. Upon their arrival, they saw that they had already began to slay their officers with rods. This sight transported them with a
rage

rage still more violent than their first; so that forgetting in a moment, not only the respect which they owed the majesty of the command, but trampling all sense of humanity under foot, they began by treating the Lictors of Pleminius with the utmost cruelty. Then, having cleared their way through all that could defend him, they fell upon Pleminius himself, gave him a thousand blows, and after having cut off his nose and ears, left him almost dead upon the spot.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

Scipio having been apprized of this at Messina, where he still was, returned to Locri in one galley, and having taken cognizance of the affair, he gave the cause in favour of Pleminius, continued him in the authority he had in the city, declared the Tribunes criminal, and ordered that they should be carried to Rome to the Senate in chains. After this he returned to Messina, and from thence into Syracuse.

But Pleminius, full of fury and rage, complained, that Scipio had not done him entire justice; and persuading himself, that no body was a better judge of the punishment such an injury deserved, than he who had suffered it, he ordered the Tribunes to be brought before him, caused them to be flayed with a thousand stripes, and after having made them suffer all the torments it was possible to imagine, not contented with having seen them expire before his eyes, he caused their bodies to be thrown upon the dunghill, and forbade that interment should be given them. He treated the principal persons of Locri with the same cruelty, who had been to complain of his oppressions and injustice; and from thenceforth, his anger and revenge made him redouble the excesses, to which only his avarice and brutality had inclined him before. He thereby not only became himself the object of the curses and abhorrence of the public, but reflected disgrace upon the General who had put him in office.

The time of the assemblies for the election of Consuls approached, when letters from the Consul Licinius were received at Rome, by which the Senate

Liv. xxix.
10.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

were informed, “ that a disease spread in his army ; that himself had it ; and that it would have been impossible to oppose the enemy, if the same distemper had not also spread in their camp with still greater violence. That for this reason, not being able to come to Rome himself, he would, if the Senate approved it, nominate Q. Cæcilius Metellus Dictator, to hold the assemblies in his place. That it was proper to dismiss Metellus’s army ; because, on one side, it was of no use, as Hannibal had put his troops into winter-quarters ; that besides, the distemper made such horrible havock amongst them, that not a single foldier of them would be left, if they were not separated as soon as possible.” The Senate answered the Consul, that they left him at liberty to act therein as he should judge most expedient for the good of the Commonwealth.

Liv. xxix.
10, 11, 14.
App. Bell.
Annib.
345.

The Romans were a little disturbed in thought, upon account of its having rained stones, (that is to say, large hail) that fell frequently enough during this year ; which had obliged them to consult the books of the Sibyl. An oracle was found in them, that declared, that when a foreign enemy should bring the war into Italy, the means of conquering and driving him out again, was to seek the goddess Idæa Mater at Pessinus, and to bring her to Rome. This goddess was also called Rhea, Ops, The Mother of the Gods, and the epithet Idæa came from mount Ida, in Phrygia, where she was adored with a peculiar worship. The most revered of her temples was in the city of Pessinus. The Senators were the more affected with this prediction found in the Sibyl’s books by the Decemviri, as the deputies who had carried the offering to Delphi, of which we have spoke above, reported that Apollo Pythius, after having accepted the sacrifice, had answered, “ That the Romans were upon
“ the point of gaining a much greater victory over
“ the enemy, than that which had occasioned the
“ sending of the presents that had been offered to
“ him.” To these two motives of hope, they added
the

the extraordinary confidence which had induced Scipio to demand the province of Africa ; a confidence, that might be considered as an assured presage that he would terminate that war to the advantage of the Romans. Therefore, to hasten the accomplishment of the fates, presages, and oracles, that promised them victory, they considered the measures that were to be taken for bringing the Goddesses to Rome.

For this purpose they sent M. Valerius Lævinus, who had been twice Consul, Ambassador to Attalus King of Pergamus, with whom they had been allied in the war against Macedonia ; persuaded that Prince would readily incline to do every thing in his power, that might be agreeable to the Roman People. Lævinus had four colleagues with him. Five galleys (Quinqueremes) were given them, in order that they might appear with dignity amongst the States they were sent to, to whom it was thought proper to give an high idea of the Roman People. In their voyage to Asia, they touched at Delphi, where they consulted the oracle, to know what success they should have in the enterprize that was the purpose of their commission. They were answered, “ That by the assistance of King Attalus, they should obtain what they went so far to seek. That when they brought the Goddesses to Rome, they should cause her to be received by the worthiest man of that city.” They arrived at Pergamus, from whence Attalus, after having received them in a very kind and honourable manner, conducted them to Pessinus in Phrygia. He there put into their hands a stone, which the inhabitants held in great veneration, calling it The Mother of the Gods, and told them they had only to carry it to Rome.

When they were upon the point of arriving, M. Valerius Falto, one of the deputies, set out before, to give notice of the near approach of the Goddesses, and to tell them to find out the best man, and the most worthy, to receive the Goddesses, as the oracle of Delphi had directed: It was a great difficulty for the

Senate

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

Senate to determine who the best man of the Commonwealth was. * “There was not a single citizen,” says Livy, “who would not have preferred this preference justly acquired, to all the commands and dignities that could be obtained by the suffrages of the Senate or People. † Search all the archives of the State,” says an Author, “and all the triumphs related in them, and you will find that there is no glory comparable to that of holding the first rank amongst the men of worth.” There is therefore in virtue a most real greatness, as it merits the preference to whatever else is most shining, and most pursued. But it is surprizing, that amongst so many great men of such high renown, and whose merit was so generally confessed at Rome, so honourable a distinction should fall upon a young man not quite seven and twenty years of age. This was Publius Scipio, surnamed Nasica, son of Cneus, who was killed in Spain. It is unfortunate for us, that history does not inform us what qualities determined the Senate to pass judgment in this point.

Sueton.
in Tib.
c. 2.

Young Scipio had orders to go to Ostia to meet the Goddess, with all the Roman ladies, to take her out of the ship, and to put her into the hands of the women. When the vessel entered the Tiber, an accident happened, if we may believe historians, which occasioned great surprize and affliction: the ship stopped on a sudden, and it was not possible to make it move forwards. Upon this, Claudia Quinta, one of the Roman ladies, whose reputation had till then been dubious (in effect of too much care in adorning her person) prayed the Gods that, if the suspicions in prejudice of her virtue were without foundation, the ship, to which she had made fast her girdle, in order to draw it, might follow her; which happened that moment. Scipio having entered it, took the Goddess

Appian.

* Veram certè victoriam ejus rei sibi quisque mallet, quàm ulla imperia honoresve suffragio seu Patrum seu Plebis delatos.

† Explica totos fastos, constitue omnes currus triumphales, nihil tamen morum principatu speciosius reperiēs. VAL. MAX. VIII. 15.

from the hands of the priests, and carried her to shore, where she was received by the Roman ladies. They successively shared in the honour of carrying so glorious a burthen, and entered the city, from which the whole people came out to meet the Goddesses, and all the way vases smoking with incense were placed to honour her as she passed. At the same time all places resounded with the prayers addressed to her, to enter Rome auspiciously as into her abode, and to establish her residence there. And lastly, she was placed in the temple of Victory upon mount Palatine, and this day became a festival with the Romans from thenceforth. There was not a single citizen, to the lowest, who did not carry his offering to mount Palatine. The following days the ceremony of the * Lectisternium was performed, and games were exhibited, which were called Magalesia, that is, the great Games, from the name of the Goddess, Great Mother of the Gods.

A. R. 547.
Ant. C.
205.

For the rest, as we have said before, this Goddess, sought with so much care, brought from such a distance, expected with so much impatience, received with so much joy, and so many marks of veneration, was nothing but a stone without form or sculpture. Can we read of divine honours rendered to this vile stone by a people so wise in other respects, without deploring the sad effects of idolatry, and without returning thanks, with the warmest gratitude, to the God of Mercy who has preserved us from them?

M. CORNELIUS CETHEGUS.
P. SEMPRONIUS TUDITANUS.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

We come now to the fifteenth year of the second war with the Carthaginians. Whilst the Senators were deliberating upon the recruits for the legions, some of them remonstrated, that the Commonwealth, by the favour of the Gods, being at length delivered

Liv. xxix.

* This feast has been spoken of elsewhere.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

from the dangers and fears which had alarmed it during so many years, it was time to suffer no longer what those unhappy conjunctures had obliged them to tolerate. This proposal having excited the curiosity and attention of the Senate, they added, that the twelve Latine colonies, which, in the Consulship of Q. Fabius and Q. Fulvius, had refused to furnish their contingents, had enjoyed, during almost six years, an entire exemption from all the expences of the war, as an honourable privilege granted them for their good services; whilst the dutiful and obedient allies, in reward of their fidelity, were exhausted by levies made every year in their countries.

This discourse, putting the Senators in mind of a kind of rebellion, which they had almost forgot, at the same time revived the rage and indignation it deserved. Accordingly the Senate, being desirous that this affair should be regulated before any other, decreed, that the Consuls should order the twelve colonies in question, each to send their magistrates and ten of their principal citizens to Rome. That when they should arrive, they should tell them, “that each should supply the Roman People with twice the number of foot they had ever furnished since the enemy were in Italy, when the levies were greatest; and with an hundred and twenty horse over and above. That if any of them had not horse enough, they should be allowed to supply three foot-soldiers for each horseman. But that they should take care to chuse men of each kind, that were easiest in their circumstances, and to send them out of Italy to all places that had occasion for recruits. That, if any of them should refuse to obey, their magistrates and deputies should be laid under arrest without being allowed audience, when they demanded it, till they had complied. That further, the same colonies should pay a tax of one for every thousand asses of their value, and that an account of their persons and estates should be taken in such manner as the Roman censors should prescribe, that is, according to the method

thod used amongst the Roman People ; and that the cen-
sors of the colonies, before they quitted their of-
fice, should deliver in their registers to Rome, where
they should make oath, that they were drawn up ac-
cording to the direction of the law.”

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

In virtue of this decree, the magistrates and prin-
cipal persons of the colonies were cited to Rome,
where the will of the Senate was declared to them, in
respect to the troops and the tax. They all declared,
more or less, against an exaction which seemed to
them excessive. They represented, “ that they were
not able to supply so great a number of soldiers. That
they could scarce furnish the contingent mentioned in
the treaty. That they desired as a favour, that they
might be permitted to enter the senate, in order to
make their remonstrances. That they had not de-
served to be crushed in such a manner ; but that, if
they must be destroyed, neither their fault, nor the
anger of the Senate, could make them furnish more
soldiers than they had.” The Consuls, without abat-
ing any thing that had been decreed, kept the de-
puties at Rome, and sent home the magistrates into
their colonies in order to raise the troops ; declaring
to them, “ that they should have no audience till
they brought the men required of them.” Thus
having nothing to hope in the Senate, they made the
levies prescribed them in the twelve colonies, and
easily found the number of soldiers demanded, be-
cause their youth had time to increase, during so
many years as they had enjoyed a total exemption.

Another affair, which had been buried in silence still
longer than the former, was afterwards proposed by
M. Valerius Lævinus. He said, that it was proper
at length to repay to many private persons the sums
they had thought fit to advance for the Common-
wealth in his Consulship, and that of M. Claudius,
whilst they were in office together. That no body
ought to wonder at his making it a personal interest
to see the public faith discharged, as he had not only
been Consul the year that money had been lent, but

Liv. xxix.
16.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

that himself had proposed that voluntary contribution, the public treasury being exhausted, and the people not being in a condition to pay the common taxes. This opinion pleased the whole Senate; and the Consuls having been desired to bring the affair upon the carpet, it was decreed that those debts should be discharged in three payments, of which the first should be made immediately by the Consuls for the current year, and the two others by those who should be in office the third and fifth years following.

Liv. xxix.
16.

The arrival of the deputies from Locri, who came to Rome to complain of all the ills they suffered, and of which they had not been apprized till now, suspended all other business, and engrossed the attention of the whole city. The public indignation declared itself less against the crimes and impiety of Pleminius, than against the inexcusable negligence of Scipio in an affair of such importance, and his blind indulgence in respect to an officer universally condemned: for these were the things imputed to that General. The sequel will shew with what foundation.

The deputies of the Locrians, to the number of ten, in mourning habits, carried olive branches in their hands, according to the custom of the Greeks, when they asked favours; and presenting them to the Consuls, who were sitting upon their Tribunal in the Forum, they prostrated themselves at their feet with lamentable cries and groans. The Consuls having asked them who they were, and what they would have, they answered, that they were Locrians, and that they had suffered such cruel injuries from Pleminius and the Roman soldiers, as the Roman People never inflicted upon the Carthaginians themselves. They desired permission to address the Senate, in order to explain their misery to them.

Liv. xxix.
17, 18.

When they had obtained audience, the eldest of them spoke to the following effect. “I know, Fathers, that in order to your judging rightly of our complaints, it is necessary that you should know in
“ what

“ what manner Locri was delivered up to Hannibal,
“ and how we returned to our duty to you, after
“ having driven out the Carthaginian garrison. For,
“ if we can demonstrate evidently to you, that the
“ public council of Locri had no share in the revolt;
“ and that it was not with our consent, but by our
“ strenuous endeavours and courage that you regain-
“ ed possession of our city, you will be more sensibly
“ affected with the atrocious and enormous outrages,
“ with which your lieutenant and soldiers have over-
“ whelmed good and faithful allies.

“ But I believe it proper to refer the explanation
“ of the causes that occasioned this double revolu-
“ tion to another time; and that for two reasons.
“ First, in order that this affair may be treated in
“ the presence of Scipio, who retook our city, and
“ is an irreproachable witness of all we may have
“ done, good or bad: and in the second place, in
“ whatsoever manner we may have acted in respect
“ to you, we certainly could not have deserved the
“ evils we have been made to suffer.

“ We cannot deny, Fathers, that as long as Amil-
“ car was in our city with his Numidians and Afri-
“ cans, we did suffer inhuman and horrid treatment
“ from them: but that bears no comparison to what
“ we now undergo. I beg, Fathers, that you will
“ not take offence at what I am going to say, and
“ which I do not repeat without extreme repugnance.
“ It may actually be said, that all mankind expect in
“ suspense which of the two People, the Romans or
“ Carthaginians, shall become masters of the uni-
“ verse. Now, if the choice were to be determined
“ by the injuries we have received from the Cartha-
“ ginians, or those we actually now receive from your
“ garrison, there is no body that could not pre-
“ fer their government to yours. And however,
“ these are the sentiments of the Locrians in respect
“ to you. When we suffered much less cruel treat-
“ ment from the Carthaginian garrison, we had re-
“ course to your General. And now, when we un-

A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
294.

“ dergo from your garrison, injuries that far exceed
“ the most cruel hostilities, it is to you only that we
“ address our complaints.

“ Q. Pleminius, your lieutenant, was sent to Lo-
“ cri, to retake it from the Carthaginians, and con-
“ tinued there with the same troops he had employed
“ for the expedition. This officer (for the excess of
“ our injuries give us courage to speak freely) has
“ nothing either of the man, except the form, or of
“ the Roman, except the habit and language. He
“ is a monster in nature, like those which fable sup-
“ poses to have seized the strait which separates us
“ from Sicily, for the misfortune of those who sail
“ along the coasts of both. And were he the only
“ one who exercised his avarice, cruelty, and bru-
“ tality over your allies, we might perhaps, by our
“ patience, suffice for that gulph, as deep and im-
“ mense as it is. But he has given such a loose to
“ licentiousness and disorder, that he has made every
“ centurion, every soldier, a Pleminius. There is
“ not one of them who does not rob and plunder;
“ who does not beat, wound, and murder: not one
“ who does not ravish the married women, and the
“ youth of both sexes, after having torn them by
“ force out of the arms of their parents. Every day
“ our city is in a manner taken by storm; every day
“ it is plundered. Night and day the mournful cries
“ of women and children taken by force, and carried
“ off, are heard. To say all in one word, there is not
“ a family, not a person, at Locri, who has not suf-
“ fered their share in the miseries I speak of; and
“ there is no kind of injustice, violence, and disgrace,
“ not practised there.

“ But there is one circumstance that affects us
“ more than all the rest, because it regards the Gods;
“ and in which it is not indifferent that you should be
“ informed; because it might, if it passed with im-
“ punity, draw down their vengeance upon you. We
“ have in our city a temple of Proserpina, the sanctity
“ of which you no doubt have heard mentioned, at
“ the

“ the time when you were at war with Pyrrhus. It
 “ cost that Prince dear for having taken the treasures
 “ out of that temple, which had hitherto been in-
 “ violable. His fleet was shattered by a dreadful
 “ storm, and all the ships that had the treasures of
 “ the Goddess on board, were dashed to pieces upon
 “ our coast. So terrible a disaster at length opened
 “ the eyes of that Prince, notwithstanding his pride
 “ and haughtiness: he owned, that there were Gods,
 “ and having caused all the money he had taken to
 “ be amassed, he caused it to be carried back into the
 “ temple of Proserpina. This satisfaction did not
 “ prevent him from being unfortunate all the rest of
 “ his life. Having been driven out of Italy, he
 “ ended his days at Argos, by a death equally un-
 “ happy and unworthy of his past glory.

A. R. 547.
 Ant. C.
 204.

“ Your Lieutenant and Tribunes, though well ac-
 “ quainted with this fact, and many others of the like
 “ nature, have however not refrained from laying
 “ their sacrilegious hands upon these treasures, and
 “ to contaminate themselves, their houses, and your
 “ soldiers, with so abominable a prey. I should be
 “ afraid, Fathers, if you did not take care to expiate
 “ their sacrilege by an exemplary reparation, that
 “ the Goddess would take vengeance of your Com-
 “ monwealth, which is innocent of it, as she has already
 “ of the criminal. They have formed two parties.
 “ Pleminius commanded one of them, and the le-
 “ gionary Tribunes were at the head of the other.
 “ They have come to blows several times, with no
 “ less animosity and fury, than if they were fighting
 “ with the Carthaginians. They have committed
 “ unheard-of cruelties on both sides. And in this
 “ manner does the Goddess punish the violators of her
 “ temple.

“ As to what relates to the injuries we have sustain-
 “ ed, we neither have had, nor ever shall have, re-
 “ course to any but yourselves to avenge them. We
 “ do not ask you to give credit to our complaints im-
 “ mediately, and that you should condemn Pleminius

A.R. 548. “ unheard. Let him appear in person : let him hear
 Ant. C. “ our accusations, let him refute them. If in any
 204. “ thing we have advanced there be found the least
 “ exaggeration, we do not refuse to be delivered up
 “ by you to all his fury, to all his brutality.”

When the deputies had done speaking, Fabius asked them, whether they had complained to Scipio. They answered, “ That they had sent deputies to him : but that he was engrossed by making preparations for the war, and that he was actually either embarked, or upon the point of embarking, for Africa. That besides, they had experienced the Lieutenant’s influence with the General, when, upon his taking cognizance of the affair between that officer and the Tribunes, he had caused the latter to be put in prison, whereas he had continued that officer in place, though at least as criminal, or even more so, than them.”

Liv. xxix. After this account, the Locrians were dismissed,
 29. and the Senate took the matter into consideration. Many sharply attacked, not only Pleminius, but Scipio himself. Q. Fabius spoke with the most warmth in reproaching Scipio, “ That he was born to corrupt military discipline. That, accordingly, in Spain, the sedition of his soldiers had done the Commonwealth more hurt than the arms of the Carthaginians. That by a licence hitherto unknown amongst the Romans, and purely tyrannical, he sometimes acted in respect to the troops with excessive indulgence, and sometimes with a rigour that rose even to cruelty. He concluded, that Pleminius should be brought to Rome, and kept in prison till his trial ; and that, if the accusations of the Locrians should be proved true, he should be strangled in prison, and his whole fortune should be confiscated. That Scipio should be recalled to Rome for having quitted his province without the Senate’s permission ; and that the Tribunes of the People should be prevailed upon to make the People divest him of his command. That the Locrians should be answered, upon their being called

called in, that the Senate and People had no share in the oppressions they complained of, and were highly affected with them. That they should be told, they were considered at Rome as persons of worth and honour, and as good and faithful allies. That their wives, children, and estates, should be restored to them. That an exact account should be taken of the treasures plundered, and that double the sum should be replaced in the temple. That a sacrifice of expiation should be offered, after previously consulting the college of Pontiffs, to know from them the ceremonies necessary to be observed in it, to what Gods to address, and what victims it was necessary to offer for expiating the sacrilege of those who had plundered the treasures of Proserpina. And lastly, it was his opinion, that all the soldiers in garrison at Locri should be transported to Sicily, and that four cohorts of the Latine allies should be sent thither in their room."

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Ant. C.
204.

The dispute between those who favoured Scipio and were against him, prevented the voices from being taken, or any thing determined that day. Besides the crimes of Pleminius, and the misery of the Locrians, that General was reproached with dressing himself * unbecoming a soldier, and especially a Roman. To this was added, " That he passed his time in hearing rhetoricians and philosophers, and in judging of the strength and address of Athletæ. That his officers, and his whole house, lived in the same effeminate manner in the midst of the pleasures of Syracuse. That he seemed to have forgot Carthage and Hannibal. That his whole army, wallowing in the same licentiousness which had corrupted the Soldiers of Sucro and those of Locri, was more formidable to the allies of the Roman People than to their enemies."

Though these accusations, partly true and partly false, were supported with some probability, the Se-

Liv. xxix.
20.

* It was for using a cloak and sandals, which were peculiar to the Greeks. Cum pallio crepidisque inambulare in gymnasio.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

nate gave in to the opinion of Q. Metellus, who agreed with Fabius in all points, except what concerned the person of Scipio. "What would be thought, said he, if after having chosen Scipio whilst very young for recovering Spain, which he hath effected with great prudence and valour; if after having created him Consul to terminate the war; if at the time that he gave reason to hope that he would force Hannibal to quit Italy, and would conquer Africa, we should recal him on a sudden from his province, and force him to return to Rome with Pleminius, by condemning him in some measure without hearing him; and the rather as the Locrians have declared, that it was in his absence they had been oppressed with all the ills they complained of, and that in consequence, he could be reproached at most with only having had too much indulgence for the commander he had left in their city. That it was his opinion, that the Prætor M. Pomponius, to whom Sicily had fallen by lot, should be made to set out in three days for that province; that the Consuls should send ten Senators as commissioners, with two Tribunes of the People, and an Ædile along with him; and that the Prætor, with this council, should take cognizance of the whole affair. That if they should discover, it was by Scipio's consent the violences complained of had been exercised upon the Locrians, that then he should be ordered to quit his province. That in case he should be gone to Africa, the two Tribunes and the Ædile, with such two of the commissioners as the Prætor should chuse, should set out immediately for Africa: the Tribunes and Ædile to bring Scipio back to Rome; and the two commissioners to command the army, till a new General should be sent in his place. That if, on the contrary, M. Pomponius, and the ten commissioners of the Senate, should find that Scipio had no share in the misfortunes of the Locrians, he should then continue at the head of his troops, and carry on the war according to his plan."

The

The decree of the Senate having been drawn up according to this opinion, which was very wise and well limited, the Tribunes of the people were desired to chuse out of their number, or by lot, the two who were to set out with the Prætor and commissioners. The college of Pontiffs was consulted upon what was necessary to be done for expiating the thefts and sacrileges committed at Locri in the temple of Proserpina. The Tribunes, who set out with the Prætor and the commissioners, were M. Claudius Marcellus, and M. Cincius Alimentus. A Plebeian Ædile was associated with them, who was, by their order, to seize Scipio, in case he should refuse to obey the Prætor either in Sicily or in Africa, if he was gone thither, and to bring him to Rome, in virtue of the sacred and inviolable authority annexed to the office of the Tribunes of the People. This council thought proper to repair to Locri before they went to Messina.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.
Liv. xxix.
20, 21.

They began by laying Pleminius in irons, and sending him to Rhegium, with thirty-two of his accomplices. After which, their first care was, according to the instructions they had received, to perform all that religion required for the expiation of the sacrilege. Having, therefore, seized all the money that Pleminius and his troops had plundered, and added to it that which they had brought with them, after having replaced the whole in the temple of the Goddess, they offered to her a sacrifice of expiation.

The Prætor afterwards assembled the garrison, and ordered them to quit the city, and to incamp in the midst of the country, forbidding every soldier, upon pain of the most severe punishment, to remain in the place, or to carry away any thing with him that did not belong to him. He then gave the Locrians permission to take their effects wheresoever they found them, and to call for whatever might have disappeared. But above all things, he commanded, that all the free persons should be delivered up, threatening the

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

the greatest chastisement to those who should presume to retain any one whatsoever. And, lastly, having assembled the Locrians, he declared to them, "that the Roman Senate and people restored them their liberty and laws. That if any of them was desirous to accuse Pleminius, or any other person, they had only to follow him to Rhegium. That if they intended to accuse Scipio, in the name of their city, for having either ordered or approved the violences that had been committed against them, they should send their deputies to Messina, and that he would there examine the whole affair with his council."

The Locrians gave great thanks to the Prætor and commissioners, and to the Roman Senate and people, adding, that they would accuse Pleminius. "That, as to Scipio, though he seemed little sensible to their miseries, he was a person they chose rather to have for a friend than an enemy. That they were fully convinced, it was neither by his order, nor consent, that such enormous oppressions had been committed. That he had either believed Pleminius too much, or the Locrians too little. That there were persons who naturally were enemies enough to crimes, to desire they should not be committed; but who had not resolution enough to punish them when they were."

This discourse, which justified Scipio, gave the Prætor and commissioners great pleasure, who were thereby discharged from a very ungrateful part of their commission. They condemned Pleminius, and with him about two-and-thirty more, whom they sent to Rome, bound hand and foot. As to themselves, they set out for Sicily, in order to examine, in person, whether the reproaches made Scipio upon his particular conduct, and the little discipline of his army, had any foundation, and to give an account of them afterwards to the Senate.

Liv. xxix.
22.

Scipio having received advice that they approached Syracuse, prepared to vindicate himself by effects, and not by words. He made his troops assemble, and gave

orders,

orders, that the fleet should hold itself in readiness, completely manned and equipped, as if he was to give the Carthaginians battle that very day both by sea and land. The day they arrived, he received them at home with abundance of respect and politeness; and the next morning, shewed them both the sea and land armies, not only in a condition to give the enemy battle, but each exhibiting the image of a battle in their different manner of exercise. He then conducted the Prætor and commissioners to the magazines and arsenals, where they found in abundance, and in the best order possible, all the provisions, arms, and machines, necessary in war. The sight of these preparations, as well in gross and in general, as in detail and particular, filled them with such admiration, that they remained fully convinced, that if the Carthaginians could be conquered, it must be by this General and this army. They therefore exhorted Scipio to go to Africa with the protection of the Gods, and to accomplish, as soon as possible, the hopes which the Roman people had conceived the day when all the centuries had elected him Consul; and they set out from Sicily with the same joy, as if they were returning to Rome to carry the news of the victory thither; and not of the grand preparations which Scipio had made to put himself into a condition to obtain it.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

Pleminius and his accomplices having been carried to Rome, were immediately put in prison: and at first, having been brought before the people by the Tribunes, they found them so much prejudiced against them by the injuries they had done the Locrians, that there seemed no hope of any indulgence for them. But as they were frequently made to appear in the Forum, the mutilation of Pleminius, in effect of catching the eyes of the people, made compassion insensibly succeed to hatred and indignation; besides which, regard for Scipio, though absent, contributed much to incline the multitude in their favour.

Liv. xxix.
22.

Authors

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

Authors differ concerning the manner in which that wretch ended his life. According to some, he died in prison before the people had passed sentence upon him. Others say, he remained some years in prison, at the end of which, having prevailed upon some abandoned wretches to set the city on fire in different parts, in order to escape by favour of the tumult, he was discovered, and strangled in the dungeon.

As to what regards Scipio, his affair was never treated any where but in the Senate, in which all the commissioners and Tribunes unanimously spoke with such great praises of his fleet, his army, and personal merit, that all the Senators unanimously decreed, that he should go as soon as possible to Africa, leaving him at liberty to chuse out of the troops in Sicily those he would take with him, and those he should leave behind to guard the province.

Thus ended the important commission given to several of the principal magistrates of Rome, of which the chief object was Scipio, for whose advantage it terminated; but it did no honour to Fabius. Whatever great and just esteem the latter's exalted merit had acquired him, his conduct, in respect to Scipio, gives room for violent suspicions of jealousy and envy; vices alone capable of sullyng the most glorious reputation. He opposes that young General's design of going to Africa; and he does it with a rancour and inveteracy that favour strongly of those bad passions, though covered and disguised, perhaps even to himself, under an apparent zeal for the public good. The design having been approved in the Senate against his opinion, he employs his whole credit to thwart the execution of it, by preventing him from being supplied with the necessary funds, and from being permitted to make new levies. Scipio having surmounted all these obstacles, and gone to Sicily, Fabius catches at flying reports against him, and, without farther enquiry, concludes for recalling him and divesting him of the command. Can we see, in such a proceeding, the

the wisdom of an old man so worthy of veneration in other respects? We have here an effect of * self-love, soothed and sustained by long success, and of a too great esteem for one's own excellency, which can suffer no rival.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

* *Nimius sui suspectus, & insitum mortalitati vitium se suaque mirandi.* SENECA. de Benef. II, 26.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE TWENTIETH.

THIS book contains the history of almost five years, from the 548th to the 552d year of Rome. The principal facts included in it are, the arrival of Scipio in Africa, the burning of two of the enemy's camps, the defeat and taking of Syphax, the history of Sophonisba, Hannibal's departure from Italy, his defeat at the battle of Zama in Africa, and peace granted to the Carthaginians, which terminates the second Punic war.

S E C T. I.

Syphax marries Sophonisba, the daughter of Asdrubal. Syphax renounces his amity with Scipio and the alliance of the Romans. Scipio conceals the infidelity of Syphax from his troops. Scipio repairs to Lilybæum, and prepares every thing for the departure of the fleet. It sails. The fleet anchors in Africa. Consternation of the country and cities. Scipio ravages the country, after having defeated a detachment of the Carthaginian cavalry. Masinissa joins Scipio. Action between the cavalry. Hanno is defeated, and killed, by Scipio. Scipio ravages Africa. He undertakes the siege of Utica, and is obliged to suspend it. Convoys sent to Scipio. The
Consul

Consul Sempronius is defeated by Hannibal, and soon after beats him in his turn with great advantage. The Consul Cornelius keeps Etruria in awe. Extravagant and indecent conduct of the Censors Livius and Nero.

M. CORNELIUS.

P. SEMPRONIUS.

A. R. 548.

Ant. C.

204.

WHILST the Romans were engrossed by the Liv. xxix. affairs I have been relating, the Carthaginians ^{23.} on their side took measures against the designs of their enemy. They had erected centry-boxes and beacons upon all the promontories. And after having passed the winter in perpetual apprehension and alarm, informing themselves of every thing, and trembling on every advice they received, they at length concluded an alliance with King Syphax, which was of no small importance for their defence; and deprived Scipio of one of the principal supports upon which he had relied, in forming his plan for invading Africa. Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, was not only united with Syphax by the ties of hospitality they had contracted together, when on his return from Spain he met Scipio, as we have said, in that Prince's palace; but there subsisted a project for a closer alliance between them, and the Carthaginian negotiated the marriage of his daughter Sophonisba with the Numidian Prince. He had formerly promised her to Masinissa; but the interests of his house easily dispensed with that engagement. He hastened to complete the treaty with Syphax, and seeing him excessively enamoured of Sophonisba, he caused her to come from Carthage, and married her without delay. In the midst of the feasts and rejoicings for the nuptials, Asdrubal desired Syphax to add to the private alliance they had lately made with each other, a public one between the Numidians and Carthaginians. The King accepted the proposal, and each engaged by oath, that, from thenceforth, the two States should have the same friends and enemies.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

For the rest, Asdrubal not having forgot the alliance Syphax had also sworn with Scipio, and knowing how little the promises of that barbarous Prince were to be relied upon, he apprehended that the marriage with his daughter would be too weak a tie to bind him, when Scipio should arrive in Africa. For this reason, taking advantage of the Numidian Prince's first orders, he prevailed upon him by his instances, to which the young bride added her caresses, to send Ambassadors to Scipio in Sicily, to declare to him, "that the promises he had made him, when he received him at his Court, should not be a motive for him to come to Africa. That he had married the daughter of Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, with whom Scipio had lodged in his palace; and that, in consequence of this particular union, he had made a public alliance with the people of Carthage. That his first intentions were, that the Romans should make war against the Carthaginians far from Africa, as they had done hitherto, in order that he might not be under the necessity of taking part in their difference, and of joining one side by declaring against the other. But that, if the Romans should come to attack Africa, and their army should approach Carthage, he should not be able to avoid fighting for Africa, which had given him birth, and for the country of his spouse and father-in-law."

The ambassadors, whom Syphax charged with this commission, found Scipio at Syracuse. Though the inconstancy of Syphax made that General lose a considerable resource, upon which he had much relied, for the success of his designs against Africa, he was not discouraged; but immediately dismissing the ambassadors of that Prince, before the subject of their voyage was known in the army, he gave them a letter to their master, in which he exhorted him in the strongest terms, "not to violate the laws of hospitality, by which they were bound to each other; to remember the alliance which he had made with the Roman people; not to betray his faith, honour, and

conscience ; and, lastly, to respect and fear the Gods, the witnesses and avengers of treaties." For the rest, as it was not possible to conceal the arrival of the Numidians, who had been seen in different parts of the city ; and that it was to be feared, on one side, that the motive of their voyage would be discovered by the very care taken to conceal it ; and, on the other, that the rumour of this rupture, when it should break out, might discourage the troops : Scipio, to avert the bad effect which this affair might occasion, substituted a false and directly opposite one to it. Accordingly, having assembled his soldiers, he told them, " That there was no longer any time to lose. That the King's allies pressed him to come immediately to their aid. That Masinissa had before had an interview with Lælius, to complain of his delaying so long : that Syphax had now sent ambassadors to ask, what reasons he could have that kept him so long in Sicily. That he desired him either to come as soon as possible to Africa ; or, if he had changed his plan, to let him know it, in order that he might take such measures as he should judge necessary to his own security, and that of his kingdom. That therefore, as every thing was ready for their departure, and it was not possible to delay any longer, his design was to send his fleet to Lilybæum ; to rendezvous all his troops, both horse and foot, there ; and, with the' protection of the Gods, to embark for Africa with the first fair wind."

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

This plain and bold falsity, which Scipio uses here in respect to Syphax, would have become a Carthaginian better than a Roman ; and is far from the disposition so much admired in Epaminondas, who was as great a captain as Scipio, but more delicate than him in point of truth, for which he had so high a veneration, that he did not believe it allowable to lie even in jest, and by way of diversion. *Adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.*

Cornel.
Nep. in
Epamin.
c. 3.

Scipio, in consequence, wrote to M. Pomponius, to desire him to meet at Lilybæum, if he thought proper, in order that they might consider in concert what

Liv. xxix.
24.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

legions and what number of troops it was proper to carry to Africa. At the same time, he sent orders throughout the whole coast, for assembling and bringing to Lilybæum all the transport ships that could be drawn together. All the troops and ships in Sicily having repaired to Lilybæum, the city could not contain so many soldiers, nor the port so many vessels; and the whole multitude had so much ardor for setting sail, that they seemed to be going to Africa, not to make war, but to reap the fruits of a victory already certain. The soldiers who had survived the battle of Cannæ, were persuaded, that only Scipio could give them occasion of deserving, by great and important service, the end of their disgrace, and their re-establishment in all their rights. Scipio, on his side, did not despise those troops. He was convinced, that it was not through their cowardice, that the battle of Cannæ had been lost; and he knew that there were not older soldiers in all the Roman armies; and that, besides, they were experienced not only in the different kinds of combat, but in sieges. These troops composed the fifth and sixth legions. He reviewed them; and formed a chosen corps out of them, separating from them such as did not promise good service, and supplying their places with those he had brought from Italy. He also reinforced those legions in respect to number, and made each consist of six thousand two hundred foot, and three hundred horse. Of the Latine allies, horse and foot, he also gave the preference to those who had been at the battle of Cannæ. The number of the troops that embarked is not exactly known: historians differ much upon this head. The fleet consisted of fifty large ships, and almost four hundred transports.

Scipio took great care that it should want for nothing; and, in order to that, was very circumstantial in seeing whether his orders were duly executed. M. Pomponius, who had the care of the provisions, caused enough for forty-five days to be put on board, of which for fifteen, were ready dressed. Water was
also

also put on board for horse and man for a like number of days. The transports were disposed in the center, covered, on the right, by twenty large ships, commanded by the General, in person, and by L. Scipio, his brother; and on the left, by as many ships of the same kind, under C. Lælius, commander of the fleet, and M. Portius Cato, the Quæstor. Each of the great ships had a lanthorn, the transports two, and the Admiral three, for distinction, and for being the more easily known. He commanded the pilots to anchor on the coast of the district * Emporia, whose inhabitants, little warlike, and even enervated by the pleasures and fertility of the soil, seemed least capable of making resistance. The departure was fixed for the next day.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

Many Roman fleets had been seen to set sail from Sicily, and even from the port of Lilybæum; but, neither during this, nor throughout the whole course of the first war, had one been distinguished by so great a concourse of spectators. However, if a fleet were to be judged of by its greatness, there had one been seen, which had transported beyond sea both the Consuls, with two consular armies, composed of almost as many ships of war, as Scipio had transports at this time. But the importance of this second war, which was infinitely superior to the other; the extreme danger in which Italy had been, and still was, after so many bloody defeats; Scipio's great reputation, founded on the glorious exploits he had already performed, and upon those expected from his courage and good fortune; the bold design of going to Africa, which had not yet entered the thoughts of any other General; the report which he had spread, with an air and tone of confidence, that he was going to force Hannibal out of Italy, and to remove the war into Africa, where it would at length be terminated: all this had excited an eager curiosity in the minds of all people, and

Liv. xxix.
26.

* Emporia was in the little Syrtis, now called the gulph of Capes, upon the coast of the kingdom of Tunis.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

drawn an extraordinary attention upon the departure of the fleet. The port was covered not only with all the inhabitants of Lilybæum, but also of a great number of deputies from the States of Sicily, whom either the desire of making their court to Scipio, or their affairs with the Prætor Pomponius, had brought into that city. Besides which, the soldiers of the legions who remained in Sicily, were come thither to take leave of their comrades. And if the fleet attracted the eyes of that infinite multitude which filled the ports, and the parts of the shore from whence it could be seen; that multitude itself did not make a much less splendid appearance.

As soon as it was day, Scipio appeared upon the deck of the Admiral's ship, and having commanded an herald to make silence—"O Gods and Goddeses
" of the sea and land (said he) I implore and conjure
" you to give success to all the designs I have formed
" and shall form hereafter, and make them turn to
" my advantage and glory, as well as to those of the
" Roman people, the allies of the Latine name, and
" all who bear arms under the auspices of the Roman
" people and mine, as well by sea as land; to grant
" us from day to day, and to continue to us more
" and more your protection; to give us victory and
" triumph over our enemies; to bring us back to our
" country laden with their spoils, and full of joy and
" health; to give us the means of avenging ourselves
" upon our public and private enemies, and to make
" all the misfortunes fall upon the Commonwealth of
" the Carthaginians, with which they have menaced
" the Roman people." After this prayer, the victim was slain, and according to custom, he threw the raw entrails into the sea, and gave the signal for sailing by the sound of trumpet.

Having set out with a fair wind, they soon lost sight of the shore. But so thick a mist arose towards noon, that the ships could scarce keep clear of each other. When they were farther out at sea, it grew calm; and the same fog having continued during all the next night,

night, it dispersed at sun-rise, and the wind began to grow fair and fresh, so that they soon perceived the land. A moment after the pilot told Scipio that they were not above five miles from Africa, that he could descry the * promontory of Mercury, and that, if it were his order to steer that way, the whole fleet would soon be in the port. Scipio immediately prayed to the Gods, that having made the land of Africa, might be for the good fortune of himself and the Commonwealth; and he ordered the pilot to come to an anchor a little lower.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

The same wind continued blowing. But a fog like that the night before, and almost at the same time, arose, which deprived them of the sight of the land, and made the wind fall. Night came on, which made it intirely impossible for them to think of landing. They cast anchor to keep the ships from running foul of each other, or from driving ashore. As soon as day appeared, the wind began to blow again; and the fog being cleared up, the coasts of Africa appeared. Scipio asked the name of the next promontory, and on being told that it was called THE FINE Promontory, (*Pulchri*) "I like the omen, said he, let us land here." Immediately all the prows were turned that way, and the troops were landed.

Liv. xxix.
27.

After this, the Romans incamped upon the adjacent eminences. The sight already, first of the fleet, and then of soldiers quitting their ships in throngs, had spread terror and consternation, not only through the adjacent countries, but even into the cities. A confused multitude of men, women, and children, who fled, driving their cattle before them, had thronged all the ways, so that it might be said, that Africa was abandoned by all its inhabitants. But the country people brought much greater terror into the cities, than that they had been before seized with. Particularly at Carthage the dread and consternation were as

Liv. xxix.
28.

* The cape Bon, in the kingdom of Tunis, near the city called anciently Clypea.

A. R. 548
Ant. C.
204.

great, as if the city had been taken by storm. For, from the time that the Consuls Manlius and Regulus, that is above fifty years before, the Carthaginians had not seen a Roman army in their country. All the hostilities were confined to some descents, which had not had any consequences. This rendered the terror the greater. And indeed, they had neither an army of sufficient strength, nor a General of sufficient experience, to defend them against the troops and General of the Romans. Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, had abundance of reputation and merit: but every body remembered, that the same Scipio had defeated him several times in Spain, and had at length driven him out of the province; and they did not believe him more capable of opposing Scipio, than their troops raised in haste to oppose the veterans of the enemy. For this reason, as if Scipio was coming to attack Carthage, they cried out to arms, shut their gates, posted armed soldiers upon the walls, and placed guard-houses and sentinels every where; and they kept watch during the night.

The next day, five hundred horse, who had been sent towards the sea-coast to observe the motions of the Romans, and harass them in landing, met some of the enemy's advanced guards. For Scipio had already sent his fleet towards Utica, and, as to himself, having removed a little from the sea, he had seized the neighbouring eminences, and had placed part of his cavalry in some advantageous posts, whilst the rest were detached to plunder the country. A combat of the cavalry ensued, which was not in favour of the Carthaginians. Some of them were killed in the action itself, but much more in the flight, of the number of which was a young Carthaginian officer, named Hanno, who commanded the party. Scipio was not contented with ruining the countries round about: he attacked and took a town of some opulence in the neighbourhood, wherein, besides considerable plunder, with which he immediately loaded his ships, and sent

sent them to Sicily, he took eight thousand prisoners, both freemen and slaves. A. R. 548.
Ant. C.

In the beginning of such an expedition as this, of the Romans against Africa, the slightest aids are sometimes of great importance, and always give a sensible pleasure. 204.
Liv. xxix.
29, 33. It was therefore with great joy that Scipio saw Masinissa arrive in his camp. That Prince, who was young at this time, had suffered great misfortunes, having been deprived of his kingdom, obliged to fly from province to province, and frequently upon the very point of losing his life. Syphax, animated by Asdrubal, had declared against, and made a cruel war upon, him. Syphax was king of the Masesylians, Masinissa of the Massylians. These two States were both denominated Numidians. Masinissa, therefore, as we have said, came to join Scipio with two thousand horse, according to some, and only with two hundred, according to others. The unhappy state of his affairs makes the latter opinion most probable.

The Carthaginians having made levies, set a new body of cavalry on foot in the room of that which had been defeated with its leader, and gave the command of it to Hanno, son of Amilcar. They sent letters after letters, deputies after deputies, to Asdrubal and Syphax, to press them to act. They ordered the one to come to defend his country, almost besieged by the enemy. They conjured the other to hasten to the aid of Carthage and all Africa. Scipio was then about a thousand paces from the city of Utica, whither he marched to incamp, after having continued some days on the sea-side opposite to his fleet.

As Hanno, with the horse that had been given him, far from being able to attack the enemy, was not in a condition to prevent them from plundering the country, his first care was to make levies for augmenting the number of his horse. Without refusing those of other nations, he listed as many Numidians as he could, who were the best horse-soldiers in Africa. He had drawn together about four thousand horse, when he shut himself up in the city of Salera. Scipio, after having Liv. xxix.
34.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

having directed Masinissa how he was to act, gave him orders to make excursions as far as the gates of that city, in order to draw on the enemy to a battle. They did not fail to come out, and charge Masinissa. The battle ensued by degrees, and was long doubtful. At length that Prince, as if he had found himself the weaker, began to give way, not by a precipitate flight, but fighting in retreat, and drew on the enemy as far as the hills, behind which the Roman cavalry were concealed. Scipio's troops, who were fresh as well as their horses, then appeared, and surrounded Hanno and his Africans, who were much fatigued in effect of fighting, and pursuing Masinissa. Masinissa, on his side, faced about, and renewed the battle. Hanno, with about a thousand horse, having been separated from the rest of his troops by the Romans, and thereby rendered incapable of making off, were killed upon the spot. All the rest, terrified with the death of their General, fled full speed. But the victors pursued them almost ten leagues, and either took or killed about two thousand more, amongst whom were two hundred Carthaginians illustrious by their birth and fortune.

The same day this battle was fought, the ships which had carried the first plunder to Sicily, of which we have spoke, returned with new provisions.

Liv. xxix.
35.

Scipio made considerable presents to the officers in proportion to their valour: but he treated Masinissa with more distinction than any of them. He put a strong garrison into Salera, and marching with the rest of his troops, he not only ravaged all the countries through which he passed, but, on his way, took a great number of cities and towns; and having spread the terror of his arms on all sides, he returned to his camp seven days after he had left it, bringing with him a vast multitude of men and cattle, with infinite plunder of all kinds, which he caused to be put on board his ships, and sent them back to Sicily laden with rich spoils.

The

The Victor, abandoning the plunder, and other expeditions of little consequence, turned all his forces against the city of Utica, with design, after having taken it, to make it a place of arms, which would be very advantageous for him in the execution of his designs. He attacked it at once by sea and land, being abundantly provided with all machines necessary for a siege. Carthage took as much pains to save this place as if itself had been attacked. Asdrubal, by the levies which he made with all possible diligence, set on foot an army of thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. But with such considerable forces, he did not dare to approach the enemy, till Syphax came to join him. That Prince arrived at last with fifty thousand foot and ten thousand horse. Asdrubal then immediately began his march, and incamped with him not far from Utica and the intrenchments of the Romans. All the benefit they reaped from so considerable an armament, was to oblige Scipio to suspend the siege of Utica, after having ineffectually employed, during forty days, all imaginable efforts to carry it. In consequence, as the winter approached, he incamped upon a promontory that extended a considerable way into the sea, and joined the terra firma by a kind of narrow isthmus, inclosing both the sea and land armies within the same works.

Besides the corn which Scipio had taken in the countries he had plundered, and that he had brought from Sicily and Italy, the Proprætor Cn. Octavius brought him a very great quantity, which had been sent him from Sardinia by Ti. Claudius, Prætor of that province: so that he not only filled the magazines he had already, but was obliged to have more built. As his soldiers wanted cloaths, he sent the same Octavius to Sardinia to confer with the Prætor of that province upon that head. He punctually acquitted himself of that commission; and, in a very short time, brought back twelve hundred robes (*togas*) and twelve thousand tunics.

The

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

Liv. xxix.
36.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

The same campaign that these things passed in Africa, the Consul P. Sempronius, who had Bruttium for his province, was attacked upon his march by Hannibal. The two enemies fought in parties rather than line of battle. The Consul was repulsed, left twelve hundred of his troops upon the spot, and regained his camp in no little disorder. Hannibal, however, did not venture to attack him in it. The Consul, in consequence, quitted it the night following, after having given the Proconsul Publius Licinius notice to join him with his legions. When the two Generals were joined, they marched with both armies in quest of Hannibal, to offer him battle, which he did not hesitate to accept. He was encouraged by the victory which he had lately gained, and Sempronius by the augmentation of his forces. The Consul posted his own legions in the front, and those of Licinius in the corps de reserve. He defeated the Carthaginians, put them to flight, killed them above four thousand men, and took near three hundred, with forty horses and eleven ensigns. Hannibal, discouraged by this defeat, retired towards Croton.

During this time, the Consul M. Cornelius, in the other part of Italy, employed rigorous prosecutions, rather than the force of arms, to keep and bring over the Hetrurians to their duty, who, on Mago's approach, had almost all of them suffered themselves to be carried away by the love of novelty, and the desire of changing their masters.

At Rome, the Censors M. Livius and C. Claudius reviewed the Senate. Q. Fabius Maximus was declared Prince of it, for the second time. They laid a new duty upon salt, or rather an additional one: I have spoke of it elsewhere. The Census was completed later than usual, because the Censors sent persons into the provinces to know the exact number of the soldiers of which each army consisted. That of all the citizens, amounted to two hundred and fourteen thousand men. It was C. Claudius that closed the Lustrum,

Lustrum, that is, the religious ceremony of the A. R. 543.
Ant. C.
Census.

They then began the review of the Knights, and 204.
Liv. xxix.
both the Censors, by an accident that seems singular, 37.
Val. Max.
II. 9.
were of that order. When they came to the tribe Pollia, of which M. Livius was, as the crier hesitated to cite the Censor himself, “Cite M. Livius,” said Nero; and whether he retained some remains of enmity to him, or improperly affected to shew a rigid severity, he obliged Livius to * resign his horse, under pretence, that he had been condemned by the people. M. Livius, in his turn, in reviewing the tribe Narniensis, obliged Nero, who was of it, to sell his horse, for two reasons; first, because he had borne false witness against him; and secondly, because he had not been reconciled to him in earnest. Thus were the whole Roman people witnesses of a very scandalous quarrel between two Censors, who were each mutually bent to destroy the other’s reputation, at the expence of his own. When the question was to quit their office, C. Claudius swore, according to the custom, that they had done nothing that was not conformable to the laws; and, going to the public treasury, he placed his colleague in the number of those to whom he gave the degrading name of Tributaries, (*† ærarios*). M. Livius carried his revenge still farther; for when he came to the public treasury after his colleague, except the tribe Metia, which had neither condemned nor elected him Consul and Censor after his sentence, he degraded with the same ignominy all the rest of the Roman people, that is, thirty-four whole tribes; “as a punishment (added he) for having first sentenced him unjustly, and then elected him Consul and Censor; for they could not deny, but that they had committed a crime, either once in the sentence they had passed against him, or twice in the

* That was to degrade him from the rank of Knight.

† So those were called whom the Censors deprived of all the rights of citizens, except the obligation of paying taxes.

A. R. 548.
Ant. C.
204.

assemblies, wherein they had raised him to the great offices after they had condemned him. He said, that Claudius was included in the thirty-four tribes; but that, if there had been any example of a citizen's being condemned twice in the same penalty, he should not have failed to have noted C. Claudius by name."

Livy's opinion of this conduct of the Censors is remarkable. He approves that of Livius in respect to the people. The * people, says he, well deserved to be noted for their inconstancy; and the reproaches he made them, perfectly become the severity of a Censor, and the gravity of the magistrates of those times: but the animosity which these two Censors shew against each other, was of very bad example, and flowed from a levity of mind that dishonoured the wise conduct they had observed during their Consulship, and reflected a kind of infamy upon their most glorious actions. Accordingly, that conduct rendered them odious; and as soon as they quitted their office, C. Bæbius, one of the Tribunes of the people, believing the occasion favourable for recommending himself at their expence, accused them before the people. But the Senators suppressed this affair, in order that the Censorship might not in the consequence be exposed to the caprice of the multitude.

As the time for the elections approached, M. Cornelius was made to return to Rome, who had no war upon his hands in Hetruria, rather than Sempronius, who had Hannibal to oppose. Cn. Servilius Cæpio, and C. Servilius Geminus, were created Consuls; after which the other magistrates were elected.

* Prævum certamen notarum inter Censores: castigatio inconstantiaæ populi censoria, & gravitate temporum illorum digna. LIV.

S E C T. II.

Distribution of the provinces between the Consuls. Praise of Licinius. Scipio continued in command. The Consuls repair to their provinces. Scipio forms a great design, and, however, amuses Syphax with the hope of an accommodation. Scipio discovers his design, which is to burn the two camps of the enemy, and executes it with success. General consternation of Carthage. The Carthaginians and Syphax raise new troops to continue the war. A battle is fought, in which Scipio is victorious. He takes all the cities dependent on Carthage. Consternation of the inhabitants of that city. Hannibal is recalled into Africa. The Carthaginians attack the Roman fleet, and gain a slight advantage. Masinissa is reinstated in the possession of his kingdom. Syphax raises new forces. He is defeated by Lælius and Masinissa, and taken prisoner. Cirta, the capital of Syphax's dominions, surrenders to Masinissa. Sophonisba's discourse to Masinissa. Masinissa espouses Sophonisba. Syphax is carried prisoner to the Roman camp. He endeavours to justify himself to Scipio, by accusing Sophonisba. Scipio reproaches Masinissa with great mildness and reserve. Masinissa sends poison to Sophonisba. She drinks it with great resolution. Scipio consoles Masinissa, and gives him the highest praises. Lælius carries Syphax and the prisoners to Rome. The Carthaginians send to demand peace of Scipio. Conditions of peace proposed by Scipio. Lælius arrives at Rome. Joy occasioned by the news of the victories gained in Africa. Masinissa's Ambassadors well received by the Senate. Mago is defeated. He receives orders to return to Africa. He dies on the way.

CN. SERVILIUS CÆPIO.

C. SERVILIUS GEMINUS.

A. R. 549.

Ant. C.

203.

THESE two Consuls entered upon office the sixteenth year of the second Punic war. They drew lots for the provinces, and Bruttium fell to Cæpio, and Hetruria to Servilius Geminus. The provinces of the other Generals were then settled.

P. Li-

A. R. 549.
Ant. C.
203.

P. Licinius, who had commanded the year of his Consulship, and the year following, was recalled. Livy here gives us a picture of him, which represents him as an accomplished person: He had all the exterior advantages of nature and fortune; birth, riches, a fine mien, and a beautiful person. He had eloquence of every kind; and was equally capable of pleading at the bar, speaking in the Senate, and haranguing before the People. As he was Pontifex Maximus, he had particularly studied the laws of religion, and made himself perfectly master of them. And lastly, to all the other talents, natural and acquired, which he possessed in as eminent a degree as any other Roman, he added the qualities of a soldier, and his Consulship had afforded him occasions of making them appear.

The duration in command was fixed for all others: but it was decreed, that Scipio should retain his till the war in Africa should be terminated, without limiting any time; and public prayers were appointed, to implore the favour and protection of the Gods, for the enterprize Scipio had already happily began by going to Africa. The sea and land forces with which the Romans made war this year, amounted to twenty legions, and an hundred and sixty large ships.

Liv. xxx.
3.

When the Consuls had discharged all the duties of religion, they set out, as well as the Prætors, for their respective provinces. But they were all principally intent upon Africa, as if the lots had given it themselves for a province, whether they thought that the safety and glory of the Commonwealth depended on the successes they should have on that side; or that they were glad of an occasion to please Scipio, upon whom the eyes of the whole city were turned. For which reason, they sent cloaths, corn, arms, and every kind of munitions, in emulation of each other, not only from Sardinia, as we have said above, but from Sicily and Spain.

Scipio, on his side, acted as a man of superior genius, taking in every thing at once, and making head on all sides. He had, no doubt, employment enough. For, besides the siege of Utica, which he continued, he

drubal, who was encamped in view ; and the Carthaginians had put a well-equipped fleet to sea, with design to cut off his provisions.

In the midst of all these cares, he had not renounced all hopes of bringing over Syphax ; flattering himself, that perhaps the first heat of his passion for Sophonisba, which had allured him to the Carthaginian side, might be abated ; and knowing besides, that the Numidians made no scruple to violate the faith of treaties. He therefore took occasion, from the nearness of the two armies, to enter into a negotiation with that Prince, and to sound his thoughts, by giving him some room to hope an accommodation between the two States ; which agreeably soothed the ambition of Syphax, and induced him to make a truce.

Some of those he had sent to that Prince, brought back advice, that the Carthaginians lay in their camp, under huts made only of wood and boughs, without any mixture of earth ; and that those of the Numidians, consisting of rushes and leaves, were partly within and partly without the intrenchment. This account gave birth to a thought in Scipio, which he very much revolved in mind, but at first kept very secret. Hitherto he had always rejected the proposals brought to him on the part of Syphax ; which were, that the Carthaginians should quit Italy, and the Romans Africa ; continuing, as to the rest, in the same state as they were before the war. Scipio began then to seem less difficult ; and not to think what was proposed to him impossible.

Syphax, charmed with this news, kept himself less upon his guard in respect to comers and goers. Scipio did not omit to take advantage of this facility. He sent oftener, and more in number to the camp of that Prince ; and both sides even remained several days in each other's camps, without distrust or precaution. Scipio sent with his deputies some intelligent persons, and officers disguised as slaves, to observe the avenues and issues from the two camps, and to inform them-

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Polyb. xiv.
677—679.
Liv. xxx.
3, 4.
App. de
Bell. Pu-
nic. p. 10
—15.

A. R. 549. selves how they kept guard day and night. There
 Ant. C. were two camps, as I have said : that of Asdrubal,
 203. in which there were about thirty thousand foot, and
 three thousand horse ; and that of the Numidians, in
 which there were ten thousand horse, and fifty thou-
 sand foot. They were but ten stadia distant from
 each other (half a league.) Hence we see what inte-
 rest Scipio had to avoid a battle with enemies so much
 superior to him in number.

The manner in which the affair was treated, gave
 Syphax and the Carthaginians, in concert with whom
 he acted, more hope every day, that a peace would
 at length be concluded. When Scipio had taken all
 the measures necessary to the success of his design, his
 deputies declared to Syphax, that Scipio had directed
 them not to return without bringing back a positive
 answer, finding the affair was protracted too long.
 This kind of earnestness made that Prince believe,
 that the Romans ardently desired peace ; and induced
 him to add some new conditions to the plan of accom-
 modation harder than the first. These new terms sup-
 plied Scipio with a plausible pretext for breaking the
 truce. He accordingly told the courier, who brought
 them from the King, that he should consider of them
 in a council of war ; and the next day returned for
 answer, “ That whatever desire he might have to
 conclude a treaty, the conditions proposed by the
 King seemed insupportable to him. That he should
 therefore declare to his master, that the sole means he
 had for living in peace with the Romans, was to re-
 nounce his alliance with the Carthaginians.” He
 immediately broke the truce, in order to execute his
 project, without giving room to accuse him of breach
 of faith.

During the conferences, Scipio having made his
 fleet put to sea, had shipped his machines on board of
 it. He had at the same time sent two thousand men
 to seize one of the eminences that commanded the
 city, of which he had been master before. These
 motions had two reasons : the first, to divert the at-
 tention

tention of the enemy from his real designs : the second, to prevent the inhabitants of Utica, whilst he was acting against Syphax and Asdrubal, from making any sally upon his camp, where he left few troops. He succeeded in amusing, not only the enemy, but even his own troops, who hitherto, from the preparations he made, had believed that his sole design was to surprize Utica.

After having taken such wise measures, Scipio called a council of war, and having ordered those he had employed to view the enemy's camp, to give an account of what they had remarked in it ; and desired Masinissa, who was particularly acquainted with it, to speak his thoughts ; he at length openly declared the enterprize he intended to execute the same night, which was to burn both the enemy's camps. He ordered the Tribunes to make the legions quit the camp on the first signal that should be given them after the council broke up. The troops took refreshment, and set out, according to the orders they had received, immediately after sun-set. Some time after they drew up in battle, and marching slow, arrived about midnight at the enemy's camp, which was about two leagues from their own. Scipio there, giving part of his troops to Lælius, ordered him to go with Masinissa and his Numidians, to attack the camp of Syphax and set it on fire. And at the same time, taking Lælius and Masinissa aside, he conjured them to prevent, with all possible vigilance and attention, the confusion which the night might occasion on the execution of such an enterprize. That, as for himself, he should attack Asdrubal and the Carthaginians in person ; but that he should not begin till he saw the camp of Syphax on fire.

He did not wait long. For as soon as the flames had taken hold of the first huts, they communicated themselves to the next so suddenly, that in a very short time every part of the camp was in a blaze. It is easy to judge the consternation that a fire in the night occasioned amongst the enemy, which spread so

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fast and so universally. But the Barbarians, who imputed it to chance, without thinking at all of the Romans, having ran without arms, and almost naked, to extinguish it, fell into the hands of well-armed enemies, especially of the Numidians; whom Masinissa, in effect of his knowledge of the places, had disposed every where through which they could escape. The fire suffocated many half asleep in their beds: many, in the press, were crushed to death at the gates, that were too narrow to let all through who flew thither to get off.

The light of so great a fire first alarmed the sentinels of the Carthaginians. Others afterwards, whom the noise and tumult had awakened, having also perceived it, fell into the same error as the King's troops. They believed that the fire was only a mere accident. The cries raised by the soldiers, wounded and slaughtered by the Romans, which might be attributed to the terror occasioned by such a fire in the night, prevented them from guessing the real cause. Consequently every one running eagerly to help the Numidians, without carrying any thing with them but what might serve to extinguish the fire, because they did not apprehend that they had any thing to fear from the enemy, they fell into their hands without arms and defenceless. All were put to the sword, not only in effect of the hatred natural to enemies, but because it was thought proper, that not one might escape to carry the news of what passed to the rest. Scipio afterwards went to attack the gates of Asdrubal's camp, which were quite abandoned, as is natural on such a tumult. He immediately caused the first tents to be set on fire. The flames first appeared in many different places, but uniting soon after set the whole camp in a blaze, and in a moment consumed every thing combustible. The men and beasts, half burned, made to the gates to save themselves: but they were soon blocked up by the multitude, who, falling over one another, lay in heaps in the way. Those whom the flames spared, perished by the sword. The two camps of Syphax and Asdrubal were

were destroyed almost in the space of one hour. However, the chiefs escaped, with about two thousand foot, and five hundred horse; most of them without arms, wounded, or hurt by the flames: a deplorable remainder of two such numerous armies. The sword, or the fire, destroyed about forty thousand men, and eight elephants. Above five thousand men were made prisoners, amongst whom were a great number of Carthaginians of principal distinction, and eleven Senators; an hundred and seventy-four ensigns were also taken, with above two thousand seven hundred Numidian horses, six elephants, and a prodigious quantity of arms, which the General burnt as a sacrifice to Vulcan, who had just done him so great a service.

Asdrubal, very ill attended, had escaped to the nearest city; and all who had escaped death took refuge there, by following him upon the heel. But he soon after quitted it, apprehending that the inhabitants would deliver him up to Scipio. He was not mistaken. The Romans no sooner appeared before their gates, than they were opened to them. As they surrendered voluntarily, no hurt was done them. Scipio took two other cities afterwards, of which he gave the plunder to the soldiers, with all that could be saved from the fire in the two camps. Syphax incamped eight miles from thence in a well-fortified post: and Asdrubal repaired to Carthage, to encourage the citizens, and prevent them from taking some weak and timorous resolution.

Of all the surprizing events that we have hitherto seen, says Polybius, none come up to this, and we know nothing that can give us an image of it. And indeed, adds he, it is the most subtle and bold of all Scipio's exploits, though his life was but one continued series of great and glorious actions. In effect, nothing, that was proper to make important designs succeed, was wanting in this: wonderful sagacity and attention to improve the slightest openings chance offered, a lively and active foresight, that without perplexity and eagerness, prepares all necessary measures,

A. R. 549. a scrupulous exactness that descends to the most minute particulars, but above all impenetrable secrecy, which is the soul of great enterprizes.

Ant. C.

293.

Polyb xiv.

682.

Liv. xxx.

7.

The first news of the ruin of the two armies, struck such a terror and consternation into the minds of the Carthaginians, that they did not doubt but Scipio would abandon the siege of Utica to attack Carthage. It was for this reason the Suffetes, who were at Carthage what the Consuls were at Rome, assembled the Senate, that were divided by three different opinions. Some were for sending ambassadors to Scipio, to treat with him of peace : others, that Hannibal should be recalled, to defend his country against an enemy that threatened its immediate ruin : and lastly, some, imitating the constancy of the Romans in adversity, maintained that it was necessary to set new troops on foot, and to implore Syphax not to abandon his allies, nor to be discouraged by a first defeat. This opinion, supported by Asdrubal's presence, and the credit of the Barcinian party, who were averse to peace, carried it against the other two.

Polyb. &
Liv. ibid.

They accordingly began to levy troops in the city and country ; and ambassadors were sent to Syphax, who, on his side, was making preparations to renew the war with all his forces. For his spouse was not contented with employing, as before, caresses, sufficiently powerful of themselves with a husband so passionately fond as Syphax : but she added to them the most tender and urgent prayers ; conjuring him, all bathed in tears, not to abandon her father and her country, and not to suffer Carthage to be destroyed by the same flames that had consumed the two camps. The ambassadors added, to encourage him, that they had met on their way, four thousand Celtiberians, all young and brave, whom the Carthaginian officers had lifted in Spain : and that Asdrubal would soon join him with considerable troops. Syphax, after having given the ambassadors a very obliging and favourable answer, shewed them a great multitude of Numidians, whom he had raised in the country, and

to whom he had lately given horses and arms; and assured them, “that his design was to arm all the youth of his country. That he well knew it was by surprize, and not in battle, they had sustained the last loss; and that it was necessary to be overcome in the field, to confess themselves inferior to an enemy in war.” He dismissed the ambassadors of Carthage with this answer; and some few days after, Asdrubal and Syphax again joined their forces, which amounted to thirty thousand fighting men.

Scipio considering Syphax and the Carthaginians as flying enemies, thought almost only of pushing the siege of Utica; and he had made his machines approach the walls of that city, when he received advice that the enemy had taken the field again with new armies. He was therefore obliged to suspend his attacks; and to preserve the appearances at least of a siege; leaving the most inconsiderable part of the army in his lines, and on board his ships, he set out with the flower and greatest part of his troops, in quest of the enemy. He at first posted himself upon an eminence about four miles from the camp of Syphax. The next day he came down with his cavalry into a large plain below that hill, and passed the whole day in harrassing the enemy, and defying them by skirmishing quite up to the gates of their camp. During the two following days, the armies made excursions reciprocally upon each other, in which nothing memorable passed.

The fourth day, the two parties actually drew up in battle. Scipio, according to the custom of the Romans, posted the Principes in the second line, behind the Hastati, who formed the front, and the Triarii in the rear. He placed the Italian cavalry on the right wing, and Masinissa with his Numidians on the left. Syphax and Asdrubal posted their Numidians opposite to the Italian horse, and the Carthaginians against Masinissa. The Celtiberians were in the main body, and were to act against the Roman legions, that were drawn up facing them. In this order they

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came to blows. On the first charge both wings gave way on the side of the Carthaginians. Syphax's Numidians, most of whom were only peasants, could not sustain the charge of the Roman cavalry; nor the Carthaginians, who were also but new-raised forces, Mafiniffa's, with whose valour and experience united the boldness which a quite recent victory is apt to inspire. The Celtiberians, though abandoned and uncovered by the flight of the two wings, continued however in their post; because not knowing the country, they could not hope to find safety in flight; and the treachery which had induced them to take arms against the Romans, the benefactors of their nation, though during the war in Spain, no hostilities had been committed against them, left them no hopes of quarter. In the mean time, the wings being broke, they were soon surrounded by the Principes and Triarii. An horrible slaughter of them ensued; which very few of them escaped. The Celtiberians were however of great service to the Carthaginians. For they not only fought with courage, but much favoured their retreat. If the Romans had not been stopped by them, and had at first pursued those that fled, hardly one of them had survived. Their long resistance gave Syphax time to retire home with his horse, and Asdrubal to regain Carthage, with those who had escaped from the battle.

Polyb. xiv
685.
Liv. xxx.
9.

The next day, Scipio sent out Lælius and Mafiniffa with all the Roman and Numidian cavalry, and a detachment of infantry, in pursuit of the flying enemy. As for himself, with the gross of the army, he reduced all the neighbouring cities in the dependance of Carthage under the Roman power; employing terror and force against those who refused to surrender voluntarily. The whole country, tired with the length of the war, and the taxes which they were compelled to pay for carrying it on, had been long ripe for an universal revolt.

At Carthage, though the burning of the two camps had greatly affected the People, their confusion became

came much greater by the loss of the battle. This second blow put them into a terrible consternation, and made them lose all hope, not doubting that now Scipio, after having subjected the country round about, would turn his arms against the capital itself. However, there were some wise and generous Senators, who, in so afflicting a conjuncture, took pains to animate the courage of their fellow-citizens, and to make them take vigorous resolutions. They were of opinion, that it was necessary to attack the Romans, who were before Utica, by sea; that endeavours should be used to make them raise the siege, and battle given them, whilst they expected nothing less, and had nothing in readiness for such an attack. Others added, that it was necessary to send deputies to Hannibal, in Italy, without loss of time, to recal him into Africa: because the success that might be obtained against the enemy's fleet, might indeed relieve the city of Utica, but would not rid Carthage of its fears, which could be defended only by Hannibal and his army. And lastly, others represented, that the most important point was to strengthen Carthage, to place it safe from insult, and to keep themselves in readiness to sustain a siege. These three opinions were joined together, and immediately put in execution. The next day the fleet put to sea, the deputies set out for Italy, and incredible ardour was used in repairing and augmenting the fortifications.

Scipio having found no resistance wherever he had marched with his victorious army, had taken considerable spoils. He thought it proper that they should be carried into his first camp before Utica, to march his troops to attack Tunis, and to encamp in sight of the Carthaginians, with the view that his approach would spread terror amongst them. The latter having in a few days shipped the necessary equipage and provisions, were preparing to sail, when Scipio arrived at Tunis. Those who guarded that place retired through fear

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A. R. 549. fear of being attacked and forced. Tunis was about
 Ant. C. * five or six leagues from Carthage.
 203.

The Romans were already at work upon their intrenchments, when they discovered the fleet of the enemy rowing from Carthage to Utica. For this reason, Scipio ordered them immediately to quit their work, and march away; apprehending, that the ships which he had left at the siege of Utica might be surprized, and put into disorder by those of the Carthaginians, which they were not in a condition to oppose, because the latter were light, and equipped with every thing necessary for working them well in a battle; whereas those of the Romans, laden with all the things used in a siege, were by no means fit to fight. He did not upon this occasion follow the usual custom of drawing up in this kind of battles. Having placed in the rear, and near the shore, the ships of war, which are usually destined to defend the others, he opposed the enemy on the side next the sea, in the form of walls, with all his transports, of which he had formed four rows. And to prevent their being displaced in the tumult of the battle, he fastened them all together, by laying the masts and yards across from one ship into another, and binding the whole with large cables; this formed a body of which the parts were inseparable. He afterwards covered them with planks, in order that the soldiers might pass from one to another; and under this kind of bridges formed by the planks, he left intervals, through which the boats were to pass between the barks, in order to view the enemy, and retire with safety. All this having been executed with expedition, he put about a thousand chosen troops on board of the transports, and caused all kinds of darts to be carried into them, and especially of those that are discharged at a great distance, in sufficiently large quantities, that they might not be wanting, how long soever the battle might be. With these

* An hundred and twenty stadia according to Polybius; fifteen miles according to Livy.

preparations, and in this order, they waited the enemy's arrival, with intent to give them a warm reception.

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If the Carthaginians had not lost time, they would have surprized the Romans in disorder and confusion, and have defeated them at the first attack. But being still terrified with the losses they had sustained by land, and not confiding too much at sea, though they were much the stronger, they employed an whole day in tacking very slowly, and did not anchor till sun-set, in the port called Ruscinon by the Africans. The next day at sun-rise, they drew up their ships out at sea, as if they intended to give battle in the forms, and supposing that the Romans would come out to attack them. They continued in this situation a considerable time: but, seeing that the Romans did not move, they at length came on, and charged the transports. This action had not the aspect of a sea-fight, but rather resembled ships attacking a wall. As the transports of the Romans were much higher than the enemy's galleys, the darts of the Carthaginians thrown upwards were most of them ineffectual; whereas those of the Romans, discharged from above, had all their effect. The Carthaginians, after having long sustained this shower of darts, which incommoded them exceedingly, at length began to throw grappling irons (harpagons) from their ships into the transports; and as the Romans could not cut them, nor the chains to which they hung, the beaked galley, which had grappled a transport, dragged it away in retiring, and with it the whole line of which it was a part, till the cordage which made it fast was broke by the violence with which it was pulled. This rude shock divided the planks of which the bridges were made, so that the Roman soldiers had scarce time to get to the second row of barks. Six of these transport ships were towed to Carthage, and * occasioned much greater rejoicing there than so small a success deserved in it-

* Major, quàm pro re, lætitia, sed eo gratior, quòd inter assiduas clades ac lacrymas unum quantumcumque ex insperato gaudium affulserat. LIV.

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self. But, after so many bloody defeats received upon the necks of each other, after so many tears shed concerning the public misfortunes, the slightest advantage was the occasion of infinite joy, especially because it happened contrary to all hope. Besides which, it was a consolation for them, and an idea that soothed them, to think that the Roman fleet would have been entirely destroyed, if their commanders had been more expeditious, and Scipio had not come in time to aid it.

Liv. xxx.
11.
Appian.
13, 14.

During this time, Lælius and Masinissa arrived in Numidia, after a march of fifteen days. The Masæsylians, Masinissa's subjects, surrendered themselves immediately with great joy and ardour to their King, whose return and re-establishment they had long desired. Though Syphax, whose lieutenants and garrisons had been driven out of the country entirely, kept within the bounds of his own kingdom, it was not his design to stay long there. His wife, whom he loved to excess, and Asdrubal his father-in-law, incessantly importuned him to continue the war: and the forces of so powerful a state as his, that abounded with men and horses, might have inspired a Prince less haughty and presuming than him with courage. Having therefore drawn together all the people he had capable of service, he gave them horses and arms; and divided his cavalry into squadrons, and his infantry into cohorts, as he had formerly been taught by the Roman centuries sent to him from Spain by the Scipios. At the head of as numerous an army as he had had some time before, but for the rest, consisting of new-raised soldiers, without any knowledge of military discipline, he believed himself in a condition to march in quest of the Romans.

As soon as Syphax was encamped in sight of the enemy, frequent skirmishes happened, which soon drew on a battle of the cavalry in form. As long as it acted alone, the Romans found it difficult to make good their ground against the Masæsylians, whom Syphax detached in great bodies. But, as soon as the
foot,

foot, by passing through the intervals between the squadrons, had encouraged the horse, the Barbarians were amazed to see an enemy upon their hands whom they did not expect; presently after they stopped, being little used to such a kind of combat; and they at length entirely gave way; the Roman cavalry by the assistance of the foot having a superiority, which it had not alone. The legions were already very near. The Masæsylians, far from being in a condition to resist them, could not support the sight of them, so much were they discouraged, as well by the remembrance of their past defeats, as by the fear that seized them at this instant. Here, whilst Syphax threw himself into the midst of the Roman squadrons, to try whether the shame of abandoning him alone to the arms of the enemy, would prevent the flight of his troops, he fell from his horse, which had received a great wound, and having been taken prisoner was carried to Lælius: a very grateful sight to Masinissa, who had before been dethroned by that Prince. The greatest part of the defeated Numidians took refuge at Cirta, the capital of Syphax's kingdom. The slaughter was not so great in this battle, in which the cavalry only had fought. About five thousand of the enemy were killed upon the spot, and above two thousand taken prisoners in the attack of the camp, into which the Numidians had thrown themselves in crouds after having lost their King.

Masinissa well knew how to improve his victory. He represented to Lælius, "that if he regarded only what would be most grateful to himself, nothing could be more so than to go to his own kingdom, in order to his re-establishment. But he added, that not a moment was to be lost in prosperity more than adversity. That if Lælius would permit him to advance with the cavalry, he would march directly to Cirta, and that he should infallibly make himself master of it by shewing the terrified inhabitants their King a prisoner. That Lælius might follow him by short marches with the infantry."

This

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 203.
 Liv. xxx.
 12.
 App. 14.
 15.

This plan was followed. Masinissa repaired to Cirta, and immediately demanded an interview with the principal persons of that city. As they were ignorant of the misfortune of Syphax, neither the account of what had passed in the battle, his promises, nor his menaces could gain any thing from them, till he had shewn them their King a prisoner and in chains. At so sad a sight, nothing was heard but cries of grief and groans, which soon spread throughout the whole city. Some out of fear abandoned the walls: others, to conciliate the victor's favour, opened the gates of the city and surrendered to him. Masinissa, having posted guards at the gates and around the walls, to prevent any person from flying, hastened to the king's palace, in order to make himself master of it.

Sophonisba, Syphax's wife, and Asdrubal's daughter, came out to receive him in the porch; and having discovered him in the midst of the croud that attended him, by the splendor of his arms and robes, she threw herself at his feet; and after he had raised her, she spoke to him as follows: "The gods, your
 " own valour and fortune, have rendered you
 " master of my fate. But, if a captive may be al-
 " lowed to address a fearful prayer to him who is the
 " arbiter of her life and death; if you vouchsafe to
 " suffer me to embrace your knees, and this victo-
 " rious hand; I conjure you by the majesty of
 " kings, in which sacred character we not long since
 " shared with you; by the name of Numidian, which
 " you bear in common with Syphax; by the gods of
 " this palace, whom I implore to regard your arrival
 " with a more favourable eye than they saw his un-
 " happy departure; I conjure you, I say, to afford
 " me this sole grace, that you yourself will determine
 " the fate of your prisoner, and that you will not suf-
 " fer her to fall under the haughty and cruel power
 " of any Roman.—Though I were only the wife of
 " Syphax, that would suffice to make me prefer the
 " faith of a Numidian Prince, born in Africa as well
 " as myself, to that of a stranger. But you are sen-
 " sible

“ fible what a Carthaginian, what the daughter of
 “ Afrubal has to fear from the Romans. If you can
 “ only exempt me from their power by death, I beg
 “ it of you as the greatest favour you can grant me.”

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Sophonisba was in the flower of her youth, and of exquisite beauty. Her intreaties, which were more like caresses, easily revived a flame ill extinguished in the heart of Masinissa. He could not see her embracing his knees, and kissing his hands, without being infinitely softened; and that victorious Prince, conquered in his turn by the charms of his prisoner, without hesitating, promised what she desired, and engaged not to deliver her up to the Romans. He began by promising: but reflection ensued. The more he examined the promise he had just made, the more difficulty he found in keeping it. In this perplexity, he blindly followed the imprudent and rash counsel which his passion suggested. He resolved to marry her that very day, in order that neither Lælius, who would soon arrive, nor Scipio himself, might pretend to have a right to treat a Princess as their prisoner, who was become the wife of Masinissa.

As soon as the ceremony was over, and the marriage consummated, Lælius arrived; and, far from approving what had passed, he was upon the point of seizing Sophonisba even in the nuptial bed, to send her with Syphax and the other prisoners to Scipio. But he suffered himself to be prevailed on by the intreaties of Masinissa, and consented to refer the affair to the General's judgment. He accordingly contented himself with sending Syphax and the other prisoners to the camp, and set out with Masinissa to compleat the conquest of Numidia.

As soon as it was known in the Roman camp, that Syphax was upon the point of arriving there, all the soldiers quitted it with the same eagerness as they would to see the pomp of a triumph. That unfortunate Prince walked foremost in chains, followed by a troop of Numidians of principal distinction. The Romans, to exalt their victory, exaggerating the greatness and
 power

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power of Syphax, in emulation of each other, said, “ that this was the King, for whom the Romans and Carthaginians, the two most powerful people of the earth, had had so much consideration and deference, that Scipio their General had made no difficulty to abandon his province and army, and to go to Africa with two galleys to demand his amity in person ; and that Asdrubal, the Carthaginian general, had not only gone in person to his palace, but had given him his daughter in marriage. That what still shewed his power and strength more was, that after he had driven Masinissa out of his kingdom, he had reduced him to the sad necessity of hiding himself in the forests, and of owing the preservation of his life to spreading a report of his death.”

Syphax arrived in the camp, and was carried to Scipio's tent. The remembrance of that Prince's former greatness, compared with the sad condition in which he saw him ; the sacred rights of hospitality ; the private amity, and public alliance, which they had contracted together, touched that General extremely, and made him order his chains to be taken off. The same motives gave Syphax confidence and courage when he was to answer the victor. For when Scipio asked him, what he thought, when he not only renounced the alliance of the Romans, but had even declared war against them ; he, at first, imputed the cause of his rupture with the Romans solely to Sophonisba ; affirming, “ * that the first source of his misfortune was his having received a Carthaginian woman into his house and bed. That the same torches which had lighted those fatal nuptials, had set his palace on fire. That it was that plague, that fury, whose infectious charms had deprived him of the use of his reason ; and that she had never ceased tormenting him, till herself had put

* Tum se insanisse— cùm Carthaginiensem matronam domum acceperit. Illis nuptialibus facibus regiam conflagrasse suam : illam furiam pestemque omnibus delinimentis animum suum avertisse atque alienasse ; nec conquiesse, donec ipsa manibus suis nefaria sibi arma adversus hospitem atque amicum induerit.

those guilty arms into his hands against his friend and his guest. He added, that in the midst of so many misfortunes, he had however one consolation, which was, to see the same fury, who had caused his ruin, transferred into the house of his most cruel enemy. That Masinissa was neither wiser, nor more constant than himself; and that his youth made him still more rash: and that he had at least shewn more folly and passion in his precipitate marriage than could be imputed to Syphax."

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This discourse, dictated still more by jealousy than hatred, gave Scipio great uneasiness. The precipitation with which Masinissa had hurried on his marriage, without waiting for and consulting Lælius, by instantly changing the condition of Sophonisba from that of a prisoner to that of a wife, justified Syphax's reproaches. So extravagant a conduct was the more offensive to Scipio, as himself had always been insensible to the beauty of the prisoners he had taken in Spain, though he was then in the flower of his youth. His perplexity was how to bring Masinissa over to reason, for he was not for alienating him.

He was engrossed by these thoughts, when Lælius and Masinissa arrived. He made them both an equally gracious reception: and in the presence of the principal officers of the army, gave them all the praises due to their exploits. Then taking Masinissa aside, he spoke to him in these terms. " * I believe, Prince, " that it was some good qualities which you " thought you saw in me, that induced you first

* Aliqua te existimo, Masinissa, intuentem in me bona, & principio in Hispania ad jungendam mecum amicitiam venisse, & postea in Africa te ipsum, spesque omnes tuas, in fidem meam commisisse. Atqui nulla earum virtus est, propter quas appetendus tibi visus sum, qua ego æquè atque temperantia & continentia libidinum gloriatus fuerim. Hanc te quoque ad ceteras tuas eximias virtutes adiecisse velim. Non est, non (mihi crede) tantum ab hostibus armatis ætati nostræ periculum, quantum ab circumfusus undique voluptatibus. Qui eas suâ temperantiâ frenavit ac domuit, multo majus decus majoremque victoriam sibi peperit, quàm nos Syphace victo habemus. Quæ me absente strenuè ac fortiter fecisti, libenter & commemoravi, & memini. Cetera te ipsum reputare tecum, quàm, me dicente, erubescere malo.

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“ to make an alliance with me in Spain ; and since
 “ my arrival in Africa, to confide your person and all
 “ your hopes to me. Now of all the virtues which
 “ recommended me to your good opinion, that which
 “ I think does me most honour, is the force of mind
 “ to resist the passions too common at our age. I
 “ wish, Masinissa, that to all the great qualities which
 “ render you so estimable, you would add that of
 “ which I am speaking. No, Prince ; believe me
 “ our most formidable enemies are assuredly not those
 “ who attack us with their swords : no, they are
 “ pleasures, which lay snares for us on all sides. He,
 “ who by his virtue has known how to check and
 “ subdue them, may boast of having gained a far
 “ more glorious victory than that which hath made
 “ us masters of the dominions and person of Syphax.
 “ I took great pleasure in publicly owning the great
 “ actions you have done in my absence, and I retain
 “ the remembrance of them with joy. As to the rest,
 “ I choose rather to leave it to your own reflection,
 “ than to make you blush by repeating it. It was by
 “ the forces, and under the command of the Generals
 “ of the Roman People, that Syphax was defeated
 “ and taken prisoner. From thence it follows, that
 “ himself, his wife, his kingdom, his subjects, his
 “ cities, his lands, in a word, every thing dependant
 “ on him, belong to the Roman People. And though
 “ Sophonisba were not a Carthaginian, and her fa-
 “ ther did not command the armies of Carthage, she
 “ however must be sent to Rome, to undergo the
 “ sentence of the Roman Senate and People, for the
 “ crime with which she is charged, that is, of having
 “ made a King in alliance with the Commonwealth,
 “ take up arms against us. Try then, Masinissa, to
 “ conquer yourself. Take care not to dishonour so
 “ many virtues by a single vice, and not to lose the
 “ whole merit of the services you have rendered us,
 “ by a fault much greater than the interest which hath
 “ made you commit it.

This

This discourse must have given Masinissa strange perplexity: How to keep the promise he had made Sophonisba? How to refuse Scipio, on whom he depended? How to conquer himself? for undoubtedly his passion, though confounded by the wise advice of Scipio, could not be suppressed in an instant. With blushes in his face, and tears in his eyes, he promised to obey; imploring him however to have some regard for the promise he had rashly made to Sophonisba, not to deliver her up to any one whatsoever. But, when he was alone in his tent, a terrible conflict arose in his heart between his passion and his duty. He was heard a long while groaning excessively, which argued the violent agitation of his mind. At length, after a last sigh, he formed a very strange resolution, but one by which he believed that he acquitted himself at the same time both of what he owed to Sophonisba, and to his own glory. He called a faithful officer, who, according to the custom of the Kings of those times, kept the poison, which was their last resource in unforeseen extremities. He ordered him to prepare and carry it to Sophonisba, and to tell her in his name, “That Masinissa could have desired nothing so much as to have been able to observe the principal engagement he had made with her in espousing her. But that those, on whom he depended, having deprived him of that liberty, he at least kept the other promise he had made her, not to suffer her to fall into the hands of the Romans. That she should therefore resolve, with all the courage of a Carthaginian, of Asdrubal’s daughter, and the wife of two Kings.”

The officer went to Sophonisba, and after having presented her the poison, “I accept,” said she, “this nuptial present, and even with gratitude, if it be true that Masinissa could do no more for his wife. Tell him, however, that I should renounce life with more joy and glory if I had not married him the day before my death.” She then drank the

A. R. 549. poison with as much constancy as there seemed loftiness
 Ant. C. in her answer.
 203.

Scipio, having been informed of the whole, was struck with new apprehensions. He justly believed that every thing was to be apprehended from the transports of a young Prince whom passion had just carried to such extremities. He immediately sent for him, and sometimes consoled him in kind and tender expressions, and sometimes made him some reproaches upon the new fault he had just committed; but they were attended with an air of humanity and friendship that softened their bitterness.

The next day, to divert that Prince's melancholy, he assembled the army, and in the presence of all the troops, after having called, and acknowledged him a King, in the name of the Roman People, after having given him the highest and most soothing praises, he presented him with a crown of gold, a gold cup, a curule chair, an ivory scepter, an embroidered purple robe, and a tunick also embroidered with palms; adding, that these were the most superb ornaments worn in triumphs; and that Masinissa was the only person of all foreigners, that the Roman People deemed worthy of the like marks of honour. He also highly praised Lælius, and gave him a crown of gold. He afterwards rewarded all the other officers, in proportion to the services each had done. The conferring of these honours upon Masinissa very much mitigated his affliction, and gave him hopes, that after the death of Syphax, he might become master of all Numidia.

Liv. xxx. Scipio having appointed Lælius to carry Syphax
 36. and the other prisoners to Rome, and made Masinissa's Ambassadors set out along with him, marched a second time to encamp near Tunis; and compleated the fortifications which he had began there.

The joy of the Carthaginians for the inconsiderable advantage they had gained over the Roman fleets was of short duration, and soon changed into a general consternation, when they received advice of the defeat
 and

and taking of Syphax, upon whom they had relied more than upon Asdrubal and his army. No body daring to speak any longer for continuing the war, for he would not have been heard, they sent to demand peace of Scipio by thirty deputies, who were the principal persons of the Senate, and formed an united council, whose opinions had a very great influence upon the decisions of the whole Senate. As soon as they arrived in the camp of the Romans, and from thence at Scipio's tent, they prostrated themselves at the feet of that General, probably according to the custom of the Eastern nations, from which the Carthaginians derived their origin. Their discourse was as humble as their first behaviour. Without endeavouring to justify their conduct, they laid the whole blame of what had passed upon Hannibal, and the violent cabal of those who favoured his ambition. They demanded grace for their Republic, which had * twice deserved to perish by the temerity of its citizens, and would a second time be indebted for its preservation to the clemency of its enemies; adding, that they knew "That the Roman People did not seek the destruction of their adversaries, but only the glory of conquering and subjecting them. That as for them, they were ready as humble slaves to accept such conditions as it should please Scipio to impose upon them."

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That General answered them, "That he came to Africa with the hope of terminating the war by a compleat victory, and not by a peace; which hope had increased with the successes the gods had hitherto granted his arms. That notwithstanding, though victory was in a manner in his hands, he did not refuse them peace; that the whole Universe might know, the Roman People valued themselves upon undertaking and terminating wars with justice; that, accordingly, he would grant them peace upon the following conditions. That the Carthaginians should withdraw their troops from Italy and Gaul; that they

Liv. xxx.
16.
App. 17.

* They mean the two Punic wars.

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203.

should entirely renounce Spain, and all the islands between Africa and Italy. That they should deliver up all their ships of war, except twenty; and supply them with five hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and three hundred thousand bushels of barley." Authors differ concerning the sum of money they were to pay. According to Livy, some affirmed, that Scipio demanded five thousand talents (about seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds;) some five thousand pounds of silver in weight; and lastly, others said, that he demanded that they should give his soldiers double pay. He gave them three days to deliberate upon these proposals; and in case Carthage should accept them, he agreed to grant them a truce, during which they might send Ambassadors to Rome. The conditions were accepted; because the Carthaginians thought only of gaining time till Hannibal should be returned to Africa. Accordingly they appointed two embassies; the one to Scipio, to conclude the truce; and the other to Rome, to demand peace. They sent a small number of prisoners and deserters with the last, only for form sake, and to make it appear that they really desired peace.

Liv. xxx.
17.

In the mean time Lælius had arrived several days before at Rome, with Syphax, and the most considerable of the Numidian prisoners. He related to the Senate all that had passed in Africa; which occasioned great joy for the present, and gave great hopes of the future. The Senators having deliberated upon this account, were of opinion, that Syphax should be confined at Alba, and that Lælius should stay at Rome till the arrival of the Ambassadors from Carthage. Besides which, thanksgivings were decreed to the gods for four days; and the Prætor P. Ælius, having dismissed the Senate, and called an assembly of the People, ascended the tribunal of harangues with Lælius. As soon as the citizens were informed from the mouth of Scipio's lieutenant, that the armies of the Carthaginians had been defeated and put to rout; that a famous and powerful King had been made prisoner;

soner ; and that all Numidia was subjected, they gave themselves to immoderate joy ; which they expressed by the loud cries and other impetuous motions which are common with the multitude on the like occasions. For this reason the Prætor immediately decreed, that the temples should be opened throughout the city, and that the People should be at liberty to enter them during the whole day, to return the gods the thanks such great benefits deserved. This lively gratitude amongst an idolatrous people is a good lesson, and often a great reproach to us.

The next day the same Prætor introduced Masinissa's Ambassadors into the Senate, " who began by congratulating the Romans upon the victories gained by Scipio in Africa. They then testified their gratitude in the name of their master ; first, as Scipio had not only acknowledged, but made him King, by re-establishing him in the dominions of his father ; in which, after the fall of Syphax, he should reign from thenceforth, if the Senate thought fit, without rival or competitor : and next, as after having given him great praises in the full assembly, he had added to them magnificent presents, of which that Prince had before endeavoured to render himself worthy ; that he should spare no pains to merit further for the time to come. That he desired the Senate to ratify by a decree all that Scipio had done in his favour, as well in respect to the title of King, as all the other gifts and benefactions with which he had honoured him. That he also desired they would be pleased, if they found no inconvenience in it, to release all the Numidian prisoners confined at Rome ; which favour would do Masinissa honour with his subjects." The Ambassadors were answered, " That the King ought to share with the Romans in the compliments which the successes in Africa deserved. That Scipio, in treating him as King, and giving him all the other marks of esteem and benevolence, had perfectly answered the intentions of the Senate, who approved and ratified the whole with abundance of pleasure."

A. R. 549. They afterwards fixed the presents, which the Am-
 Ant. C. 203. bassadors were to carry to their King; these were,
 two purple mantles with gold clasps, two Senatorian
 robes, called Laticlavi; two horses richly capari-
 soned; two cuirasses, with the rest of the armour for
 an horseman; two tents with all the military appur-
 tenances to them which were usually given the Con-
 suls. The Prætor had orders to cause these gifts to
 be carried to Masinissa. The Ambassadors received,
 by way of present, each five thousand pieces of money,
 and two habits; and those of their train had each
 one thousand pieces, and one habit: an habit was
 also given to each of the Numidians taken out of the
 prisons, and restored to the King. The Ambassa-
 dors were lodged and regaled at the expence of the
 Roman People.

The same campaign in which these things were de-
 creed at Rome, and executed in Africa, the Prætor
 P. Quintilius Varus, and the Proconsul M. Corne-
 lius, fought a pitched battle in the country of the
 Insubrian Gauls, with Mago the Carthaginian gene-
 ral, Hannibal's brother. The victory was long dis-
 puted, and at last declared for the Romans, but it
 cost them dear. This was the last battle that was
 fought between the Carthaginians and Romans in
 Italy. Mago, who had been wounded in the bat-
 tle, retired the following night towards the sea-
 coast, where he found deputies from Carthage, who
 a few days before had entered the gulf of Genoa
 with their ships, and ordered him to return immedi-
 ately to Africa, whither his brother Hannibal had
 also received orders to repair as soon as possible.
 He embarked directly with his troops, but died
 of his wounds before he got beyond the island of
 Sardinia.

S E C T. III.

Hannibal quits Italy with grief, and with a kind of rage. Anxiety of the Romans in respect to Scipio. Embassy from Saguntum to Rome. On the remonstrances of some Senators public prayers to thank the gods for the departure of Hannibal were decreed. The Ambassadors of Carthage demand peace of the Senate. They are referred to Scipio. The Consul Servilius is recalled from Sicily to Italy. The Carthaginians break the truce by taking some ships. The Ambassadors of Scipio are insulted at Carthage. Hannibal arrives in Africa. Complaints of the Grecian allies against Philip. Death of the great Fabius. Distribution of the provinces under the new Consuls. Anxiety of the Romans on the departure of Hannibal. Scipio sends back Hannibal's spies. Interview between Hannibal and Scipio. Speech of Hannibal from Polybius. Scipio's answer from the same Polybius. Hannibal's speech from Livy. Preparations for a decisive battle. Scipio draws up his army in battle. Hannibal does the same. The two Generals exhort their armies. Battle of Zama between Hannibal and Scipio. Victory of the Romans. Praise of Hannibal.

WE have before observed, that deputies had been sent to Hannibal, to order him to return to Africa with his troops without loss of time. He could not hear them without trembling with rage and indignation, and refrained from tears not without great difficulty. When they had done speaking, he said, “ It is no longer by indirect means, as has been the practice hitherto, in preventing troops and money from being sent me, but by clear and positive orders, that my enemies force me to return to Africa. You then see Hannibal at length overcome, not by the Romans, whom he hath so often put to flight and cut to pieces, but by the jealousy and ill-will
“ of

A. R. 549.

Ant. C.

203.

Liv. xxx.

20.

App. de

Bell. Ann.

346—348.

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203.

“ of the Senators of Carthage ! The shame of my return will give less joy to Scipio my enemy, than to Hanno my fellow-citizen, who not being able to crush my family, is at last for burying it in the ruins of Carthage.” Having long foreseen it would come to this, he had taken care to keep ships in readiness. For which reason, after having distributed into a small number of cities in Bruttium, that still adhered to him rather out of fear than affection, all his soldiers that were incapable of service, that he might not seem entirely to give up the cause ; he took with him the flower of his troops, having had the cruelty to put to the sword a great number of Italian soldiers, who, to avoid following him into Africa, had taken refuge in the temple of Juno Lacinia, which had hitherto been an inviolable asylum for the unfortunate.

Cic. de
Divin.
l. 48.

In this temple there was a pillar of massy gold. The historian Cælius tells us, that Hannibal resolved to take it away with him, but that the goddess Juno having appeared to him in a dream, and threatened him with the loss of the only eye he had, if he presumed to commit such a sacrilege, he had left the pillar in the temple. I very much doubt whether Hannibal would have had so much regard for a dream, as to have renounced so fine a prey in effect of it.

Never did exile express more regret on quitting his native country, than Hannibal on quitting a foreign one, and that of an enemy. He often turned his eyes towards the coasts of Italy, “ accusing gods and men of his misfortune, and venting against himself, says Livy, a thousand imprecations for not having led his soldiers reeking with the blood of the Romans * after the battle of Cannæ to Rome. That Scipio, who during his Consulship had not so much as seen the Carthaginians in Italy, had the courage and boldness to go to Africa to attack Carthage ; whereas he, who had killed above an hundred thousand men at Thrasyme-

* Livy always supposes this to be an essential fault in Hannibal, which he afterwards repented.

nus and Cannæ, had unfortunately lost his time at ^{A.R. 549.} Casilinum, Cumæ, and Nola.” It was with these ^{Ant. C. 203.} mournful complaints, mixed with bitter reproaches against himself, that he tore himself from the heart of that Italy, of which he had been so long in possession.

The Romans at the same time received advice of ^{Liv. xxx. 21.} the retreat of Hannibal, and of that of Mago. The joy which so happy a deliverance would have given them, was much abated by the anxiety they were in for Scipio, upon whom alone the whole weight of the war was now to fall: and, indeed, they had ordered their generals in Italy to keep Hannibal and Mago there; and they were highly dissatisfied that their orders had been so ill obeyed.

About this time arrived at Rome ambassadors from Saguntum, who brought with them some Carthaginian officers, that had been sent to Spain to raise troops there, and had been taken prisoners. They displayed in the porch of the Senate the money those officers had brought with them, which amounted to two hundred and fifty pounds of gold in weight, and eight hundred in silver. The prisoners they brought were accepted, and were immediately put under a good guard: but they were obliged to take back the money, and were thanked for their attention and zeal. Presents were also made them, and ships given them to carry them back into Spain.

Though Rome had desired that Hannibal might be prevented from going to Africa, it was, however, highly for the good of Italy to be delivered from so formidable an enemy; and some of the most antient and considerable Senators, moved by the kind of indifference with which this event had been considered, made a very wise reflection, that may be of great use in all times. They observed, “* that men were less sensible of the good they received, than of the ill that they suffered. What terror and consternation

* *Segnius homines bona, quàm mala, sentire.*

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203.

had attended Hannibal's entering Italy! What calamities, losses, and defeats had they sustained since that time! That they had seen the enemy incamped at the gates of Rome. What vows had they not made to be delivered from these evils! How often had they cried out in their assemblies: "Shall we never see the
" happy day when Italy shall be delivered from its
" cruel enemies, and enjoy the blessings of peace and
" tranquility?" That the gods had at length heard their prayers, and granted them that grace after sixteen years of alarms and miseries, and that no one had proposed to return them thanks for so great a good. * So true it was, that men, far from being grateful for past favours, were little affected with those they received at present." After this discourse they demanded, with warmth, that the Prætor should bring on this question: and it was immediately decreed, with unanimous consent, that during five days the temples of the city should be visited with grateful piety, and that an hundred and twenty great victims should be sacrificed to the gods.

Liv. xxx.
22.

Lælius, and Masinissa's ambassadors were already dismissed, when advice came, that those of Carthage, who had been sent to ask peace, were arrived at Puteoli, from whence they were to come to Rome by land. The Ambassadors were not received in the city. They were lodged in a country-house belonging to the Commonwealth, and had audience in the temple of Bellona. They expressed themselves almost in the same words as they had used to Scipio, imputing the whole cause of the war solely to Hannibal. "That he passed the Iberus without the order of the Senate, and then the Alps, and that he had declared war, first against the Saguntines, and afterwards against the Romans, by his own authority; but that to judge rightly of things, the treaty of alliance which had been made in the time of, and by the consul Lutatius,

* Adeo, ne advenientem quidem gratiam homines benignè accipere, nedum ut præteritæ satis memores sint!

had not been violated in the least by the Senate and People of Carthage. That, for these reasons, their instructions extended no farther than to demand the observation of the peace, which had been concluded at that time between the Romans and the Carthaginians."

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The Prætor then, according to the ancient custom, having permitted the Senators to ask the deputies such questions as they should judge proper, many of the seniors, who had been concerned in the treaties, interrogated them upon different articles. But the deputies, most of whom were young men, having answered, that they had no knowledge of those things which had happened in their infancy, the usual bad faith of the Carthaginians was exclaimed against on all sides, who had designedly chosen young Ambassadors to treat of an antient peace, of which they had neither the least remembrance, nor any knowledge whatsoever.

They were then made to quit the Senate, which proceeded to deliberate. M. Livius was for having the Consul C. Servilius, who was nearest Rome, sent for, in order that the Senate might consider of the peace in his presence. He represented, "that the affair being of the most important nature, it did not seem consistent with the dignity of the Roman People, to determine concerning it without the participation of the two Consuls, or at least of one of them." Q. Metellus, who always favoured Scipio, said: "That as it was P. Scipio, who, by cutting the armies of the Carthaginians to pieces, and ravaging their countries, had reduced them to the necessity of humbly beseeching peace; no body could better judge of their intentions in asking it, than he who actually threatened the walls of Carthage. That he therefore believed, they ought to direct themselves solely by his counsel, in respect to granting or refusing them peace." M. Valerius Lævinus, who had been Consul with Marcellus, affirmed, "that they were rather spies than Ambassadors, who were come from Carthage; and
he

A. R. 549.
Ant. C.
203.

he concluded, that they ought to be made to quit Italy directly; that they should be sent under a guard to their ships; and that Scipio should be wrote to, to continue the war without any cessation." Lælius and Fulvius added, "That Scipio had not supposed the peace could subsist, if Mago and Hannibal should be recalled from Italy. That the Carthaginians would refuse no conditions, as long as they expected those two Generals and their armies: but that they should no sooner hear, that they were upon their return, but they would have no regard to treaties, nor the gods themselves, and instantly resume their arms." Every thing well considered, they adhered to the opinion of Lævinus, and the Ambassadors were dismissed without obtaining any thing, and almost without any answer.

Liv. xxx.
24.

In the mean time, the Consul Cn. Servilius assuming to himself the glory of having restored peace to Italy, went over to Sicily, with design to pursue Hannibal to Africa. He imagined, through a ridiculous vanity, that it was he who had driven the Carthaginian General out of Italy, and consequently that it was necessary to pursue him. When this news came to Rome, the Senate were at first of opinion, that the Prætor should write to the Consul, that it was the opinion of the Senate, that he should return to Italy. But the Prætor having remonstrated, that the Consul would have no regard to his letters, P. Sulpicius was declared Dictator, who, in virtue of an authority superior to that of the Consul, having obliged Servilius to return to Italy, passed the rest of the year with M. Servilius, his General of the horse, in visiting the cities of Italy which the war had detached from the service of the Romans, and in examining the different circumstances of their defection, which might render each of them more or less criminal.

During the truce, a great convoy, sent by Lentulus, Prætor of Sardinia, and consisting of an hundred transports, with twenty ships of war, arrived in Africa, without having ran any risque, either from the enemy or the sea. Cn. Octavius was not so fortunate:

fortunate: for having left Sicily with two hundred transports and thirty ships of war, when he arrived almost in sight of Africa without any danger, he was becalmed; and soon after the wind becoming quite contrary, dispersed his transports. As for himself with his great ships, after having struggled a considerable time with the waves that drove him back, by the help of oars he arrived at the promontory of Apollo; but the transports were most of them driven upon the coast of the island Ægimurus, which on the side next the main sea closes the gulph, in which Carthage is built, about thirty miles from that city. The rest were carried opposite to that city, to the place called at that time THE HOT BATHS. All this passed in the sight of Carthage. The people in consequence ran to the public place. The magistrates assembled the Senate. The multitude, who were in the porch, pressed the Senators to give the necessary orders not to let so considerable a prey escape, which in a manner came of itself into their hands. The most prudent represented in vain, that they had sent to ask peace, and that the time of the truce was not expired: the people, mingled with the Senators, made such warm instances, as at last obliged the Senate to permit Asdrubal to go with a fleet of fifty ships to the island Ægimurus, to cruize along the coasts, and neighbouring ports, in order to pick up the vessels of the Romans which the storm had dispersed, and to bring them to Carthage. We see in this an instance of the Carthaginian character, greedy of gain to madness, and far from nice in point of public faith.

Scipio was the more incensed on this insult of the Carthaginians, as the truce, which he had granted at their earnest intreaty, still subsisted, and they had not even staid for the return of the Ambassadors who were gone to Rome. He sent three deputies to Carthage, to complain of this infraction, which destroyed all hope of concluding a peace. They were insulted on their arrival by the multitude who assembled round them,

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Ant. C.

203.

Liv. xxx.

24.

App. de bell. Pun.

18—19.

Polyb. xv.

689.

Liv. xxx.

25.

Polyb. xv.

689—692.

A.R. 549. them, and would perhaps have been more so at their
 Ant. C. return, if the magistrates, at their request, had not
 203. given them an escorte, which conducted them to some
 small distance from the Roman camp. But in that
 short space, four gallies detached from the Cartha-
 ginian fleet, came to attack that which carried the
 ambassadors. It defended itself vigorously a great
 while ; but at length, to escape the enemy, was forced
 to run on shore. Only the vessel was lost.

Liv. ibid. It was after this double infraction of the truce, that
 Polyb. xv. Fulvius and Lælius arrived from Rome in Scipio's
 693. camp with the Carthaginian deputies. That General
 might have used reprisals : but having no thoughts of
 revenge, except by excelling the Carthaginians in
 virtue, and opposing their breach of faith with his
 own generous probity, he dismissed them, after having
 told them : " That though the Carthaginians had not
 only broken the truce by attacking his ships, but even
 violated the law of nations by attacking and insulting
 his ambassadors ; however, that he should not act in
 their regard in a manner repugnant to the Roman gra-
 vity, or his own generosity." As soon as they set
 out, he put himself into a condition to continue the
 war, as it had began.

Hannibal was almost ready to land, when one of the
 mariners, who had got on the top of the mast to dis-
 cover the land, told him that the head of the Admi-
 ral's ship stood towards a ruined tomb. Not liking
 that omen, he ordered the pilot to steer farther on :
 and accordingly he landed a little lower, near Leptis.

About the end of the year of which we are speaking,
 the cities of Greece in alliance with the Roman
 People sent deputies to Rome, to complain that their
 lands had been ravaged by Philip's troops, and that
 that prince had refused to receive the ambassadors
 who had been sent to demand justice of him. They
 declared at the same time, that he had sent four thou-
 sand men under the command of Sopater, with great
 sums of money, to assist Hannibal in Africa. Upon
 this news, the Senate was of opinion, that ambassa-

dors

dors should be sent to him, to declare in the name of the Romans, that such conduct seemed to them an infraction of the treaty of peace, which had been made between them and him. C. Terentius Varro, C. Mamilius, and M. Aurelius, who were charged with this embassy, set out in three galleys, of five benches of oars, which were given them for this voyage. A. R. 549.
Ant. C.
203.

This same year was remarkable for the death of the great Fabius. He was generally regretted by all the good citizens. Every individual, with design to honour his memory, and to testify their gratitude for the considerable services which he had rendered his country, contributed to the expence of his funeral, as to that of their common father. The People had done his grandfather Fabius Rullus the same honour. Liv. xxx.
26.

The Fabius of whom we speak here, died in a very advanced age, if we believe Valerius Maximus. For, according to that author, he was Augur sixty two years, and no doubt he was at man's estate when he entered upon that office: from whence he concludes that he had lived an whole age. But this opinion carries with it some difficulty. If his life were very long, it was also very glorious, from his excellent qualities and great actions, which would have deserved the surname of *Maximus*, *Most Great*, though he had not found it already established in his family. * In respect to the great offices, he exceeded his † father's glory, and equalled that of his grandfather Rullus, who, as well as himself, had been five times Consul, and was also surnamed *Maximus*. Rullus indeed fought more battles than him, and gained more victories: Val. Max.
viii. 13. 3.

* Superavit paternos honores, avitos æquavit. Pluribus victoriis & majoribus præliis avus insignis Rullus: sed omnia equare unus hostis Annibal potest. Cautior tamen, quam promptior hic habitus fuit: &, sicut dubites, utrum ingenio cunctator fuerit, an quia ita bello propriè quod tum gerebatur aptum erat; sic nihil certius est, quàm unum hominem nobis cunctando rem restituisse, sicut Ennius ait. Liv.

† Fabius Gurges was Consul only three times; and Fabius Cunctator, his son, was so five times.

A. R. 549.
Ant. C.
203.

but to have been capable of opposing such an enemy as Hannibal, is a merit and title of honour that may stand in comparison with the greatest exploits. He shewed more prudence and circumspection than ardour and vivacity. It cannot well be determined, whether this slow and wary conduct proceeded from his genius and natural character, or whether it was the conjuncture and nature of the war, with which he was charged, that gave him this spirit of precaution and reserve. But it is certain, that this wise delayer preserved the Commonwealth by it, as Ennius observes, in a verse in every body's mouth :

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

M. SERVILIUS.
TI. CLAUDIUS.

Liv. xxx.
27.

The new Consuls desired with equal ardour to have Africa for their province. The affair was referred to the people, who continued the command to Scipio. The Senate was however obliged, without doubt by their great importunity, to order that one of the Consuls should go to Africa with a fleet of fifty galleys, all of five benches of oars, and should have equal authority with Scipio. Lots determined that employment to Ti. Claudius. The other Consul had Etruria for his province. To draw down the protection of Heaven, the Consuls were ordered; before they set out for the war, to celebrate games, and sacrifice the great victims, which the Dictator T. Manlius had * promised to the gods in the consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quintius, in case the Commonwealth should be in the same condition it then was at the expiration of five years: which was executed.

Ibid. 28.

In the mean time, people were divided between hope and fear, and those two passions increased every

* This vow should have been accomplished the year before, and orders had been given accordingly. Some obstacle evidently must have happened.

day. “ They did not know whether they should rejoice that Hannibal, after having in a manner been in possession of Italy during sixteen years, had at length abandoned it; or lament for his having returned into Africa with his troops. They said, that the war, from having changed its seat, was not the less dangerous. That Q. Fabius, who was lately dead, had often foretold, that Hannibal would be much more formidable when he fought in defence of his country, than he was in attacking that of an enemy. That Scipio had not to deal with a barbarous king like Syphax, of no experience in war, with his father-in-law Asdrubal, more disposed to fly than to fight, nor with a multitude of peasants drawn together in haste, and half armed: but with Hannibal, that famous Captain, who, to use the expression, was born in his father’s tent, and had been brought up in the midst of arms; who had served from his infancy, and commanded in chief from his earliest youth; who, always followed by victory, had made Spain, the Gauls, and Italy, resound with nothing but his name, and left in all those provinces glorious monuments of his exploits. That he was at the head of soldiers as old in service as himself, enured to perils and labours that seemed to transcend human force; that had a thousand times been covered with Roman blood, and carried with them the spoils not only of soldiers, but even of Generals. That Scipio would meet in battle many Carthaginians who had killed Prætors, Generals, and Consuls, with their own hands, that were distinguishable by crowns, and other military rewards, the undoubted proofs of their bravery; who had taken cities, and stormed camps. That all the Roman magistrates together had not so many *fascēs* carried before them, as Hannibal had taken from the Generals whom he had killed in different battles.”

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

By this kind of reflections they themselves augmented their terror and anxiety. Besides which, being accustomed during many years to see war made, to use the expression, before their eyes in different parts of Italy,

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202. in a manner slowly enough, and without hope of a speedy end, their attention and alarms redoubled, when they saw Scipio and Hannibal upon the point of coming to blows in order to terminate so famous a quarrel. Those themselves who had the highest opinion of Scipio, and assured themselves most of victory, felt their anxiety and terror exceedingly increase, as the fatal and decisive hour approached.

The Carthaginians were very near in the same disposition. Sometimes, seeing Hannibal near, and considering the greatness of his military exploits, they repented their having asked peace with so much eagerness; sometimes reflecting that they had lost two battles; that Syphax, their friend and ally, was a prisoner; that they had been driven out of Spain and Italy; and that all these disgraces were the effects of the valour and conduct of Scipio, they could not help trembling, through fear that the Fates had given birth to that General for the ruin and destruction of Carthage.

Polyb. 15.
23.
Liv. xxx.
29.
--pp. 21. Hannibal being come to * Adrumetum, gave his troops some days rest after their voyage. But being pressed by couriers, sent to inform him that all the neighbourhood of Carthage swarmed with the enemy, he repaired to Zama, marching with abundance of diligence. That place is but five day's march from Carthage. From thence he sent out spies, to examine the motions of the enemy; but those spies were stopt by the advanced guards of the Romans, and carried to Scipio. That General, always full of confidence and generosity, told them, they had nothing to fear from him. He even put them into the hands of one of the legionary Tribunes, whom he ordered to carry them into every part of his camp, and to suffer them to see and examine every thing at their pleasure. Afterwards, having asked them whether they had satisfied their curiosity, he gave them an escorte, and sent them back to their General.

* A city of Barbary.

SERVILIUS, CLAUDIUS, Consuls.

477

Hannibal heard nothing from his spies but bad news; amongst the rest, that Masinissa arrived that very day, with a body of six thousand foot and four thousand horse. But what struck him most, was the air of confidence and assurance which Scipio shewed; and which Hannibal considered as a proof, but too well founded, of his enemy's strength. Accordingly, though he was the author of the war, and his return had occasioned the infraction of the truce and put a stop to the negotiations; he flattered himself, that if he treated of peace whilst he had all his forces, he should obtain more favourable conditions than if he were overcome. He first sent to Masinissa, putting him in mind of his residence at Carthage in his early years, to receive there an education suitable to his birth; and which, for that reason, he ought to consider as his second country. The only favour he asked of him was to obtain him an interview with Scipio. Masinissa, who retained a lively sense of gratitude for the instructions he had received at Carthage, and who still had many friends at that place, joyfully undertook this commission, and told Scipio Hannibal's request; which Scipio made no difficulty to comply with.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

App.
Bell. Pu-
nic. p. 20.

Those two Generals, in concert, encamped nearer to each other, in order to negotiate with more ease. Scipio's camp was at a small distance from Nadagara, in a place which, besides other advantages, was not farther from the water than half a bow shot. Hannibal was posted four miles from thence, upon an eminence advantageous enough, except the necessity of fetching water a great way. They chose for their conference a place situated between the two camps, and open enough to leave no room for apprehending any surprize. The next day both quitted their camps, with some horse whom they afterwards made withdraw. Those two Generals then, not only the most illustrious of their times, but comparable to the most famous Captains, and greatest Kings of preceding ages, conferred together, each having an interpreter.

Polyb. xv.
694.
Liv. xxx.
29.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

They continued silent some time, to consider each other attentively, and struck with mutual admiration : Hannibal spoke first.

The speeches made by these two Generals to each other are in Polybius and Livy. I thought the reader would not be displeased at my inserting them from both in this place. I shall take party with neither, and will not prejudice his judgment. I content myself with observing, that Polybius wrote first, and was a foldier.

HANNIBAL's Speech from POLYBIUS, XV. 694.

“ I could have been sincerely glad, that the
 “ Romans and Carthaginians had never thought of
 “ extending their conquests, the first beyond Italy,
 “ and the latter beyond Africa ; and that both had
 “ confined themselves within those fine Empires, of
 “ which nature itself seems to have fixed the bounds
 “ and limits. On both sides we have been far from
 “ such a conduct. We first took arms for Sicily.
 “ We afterwards disputed for the dominion of Spain.
 “ At length, blinded by fortune, we rose so high as
 “ to desire our mutual destruction. You have been
 “ reduced to defend the walls of your country against
 “ me ; and we, in our turn, are in the same danger.
 “ It should be high time, after having appeased the
 “ anger of the gods, for us to think of banishing at
 “ length from our hearts the obstinate jealousy that
 “ has armed us hitherto against each other.

“ As to me, taught by experience how high the
 “ inconstancy of fortune rises, for how little she has
 “ occasion to bring about the most dreadful revolutions ; and lastly, what pleasure she seems to take
 “ in making mankind her sport, I am much disposed
 “ to peace. But I much fear, Scipio, that you are
 “ not in the same disposition. You are in the flower
 “ of life : you have succeeded in all things to your
 “ desire in Spain and Africa ; and nothing, hitherto,
 “ has interrupted the course of your prosperity. All
 “ this

“ this makes me apprehend, that however strong my
 “ reasons to incline you to a peace may be, that you
 “ will not suffer yourself to be persuaded.

A. R. 550.
 Ant. C.
 202.

“ However, pray consider how little fortune is to
 “ be relied upon. In order to this you need not go
 “ far for examples : cast your eyes on me. I am that
 “ Hannibal, who, when become master of almost all
 “ Italy by the battle of Cannæ, went some time after
 “ to Rome itself, and when incamped forty stadia
 “ from that city, considered myself already as the
 “ absolute arbiter of the fate of the Romans and
 “ their country. And now, at my return into Africa,
 “ behold me obliged to come to treat with a Roman,
 “ concerning the conditions upon which he shall
 “ vouchsafe to grant me my own safety, and that of
 “ Carthage. Let this example teach you not to in-
 “ dulse pride, and to reflect that you are man.

“ When we deliberate on any affair, wisdom re-
 “ quires, that of advantages we should chuse the
 “ greatest, and of evils the least. Now what man
 “ of sense would, in cool blood, expose himself to
 “ so great a danger as that which threatens you?
 “ Though you should gain a victory, you would not
 “ add much either to your own glory, or that of
 “ your country : whereas, if you are defeated, you
 “ lose in one moment all the glory and renown you
 “ have hitherto acquired.

“ But to what does this discourse tend? It is to in-
 “ duce you to agree to the following conditions :
 “ That Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, which have here-
 “ tofore been the cause of our wars, shall from hence-
 “ forth remain to the Romans, and that the Cartha-
 “ ginians shall never take up arms against them in
 “ order to dispute with them the possession of all those
 “ countries ; and that, in like manner, all the islands
 “ between Italy and Africa shall appertain to the Ro-
 “ mans. These conditions seem to me to suit both
 “ States. On the one side, they will secure the Car-
 “ thaginians for the time to come ; and on the other,
 “ they are very glorious for you, yourself in parti-

A. R. 550. " cular, and your whole Commonwealth." So Han-
 Ant. C. nibal spoke.
 202.

SCIPIO's answer also from POLYBIUS, XV.
 696, 697.

Scipio replied, " That it had not been the Romans, but the Carthaginians, who had occasioned the war in Sicily, and that of Spain : that he called Hannibal himself to witness to this, who certainly could not disown it : but that the gods themselves had determined the question, in declaring by the success; not for the Carthaginians, the authors of an unjust war, but for the Romans, who had only defended themselves. That, however, these successes did not make him forget the inconstancy of fortune, nor the uncertainty of human things." He continued, " If before
 " the Romans had come to Africa, you had quitted
 " Italy, and proposed the same conditions as you now
 " offer, I do not believe they would have refused to
 " hearken to them. But at present, when you have
 " been obliged to abandon Italy, and we are in Africa
 " masters of the field, the state of things is much
 " altered. We consented, at the request of your
 " fellow-citizens, who had been defeated, to begin a
 " treaty with them; the articles of which have been
 " reduced to writing. Besides those which you pro-
 " pose, this treaty imported, that the Carthaginians
 " should restore us all our prisoners without ransom;
 " that they should deliver up their ships of war;
 " that they should pay us five thousand talents; and
 " that they should give us hostages for all this. Such
 " are the conditions upon which we agreed. Both
 " sides sent to Rome to have them ratified by the Se-
 " nate and People; we, on our part, declaring, that
 " we approved them; and the Carthaginians ear-
 " nestly desiring that they should be granted them.
 " And after the Senate and People had given their
 " consent, the Carthaginians broke their engage-
 " ment, and deceived us. What is to be done after
 " this?

“ this ? Put yourself in my place, I desire you, and
 “ give me an answer. Must we acquit them of what
 “ is of greatest moment in the treaty ? That would
 “ certainly be a marvellous expedient to teach them
 “ to deceive those for the future who have obliged
 “ them. But you will say, that if they obtain what
 “ they demand, they will never forget so great a be-
 “ nefit. Of this we may judge from their still re-
 “ cent behaviour. What they asked with humble
 “ supplications they obtained ; and, however, on the
 “ slightest hopes your return made them conceive,
 “ they were the first to treat us as enemies. If to the
 “ conditions, which have been repeated to you, some
 “ other still more rigorous one should be added, in
 “ that case our treaty might again have been carried
 “ before the Roman People ; but as you, on the
 “ contrary, retrench from those which have been
 “ agreed on before, there is no farther report to be
 “ made of it. If then you ask me in my turn upon
 “ what I conclude, it is in one word, that you either
 “ must surrender yourself and country at discretion,
 “ or a battle must decide in your favour.”

A. R. 550.
 Ant. C.
 202.

SPEECH of HANNIBAL from LIVY, XXX. 30.

“ Since it is the decree of the fates, that after
 “ having been the first cause of the present war, and
 “ having had victory so often in my hand, I should
 “ be reduced to take the first steps for asking a peace,
 “ I am highly glad that I am to address myself to
 “ such a General as you. You have signalized your-
 “ self by many famous exploits ; but it will not be
 “ the least glorious circumstance of your life, that
 “ Hannibal, to whom the gods have so often granted
 “ victory over Roman Generals, hath been obliged
 “ to give place to you ; and that you have terminated
 “ a war that has been memorable by the defeats of
 “ you, before it was so by those of us. And what
 “ may be considered as a kind of caprice and sport of
 “ fortune is, that your father was the first of the
 “ Roman

A. R. 550. " Roman Generals that I met in arms, and that I am
 Ant. C. " now come without arms to meet his son, in order
 292. " ask peace of him.

" It were to be wished, that the gods had inspired
 " our forefathers with a spirit of moderation and
 " peace, and that you had confined yourselves within
 " the bounds of Italy, and we within those of Africa.
 " For indeed Sicily and Sardinia, of which fortune
 " made you masters, are but small amends for the
 " many considerable fleets, numerous armies, and
 " great Captains, which those two provinces have
 " cost. But let us leave the past, which may be
 " blamed, but cannot be altered. Our successes have
 " been equal hitherto; and by attacking each other
 " in our several countries, we have exposed ourselves
 " to perish in our own. Rome has seen the Cartha-
 " ginian armies encamped at her gates, and at the
 " foot of her walls; and we now hear at Carthage
 " the noise of the arms and camp of the Romans.

" We now treat of peace at the time when you are
 " at the height of success, that is, at a conjuncture
 " which is now as contrary to us as it is favourable to
 " you. You and I, who treat of it, are certainly the
 " persons who have most interest that it should be
 " speedily terminated, and most authority not to be
 " disclaimed by our Commonwealths. In order to
 " conclude it, we want only a disposition of mind
 " not desirous to retard it. As to me, who return in
 " an advanced age into my country, after having left
 " it almost in my infancy, during so great a length
 " of time, I have learnt, from the different successes I
 " have had, to confide more in reason and prudence
 " than in chance and fortune. I am afraid that you
 " have not the same sentiments, and that your youth,
 " and the good fortune that has hitherto always at-
 " tended you, inspire you with lofty thoughts, that
 " are averse to peace and moderation. Adversity
 " seldom affects the minds of those who have never
 " been unfortunate. You are at this time what I was
 " formerly at Thrasymenus and Cannæ. You had
 " scarce

“ scarce learnt to obey, when the command of ar-
 “ mies was confided to you; and, since then, you
 “ have succeeded beyond your hopes in all the enter-
 “ prizes you have formed, however bold they were.
 “ The very calamities of your family you have made
 “ conduce to your glory; you have avenged the
 “ deaths of your father and uncle, and given the
 “ whole universe a shining proof of your valour and
 “ piety. After having driven four Carthaginian ar-
 “ mies out of Spain, you have recovered those pro-
 “ vinces, which the Romans had lost just before.
 “ You have been made Consul; and in conjunctures
 “ wherein all the other Generals had not courage
 “ enough to defend Italy, you have been so bold to
 “ come to Africa; where you no sooner arrived, but
 “ after having successively defeated two armies, after
 “ having burnt and taken two camps at the same in-
 “ stant, after having taken Syphax, the most power-
 “ ful King of the whole country, and reduced a great
 “ number of cities, as well of his dominions as ours,
 “ into subjection; you at length have forced me
 “ from Italy, of which I had been sixteen years in
 “ possession.

“ You * therefore may be more allured by the
 “ charms of victory than the sweets of peace. I
 “ know the character of the Romans: you are more
 “ affected with the glorious than the solid. And, as
 “ to myself, in happier times I was soothed with the
 “ same illusions. If the gods with good fortune gave
 “ us also right reason and understanding, we should
 “ think of what might happen hereafter, as well as
 “ what has happened heretofore. Not to propose
 “ the example of so many other Captains, mine alone
 “ may teach you the various revolutions of fortune:
 “ Me, whom you saw, not long since, encamped be-

* Potest victoriam malle, quàm pacem, animus. Novi vobis spi-
 ritus magis magnos, quàm utiles. Et mihi talis aliquando fortuna af-
 fulsit. Quòd si in secundis rebus bonam quoque mentem darent dii,
 non ea solum quæ evenissent, sed etiam ea quæ evenire possunt, repu-
 taremus.

A.R. 550
Ant. C.
202.

“ tween Rome and the Anio, upon the point of
“ scaling the walls of that city. You see me now,
“ after having lost two illustrious brothers, trembling
“ for Carthage, already almost besieged, and reduced
“ to desire you to spare my country the alarms which
“ I have given yours.

“ The more fortune smiles upon us, the less we
“ ought to trust her. Now when you are prosperous
“ in every thing, and our condition is doubtful, peace
“ will be glorious to you who give it; whereas to us
“ who ask it, it will be more necessary than honour-
“ able. A certain peace is better than a dubious
“ victory. The first depends on you, the other is in
“ the power of the gods. Do not expose yourself to
“ lose in one moment what you have been so many
“ years acquiring. When you reflect upon your
“ strength, consider also the inconstancy of fortune,
“ and the uncertainty of battle. There will be arms
“ and men on both sides. In war, especially, events
“ least answer the hopes with which men flatter them-
“ selves. Victory, supposing it declares for you, will
“ not add so much to the advantages that peace se-
“ cures you, as bad success will diminish them. A
“ single moment may deprive you both of all your
“ past acquisitions and all you may hope for the fu-
“ ture. In making peace, Scipio, it is you who de-
“ cide your own fate: in fighting, the gods will dis-
“ pose of it. Regulus had been, in the very country
“ where we now are, one of the most glorious exam-
“ ples of valour and good fortune, if, after having
“ overcome our fathers, he had granted them peace.
“ But, by suffering himself to be dazzled by prospe-
“ rity, and not having made a moderate use of his
“ good fortune, his fall was the more deplorable, as
“ it was from the exalted height to which fortune had
“ raised him.

“ I know that it is for him who gives peace to pre-
“ scribe the conditions: but perhaps we are not un-
“ worthy of determining the punishment we deserve
“ to undergo ourselves. We consent that you remain

“ masters of all the countries which have given occa-
 “ sion for the war : Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all
 “ the islands between Africa and Italy. Confined
 “ within the narrow bounds of Africa, we shall see,
 “ since it is the will of the gods, the Romans extend
 “ their sway, both by sea and land, over many fo-
 “ reign nations.

A. R. 550.
 Ant. C.
 202.

“ I agree, that in effect of the little sincerity that
 “ has been shewn during the truce, and of the steps
 “ which have been taken for obtaining peace, the
 “ faith of the Carthaginians may be suspected by
 “ you. But the observation of a treaty depends much
 “ upon the authority of those that have concluded it.
 “ I am informed, that what principally induced your
 “ Senators to refuse it us, was the want of dignity in
 “ the Ambassadors who were sent to negotiate it. At
 “ present it is Hannibal who asks it, because he be-
 “ lieves it advantageous : and the same advantages
 “ which induce him to ask it, will also induce him to
 “ keep it. And as I have so acted as to give none
 “ occasion to complain of the consequences of a war
 “ of which I was author, till the gods themselves
 “ seemed to envy my glory ; I shall also spare no
 “ pains that none may have cause to complain of a
 “ peace obtained by me.”

SCIPIO's answer, also taken from LIVY, XXX. 31.

“ I well knew Hannibal, that it was the hopes of
 “ your return that induced the Carthaginians to break
 “ the truce, which had lately been made ; and to re-
 “ nounce the peace, which seemed upon the point of
 “ being concluded. And you do not depart from
 “ this yourself, when you retrench from the condi-
 “ tions all that was at first granted, and leave us
 “ only what was long before in our possession. For
 “ the rest, as you have made your country sensible
 “ of the load you have taken off their shoulders, it is
 “ my part to prevent the advantages they ceded to
 “ us by the intended treaty, as they are now suppres-
 “ sed,

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

“ fed, from being the reward of their perfidy. Your
“ Carthaginians do not deserve that the first condi-
“ tions should be granted them; and they expect that
“ their fraud should turn to their benefit. It was not
“ the desire of possessing Sicily that induced our fa-
“ thers to carry their arms thither; nor to conquer
“ Spain that they went to that country. It was, on
“ one side, the pressing danger of the Mamertines,
“ our allies; and on the other, the cruel ruin of Sa-
“ guntum, that justly and equitably armed us. You
“ yourself confess that you were the aggressors, and
“ the gods have clearly attested it, in granting those,
“ who had right on their side, the advantage in the
“ first war; as they again both do and will grant it
“ in this.

“ As for me, I neither forget human frailty, nor
“ the inconstancy of fortune; and I know that our
“ designs are liable to a thousand miscarriages. And
“ I further admit, that if you had voluntarily quitted
“ Italy before I came to Africa, and had come to ask
“ me to make peace, in that case I should not have
“ been able to reject your proposals, without giving
“ you room to accuse me of haughtiness and violence.
“ But as it is against your will, and after a long re-
“ sistance, that I have forced you to quit your prey,
“ and to return to Africa; suffer me to tell you, that
“ I am not bound by any good reason to comply with
“ your desire. Therefore, in case some new article
“ be added to the first conditions (you know them)
“ by way of reparation for our ships taken with their
“ lading, and for the insult committed upon our
“ Ambassadors during the truce, I shall consult my
“ council of war upon it. But if those first condi-
“ tions seem too hard, prepare for the war, as you
“ cannot suffer the terms of peace.”

After these speeches, the two Generals returned to the detachments they had left at a distance; and declared, that the interview having been ineffectual, it was absolutely necessary to come to blows.

As

As soon as they arrived in their camps, “ they ordered their soldiers to prepare their arms and courage for a battle, which was upon the point of deciding the fate of both People by an irretrievable victory. That before the end of the next day it would be known, whether Rome or Carthage should give the law, not only to Africa or Italy, but to the whole Universe, which would be the reward of this battle. That the danger which menaced the conquered was equal to the advantage that would attend the victors.” And, accordingly, the Romans, if they were unsuccessful, had no means to escape from an unknown country of the enemy: and the Carthaginians, after having employed their sole and last resource in vain, could not fail of being ruined if they were overcome.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.
Liv. xxx.
32.
Polyb. xv.
676.

The next day, the two greatest Generals of the two most potent people of the world, and the two most warlike armies that ever were, advanced into the open field to an action, which on both sides was to crown the glory they had already acquired by so many exploits, or to obliterate it for ever.

Scipio drew up his troops in the following manner. He posted the Hastati in the front line, leaving intervals between the cohorts: in the second he placed the Principes, with their cohorts not behind the spaces of the first line, as was the custom of the Romans, but behind the cohorts of that front line, in order to leave openings for the elephants of the enemy, which were very numerous. The Triarii formed the third line in the same order, and served as a *corps de reserve*. He placed Lælius on the left wing with the Italian cavalry, and Masinissa on the right with his Numidians. In the spaces of the front line he placed light-armed soldiers, and ordered them to begin the battle, in such a manner, that if they could not sustain the charge of the elephants, they should retire, such of them as were most speedy, behind the whole army through the spaces that divided it in right lines; and those who should find themselves too much pressed, through

Polyb. xv.
697.
Liv. xxx.
32.
App. 228.

A. R. 550. through the spaces between the lines on the right and
 Ant. C. left, in order to leave those animals a passage, in
 202. which they would be exposed to the darts discharged
 upon them on all sides.

Polyb. xv. As to Hannibal, in order to give the enemy more
 699. terror, he placed in that front his fourscore elephants,
 Liv. xxx. a number which he never had before in any battle.
 35. In the first line he posted the auxiliary troops of the
 Ligurians and Gauls, with the Balearians and Moors,
 who amounted in all to twelve thousand men. The
 second line, in which the principal force of the army
 consisted, was composed of Africans and Carthagi-
 nians. He posted the troops he had brought with
 him from Italy in the third line, and placed them
 above a * *stadium* from the second line. He placed
 the Numidian cavalry upon the left wing, and the
 Carthaginian upon the right.

Such was the order of battle of the two armies. I
 could have wished that Polybius, or Livy, had told us
 the exact number of the troops on both sides. Appian
 gives Hannibal in all fifty thousand men, and four-
 score elephants; and Scipio about twenty-three thou-
 sand foot, and fifteen hundred Roman and Italian
 horse, without including Masinissa's very numerous
 cavalry, and fifteen hundred horse of another Numi-
 dian Prince.

Polyb. xv. Before the battle began, the Generals on both sides
 698, 699. took care to animate their troops. Hannibal, besides
 Liv. xxx. enumerating the victories he had gained over the Ro-
 32, 33. mans, the Generals he had killed, the armies he had
 App. 23. cut to pieces, used different motives for exhorting an
 army to fight well, composed of nations that differed
 from each other in their language, customs, laws,

* Livy only says, that Hannibal left a small distance between these
 two lines: "modico inde intervallo relicto." He adds, that most of
 these Italian soldiers had followed Hannibal rather through necessity
 than inclination: and in the sequel he says, that he placed them in
 the rear, and at some distance, because he did not know whether he
 was to consider them as friends or enemies: "Italicos intervallo
 quoque diremptos, incertos socii an hostes essent." Polybius says
 nothing of all this.

habits,

habits, and arms, and who had not the same interest in making war. “He promised the auxiliary troops, besides their usual pay, great rewards out of the spoils of the enemy. He sharpened the hatred which the Gauls naturally had for the Roman name. He offered the Ligurians the fertile countries of Italy instead of the barren mountains they inhabited. He made the Moors and Numidians apprehend the tyrannical sway of Masinissa. As to what regarded the Carthaginians, he represented to them, that they were to defend the walls of their country, their household gods, their fathers and mothers, wives and children. That there was no medium: that they were that day, either to lose life and liberty by their defeat, or to acquire the empire of the universe by their victory.” He made use of interpreters, in order to be understood by the different nations.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

Scipio, on his side, “put the Romans in mind of the victories they had gained in Spain, and lately in Africa. He insisted much upon the confession Hannibal had made, against his will, of his weakness, by asking peace. He animadverted to them, that they were now upon the point of putting an end to the war and their labours: that the ruin and spoils of Carthage, and their return into their country, was now in their own hands.” And * all this he said with the air and tone of a conqueror.

Every thing being ready for the battle, and the Numidian cavalry on both sides having long skirmished, Hannibal gave orders for the elephants to move against the enemy. The Romans immediately made the trumpets sound, and at the same time raised such great cries, that the elephants, which advanced against the right of the Romans, turned back, and put the Moors and Numidians, that formed Hannibal’s left, into disorder. Masinissa seeing their confusion, easily put them entirely to the rout. The

Polyb. xv.
700—702.
Liv. xxx.
33—35.
App. 23—
26.

* Celsus hæc corpore, vultuque ita læto, ut vicisse jam crederes, dicebat.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

rest of the elephants advanced between the two armies into the plain, and fell upon the light-armed Romans, of which they crushed a great number to death; notwithstanding the continual shower of darts discharged upon them from all sides. At length, being terrified, some of them ran through the spaces Scipio had prudently left; and others in their flight returned upon their own right wing, pursued by the Roman horse, who with their spears drove them quite out of the field of battle. Lælius took this instant for charging the Carthaginian cavalry, who turned about and fled full speed. He pursued them warmly, whilst Masiussa did the same on his side.

The army of the Carthaginians was uncovered on the right, and left by its cavalry. The infantry then on both sides advanced slowly and in good order, except that which Hannibal had brought from Italy, which formed the third line, and continued in its first post. When they were near each other, the Romans raising great cries according to their custom, and striking their swords upon their shields, charged the enemy with vigour. On the side of the Carthaginians, the body of foreign troops that formed the front line also raised great cries, but confused and dissonant from each other, because they were all of different nations. As they could use neither swords nor javelins, and they fought hand to hand, the strangers at first had some advantage over the Romans by their agility and boldness, and wounded a great number. However, the latter having the superiority by their good order and the nature of their arms, gained ground, supported by the second line, who followed, and incessantly encouraged them to fight with valour; whereas the strangers being neither followed nor assisted by the Carthaginians, whose inaction on the contrary intimidated them, lost courage, gave way, and believing themselves openly abandoned by their own troops, fell in retiring upon their second line, and attacked it in order to open themselves a passage. The latter found themselves obliged to defend their lives

lives courageously; so that the Carthaginians, attacked by the strangers, contrary to their expectation, saw they had two enemies to fight, their own troops and the Romans. Quite out of their senses, and in a manner transported with fury, they made a great slaughter of both, and put the Hastati into disorder. Those who commanded the Principes, that is, the second line, having made their troops advance, rallied them without difficulty. The greatest part of the strangers and Carthaginians fell in this place, partly cut in pieces by one another, and partly by the Romans. Hannibal would not suffer those that fled to mingle with those that remained, lest full of terror as they were, and covered with wounds, they might induce disorder amongst those who had received no blow hitherto; he even ordered the front rank to present their pikes, which obliged them to retire along the wings into the plain.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

The space between the two armies being then covered with blood, and with the dead and wounded, Scipio was in perplexity enough: for he did not know how to make his troops move in good order over that confused heap of arms and dead bodies, still bleeding, and lying upon each other. He ordered the wounded men to be carried behind the army; the retreat to be founded for the Hastati, who were pursuing the enemy; posted them opposite to the centre of the enemy, in expectation of a new charge, and made the Principes and Triarii advance on both wings.

When they were upon the same front with the Hastati, a new battle began between the two armies. The infantry alternately gave way, and returned to the charge with great courage and vigour. As number, resolution, and arms were equal on both sides, and they fought with such obstinacy that they fell in their posts rather than give way, the fate of the battle was long doubtful, and it could not be conjectured which side would remain masters of the field. Things being in this state, Lælius and Masinissa, after having pursued the enemy's cavalry a considerable time, re-

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

turned very opportunely for attacking the infantry in the rear. This last charge decided the victory. A great number of the Carthaginians were killed upon the field of battle, where they were surrounded on all sides. Many of them having dispersed in the plains round about, were cut off by the Roman cavalry that occupied all the country. The Carthaginians left above twenty thousand dead upon the spot, as well of their own citizens as allies. Almost as many were taken, with an hundred and thirty ensigns and standards, and eleven elephants. The victors lost only fifteen hundred men. Thus ended this great action, which very much contributed to render the Romans master of the world.

Liv. xxx.
35.

After the battle, Scipio caused the Carthaginians who had escaped to be pursued, plundered their camp, and then returned to his own. As to Hannibal, he retreated without losing time, with a small number of horse, and escaped to Adrumetum, * after having tried both before and during the battle all possible means for obtaining the victory. He particularly shewed singular address and consummate prudence in his order of battle, and in the disposition of his troops. And this praise he received from the mouth of Scipio himself, and of all experienced officers.

Polyb. xv.
702.

Polybius affirms the same of him, and expresses himself as follows. Hannibal may be said on this occasion to have done every thing that was possible, or could be expected from a General of so great experience in the art of war, and of so just a reputation for prudence and valour. He first had an interview with Scipio, to endeavour to terminate the war in his own person. This was not dishonouring his former exploits: it was diffiding in fortune, and putting himself upon his guard against the uncertainty and caprice of war. In the battle, he acted

* Omnia & in prælio, & ante aciem, priusquam excederet pugna, expertus; & confessione etiam Scipionis, omniumque peritorum militiæ, illam laudem adeptus, singulari arte aciem illa die instruxisse. Liv.

in such a manner, that being to use the same arms as the Romans, he could not have behaved better. The Roman order of battle is very hard to break. With them, the army in general, and every corps in particular, fight on whatever side the enemy advances : because they are so drawn up, that the cohorts nearest the danger always face all together towards the side necessary. Besides which, their armour gives them abundance of confidence and boldness ; the largeness of their shields, and the strength of their swords, contributing very much to make them firm in battle, and hard to be defeated. Hannibal however used all possible means for overcoming all these obstacles. He had drawn together a great number of elephants, and had placed them in the front of his army, to disorder and break the battle of the Romans. By posting the mercenary strangers in the front line, and the Carthaginians behind them, his first view was to tire the enemy, and blunt their swords in effect of the slaughter. Besides which, by placing the Carthaginians between two lines, he reduced them to the necessity of fighting, according to Homer's maxim. And lastly, he had placed at a certain distance the bravest and firmest of his troops, in order that seeing the event at distance, and being entirely fresh, they might, when the favourable moment should arrive, fall with valour upon the enemy. If this hitherto invincible Hero, after having done all that was possible in the case, was however overcome, he is not to be reproached on that account. Fortune sometimes opposes the designs of Great men ; besides it not seldom happens, that an able General is defeated by one more able than himself.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

Æliad. Lib.
iv. v. 297.

I thought it proper to repeat this reflection from Polybius, upon the ability which Hannibal shewed in the disposition of his army at the battle of Zama. I leave it to persons of more skill in the art of war to determine of this ; for the thing has some difficulty : for my part, I only repeat the opinions of authors, without pretending to vouch for them.

S E C T. IV.

Hannibal returns to Carthage. Scipio prepares to besiege Carthage. Ambassadors from Carthage come to him to ask peace. Numidians defeated. Conditions of peace proposed by Scipio to the Carthaginians. Gisgo opposes it. Hannibal silences him. The fleet of Claudius Nero meets with a great storm. Scipio's victory declared at Rome occasions great joy there. Dispute concerning the distribution of the provinces. The Senate first gives Philip's ambassadors audience, and then those of Carthage. Peace granted to the Carthaginians. Prisoners restored to the Carthaginians without ransom. The Ambassadors return to Carthage. Five hundred ships burnt out at sea. Deserters punished. Hannibal laughs in the Senate whilst the rest cry. Scipio gives Masinissa the kingdom of Syphax. Reflexion of Polybius upon the governments of Carthage and Rome at the time of the second Punic war. Scipio returns to Rome, and receives the honour of a triumph. He is honoured with the surname of Africanus.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.
Liv. xxx.
35. **H**Annibal, after the loss of the battle, had retired, as I have said, to Adrumettum. The Senate having sent for him, he repaired to Carthage, in which he had not been during thirty-six years, from the time he quitted it very young. He owned, in the full Senate, that he had been entirely defeated; that the battle which had lately been fought absolutely terminated the war; and that Carthage had no longer any safety to hope, but by obtaining peace from the Romans.

Liv. xxx.
36. As to Scipio, he caused the spoils and plunder, which were very considerable, to be carried on board his ships, and at his return to the sea-side he was informed there, that P. Lentulus was arrived at the Roman camp near Utica with fifty large ships, and an hundred transports laden with all kinds of provisions.

sions. Believing that it was necessary not to give the Carthaginians time to recover from their consternation, but to spread terror on all sides at the same time, and in the midst of the capital, after having sent Lælius to Rome to carry the news of his victory, he ordered Cn. Octavius to march the legions by land to the gates of Carthage; and himself with his old fleet, and that which Lentulus had lately brought, set out from his camp before Utica, and advanced to the port of Carthage.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

He was not far from it, when he perceived a Carthaginian galley, adorned with fillets and branches of olive, that came out to meet him. It had on board ten ambassadors, all principal persons of the city, who, in consequence of the advice which Hannibal had given the Senate, had been sent to demand peace. They approached the poop of Scipio's ship, and presenting him the branches of olive as suppliants, they implored his mercy and clemency. He gave them no other answer, but that they might come to him at Tunis, where he was going to incamp. As to himself, after having curiously examined the situation of Carthage, less to make any use of it in the present occasion, than to humble his enemies, he went back to Utica, whither he also made Octavius return.

Having set out from thence for Tunis, he was informed on his way, that Vermina, the son of Syphax, was coming to the aid of the Carthaginians with an army consisting of more horse than foot. He immediately sent part of his legions, with all his cavalry, against those Numidians. This detachment attacked them the first day of the Saturnalia, and entirely defeated them. The Roman horse having surrounded them on all sides, cut off even the way for flight, killed fifteen thousand upon the spot, took twelve hundred, with fifteen hundred Numidian horse, and sixty-two ensigns. Vermina escaped in the midst of the tumult, with a small number of his followers.

Scipio, in the mean time, was arrived at Tunis, Liv. xxx. and incamped in the same post he had occupied before, Polyb. xv, fore, 705.

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

fore. Though they appeared before him in a more humbled and mournful condition than before, as their present condition required, he however expressed less compassion for them, not having yet forgot their perfidy. He assembled his council. At first, all who composed it, through just indignation, were for the ruin of Carthage. But afterwards, reflecting upon the importance of such a design, and the length of time that the siege of so great and well fortified a city would take up; and Scipio himself fearing, that a successor might come to deprive him, at a small expence of service, of the honour of terminating a war which had cost him so many fatigues and dangers, the whole council inclined to peace.

The next day he ordered the ambassadors to attend; and after having reproached them with their breach of faith and perfidy in the sharpest terms, and exhorted them to confess at length, after so many defeats, which ought to be useful lessons for them, that there were gods who avenged the infraction of treaties, and the violation of oaths, he declared to them the conditions upon which he consented to grant them peace. “ That they should retain their laws and liberty. That they should possess in Africa the same cities and extent of country as they had before the war. That from henceforth no hostilities should be committed. That they should give up to the Romans all prisoners and deserters. That they should deliver up all their great ships, except ten galleys, and all the managed elephants they had, and should tame no more for the future. That they should not make war either in Africa, or elsewhere, without the consent of the Roman People. That they should restore to Masinissa the houses, lands, cities, and other estates, which had belonged to him or his ancestors throughout all the extent of his country, that should be assigned them. That they should supply the Roman army with provisions for three months; that they should furnish their pay till their deputies returned from Rome. That in fifty years they should pay the
Romans

Romans * ten thousand talents of silver, divided into equal payments; that is, two hundred talents every year. That, for security of their faith, they should give an hundred hostages, which the Consul should choose out of the youth from fourteen to thirty years of age. That the truce they asked should be granted them, on condition that the barks they had surprized during the first truce should be restored to the Romans, with all that was in them when taken. That, without this restitution, they must not expect either truce or peace.”

A. R. 550.
Ant. C.
202.

The ambassadors having received this answer, set out directly for Carthage, and reported it to the Senate and People. Whilst they were speaking in the assembly of the People, Gisgo, a Carthaginian Senator, having began a discourse to dissuade his fellow-citizens from accepting these conditions, which appeared too hard, and being hearkened to by a multitude equally incapable of making war, or of bearing peace, Hannibal, enraged that such discourses should be held, and attention had to them, in the like conjunctures, took Gisgo by the arm, and made him come down from the tribunal, roughly enough. So violent a proceeding, and so repugnant to the taste of a free city, as Carthage was, occasioned an universal murmur. Hannibal was concerned at it, and immediately excused himself: “ Having left this city at nine years
“ of age,” said he, “ and not having returned till
“ after an absence of six and thirty years; I have had
“ time to learn the trade of war, and flatter myself
“ that I have succeeded tolerably in doing so. As
“ to your laws and customs, you ought not to be
“ surprized that I am ignorant of them; and it is
“ from you that I desire to learn them.” This kind of satisfaction having appeased the People, and stopt the murmur, he continued as follows: “ It was my
“ zeal for the good of the public, that made me

Polyb. xv.
706.
Liv. xxx.
37.

* Ten thousand Attick talents amounted to about fifteen thousand pounds. These, which were Euboick talents, were something less.

A. R. 550. “ commit the fault that offends you. For I cannot
 Ant. C. “ recover my astonishment, on seeing that a Cartha-
 202. “ ginian, who knows all that has passed on our side
 “ in respect to the Roman People, and also that in
 “ effect of their last victory they are become absolute
 “ masters of our fate, should not thank the gods,
 “ that they treat us so favourable.” He then went on
 to shew particularly, “ of what importance the union
 of the Senate was, and of not giving room, by di-
 vided * opinions for carrying an affair of that na-
 ture before the People.”

This advice seemed very wise, and intirely for the
 interest of the Commonwealth in the deplorable ex-
 tremities and dangers to which it was now exposed.
 It was unanimously resolved, in consequence, to ac-
 cept the peace upon the conditions proposed ; and the
 Senate immediately nominated ambassadors to con-
 clude it.

What embarrassed them most, was the previous
 restitution demanded by the Romans ; for they had
 only the vessels which had been taken in their keep-
 ing, and it was not easy to find the effects, those who
 had appropriated them to themselves industriously
 concealing them. It was concluded that they should
 begin by restoring the ships ; that the crews should
 be found and set at liberty ; that as to the other ef-
 fects, the value Scipio should think proper to set
 upon them, should be paid.

When the deputies were returned to Scipio, the
 Quæstors had orders to fix from their accounts the
 price of all that had belonged to the Commonwealth
 on board of those ships, and private persons to declare
 the value of their effects ; and for the whole the Car-
 thaginians were made to pay down twenty-five thou-
 sand pounds of silver in weight. When this was
 done, a truce for three months was granted them,
 upon condition that, as long as it subsisted, they

* When opinions were divided in the Senate, the decision of the
 affair in question devolved to the People ; but only in that case.

should send no ambassadors to any part except Rome ; and if any should come to them from any nation whatsoever, that they should not dismiss them, till they had first informed the Roman General, both from what powers they were sent, and what demands they were instructed to make. Scipio made L. Veturius Philo, M. Marcius Ralla, and L. Scipio his brother, set out for Rome with the Carthaginian deputies.

A. R. 550
Ant. C.
202.

The convoys that came about this time from Sicily and Sardinia, made the price of provisions so low, that the merchants let the captains of the galleys have their corn for the freight.

Rome had taken the alarm on the first rumour of the breaking up of the negotiations with the Carthaginians, and the renewing of the war ; and Tib. Claudius Nero, one of the Consuls, was ordered to go with his fleet immediately to Sicily, and from thence to Africa ; and his colleague, M. Servilius, to remain near Rome, till it should be exactly known in what condition affairs were in Africa. The Consul Claudius acted with abundance of slowness in the preparations and departure of the fleet, in disgust for the Senate's having made Scipio, preferably to himself, master of the conditions on which the peace was to be concluded. Having at length set sail, he met with a violent storm, which wrecked several of his ships, and did the rest great damage. Winter overtaking him at Carali's (*now Cagliari*) in Sardinia, where he was employed in refitting them, and the time of his magistracy being elapsed, he was reduced to the condition of a private person, and brought back his fleet without glory to the Tiber.

Liv. xxx.
38, 39.

The deputies whom Scipio had sent from Africa to Rome, being arrived, with those of the Carthaginians, the Senate assembled in the temple of Bellona. L. Veturius Philo then gave an account, to the exceeding satisfaction of the whole Assembly, in what manner the Carthaginians had lost a battle near their capital, that left them no resource, and which finally terminated a war, that had occasioned so many calamities,

Liv. xxx.
40.

A. R. 550. in favour of the Romans. Though the advantage
 Ant. C. gained over Vermina, the son of Syphax, was but a
 202. slight increase of good fortune, he did not omit to mention it. He was then ordered to ascend the tribunal of harangues, and to impart such grateful news to the People. The citizens gave themselves up to the excess of their joy; and, after having congratulated each other upon such great success, dispersed into all the temples to thank the gods for it, according to a decree for public thanksgivings during three days.

The Deputies from the Carthaginians, and those from king Philip, for some from that prince were come to Rome, having demanded audience of the Senate, they were answered, that the new Consuls should give it them.

A. R. 551.
 Ant. C.
 201.

CN. CORNELIUS LENTULUS.
 P. ÆLIUS PÆTUS.

Liv. xxx.
 40.

Before the provinces of the Consuls were fixed, the ambassadors of Macedonia, and those of Carthage, had audience, and it was foreseen, that the war being terminated on one side, was on the point of beginning on another. The Consul Lentulus was infinitely ardent to have Africa for his province. He rightly judged, that if the war continued the victory would cost him little; and that, in case of peace, it would be highly for his glory to have put an end, during his Consulship, to so important a war. Accordingly, he desired that no affair should be brought on, till the command in Africa was previously given to him; for his colleague did not aspire at it in the least, being a person of reason and moderation: besides which, he conceived it no less vain than unjust to dispute that honour with Scipio.

The Tribunes of the People, Q. Minucius Thermus and Manius Acilius Glabrio, represented, "That Cn. Cornelius was making an attempt in which Tib. Claudius had already miscarried the year before; as, when

when the Senate had referred the Consul's demand to the People's determination, the whole thirty-five tribes had given Scipio the preference." The affair having been debated with abundance of warmth, both in the Senate, and before the people, the decision of it was referred to the Senate. The Senators accordingly, after having taken an oath, as had been agreed on, decreed that one of the Consuls, according as they should agree between themselves, should remain in Italy, whilst the other should command a fleet of fifty sail. That he to whom the fleet should fall by lot, should go to Sicily, and from thence to Africa, if peace were not concluded with the Carthaginians. That in that case, the Consul should act by sea, and Scipio by land, with the same authority as before. That if the Carthaginians accepted the conditions of peace proposed to them, the Tribunes should make the people determine, whether the Consul, or Scipio, should make the peace, and bring back the victorious army to Italy, if that should be deemed proper. That if that honour should be conferred upon Scipio, the Consul should not go from Sicily to Africa. P. Scipio was continued in the command of the armies, at the head of which he then was in Africa.

All these resolutions of the Senate, full of wisdom and equity, were a good lesson, and a tacit reprimand, for the Consul Lentulus, which his mean jealousy had justly drawn upon him. Through a blind desire of glory, he was for depriving Scipio of an honour, which it was evident the people allotted to him out of justice and gratitude, for all the labours and dangers he had undergone in this war. Lentulus's colleague acted much more wisely; who perceived, * that such an attempt was contrary both to equity and prudence, as it could not succeed. Jealousy, a base vice, unworthy of a man of honour, deserves to be covered with shame, and exposed to universal contempt.

* Qui gloriæ ejus certamen cum Scipione, præterquam quòd iniquum esset, etiam impar futurum cernebat. LIV.

A. R. 551.
 Ant. C.
 201.
 Liv. xxx.
 42.

After the Senate had fixed all that related to the provinces, as well of the Consuls as of the other Generals, their next care was to give audience to the ambassadors of Philip, and those of the Carthaginians.

Those of Philip were introduced first to the Senate. Their discourse consisted of three heads. They began by vindicating their master, in respect to the hostilities the ambassadors, sent from Rome to that prince, had accused him of having committed against the allies of the Commonwealth. In the second place, they themselves complained of the allies of the Roman people; but much more sharply of M. Aurelius, one of the three ambassadors that had been sent to him: for they reproached him, that, without regard to his character, he had continued in Greece to raise soldiers there; that he had made war against him contrary to the treaty, and that he had often come to blows with his lieutenants. And lastly, they demanded that Sopater, with the Macedonian soldiers he had commanded, and who being in the army and pay of Hannibal, had been made prisoners by the Romans, should be restored to Philip.

M. Furius, whom Aurelius had sent expressly from Macedonia to defend him, replied to these accusations; "that Aurelius had been left in the country, to prevent the allies of the Commonwealth, perpetually harraßed by Philip, from being reduced at length to go over to him. That for the rest, he had not quitted the lands of the allies, and that he had confined himself to preventing the king's troops from making incursions into them with impunity. That Sopater, one of the principal persons of the Macedonian court, and even the king's relation, had been sent to Africa with four thousand men, and money, to the aid of Hannibal and the Carthaginians."

After Furius had done speaking, the Macedonians were asked what they had to reply; and as their answers seemed not a little confused, they were stopt short,

short, and the Senate declared : “ That it was easy to see that the King desired war ; and that, if he did not change his conduct, he would soon have what he sought. That he had doubly violated the treaty : first, in distressing the allies of the Roman People, and making his troops ravage their country ; and next, by sending aids of men and money to the enemies of the Commonwealth. That Scipio had done nothing of which he could reasonably complain, when he put soldiers into irons, and treated them as enemies, whom he had taken in the act of fighting against the Roman People. That, as to what regarded Aurelius, the Senate and People highly approved him for having assisted the allies of the Commonwealth in arms, as the faith of a treaty did not suffice to protect them against the violence of Philip.”

A. R. 551.
Ant. C.
221.

The Macedonians having been dismissed with so menacing an answer, the Carthaginians were called in. As soon as their advanced age was observed, and that they were the principal persons of Carthage, both by their birth and employments, it was believed, that the Carthaginians really intended peace. The most considerable of them was Asdrubal, surnamed Hædus, a grave Senator, who had always recommended peace to his fellow citizens, and on all occasions had strongly declared against the Barcinian faction. This authorized him the more to impute the crime of this war to the avidity of a small number of particulars, and to acquit the public council of Carthage of it. He made a very good speech, in which he excused the Carthaginians in respect to some points, and condemned them for others, to avoid giving offence by shamelessly denying facts evidently true ; and he concluded with exhorting the Senate to make a moderate use of their advantages. He informed them, “ That if the Carthaginians had followed his and Hanno’s counsels, they might have dictated the conditions of peace themselves ; whereas they were now reduced to accept of such as should be imposed upon them. That

A. R. 551.
Ant. C.
201.

That * the gods seldom bestowed on men, at the same time, good fortune and right reason. That what rendered the Roman People invincible was, their knowing in prosperity how to make use of prudence, and to hearken to the dictates of reason. That for the rest, it would be amazing for them to act otherwise. That those to whom good successes were new, on such occasions not being masters of themselves, give themselves up to immoderate and insolent joy, because they are not accustomed to them: but that the Romans were so habituated to conquering, that they were become almost insensible to the pleasure of victory; and that they owed the increase of their dominions much more to the clemency with which they used the vanquished, than to their victories themselves." The other Ambassadors spoke a tone more humble, and more proper to move compassion. " They deplored the fate of their country, observing from what a high degree of power and greatness it had fallen into an abyss of misery. That the Carthaginians, after having carried their conquests so far, retained only the walls of Carthage. That inclosed within them, they had no longer any thing, either by sea or land, that obeyed them. And that they retained their city itself, and their household gods, only, as the Roman People should vouchsafe not to carry their rigour to the last extremities." The Senators seemed to be touched with compassion, when one of them, incensed by the perfidy of which the Carthaginians had given a quite recent instance, " asked the Ambassadors, by what gods they would swear to observe the treaty of peace, after having deceived those who had been witnesses of their first oath?"

* Rarò simul hominibus bonam fortunam bonamque mentem dari. Populum Romanum eo invidum esse, quòd in secundis rebus sapere & consulere meminerit. Et hercle mirandum fuisse, si aliter facerent. Ex insolentia, quibus nova bona fortuna sit, impotentes lætitiæ insanire. Populo Romano ulitata, ac prope jam obsoleta ex victoria gaudia esse, ac plus bene parcendo victis, quam vincendo, imperium auxisse. Liv.

“ The same gods,” replied Asdrubal, “ who have so
“ severely punished their former perjuries.”

A. R. 551.

Ant. C.

201.

Appian puts a very fine harangue into the mouth
of this Asdrubal Hædus, but addresses it to Scipio.
He also repeats that of the Consul Cn. Lentulus in
the Senate.

App. Bell.

Pun. 27—

29.

All the Roman Senators were inclined to peace.
But the Consul Lentulus, who had the command of
the fleet, opposed the decree, which they were upon
the point of passing in that disposition. Upon this
the Tribunes Man. Acilius and Q. Minucius asked
the People assembled, “ Whether it was their will
that a peace should be made with the Carthaginians,
and by whom they desired it should be made; and
whether the army should be brought back from
Africa?” All the Tribes declared for peace, and
charged Scipio with the care of concluding it, and of
leading back the troops into Italy. In consequence
of this resolution of the People, the Senate decreed,
that Scipio, with a council of ten commissioners,
should make peace with the Carthaginians on such
conditions as he should judge proper.

Liv. xxx.

43.

The Ambassadors of Carthage, after thanking the
Senate, demanded their permission to enter the city,
and to confer with their fellow-citizens confined in
the prisons of the Commonwealth. They represented,
“ that there were amongst them several of the most
considerable persons of Carthage, to whom they were
bound both by blood and friendship: and that there
were others whom their relations had desired them to
see.” After having visited them, they asked another
favour; which was, to ransom such of those prisoners
as they should think fit. The names of them were
asked. They were about two hundred, whom the
Senate caused to be carried to Africa by the Roman
commissioners, who were ordered to put them into
the hands of Scipio, directing that General to restore
them to the Carthaginians without ransom, as soon as
the peace should be concluded.

A. R. 551.
Ant. C.
201.

The Ambassadors of Carthage set out from Rome, and being returned to Scipio, made a peace upon the conditions mentioned above. They delivered up to him their ships of war, and elephants, with the slaves, Roman deserters, and four thousand prisoners, amongst whom was one Senator, named Q. Terentius Culeo. Scipio caused the ships to be carried out to sea, where they were burnt. They were in all, according to some authors, five hundred. The sight of this fire, kindled so near Carthage, occasioned as much grief to that city as the burning of Carthage itself would have done. The deserters were punished more severely than the slaves; for the heads of all those who were Latins were cut off, and the Romans were crucified.

Liv. xxx.
44.

It was forty years since the last peace had been made with the Carthaginians, in the Consulship of Q. Lutatius and Aulus Manlius. The war had broke out again three and twenty years after, in that of P. Cornelius and T. Sempronius. It was terminated* the seventeenth year, during the Consulship of Cn. Cornelius and P. Ælius Pætus. It was often said afterwards to Scipio, that if he had not terminated the war with the total destruction of Carthage, it was to be imputed to the avidity and ambition, first of Tib. Claudius, and next of Cn. Cornelius, who had both caballed to supplant him, and to have the honour of putting an end to this war.

Liv. *ibid.*

When they came to the first payment of the tribute laid on them in consequence of the treaty, as the funds of the State were exhausted by the expences of so long a war, the difficulty of raising that sum gave the Senate great grief, and many could not refrain from tears. It is said that Hannibal, upon this occasion, fell a-laughing. Asdrubal Hædus warmly reproaching him for insulting the public affliction in that manner, He, who had been the cause of it. "If," said he in return, "my heart could be seen, and its senti-

* The seventeenth year was elapsed, and the eighteenth begun.

“ ments discovered, as what passes in my face may, A. R. 551.
 “ it would presently be perceived that the laugh with Ant. C.
 “ which I am reproached is not the effect of joy; but 201.
 “ of the trouble and emotion which the public mis-
 “ fortunes give me. And, after all, is this laugh
 “ more unreasonable than the tears I see you shed?
 “ It was when our arms were taken from us, our
 “ ships burnt, and all wars abroad prohibited; it
 “ was then you should have cried: for that was
 “ the stroke, the mortal wound, that laid us low.
 “ But we do not feel the calamities of the public till
 “ they come to affect us personally; and what grieves
 “ and afflicts us most, is the loss of our money. Ac-
 “ cordingly, when vanquished Carthage was stript
 “ of her spoils, when she was left without arms and
 “ defence, in the midst of so many powerful and
 “ armed States of Africa, not one of you shed a
 “ single tear, or vented a single sigh. And now, be-
 “ cause you are each of you to contribute to the pay-
 “ ment of the tribute, you are as much dejected as
 “ if all were utterly lost. Ah! I am afraid, that what
 “ extorts so many tears from you now, will soon be
 “ the least of your misfortunes.”

Scipio, in the mean time, made preparations for his departure. He assembled his troops, and publicly declared, that he annexed to the dominions Masinissa inherited from his forefathers, Cirta, and the other cities and territories of Syphax, of which the Romans had made themselves masters, and of which he made him a present in their name. He ordered Cn. Octavius to carry the fleet to Sicily, and to leave the command of it to the Consul Cn. Octavius. He, lastly, sent orders to the Carthaginians to send new deputies to Rome, in order to the ratification of the treaty by the Senate and People, which he had lately concluded with them in concert with the ten commissioners.

I shall conclude what relates to the second Punic war with a reflexion from Polybius, which well de-

A. R. 551. scribes the different situation of the two rival Com-
Ant. C. monwealths of which we are speaking.

201.
Polyb. vi. In the beginning of the second Punic war, and of
493, 494. Hannibal's time, Carthage may be said, in some
sense, to be on the decline. Her youth, prime, and
vigour, were already faded. She had begun to fall
from her former elevation, and inclined towards her
ruin: whereas Rome was, at that time, in the flower
and vigour of life, and made great advances towards
the conquest of the Universe.

The reason Polybius gives for the decline of the
one, and the growth of the other, is deduced from
the different manner in which those two Repub-
licks were then governed.

With the Carthaginians, the People had engrossed
the principal authority in the public affairs. The
counsel of the elders and magistrates was no longer
regarded: every thing was carried by cabal and in-
trigue. Not to mention what the faction opposite to
Hannibal did against him during the whole time of his
command; the single fact of the Roman vessels taken
during a truce; a breach of faith, in which the People
forced the Senate to take part and lend their name, is
a very clear proof of what Polybius says in this place.

On the contrary, this was the time at Rome when
the Senate, that body of wise men, had more credit
than ever, and when the elders were heard and con-
sidered as oracles. Every body knows how jealous
the Roman People were of their authority. We have
however seen that a century, consisting of the youth
to whose lot it had fallen to give its suffrage first,
which was usually followed by the same vote of all the
rest, having nominated two Consuls, upon the single
remonstrance of Fabius, departed from the choice it
had made, and declared others.

From this difference of government Polybius con-
cludes, that a people guided by the prudence of the
old and experienced, must necessarily have the advan-
tage of a State governed by the rash opinions of the
multitude. Rome, in effect, governed by the wise
counsels

counsels of the Senate, had at length the upper hand in the gross of the war, though she had in particular had the disadvantage in several battles; and she established her power and greatness upon the ruins of her rival.

A. R. 551.
Ant. C.
201.

It was by these and other the like means, as we may observe in the course of our history, that Providence, which presides over States and Kingdoms, disposes events, fixes their duration, and inspires those who govern them, with prudence, courage, and all the other qualities necessary to government: it was thus, I say, that at a distance, and by successive continual increases, it prepared Rome for that greatness and power it had allotted her from all eternity. Rome * rightly perceived, that she was indebted for all her successes to a superior cause, that protected her in a peculiar manner, and which she confesses on a thousand occasions: but she had the misfortune not to know it, and to lavish the marks of her gratitude upon deaf and impotent divinities.

The presence of Scipio was no longer necessary in Liv. xxx. Africa. After having procured his country so glorious 45. a peace, he embarked his troops, and went to Lilybæum in Sicily. From thence he made the greatest part of his army set out on board the galleys for Rome directly. Livy gives us reason to think, that he landed at Rhegium. For that historian tells us, that Scipio crossed the country of Italy through two rows of people, who flocked from all parts, in order to have the satisfaction of seeing their deliverer, to whose valour and good fortune they believed themselves indebted for the repose, tranquility, and all the other advantages they were going to enjoy in effect of the peace. When he arrived at Rome, in the midst of this

* Hujus beneficii gratiam, Judices fortuna populi Romani, & vestra felicitas, & dii immortales sibi debere putant. Nec verò quisquam aliter arbitrari potest, nisi qui nullam majestatem esse ducit numenve divinum—Ea vis (divina) sæpe incredibiles huic urbi felicitates atque opes attulit. Non est humano consilio, ne mediocri quidem, Judices, deorum immortalium curâ, res illa perfecta. Cic. pro M. L. 83 & 85.

A. R. 551.
Ant. C.
201.

public joy, he entered it in triumph, with greater pomp and magnificence than had ever been seen. King Syphax, and several lords of his court, were led before his chariot. The Senator Q. Terentius Culeo, who had been released from bondage, followed the same chariot, with his head covered with a kind of hat, which was a mark of the liberty he had recovered. Syphax did not long survive his shame, and died in prison. Scipio put a very large sum into the public treasury, and gave about thirteen pence to each of his soldiers out of the spoils of the enemy. He was honoured with the glorious surname of Africanus, which he retained ever after, and which seemed to perpetuate the remembrance of his triumph. Scipio was the first who assumed the name of the nation he had conquered. In process of time other Romans, by his example, rendered their families illustrious by the like titles, but which they had not deserved by such glorious victories.



T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE TWENTY FIRST.

THIS book includes the history of four years; 552, 553, 554, and 555. It contains principally the second war with Philip, which is terminated by the victory gained by Quintius Flaminius at Cynoscephalæ; and some expeditions in Spain and Cisalpine Gaul.

S E C T. I.

War of Macedonia. Epochas of the wars of the Romans with Philip. Various complaints to the Romans against Philip. The People at first oppose this war. The Consul, by the Senate's advice, brings over the People, and war is declared against Philip. Ambassadors from Ptolomy. Insurrection of Gaul excited by Amilcar. Ambassadors sent to Carthage, and Masinissa. Ambassadors from Vermina, the son of Syphax, to the Romans. Money taken out of the temple of Proserpina. Remonstrance of several private persons to the Senate, concerning what is due to them from the Commonwealth. The Consul Sulpicius arrives in Macedonia. Centho plunders the city of Chalcis. Philip besieges Athens ineffectually. He besieges it a second time, with as little success, and lays waste all Attica. The Romans ravage the frontiers of Macedonia. Some Kings bordering

upon Macedonia join the Consul. Preparations of Philip. Assembly of the Ætolians, to which Philip, the Athenians, and Romans, send Ambassadors. The assembly separates, without concluding any thing. The Consul enters Macedonia. Rencontre of two parties. Various actions of small importance between the two armies. Philip has some advantage over the Roman foragers. He is afterwards defeated himself and obliged to fly. Sulpicius returns to Apollonia. The Ætolians declare for the Romans. Decrees of the Athenians against Philip. An ovation is granted Lentulus for his successes in Spain. L. Furius defeats the army of the Gauls, who besiege Cremona. The Consul Aurelius's jealousy of Furius. The latter returns to Rome and demands a triumph. It is granted him after long debates. P. Scipio celebrates games. His soldiers are rewarded. Army of Spaniards defeated. Return of the Consul Aurelius to Rome. New Consuls appointed. Combats of gladiators.

Liv. xxxi.
1.

THE Second Punic war, which had lately been terminated so gloriously for the Romans, was almost immediately followed by one with the Macedonians. The latter was not in the least comparable to the first, either in respect to the merit of the General, the valour of the troops, the importance of events, or the greatness of dangers. But it was in some sense more illustrious in effect of the glory of the ancient kings of Macedonia, of the lustre of the family of the prince actually upon the throne, and the conquests of that nation, who had formerly subjected by their arms great part of Europe, and a much greater part of Asia.

For the rest, the war with Philip had begun almost ten years before, in the 541st year of Rome, when Rome made an alliance with the Ætolians. The beginning of it may even be dated three years earlier. And this had been terminated three years before the end of the second Punic war. The Romans had afterwards many subjects of discontent from Philip king
of

of Macedonia, as well because he had ill observed the conditions of the peace concluded with the Ætolians and the other allies, as because he had very lately sent aids of men and money to Hannibal in Africa. Accordingly, when they saw themselves unengaged and tranquil, after the peace they had made with the Carthaginians, various complaints, which were brought to Rome from different quarters against Philip, inclined them to renew the war against that Prince.

P. SULPTIUS GALBA II.

C. AURELIUS COTTA.

It was under these Consuls that the war against Macedonia began. Many events had made way for it at a distance.

Ptolomy Philopator, King of Egypt, had left at his death one son, only five years old, called Ptolomy Epiphanes. Philip, and Antiochus King of Syria, entered into a criminal league to invade his dominions. The court of Egypt, in the danger of their young King from the joining of the two princes against him, had recourse to the Romans to implore their protection, and offered them the guardianship of the King, and the regency of his dominions, during his minority; assuring them that the late king had so ordered it at his death.

The troops of Philip actually ravaged Attica, and had carried off considerable plunder; which induced the inhabitants to have recourse to the Romans. The Ambassadors of the Rhodians and King Attalus joined those of Athens, to complain also of the enterprizes of the two Kings, and to give the Romans advice, that Philip, either by himself, or his deputies, solicited many cities of Asia to take arms, and that he had undoubtedly some great design in his thoughts.

The Romans, on the demand of the Ambassadors of Egypt, did not hesitate to accept the guardianship of the young prince; and in consequence had nominated

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.

200.
Polyb. xvi.
6. & Legat.

4.
Justin.
xxx. 2, 3.
Val. Max.
vi. 6.

Liv. xxxi.
1. 2.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

nated three deputies, who were ordered to notify it to the two Kings, and to inform them, not to disquiet the dominions of their pupil: that otherwise they should be obliged to declare war upon them. The other complaints, which, as I have said, they received almost at the same time, hastened the departure of the three Ambassadors. Every body must perceive, that it was making a noble use of their power to declare so generously for an injured King, to whom they were guardians. * And this constituted part of the glory of the Senate and People of Rome, who were the refuge of distressed Kings and States. The ambition of the Magistrates and Generals was to render themselves the defenders of the provinces and allies by their equity and public faith. Accordingly, in these happy times, the Roman empire was considered as the refuge and asylum of the whole universe, where oppressed nations were sure of finding a ready and powerful protection against injustice and violence. But things took a very different turn in the sequel.

The Senate, after having answered all the Ambassadors favourably, made M. Valerius Lævinus, who had already acted against Philip, set out, and directed him, in the quality of Proprætor, to approach Macedonia with a fleet, to examine things nearer, and to be in a condition to aid the allies immediately.

Liv. xxxi.
5.

In the mean time the Senate deliberated seriously upon what they should resolve. At the instant the Senate was assembled to examine this important affair, a second embassy arrived from the Athenians, which declared, that Philip was upon the point of entering Attica in person, and that he would infallibly make himself master of Athens, if a speedy aid were not sent them. Letters were also received from Lævinus the Proprætor, and Aurelius his lieutenant, by which they were advised, that every thing was to be feared

* Regum, populorum, nationum Portus erat & refugium Senatus. Nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios æquitate & fide defenderent. Itaque illud patrocinium orbis terræ veriùs, quàm imperium, poterat nominari. CIC. DE OFF. I. 26, 27.

from Philip; that the danger was very pressing, and that there was no time to be lost.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.

200.

Liv. xxxi.

Upon these news, the Senate believed it indispensibly necessary to declare war against Philip. The Consul Sulpicius, to whom the province of Macedonia had fallen by lot, proposed it to the People. It was at first rejected by almost all the centuries. The citizens, who had just quitted a war which had cost them so many pains and dangers, were of themselves extremely averse to it; which reluctance was much augmented by the seditious discourses of Q. Bæbius. He was one of the Tribunes of the People, who, reviving the ancient custom of his predecessors for recommending themselves to the multitude by declaring against the Senators, accused them of expressly fomenting war upon war, to continue the people under perpetual oppression, and to give them no rest. The Senators suffered so calumnious and unjust a reproach with abundance of pain: they vented their resentments in the warmest manner against the Tribune in the Senate itself, and strongly exhorted the Consul to repair a second time to the People, to reproach them highly with their indolence for the public good; and to make them sensible how shameful it would be for them, and how injurious to the State, if in the present conjuncture they deferred to declare war against Philip.

The Consul, having summoned the assembly in the field of Mars, before the centuries proceeded to give their suffrages, spoke to them as follows: “ You
“ seemed not to know, Romans, that the question at
“ present is not to deliberate, whether we are to
“ make war or peace; for Philip, in preparing to
“ make a rude war upon you, does not leave that at
“ your choice: but to consider, whether your legions
“ are to be transported into Macedonia, or to wait
“ till the enemy brings his troops to Italy. What
“ difference there is between these two resolutions you
“ certainly must know, from your own experience
“ in the last war with the Carthaginians. For who
“ doubts,

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

“ doubts, but if, as soon as the besieged Saguntines
 “ had recourse to us, we had been expeditious in
 “ giving them aid, as our fathers had before acted in
 “ respect to the Mamertines, we had turned the
 “ whole weight of the war against Spain, which our
 “ neglect drew into Italy, where it wanted but very
 “ little of entirely destroying us. We acted more
 “ wisely in respect to the same Philip, when he en-
 “ gaged, by a treaty made with Hannibal, to come
 “ to Italy; and it is evident, that it was in effect of
 “ making Lævinus set out immediately with a fleet
 “ to attack him in his own country, that we kept him
 “ in Macedonia. What we then did, whilst we had
 “ Hannibal in the heart of Italy, do we hesitate to do
 “ now, when that formidable enemy is driven out of
 “ Italy, and the Carthaginians are irrecoverably over-
 “ come? If we suffer Philip, by making himself
 “ master of Athens, to make trial of our slowness, as
 “ Hannibal did in taking Saguntum by storm, we
 “ shall see him arrive in Italy, not at the end of five
 “ months, as Hannibal did after the taking of Sa-
 “ guntum, but in five days after his fleet sets out from
 “ Corinth. Remember the alarm formerly spread
 “ throughout all Italy by Pyrrhus King of Epirus,
 “ when, haughty from his victory, he came almost
 “ to the gates of Rome, and that at a time, when
 “ the Commonwealth, more flourishing than ever it
 “ had been, wanted neither troops nor Generals, and
 “ had not been exhausted by long and bloody wars.
 “ Can the power of Pyrrhus be compared to that
 “ of Philip, or Epirus to Macedonia? But, not to
 “ recur to antient times, reflect upon what has hap-
 “ pened lately. If you had refused to go to Africa,
 “ Hannibal and the Carthaginians had been still here.
 “ Let Macedonia, rather than Italy, feel all the
 “ horrors of war, by the ruin of its cities and coun-
 “ tries. We have more than once experienced, that
 “ our arms are more successful abroad than in our
 “ own country. Romans, give therefore your suf-
 “ frages again, and hearken to the advice of the Se-
 “ nators,

“ nators, to which the immortal gods, whom I have
 “ consulted by the auspices and sacrifices, promise all
 “ kinds of prosperity.”

A. R. 552.
 Ant. C.
 200.

When the Consul had done speaking, the affair was again brought into deliberation, and the war was decreed. Public prayers were appointed for three days, to implore success of the gods in the war with Philip, which had been just resolved by the People. Sulpicius consulted the Feciales, to know whether it was necessary for the declaration of war to be made personally to King Philip, or only on the nearest frontier of his kingdom. They answered, that the thing was indifferent, and that it was regular in both forms. The Senate left the choice of the person, who should be appointed to declare war against the King, to the Consul. The distribution of the provinces, the number of troops to serve this year, and the Generals to command them, were afterwards regulated.

The public prayers which had been decreed were performed, and all the temples of the gods had been visited. The People, who were very religious and attentive, to render the gods favourable, especially in the beginning of a new war, decreed again, that the Consul, to whom the province of Macedonia had fallen, should promise games and sacrifices to the gods.

Whilst preparations for the war were making, ambassadors arrived from Ptolomy King of Egypt, who declared, “ that the Athenians had sent to demand aid of their master against Philip. But that, though they were his friends and allies as well as of the Roman People, the King thought it incumbent upon him not to send either army or fleet to Greece to attack or defend any state whatsoever, without the consent of the Roman People.” The Senate, after having thanked the King for his obliging care, replied: “ That the design of the Roman People was to defend their allies: that if, in the sequel, there should arise occasion for any aid, the King should be informed of it, because they entirely relied upon his good intentions.” The
 ambassadors

Liv. xxx.

9.

A. R. 552. ambassadors were dismissed with presents, after having
 Ant. C. received all possible honours.
 200.

Liv. xxxi. Whilst every body was solely intent upon the war
 30. of Macedonia, news, which there was not any room to expect, were received from another side : this was, that Amilcar, General of the Carthaginians, who had survived Asdrubal's army in Liguria, had made the Insubrians, Cænomani, Boii, and other nations of Cisalpine Gaul take arms. The Prætor Furius, who commanded in that province, wrote to the Senate, that the enemy, after having plundered and burnt part of Placentia, were actually upon their march against Cremona. That he was not in a condition to aid those two colonies, having no more than five thousand troops ; and that it would be exposing them to slaughter to send them against an army that amounted to at least forty thousand men.

After the reading of these letters, the Senate commanded the Consul C. Aurelius to order his army directly, that were to rendezvous in Etruria, to repair the same day to Ariminum, and either to go in person to the aid of the colony, if the affairs of the Commonwealth would permit him to quit Rome, or to give that commission to L. Furius. He chose the latter.

Liv. xxxi. At the same time the Senate decreed that three
 11. ambassadors should be sent, first to Carthage, and then to Numidia to King Masinissa. C. Terentius Varro, P. Lucretius, and Cn. Octavius, were charged with this commission.

They had orders to complain, “ that the General Amilcar had made the Gauls and Ligurians take arms contrary to the treaty ; and to declare, if they desired that the peace which had been granted them should subsist, that they must recall their citizen, and deliver him into the hands of the Romans. They were also to observe to them, that they had not restored all the deserters : that it was known at Rome a great number had remained at Carthage, where they went to and fro publicly : that they should take care to have a

strict

strict search made for them, in order to their being delivered up conformably to the treaty.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.

200.

The same ambassadors were ordered to congratulate Masinissa, in the name of the Roman People, on his not only having recovered the kingdom of his forefathers, but augmented it with the most flourishing part of the dominions of Syphax. They were also to inform him, that war had been declared against King Philip, because he had aided the Carthaginians against the Romans; and, in consequence, to desire him to send the Romans a body of Numidian cavalry to be employed in this war." They had presents with them for the King, and were ordered to tell him, "That he should find in the gratitude of the Roman People all the assistance he might ever want, either to confirm his authority, or extend his dominions."

At the same time the ambassadors of Vermina, the son of Syphax, applied to the Senate, "excusing the imprudent conduct of their master in taking arms against the Romans, from the youth of that Prince; and ascribing the whole fault to the deceitful counsels of the Carthaginians. They represented, that Masinissa, from an enemy to the Romans, had become their friend and ally. That Vermina would ardently endeavour by his services not to give place to Masinissa or any other Prince, in zeal and attachment for the Roman People." The Senate answered the ambassadors, "That it was without any just reason that Syphax, the friend and ally of the Roman People, had suddenly become their enemy; and that it was with no less injustice that Vermina, his son, had, in a manner, signalized his accession to the throne by attacking the Romans. That therefore he must ask peace of the Roman People, before he entertained thoughts of being acknowledged as King, ally, and friend. That this was an honour it was not usual for the Roman People to grant, except to those who had rendered them great services. That the deputies from Rome would soon be in Africa, and would signify to Vermina the conditions upon which the Roman People consented

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

consented to grant him peace. That if he should desire any article to be added to, or retrenched from them, or any other change to be made, he might have recourse again to the Senate." The Roman deputies set out with the instructions, of which we have just been speaking. Each of them had a galley with five benches of oars.

Liv. xxxi.
19.

When they arrived in Africa, the Carthaginians replied, that all they could do in respect to Amilcar, was to pass sentence of banishment upon him, and to confiscate his estate. That as to the deserters and Roman slaves, that they had delivered up all those they had been able to discover. That as to the rest, they would send ambassadors to Rome to give the Senate satisfaction in respect to these two articles. At the same time they sent two hundred thousand bushels of wheat to Rome, and as many into Macedonia, for the subsistence of the armies.

From Carthage the Roman ambassadors repaired to the court of Masinissa, who received them perfectly well. He offered the Commonwealth two thousand Numidians. The ambassadors accepted only a thousand; and that Prince took care to embark them himself, and sent them to Macedonia, with two hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and as much barley.

When Vermina knew that the Roman ambassadors were on their way to his dominions, he went as far as the frontier of his kingdom to meet them. He submitted beforehand to all the conditions they should think fit to prescribe; adding, that any peace with the Romans would seem just and advantageous. It was granted him. The articles were dictated to him, and he was directed to send deputies to Rome to receive the ratification of them.

Liv. xxxi.
12.

In the mean time the Roman Senate had received advice of a new sacrilege committed at Locri, in the temple of Proserpina. Advice of this was sent by the Prætor Q. Minucius, to whom Bruttium had fallen by lot; who observed at the same time, that the au-
thors

thors of the crime could not be discovered. The Senate saw with indignation that sacrileges multiplied, and that the still recent example of the guilt and punishment of Pleminius, was not capable of intimidating and restraining the impious. The Consul Aurelius was ordered to write to the Prætor, "That the Senate decreed that informations should be taken in respect to this theft, as had been done some years before in the like case. That the money that could be discovered should be replaced in the treasury. That what should be deficient should be supplied: and if it were judged convenient, that such expiatory sacrifices should be made, as the Pontiffs had decreed before, by way of reparation for so criminal a sacrilege."

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After all the duties of religion had been performed upon the occasion of the different prodigies, a very great number of private persons, to whom only one payment out of three had been made of the money they had lent the Commonwealth ten years before, in the Consulship of M. Valerius and M. Claudius, applied to the Senate. The Consuls had answered them, that the treasury was not in a condition actually to discharge that debt, on account of the great expences the new war made indispensibly necessary, for keeping up numerous forces, and equipping considerable fleets. "They represented, that if the Commonwealth should employ for the war of Macedonia the sums which they had lent for that of Carthage, new wars continually succeeding each other, the reward of their zeal for the Commonwealth would be to see themselves deprived for ever of their fortunes."

Liv. xx xi.
13.

The Senate thought these remonstrances very just, as they were in effect: but the Commonwealth was absolutely not in a condition to discharge those debts. Such a situation must give abundance of pain to Senators who revered justice and sincerely loved the People. They found a wise expedient, which the persons concerned themselves suggested to them: this was, to give up to those particulars such lands belonging to the public within the space of fifty miles

A. R. 552. from Rome, as should be actually to sell. The Con-
 Ant. C. suls were ordered to take an estimate of these lands,
 200. and to lay the yearly rent of a single As upon each
 acre, to denote that they were the property of the
 public. And, when the state should be able to dis-
 charge these debts, it should be left to particulars,
 either to receive their money and surrender these
 lands, or to keep them. They accepted these condi-
 tions with joy. In all this proceeding there is a spirit
 of equity and love of the public good, which does
 great honour to the Romans, and which ought to
 serve as a model to all those who administer govern-
 ments; of which one of the most essential duties is
 to consider Faith to public engagements as a thing
 sacred and inviolable, from which they ought never
 to depart in the least. This * persuasion strongly
 implanted in the minds of a People, is the greatest
 resource of States.

Liv. xxxi. At length the Consul Sulpicius, after having made
 14. the usual vows and prayers in the Capitol, set out
 from Rome in the military robe [*paludamentum*] of
 his office, and preceded by his Lictors. He went
 from Brundisium to Macedonia in two days. At his
 arrival he found the deputies of Athens, who con-
 jured him to deliver the city from the siege carrying
 on by the troops of Philip. He immediately de-
 tached C. Claudius Centho with twenty galleys and
 some troops to the aid of Athens.

Liv. xxxi. Centho having entered the Piræus with his galleys,
 23. the courage and resolution of the inhabitants revived.
 He did not content himself with providing for the se-
 curity of the city and all the adjacent country; but
 having received advice that the garrison of Chalcis
 observed neither order nor discipline, as remote from
 all danger, he set out with his fleet, arrived near that
 city before day, and having found the centinels asleep,

* Nulla res vehementius reimp. commendat. [or, continet] quam
 fides: quæ nulla esse potest, nisi erit i. necessaria solutio rerum credi-
 tarum. CIC. OFFIC. ii. 84.

entered it without difficulty, set fire to the public magazines of corn, and the arsenal, which was full of machines of war, and cut to pieces all the foldiers in the city. If he had had troops enough to leave a garrison in Chalcis, without abandoning the defence of Athens, it would have been, in the beginning of this war, a blow of the last importance, to have deprived Philip of the city of Chalcis, and of the Euripus : for the strait of the Euripus closes the entrance into Greece by sea, as the defile of Thermopylæ does by land. But he was not in a condition to divide the few troops he had. In consequence, after having caused the plunder he had taken to be carried on board of his ships, he returned to the Piræus, from whence he had set out.

Philip, who was then at Demetrias, on the first news he received of the misfortune befallen that alled city, set out with the utmost diligence, in hopes of surprizing the Romans. But they were gone ; so that he seemed to have come thither only to be a spectator of that place, still smoking and half in ruins. Substituting to the joy he would have had in aiding his allies, the pleasure of avenging himself upon his enemies, he conceived thoughts of doing the same to Athens, and to surprize it, as the Romans had surprized Chalcis. He would have gained his point, if one of those couriers, called * Hemero-dromi, having perceived the king's troops from the eminence where he was placed, had not immediately carried the news to Athens, where he arrived about midnight, and where all were asleep. Philip also arrived there some few hours after, but before day. That Prince perceiving the lights which had been kindled in different parts, and hearing the tumult and cries of the citizens, who ran on all sides where danger and necessity called, resolved to attack the city by open force, as stratagem had miscarried.

* They were so called: because they ran a great way in a day, on foot.

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Ant. C.
200.

The Athenians had drawn up their troops in battle on the outside of the walls at the gate Dipylon. Philip, at the head of his army, threw himself into the press, and having killed and wounded several with his own hand, repulsed them into the city, into which he did not think fit to follow them. He vented his wrath upon the country-houses and public places of exercise, burning and destroying every thing that came in his way, without sparing even the tombs, or what was the most sacred. He set out from thence to surprise Eleusis, where he was again disappointed.

Liv. xxxi.
26.

He returned soon after against Athens, and formed the siege a second time, with as little success as the first. After having been shamefully repulsed by the besieged, he went again to destroy the country. After the first siege he had only destroyed the tombs which were without the city: but now, to spare nothing of all that religion ought to render inviolable, he caused all the temples in the towns and villages of the country to be burnt and demolished. The marble, which abounded in Attica, wrought by the most excellent workmen, skilled in the use of that stone, adorned the whole country with those sacred edifices, which that Prince then sacrificed to his fury and revenge. Not contented with demolishing the temples, and throwing down the statues of the gods, he also caused all the stones which had remained whole to be broken to pieces, in order that no trace of so many fine monuments might remain, and that it might not be possible even to shew the ruins of them. After so glorious an expedition he retired into Bæotia. A King, who is so little master of his rage, and who abandons himself to such excesses, scarce deserves that name.

Liv. xxxi.
27.

The Consul, who was incamped between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, sent a considerable detachment into Macedonia, under the command of his lieutenant Apustius, who ravaged the flat country, and took several small cities.

The Romans having began the war by these successful expeditions, saw several Kings and Princes bordering

dering upon Macedonia arrive in their camp : amongst others, Pleurates son of Scerdiledes King of part of Illyricum, Aminander King of the Athamantes, and Bato, son of Longarus, Prince of the Dardanians. Longarus had been powerful enough to make war with his own forces against Demetrius, Philip's father. The Consul answered these Princes, who offered him their service against the King of Macedonia, that when he should enter the enemy's country with his army, he should make use of the troops with which the Dardanians and Pleurates should supply him. As for Aminander, he directed him to engage the Ætolians to enter into the league against Philip. He caused Attalus to be told, whose Ambassadors were also come to him, that he should expect the Roman fleet at Ægina, where he was in winter quarters, and when it arrived and had joined him, that he should continue to act against the Macedonians by sea, as he had began. He also sent Ambassadors to the Rhodians, to exhort them to act in concert with the allies against Philip.

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That Prince, on his side, on his arrival in Macedonia, also made great preparation for the war. He made his son Perseus, who was then very young, set out with lieutenants capable of advising him, and a part of his troops, to seize some défiles at the entrance of * Pelagonia. He demolished Sciathus and Peparethus, cities considerable enough, situated in islands of the Ægean sea of the same name, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy's fleet. He sent Ambassadors to the Ætolians, whose restlessness and inconstancy he knew, to exhort them to continue in alliance with him against the Romans.

The Ætolians were on a certain day to hold their general assembly. Philip, the Romans, and the Athenians sent thither their Ambassadors. Those of Philip spoke first. They confined themselves to demanding, " That the Ætolians should adhere to the con-

Liv. xx xi.
29—32.

* A province of Macedonia.

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200.

ditions of the peace they had concluded some years before with Philip, having then experienced how much the alliance with the Romans was contrary to their interests. They cited the example of Messina and of all Sicily, of which the Romans had made themselves masters, under the pretext of bringing them aid. They exaggerated upon the rigor with which the Romans treated conquered cities; Syracuse, Tarentum, Capua: * the latter in particular, which was no longer Capua, but the tomb of the Campanians, the carcase of a city, without Senate, without People, without Magistrates, and more cruelly treated by those who had suffered it to subsist in that condition, than if they had entirely destroyed it. “ If
“ strangers,” said he, “ more remote from us by
“ their language, manners, customs, and laws, than
“ by the spaces of land and sea that separate us from
“ them, should possess themselves of this country, it
“ were madness to hope, that they would treat us
“ with more humanity, than they have their neigh-
“ bours. Amongst us, States of the same country,
“ and who speak the same language, Ætolians,
“ Arcarnanians, Macedonians, slight differences may
“ arise, without consequence or duration: but with
“ strangers, with Barbarians, as long as we are
“ Greeks, we are, and continually shall be, at war.
“ For it is nature, always invariable, and not any
“ transitory cause, that arms us against them, and
“ them against us. In this very place it is but few
“ years since you made peace with Philip. The same
“ causes still subsist, and we hope you will also ob-
“ serve the same conduct.”

The deputies of Athens, with the consent of the Romans, spoke next. “ They began by relating, in a very moving manner, the impious and sacrilegious fury of Philip against the most sacred monuments of

* Capua quidem sepulcrum ac monumentum Campani populi, elato & extorri ejecto ipso populo, superest; urbs trunca, sine Senatu, sine plebe, sine magistratibus, prodigium; relicta crudelius habitanda, quam si delata foret. Liv.

Attica, against the most august temples, the most venerable tombs, as if he had declared war not only against men and the living, but against the manes of the dead, and even the majesty of the gods. That Ætolia, and all Greece, must expect the same treatment, if Philip had the same occasion. They concluded with imploring and conjuring the Ætolians to have compassion upon Athens, and to undertake, under the guidance of the gods, and that of the Romans, whose power gave place only to that of the gods, a war so just as that they proposed to them."

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"The Roman deputy, after having at large refuted the insinuations of the Macedonians concerning the treatment of the conquered cities by Rome, and opposed them with the example of Carthage, to which peace and liberty had very lately been granted, maintained, that the Romans were so far from deserving the imputation of cruelty, that what they had to fear was rather, that the excess of their favour and lenity might induce States to declare the more easily against them, because the conquered had always an assured resource in their clemency. He represented in a brief, but lively, manner, the criminal actions of Philip, his horrible cruelties, and still more detestable debauches: all facts the better known to them to whom he was speaking, as they were nearer neighbours to Macedonia, and in perpetual commerce with Philip. "But to confine myself to what re-

"gards you," continued that deputy, addressing himself to the Ætolians, "we have undertaken the

"war against Philip for your defence: you have

"made peace with him without our participation.

"Perhaps you will say, to justify yourselves, that

"seeing us employed in the war against the Cartha-

"ginians, reduced by fear you accepted the law im-

"posed upon you by the strongest: and we, on our

"side, called off by more important cares, having

"neglected a war, which you had renounced. De-

"livered now, thanks to the gods, from the war

"with Carthage, we turn all our forces against Ma-

A. R. 550. “ cedonia. This is an occasion for you to renew your
 Ant. C. “ amity and alliance with us; which you ought not
 202. “ to neglect, unless you chuse rather to perish with
 “ Philip, than to conquer with the Romans.”

Liv. *ibid.* Damocritus, Prætor of the Ætolians, plainly perceived, that this last discourse would bring over all the suffrages: it is said, that Philip had corrupted him with money. Without seeming to espouse either side, he represented, that the affair was too important to be determined immediately, and that it required time to be maturely considered. He thereby eluded the designs and expectations of the Romans; and boasted, that he had done his nation a considerable service, which might wait the event before it resolved, and might then declare for the strongest.

Philip, in the mean time, made vigorous preparations for the war by sea and land: but the Consul actually carried it on. He had entered Macedonia, and advanced towards the Dassaretæ. Philip also took the field. Neither side knew what route the other had taken. Detachments of horse were sent out on both sides to scout. These two parties met. As they consisted entirely of chosen troops, the action was rude, and the victory remained doubtful. Forty of the Macedonians, and thirty-five of the Romans, were left upon the spot.

The King, persuaded that the care he should take to bury those who fell in this rencounter, would abundantly contribute to gain him the affection of the troops, and would animate them to fight valiantly for him, caused their bodies to be brought into the camp, in order that the whole army might be witnesses of the honours he should pay them. * Nothing is less to be relied on than the sentiments and disposition of the multitude. This fight, which it was believed could not fail to animate the soldiers, had a quite different effect. Hitherto they had only had Greeks

* Nihil tam incertum nec tam inæstimabile est, quàm animi multitudinis. Quod promptiores ad subeundam omnem dimicationem videbatur facturum, id metum pigritiamque incussit. Liv.

Greeks to deal with, who scarce used any weapons but arrows, half pikes, and lances, and for that reason made less wounds. But when they saw the bodies of their comrades covered with large wounds made by the Spanish broad-swords, whole arms and shoulders cut off, and heads separated from bodies, that sight struck them with terror, and made them conceive against what enemies they were led.

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Ant. C.
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The King himself, who had not yet had a near view of the Romans in a battle in form, was terrified at it. Having been informed by deserters of the place where the enemy had halted, he caused himself to be conducted thither by guides with his army, which consisted of twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse; and he posted himself at the distance of above two hundred paces from their camp, near the little city of Athaca, upon an eminence, which he caused to be fortified with good intrenchments. When he considered the disposition of the Roman camp from the top of that hill, he cried out, * “ That “ was not a camp of Barbarians.”

The Consul and the King continued two days without making any motion, in expectation of each other. On the third day Sulpicius quitted his camp, and drew up his troops in battle. Philip, who was afraid to hazard a general action, sent a detachment against the enemy of fourteen hundred men, half infantry, half cavalry; to which the Romans opposed a like number, that had the advantage, and put the other to flight. They also happily avoided the ambuscade which the king had laid for them. These two advantages, the one by open force, and the other overstratagem, filled the Romans with boldness and courage; and the soldiers, superior by force, and ineffectually attempted by stratagem, retired full of joy and confidence. The Consul led them back into his camp, and the next day made them quit it, and advanced to offer the King battle; having posted the

Liv. xxxi.
35.

* The same saying is ascribed to Pyrrhus.

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200.

elephants, which the Romans had taken from the Carthaginians, and then used for the first time, in the front. Philip did not judge it proper to accept of the defiance, and kept close in his camp, notwithstanding the insults and reproaches of Sulpicius, who taxed him with fear and cowardice.

As foraging was very dangerous, from the nearness of the two armies, the Consul removed about eight miles, and advanced towards a town called Octolopha; from whence the foragers dispersed into all the adjacent country in separate parties. The King at first kept close within his intrenchments, as if through fear; in order that the enemy, by becoming more bold, might also become less cautious. This did not fail to happen. When Philip saw them dispersed in great numbers about the country, he suddenly quitted his camp with all his cavalry, followed by the Cretans as fast as was possible for foot to move, and posted himself between the camp of the Romans and the foragers. There dividing his troops, he sent a part of them against the foragers, with orders to put all to the sword that came in their way; and with the other part he seized all the avenues by which they could return. The whole plain was covered with the flight and slaughter; whilst nothing of what passed without was yet known to the Roman camp, because those who fled fell in with the King's troops; and those who were posted in the ways killed a much greater number than those who were sent out in pursuit of the enemy.

At length this bad news arrived in the camp. The Consul gave orders to the horse to go each as they could to the aid of the foragers. As to himself, he made the legions quit the camp, and marched them against the enemy, drawn up in an hollow square. The horse, dispersed on all sides, straggled at first, misled by the cries which came from several parts. Many fell in with the enemy. The charge was given at the same time on different sides. The rudest part of the action passed with the body of troops whom
the

the King commanded in person, which were very numerous, as well infantry as cavalry; besides which, those troops were infinitely animated by the presence of the King; and the Cretans, who fought in close order, and firmly drawn up against enemies dispersed and in disorder, killed a great number of them.

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200.

It is certain, that if they had been less eager in pursuing the Romans, this day would not only have decided the present success, but perhaps that of the whole war. But in effect of having abandoned themselves to an inconsiderate ardor, they fell into the midst of the Roman cohorts, who had advanced, with their officers. Those who fled, then perceiving the Roman ensigns, faced about, and spurred their horses against the enemy, who were entirely in disorder. The face of the battle changed that moment; and those who pursued before, now fled. Many were killed in close fight, and many in flying: and they did not only perish by the sword, but abundance, by throwing themselves precipitately into the morasses, were so plunged in the mud, that they remained there with their horses.

The King himself was in great danger; for having been thrown down by his horse, which had received a great wound, he was upon the point of being cut to pieces, if one of his cavalry had not immediately alighted, and remounted him. But that trooper himself, not being able to make off soon enough, was killed by the enemy, after having saved his King's life. Philip took a long compass round the marshes, and at length regained his camp, to which it was not expected that he would ever return.

We have already seen several times, and it cannot be too much inculcated to military persons, in order to their avoiding the like fault, that the loss of battles often proceeds from the too great ardor of officers, who being solely intent upon the pursuit of an enemy, neglect and forget what passes in the rest of the army, and suffer themselves to be deprived, through an ill-judged

A.R. 552. judged desire of glory, of a victory which they had
 Ant. C. in their hands, and were assured of.
 200.

Philip did not lose many of his troops in this action, but he feared a second; and, to avoid it, he proposed to retire, and to conceal his retreat from the enemy. With this design, in the evening he sent a herald to the Consul to demand a suspension of arms, in order to bury the dead. The Consul, who had sat down to table, ordered the herald to be told, that he would give him an answer the next morning. Philip, during that time, having left abundance of fires in his camp, to amuse the Romans, set out, without noise, as soon as it was dark. As he was the whole night, and part of the next day, before the Consul, the latter had no hope of being able to come up with him.

Sulpicius did not set out till some days after. The King had entertained hopes of stopping him in the defiles, the entrance of which he fortified with intrenchments, and barricades of stones and trees: but the perseverance and courage of the Romans surmounted all these difficulties. The Consul, after having laid waste the country, and made himself master of many important places, led back his army to Apollonia, from whence he had set out in the beginning of the campaign.

Liv. xxxi. The Ætolians, who only waited the event for de-
 40—43. claring themselves, delayed no longer to do so in favour of the Romans, who had the advantage. Having joined Amynder, King of the Athamantes, they made some incursions into Thessalia, which succeeded badly enough; Philip having beaten them on different occasions, and reduced them to retire with great difficulty into Ætolia. One of his lieutenants also defeated the Dardanians, that had entered Macedonia during the King's absence; who consoled himself with these slight advantages for his bad success against the Romans.

Liv. xxxi. In this campaign, the Roman fleet, in conjunction
 44, 45. with that of Attalus, approached Athens. The hatred

of the Athenians for Philip, the effects of which fear had reduced them to suppress, broke out without any bounds on the sight of so powerful an aid. In a free city, like Athens, where the talent of speaking had a kind of absolute sway, the orators had acquired such an ascendant over the people, that they made them take what resolutions they thought fit. On this occasion the people, on their remonstrances, decreed, “that all the statues and representations of King Philip, and of all his ancestors, of both sexes, should be absolutely destroyed; that their names should be effaced, with all the titles and inscriptions, with which they might have been honoured in past times. That the festivals, sacrifices, and priesthoods instituted in honour of them, should likewise be abolished. That all the places in which monuments had been erected to them, should be declared impure, profane, and detestable. That the priests, as often as they should offer up their prayers to the gods for the people of Athens, their allies, armies and fleets, should pronounce all kinds of anathemas and execrations against Philip, his children, kingdom, and forces by sea and land; in a word, against all the Macedonians in general, and all that appertained to them.” To this decree was added, “That all which should from thenceforth be proposed to the disgrace and dishonour of Philip, should have the consent of the people; and that whoever should presume to say or do any thing in his favour, or contrary to these defamatory decrees, might be killed upon the spot, without farther formality.” And lastly, that nothing might be omitted, and to include all in one general expression, “That all which had been formerly decreed against the children of the tyrant Pisistratus, should take place against Philip.” The Athenians made war in this manner against Philip, by decrees and ordinances, which at that time were their only force. And as they carried all things to excess at this time, they in proportion lavished praises, honours, and every kind of homage, upon Attalus and the Romans.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

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200.

Liv. xxxi.

14. 15.

Some time before, when the same Attalus entered the port Piræus with his fleet, with design to renew his treaty of alliance with the Athenians, all the inhabitants of the city, with their wives and children, all the priests in their sacerdotal vestments, and one might almost say, the very gods themselves, quitted their abodes, in some sense, and went out to meet and receive him in a kind of triumph. The assembly was summoned, to hear the proposals that prince had to make. * But he wisely judged it more for his dignity to declare to them his intentions by a writing, which should be read in his absence, than to expose himself to the shame of relating in person the service he had done their Commonwealth, and receiving excessive praises from them, which would infinitely shock his modesty. At that time it was proposed to add an eleventh tribe to the ten old ones that formed the body of the State, which should bear the name of Attalus.

We do not see in this that elevation of sentiments, that lively and ardent zeal for liberty, that dislike, or rather aversion, in a manner natural, for all kinds of flattery and abject submission, which was the most distinguished characteristic of these antient Republicans, and which had constituted their glory in antient times.

Liv. xxxi.

45—47.

The fleet of the Romans and Attalus, in conjunction with twenty Rhodian ships, scoured the coasts, and executed some expeditions, the particulars of which are of little importance: after which it separated, and each ally went to winter in their own country.

To break the less into what regards the war with Philip, I have omitted some facts, which I shall restore in this place. I shall do the same sometimes, without taking notice of it.

* Ex dignitate magis visum, scribere eum de quibus videretur, quam præsentem aut referendis suis in civitatem beneficiis erubescere; aut significationibus acclamationibusque multitudinis assentatione immodicâ pudorem onerantis. Liv.

The Proconsul L. Cornelius Lentulus being re-
 turned from Spain, after having related to the Senate
 the services which he had done during several years
 in that province, demanded as a reward, that he
 should be permitted to enter the city in triumph.
 The Senators did not deny that he had deserved that
 honour; but there was no example of a General's
 having triumphed, unless he had commanded either
 in quality of Dictator, Consul, or Prætor; and Len-
 tulus had only been Proconsul in Spain. It was for
 the same reason that Scipio himself had been refused
 a triumph after his return from Spain. However, on
 this occasion a medium was chosen, and an Ova-
 tion was granted to Lentulus; that is, the smaller
 triumph.

I have observed before, that the Prætor L. Furius,
 in the absence of the Consul, had received orders
 from him to march directly to the aid of Cremona,
 besieged by the Gauls. He lost no time, approached
 the enemy, and offered them battle. Furius gave
 such good orders, and animated his troops so effectually,
 that the Gauls, after an indifferent resistance,
 fled in disorder to their camp. The Roman cavalry
 pursued them thither; and the legions arriving there
 soon after, attacked and took it. Scarce six thou-
 sand of them escaped. More than thirty-five thou-
 sand were killed or taken, with fourscore ensigns,
 and above two hundred carriages laden with rich
 spoils. Amilcar, the Carthaginian General, was killed
 here, with three of the Gaulish Generals of the greatest
 distinction. The victor recovered from them two
 thousand free citizens of Placentia, whom they had
 taken, and reinstated them in their colony. So con-
 siderable a victory occasioned great joy at Rome. As
 soon as the Prætor's letters brought the news of it,
 the Senate decreed thanksgivings to the gods, which
 were solemnized during three days.

Though the Prætor had almost terminated this war,
 the Consul Aurelius, having made an end of the af-
 fairs that kept him at Rome, immediately repaired

to

A. R. 552.
 Ant. C.
 200.

Liv. xxxi.

20.

Liv. xxxi.

21. 22.

Liv. xxxi.

47.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

to Gaul, and took upon him the command of the victorious army, which the Prætor resigned to him. On his arrival he could not conceal his envy and resentment for the Prætor's having acted during his absence. There is in envy a base turn of mind, and a meanness of sentiment, which ought to make all mankind abhor and detest that vice. It was the Consul himself who had ordered Furius, in the name of the Senate, to proceed immediately to action. Would he have had him stand for him with his folded arms, and suffered Cremona to be taken before his eyes? Instead of sharing in the victory, and doing himself honour by treating the victor with justice, he ordered him to go to Etruria, whilst he led the legions into the enemy's country, and by the ravages he committed there, made a war by which he acquired more plunder than glory.

Liv. *ibid.*

The Prætor Furius, seeing there was nothing to do in Etruria, and convinced that in the absence of the incensed and envious Consul, he should more easily obtain a triumph, at which he aspired, and believed he had justly deserved by the defeat of the Gauls, returned with speed to Rome, where he was not expected. The Senate gave him audience in the temple of Bellona. After having given an account of his conduct, and related the circumstances of his victory, he demanded permission to enter the city in triumph.

Ibid. 48.
49.

This proceeding had something irregular in it. Accordingly, the senior Senators were for refusing him a triumph, “and because it was not with his own army, but with that of the Consul, that he had defeated the Gauls; and especially because he had quitted his province, which had no example, through his eager desire of obtaining a triumph by favour of the Consul's absence.” The persons of consular dignity went farther; and as they were interested in supporting the splendor and dignity of the Consulship, which seemed to have been little regarded by Furius, they pretended, “That it had been his duty to wait for the Consul,
before

before he had attempted any thing. That he might, by remaining incamped near Cremona, have defended the colony, and protracted affairs, without coming to a battle, till Aurelius had arrived. That the Senate ought not to imitate his temerity, but wait the Consul's return. That then, having heard the reasons on both sides, they should be more capable of deciding in the question."

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

The majority, struck with the greatness of the victory gained by Furius, and warmly solicited by his friends and relations, maintained, "That the only point in question was to know, whether the Prætor had acted as General in chief, and under the guidance of his own auspices, and whether his actions deserved a triumph or no. That the order of the Senate to the Consul, either to set out himself to defend an allied city in person, or to give that Commission to the Prætor, was an unanswerable apology for the latter. * That besides, in affairs of war, the least delays occasion the loss of the most favourable opportunities; and that a General frequently gives battle, not out of inclination, but because he is reduced to it by the enemy. That nothing was to be considered but the battle itself, and the consequences attending it. That the victory was compleat: that the enemy had been defeated and cut to pieces: that their camp had been taken and plundered: that of the two colonies, the one had been delivered from the danger that threatened it, and the other had recovered such of its citizens as the enemy had made prisoners: and lastly, that a single battle had terminated the war, with as much glory as good-fortune. That this victory had not only rejoiced the Romans, but the gods themselves had been thanked for it during three days, in the most solemn manner; which was an authentic approbation of Furius's conduct, to whose name and † family

* Non expectare belli tempora moras & dilationes Imperatorum: & pugnandum esse interdum, non quia velis, sed quia hostis cogat. Liv.

† In allusion to the great Camillus (M. Furius Camillus) who had reconquered Rome from the Gauls.

A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

even the gods seemed to have attached the glorious privilege of conquering and triumphing over the Gauls."

These discourses of Furius and his friends, supported by the presence of that Prætor, prevailed over the regard some believed due to the supreme rank of the absent Consul, and occasioned the honour of a triumph to be decreed to the Prætor. He caused 320,000 asses to be carried into the public treasury, which amounts to about eight hundred pounds sterling, and 17,000 pounds of silver in weight. But he had neither prisoners nor spoils carried before his chariot, and was not accompanied by troops. Every thing was plainly at the Consul's discretion, except the victory.

Liv. xxxi.
49.

After this triumph Scipio caused the games to be celebrated with great magnificence, whilst he commanded in Africa in quality of Proconsul, and two acres of land were granted to each soldier who had served under him, for every year they had borne arms in Spain and Africa.

This same year C. Cornelius Cethegus, who commanded in Spain as Proconsul, defeated a considerable army in the country of the Sedetani. The Spaniards left fifteen thousand men upon the place, and seventy-eight ensigns in the hands of the victors.

The Consul C. Aurelius being come to Rome to preside in the assemblies for the election of Consuls, did not complain, as it was expected he would, "of the Senate's not waiting his return for asserting his rights and authority over the Prætor in person: but that they had decreed Furius a triumph upon the meer account of his exploits, without hearing any of those who had shared with him in this war. He represented, that the motive which had induced their ancestors to decree, that the person who triumphed should be attended by the Lieutenant Generals, Tribunes, Centurions, and troops, was in order that the reality of facts should be attested in an authentic manner." After this sufficiently moderate complaint, which shewed, that

that the Consul had at least partly suppressed the first virulence of his envy for Furius, he declared the day for the assemblies; in which L. Cornelius and P. Villius Tappulus were created Consuls A. R. 552.
Ant. C.
200.

This year provisions were sold at a very low price: as prodigious quantities of corn had been brought from Africa, the Curule Ædiles distributed it amongst the people at fifteen denarii a bushel. Liv. xxxi.
50.

Publius, Valerius, and Marcius his brother, celebrated funeral games during four days, in honour of M. Valerius Lævinus their father, which were followed by a shew of Gladiators. This Lævinus is the same that was Consul with Marcellus, and who, after having served the Commonwealth in the war, distinguished himself by the wisdom of his counsels in the Senate on different occasions; as we have related.

S E C T. II.

Provinces of the Consuls. First payment of the tribute laid on the Carthaginians. Sedition excited by the legions in Macedonia. Philip returns into Macedonia. He becomes anxious concerning the consequences of the war. He takes pains to conciliate allies by delivering up some cities: and to gain the affection of his subjects by disgracing a minister universally hated by them. Scipio and Ælius created Censors. Cn Bæbius is defeated in Gaul. Contest upon Quintius's demanding the Consulship. Character of that young Roman. Distribution of the provinces. The Ambassadors of King Attalus demand aid of the Senate against the invasions of Antiochus King of Syria. Wise reflection of Plutarch upon the present war. Quintius sets out from Rome, and arrives in the army near Epirus. He resolves to march in quest of Philip in the defiles where he had intrenched himself. Conference between Quintius and Philip. The Consul attacks Philip in his defiles; defeats and puts him to flight. The King crosses Thessalia and retires into Macedonia. Epirus and Thessalia submit to Quintius.

LENTULUS, VILLIUS, Consuls.

tius. Eretria and Carystos taken. Quintius besieges Elatea. Assembly of the Achæans at Sicyon. The Ambassadors of the Romans and their allies, and Philip's, have audience in it. After long debates, the Assembly declares for the Romans. Lucius, the Consul's brother, forms the siege of Corinth, and is obliged to raise it. The Consul takes Elatea. Philocles makes himself master of Argos. Affairs of Gaul. Conspiracy of the slaves discovered and suppressed. Crown of gold sent to Rome by Attalus.

A. R. 553.
Ant. C.
199.

L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS.
P. VILLIUS TAPPULUS.

Liv. xxxii. 1. **I**TALY fell by lot to Cornelius Lentulus, and Macedonia to P. Villius.

Liv. xxxii. 2. This year the Carthaginians brought to Rome the money due for the first payment of the tribute that had been laid upon them. The Quæstors having complained, that it was not of good alloy, and that upon taking the assay of it they had found the fourth part bad, they were obliged to borrow sums at Rome to make up that deficiency. The Punic Faith still sustained itself. After having discharged this duty, they desired the Senate to deliver up their hostages. Part of them were put into their hands, with a promise that the rest should be released, provided they persisted in continuing faithful.

Liv. xxxii. 3. P. Villius, on arriving in Macedonia, saw a violent sedition reviving, which sufficient care had not been taken to stifle in its birth. It had been excited by two thousand of the soldiers, who after having defeated Hannibal in Africa, had been led back into Sicily, and from thence transported as volunteers into Macedonia. They affirmed, "that they had not been voluntary in coming thither, and that the Tribunes of the soldiers had forced them to embark, contrary to their utmost resistance. But that in whatever manner the thing had passed, whether they had consented to the service, or violence had been done them, the term

of

of their service was expired. That they had not seen Italy during a great number of years. That they had grown old under arms in Sicily, Africa, and Macedonia. That they were worn out by fatigues, and exhausted of their blood and strength by the wounds they had received." The Consul replied to these complaints, "that their demand of being discharged was reasonable, if they had employed just means, and modest requests, for obtaining it. But that, neither the reasons they alledged, nor any other whatsoever, could ever justify a sedition. That accordingly, if they would continue under their ensigns, and obey their officers, he would write to the Senate, and be the first to solicit their dismissal. That they would obtain it sooner by submission than by being refractory." This answer appeased them.

Philip then attacked Thaumacia, a city of Thessalia very advantageously situated, with all his forces. ⁴ The arrival of the Ætolians, who, under the command of Archidamus, had entered the place, obliged the King to raise the siege. He led back his troops into Macedonia, to pass the approaching winter there.

The leisure he then enjoyed, affording him time to ^{Liv. ibid.} make reflections upon the future, gave him most cruel ⁵ anxiety for the consequences of a war, in which he saw so many enemies united, who pressed him by sea and land. Besides which he apprehended, that the hopes of the Roman protection would have made him lose his allies; and that the Macedonians, discontented with the present government, might think of stirring, and even of failing in fidelity to him. He employed his whole application to avert these dangers.

As to his allies, he delivered up, or rather promised to deliver up, some cities to the Achæans, in order to attach them more strongly to him by a liberality they did not expect; and at the same time he sent Ambassadors into Achaia to make the allies take the oath, which was to be renewed every year: a weak tie in respect to a Prince, who was not scrupulous himself in observing oaths!

A. R. 553.

Ant. C.

199.

Liv. *ibid.*

Polyb. xiii.

672, 673.

As to what regards the Macedonians, he laboured to gain their affection at the expence of Heraclides, one of his ministers and confidents, who was detested and abhorred for his axactions and oppressions, which had rendered the government very odious. He was of very inean birth, born at Tarentum, where he had acted in the lowest offices, and had been expelled from thence for having designed to deliver up the city to the Romans. He went to throw himself into their arms. But he soon plotted a new treason against those, who had given him refuge, holding intelligence with the principal persons of Tarentum and Hannibal. His intrigue was discovered, and he took refuge with Philip; who finding him to have wit, activity, boldness, with an unbounded ambition, which the greatest crimes could not daunt, he attached him in a peculiar manner to his person, and gave him his whole confidence: a fit instrument for a Prince, who was himself entirely void of probity and honour! Heraclides, says Polybius, was born with all the qualities imaginable for forming a great villain. From his earliest youth, he had abandoned himself to the most infamous prostitutions. He was haughty and terrible in respect to his inferiors, but the meanest and most servile of flatterers to those above him. He had so much credit with Philip, that, according to the same author, he was almost the cause of the entire ruin of so powerful a kingdom, by the general discontent occasioned by his injustice and oppressions. The King caused him to be seized and imprisoned, which occasioned universal joy amongst the People. As only fragments of Polybius upon this head are come down to us, history does not tell us what became of Heraclides, or whether he came to an end worthy of his crimes. But this passage alone perfectly informs us in respect to Philip, of whom much will be said in the sequel, and shews, what we are to think of a Prince capable of making choice of such a man for his minister.

Liv. xxxii.

5. 6.

Nothing considerable passed this campaign, between the Romans and Philip, still less than in the preceding.

ing.

ing. The Consuls did not enter Macedonia till the latter season, and all the rest of the time passed in slight skirmishes to force some passes, and carry off convoys. A. R. 553.
Ant. C.
199.

In the mean time the Consul Lentulus, who had continued at Rome, held the assemblies for the creation of Censors. Out of several illustrious persons, who were candidates for this office P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and P. Ælius Pætus were chosen. Those magistrates observed a strict union with each other, and when they read over the list of the Senators, according to custom, they did not note one. Liv. xxxii. 7.

At the same time, L. Manlius Acidinus returned from Spain. Though the Senate had decreed him an Ovation, the opposition of the Tribune M. Porcius Læca prevented him from enjoying that honour. He was obliged to enter the city as a private person.

The Prætor Cn. Bæbius Tamphilus, to whom C. Aurelius, Consul the preceding year, had resigned the province of Gaul, having rashly entered the country of the Insubrian Gauls, was surrounded with all his troops, and lost above six thousand six hundred men. So considerable a loss received from an enemy, from whom nothing was then apprehended, obliged the Consul to set out from Rome and to repair to the place. On his arrival, he found the province full of trouble and alarm. After having reproached the Prætor, as his imprudence deserved, he ordered him to quit the province, and return to Rome. But as to himself he did nothing memorable in Gaul, having been recalled almost immediately to Rome, on account of the assemblies for the election of Consuls.

There was some commotion in these assemblies, in respect to T. Quintius * Flamininus, who stood for the Consulship. As this is the first time that we have occasion to speak of this Roman, who rendered himself very illustrious in the sequel, we shall begin by giving his character after Plutarch. He was very sudden, both in respect to anger and good offices; with this difference however, that his anger was of no long Plut. in
Flamin
369.
Liv. x
7.

* Plutarch calls him Flamininus, but through mistake; they were different families.

A. R. 553.
Ant. C.
199.

duration, and did not carry him into extreme rigours; whereas he never did favours by halves, and valued himself upon his steadiness and constancy in respect to those he had once granted. He always retained the same amity and good will for those on whom he had conferred some benefit, as if they had been his benefactors; considering it as a great advantage to himself, to be capable of retaining the regard and gratitude of those he had once obliged. Naturally ardent for honour and glory, he was averse to owing his greatest and most glorious actions to any thing but himself. For this reason he rather sought those, who stood in need of his aid, than those who could aid him; considering the one as an ample field for his virtue, and the others as rivals upon the point of depriving him of part of his glory.

In the different offices which he passed through, he acquired great reputation not only for valour, but probity and justice: which occasioned him to be chosen commissioner and chief of the colonies, which the Romans sent into the two cities of Narnia and Cosa. This distinction exalted his courage to such a degree, that leaping over the other employments, which were the steps by which young persons were obliged to rise, he on a sudden boldly aspired at the Consulship, though he had not yet been Quæstor, and offered himself as a candidate for it, supported by the favour of those two colonies.

M. Fulvius and Manius Curius, Tribunes of the people, opposed his demand, affirming it was a strange and unheard of thing, that a young man, a kind of novice and without experience, should undertake on a sudden to seize in a manner by force the first dignity of the Commonwealth. They reproached the Patricians with having for some time despised the Ædile and Prætorships, and with aspiring at once at the Consulship, before they had given the People any proof of their ability and merit, by exercising inferior magistracies. The contest was carried from the field of Mars into the Senate. When every one had given their reasons, the Senators determined, that the people had a right to raise

raise such of the citizens to offices as they pleased, provided they had the qualities required by the laws. A. R. 553.
Ant. C.
199.

There * were none yet, that made it necessary to pass through these different gradations. The Tribunes insisted no longer, and submitted to the decision of the Senate. Accordingly the People elected S. Ælius Pætus and T. Quintius Flaminius Consuls: the latter was not yet quite thirty years of age: which is a farther remarkable singularity, but not a contravention to the laws. For the laws which fixed the competent age for possessing the Curule offices, are posterior to these times. M. Porcius Cato was one of the Prætors, and had Sardinia for his province.

SEX. ÆLIUS PETUS.

A. R. 554.

T. QUINTIUS FLAMININUS.

Ant. C.

198.

The new Consuls having entered upon office, drew lots for the provinces. Italy fell to Ælius, and Macedonia to Quintius. Liv. xxxii.
8.

At the beginning of this year, Antiochus King of Asia attacked Attalus vigorously both by sea and land. The latter sent Ambassadors to Rome, “ who represented to the Senate the extreme danger their master was in. They demanded in his name, either that the Romans would be pleased to defend him themselves, or that they would permit him to recall his fleet and troops. The Senate replied, that nothing was more reasonable than the demand of Attalus. That they could not afford him aid against Antiochus, who was their friend and ally: but that the King was at entire liberty to recall his fleet and troops. That the intention of the Roman People was not to be a burthen in any sort to their allies, and that they should not fail to acknowledge the services and zealous attachment of Attalus. That for the rest, they should employ their good offices with Antiochus to induce him not to disturb King Attalus.” Accordingly the Romans sent

* Sylla the Dictator passed a law to prohibit standing for the Prætorship before the Quæstorship, and for the Consulship before the Prætorship. Appian, lib. i. Bellor. Civil.

A. R. 554 Ambassadors to Antiochus, to remonstrate to him
 Ant. C. 198. " that Attalus had lent them his troops and ships,
 which they then actually employed against Philip,
 their common enemy. That it would be highly
 agreeable to them, if he would leave that Prince
 in tranquility. That it seemed reasonable, that the
 Kings who were the friends and allies of the Ro-
 man People should live at peace with each other."
 Antiochus, upon this remonstrance, immediately drew
 off his troops from the territories of Attalus.

Plut. in
 Flam. 369.

I have said that Macedonia had fallen by lot to Quin-
 tius. This, according to Plutarch, was much for the
 advantage of the Romans. For the affairs and ene-
 mies they had upon their hands, did not require a Ge-
 neral, who would be for carrying every thing by arms
 and force, but rather, who knew how, according to con-
 junctures, to employ gentle methods and persuasion.
 Accordingly King Philip could indeed raise sufficient
 numbers of men for some battles in his kingdom of
 Macedonia only, but it was Greece principally, that
 enabled him to sustain a long war, by supplying him
 with money, provisions, munitions, and retreats: in
 a word, it was the arsenal and magazine of his army.

In consequence, till the Greeks could be separated
 from their alliance with Philip, this war could not be
 terminated by a single battle. Greece at this time was
 not accustomed to the Romans, and only begun to
 have some engagements with them. For this reason,
 if the General of the Romans had not been a mild
 and tractable man, more inclined to terminate diffe-
 rences by conferring, than by force, insinuating enough
 to persuade those to whom he spoke, sufficiently affa-
 ble to hearken to their reasons with goodness and com-
 placency, and always disposed to abate something even
 of his most legitimate pretensions, in order to accom-
 modate things, Greece would not so easily have re-
 nounced an ancient engagement, to which she had
 been accustomed, for a foreign alliance. The sequel
 of Quintius's actions will better shew the solidity of
 this reflexion.

ÆLIUS, QUINTIUS, Consuls.

507

Quintius having observed that the Generals who had been sent before him against Philip, as Sulpicius and Villius, had not entered Macedonia till the latter season, and had made war with little or no vigour, wasting time in slight skirmishes, to force some passes, and carry off some convoys, he on the contrary was for making the best of his time, and for hastening his departure. Having therefore obtained of the Senate, that his brother Lucius should command the naval forces under him; out of the soldiers, who, with Scipio at their head, had conquered the Carthaginians in Spain and Africa, and were still capable of the service, and full of desire to follow him, he chose about three thousand men. To these he added five thousand more, and with a body of eight thousand foot and eight hundred horse, he went to Epirus, and by forced marches arrived at the Roman camp. He found Villius incamped before Philip's army, which had long guarded the passes and defiles, and kept that of the Romans at a stand.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.
Liv. xxxii.
9.
Plut. ibid.
370.

The Consul, after having taken upon him the command of the troops, and dismissed Villius, began by considering attentively the plan of the country. The only pass for approaching the enemy was a narrow way between high mountains and the river * Aous, which runs at the bottom of those hills. That way, cut through the rock, was so narrow and steep, that an army could not pass it without great difficulty, though it were not defended; and with the least defence it seemed impracticable. Quintius assembled the council of war, to consult whether he should march directly against the enemy by the strait and shortest way, in order to attack them in their camp; or whether, abandoning an equally difficult and dangerous design, he should take a long compass, but without danger in order to enter Macedonia by the country of the Dassaretæ. The council were divided in their opi-

* Plutarch calls it the Apfus, a river more to the north than the Aous. But the whole series of the facts determines us to follow Livy.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

nions. Quintius was inclined to take the latter method. But, besides that so long a march would protract things too much, and give the King time to escape into the deserts and forests, as he had done before; he was afraid to remove from the sea, from which he had his provisions. He therefore resolved to force the passes, whatever it might cost him, and prepared for this bold enterprize.

Liv. xxxii.
12.

In the mean time Philip having demanded an interview by the mediation of the People of Epirus, in order to consult upon the means of reconciliation and peace, Quintius made no difficulty to consent to it. The conferences were held upon the banks of the river Aous. They continued three days. The Consul offered the King peace and the alliance of the Romans, upon condition, that he would leave the Greeks at liberty, and in subjection only to their own laws; and that he would withdraw his garrisons from their cities. This was the principal article. Several others were added to it, which required some time to discuss. When they examined what states were to have their liberty, the Consul named the Thessalians first. Thessalia, from the time of Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, had always been in subjection to the Macedonians. The King in consequence was so much incensed by the Consul's proposal, that he cried out in a rage: "What harder terms could you impose upon me, Quintius, if you had conquered me?" And he immediately broke up the conferences. It was then evident, and the most affected to Philip's party were obliged to own it, that the Romans were come to make war, not against the Greeks, but against the Macedonians in favour of the Greeks, which gained them the hearts of the People.

Liv. xxxii.
11.

The conference having been without effect, it was necessary to proceed to force. The next day there was a very warm skirmish between the advanced guards. And as the Macedonians retired to their mountains by rough and steep paths, the Romans animated by the ardor of battle, being desirous to pursue them, suffered exceedingly; because the Macedo-
nians

nians had disposed Catapultæ and Balistæ upon those rocks, and showered darts and stones upon them. Many were wounded on both sides, and night separated the combatants.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

Affairs were in this situation, when a shepherd, sent by Charopus, one of the principal persons of Epirus, who secretly favoured the Romans, came to the Consul. He told him that he fed his flock in the defile, where the king was incamped with his troops: that he knew all the accessible parts and paths of those mountains: that if the Consul would send a detachment of soldiers along with him, he would guide them, by secure and easy ways, where they would be over the heads of the enemy. Though Quintius was not absolutely without distrust, and his joy was mixed with some fear, however, struck with the name and authority of Charopus, he resolved to undertake the enterprize.

Liv. xxxii.
11.
Plut. in
Flam. 370.

Accordingly, he detached a Tribune with four thousand foot and three hundred horse. In the day, they lay hid in bottoms covered with wood, and as soon as night came, they marched on by the light of the moon, which happily was then at the full. The shepherd, of whom they had made sure by chaining him, directed the way it was necessary to keep. It had been agreed, that when the detachment arrived over the heads of the enemy, a signal should be given the Consul by smoke raised in the air; but that they should make no cries, till their signal was answered from him by another, that the battle with Philip was begun.

Liv. ibid.
Plut. ibid.
371.

To prevent the enemy from having any suspicion, he continued to harraßs them warmly, as if he intended to force them in their posts. The third day, in the morning, Quintius perceived a smoke upon the top of the mountains, which at first was but small, but increasing gradually soon darkened the air, and rose in great clouds. Having then given the detachment the signal agreed upon, he marched directly against the eminence, continually exposed to the darts of the Macedonians, and in close fight with those who

A.R. 554. defended the passes. The Romans raised great cries,
 Ant. C. in order to be heard by their companions who were
 198. upon the eminence. The latter answered from the
 top of the mountain with a dreadful noise, and at the
 same time charged the Macedonians, who seeing them-
 selves attacked in front and rear, lost courage, and
 betook themselves to flight. Philip's army would
 have been entirely defeated, if the victors could have
 pursued them: but the cavalry was stopt by the diffi-
 culty of the ways, and the infantry by the weight of
 their arms. Philip fled at first with precipitation,
 and without looking behind him. But, after having
 made above a league and a half, judging, as it really
 was, that the difficulty of the ways had stopt the
 enemy, he halted upon an eminence, and sent officers
 into all the valley, and to all the neighbouring moun-
 tains, to assemble such of his troops as had dispersed
 in flying. The victors finding the camp of the Ma-
 cedonians deserted, plundered it entirely at their ease,
 and returned into their own, where they rested them-
 selves during the night.

Liv. xxxii. Philip at first took the route of Thessalia, and
 12, 13. hastily running from city to city in that province, he
 Plut. 371. took away with him such of the inhabitants as were
 in a condition to follow him, set fire to the houses,
 and after having permitted the masters of them to take
 away such of their effects as they could, he gave all
 all the rest to his troops; making his allies suffer a
 treatment they could scarce have apprehended from
 their enemies.

Liv. xxxii. Quintius Flaminius did not act in this manner.
 24, 26. He crossed Epirus, without ravaging the country,
 though he knew that the principal persons of it, ex-
 cept Charopus, had been against the Romans. But,
 as they submitted quietly, he had more regard to their
 present disposition, than to the resentment he might
 have had for the past; which gained him the hearts
 of that people, and attached them to him out of in-
 clination. He soon found how advantageous this
 mild and humane conduct was to him: for he no
 sooner

sooner arrived upon the frontiers of Thessalia, than most of the cities were eager to open their gates to him. Atrax was almost the only one that did not surrender. It was very well fortified, and had a numerous garrison, entirely consisting of Macedonians. It made so long and so vigorous a resistance, that the Consul was at length obliged to raise the siege.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

The Roman fleet, in the mean time, in conjunction with those of Attalus and the Rhodians, acted on their side. It took two of the principal cities of Eubæa, Eretria and Carystos, which were also garrisoned by Macedonians: after which the three fleets advanced to Cencheæ, the port of Corinth.

Liv. xxxii.
26, 27.

The Consul having entered the country of Phocis, took several places which made no great resistance. Elatia stopt him, and he was obliged to besiege it in form.

Ibid. 18.

Whilst he was carrying on this siege he formed an important design; which was to divide the Achæans from Philip's party, and to make them come over to that of the Romans. The three united fleets were upon the point of forming the siege of Corinth, of which Philip was then actually in possession. Nothing could give the Achæans more pleasure, than the cession of that great and important city to them. The Consul believed it proper to try them by that offer, and made it by the Ambassadors, Lucius his brother, those of Attalus, the Rhodians and the Athenians. The Achæans gave audience to all these Ambassadors in their assembly held at Sicyon.

Liv. xxxii.
19—23.

The Achæans were highly perplexed in respect to the resolution they should take. Nabis, tyrant of Lacedæmon, was a troublesome neighbour, who incommoded them extremely; but they dreaded the arms of the Romans more. They had in all times, and very lately, great obligations to the Macedonians: but they all suspected Philip, on account of his perfidy and cruelty; and they apprehended that the lenity he then affected, might degenerate into tyranny, as soon as he was rid of his difficulties. Such was the disposition

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

disposition of the Achæans, fluctuating between all parties, finding inconveniencies on all sides, and not knowing how to determine any thing with safety.

L. Calpurnius, who came from the Romans, had audience first. After him the deputies from Attalus and the Rhodians were heard; and then those from Philip; for that Prince had also sent an embassy to this assembly, the event of which gave him disquiet. The Athenians were reserved to the last, in order that they might be capable of refuting what Philip's Ambassadors might have advanced. They spoke with more force and liberty against that King than any of the rest, because none had been so ill treated as them; and they enumerated at large his many oppressions and cruelties. The conclusion of their harangue, as well as of the three that had been made before in the assembly, was to exhort the Achæans to join the Romans against Philip. The Ambassadors of that Prince, on the contrary, conjured the Achæans to regard the sacred nature of the oath they had taken on making an alliance with their master; or, if they would not declare openly for him, that they should at least observe an exact neutrality. These harangues took up the whole time of the assembly, which was adjourned to the next day.

When they were all met again, the herald, according to custom, in the name of the magistrates, exhorted such to speak as had any thing to say. No body rose: but all, looking upon each other, kept a profound silence. Aristenes, who was principal magistrate of the Achæans, then spoke, that the assembly might not be dismissed without deliberating. "What is become," said he, "of that warmth and vivacity with which you dispute with each other at table, and in private conversation, concerning the Romans and Philip, with so much heat as to be almost ready to come to blows? Why then are you now mute, in an assembly summoned solely on this subject, after having heard the speeches and reasonings

“sonings on both sides? Will it be time enough to
 “speak, when the resolution is taken and decreed?”

A. R. 554.
 Ant. C.
 198.

Such just and rational reproaches, made by the principal magistrate, were so far from inducing any that were present to give their opinion, that they did not excite the least noise or murmuring in an assembly so numerous, and composed of the deputies of so many States. They all continued mute and motionless, no body daring to hazard speaking freely on so delicate a point.

Aristenes then, being obliged to open himself, declared frankly in favour of the Romans. “The manner,” said he, “in which the deputies of the opposite parties speak to us, suffices alone to direct us in the resolution we ought to take. The Romans, the Rhodians, and Attalus press us to join them in the war against Philip, and support their demand with strong reasons, deduced from the justice of their cause, and our own interest. Philip’s Ambassador also demands, but weakly, that we should continue to adhere to their master, and he is contented with our observing an exact neutrality. From whence do you think proceeds so different a manner of acting? It is undoubtedly not from moderation on the side of Philip, nor rash boldness on that of the Romans. It is the knowledge of their strength, or weakness, that makes them speak differently. We see nothing here on the part of Philip but his Ambassador, which is no great encouragement for us: whereas the Roman fleet lies at anchor near Cenchreæ, and the Consul is not far off with his legions.

“What aid can we expect from Philip? Do we not see in what manner he defends his allies? Why has he suffered Eretria and Carystos? Why has he abandoned so many cities of Thesaly, as well as all Phocis and Locris? Why does he now suffer Elatia to be besieged? Is it through force, through fear, or voluntarily, that he hath abandoned the defiles of Epirus, and has given up

A. P. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

“ those impenetrable barriers to the enemy, in order
 “ to hide himself in the remote parts of his king-
 “ dom? If he voluntarily gives up so many allies to
 “ the mercy of the enemy, ought he to prevent them
 “ from making such provision as they can for their
 “ own safety? If it be through fear, he ought to
 “ excuse the same weakness in us. And if he is
 “ forced to do so, do you believe, Cleomedes,”
 which was the name of Philip’s ambassador, “ that
 “ the forces of the Achæan States can sustain the
 “ Roman arms, to which the Macedonians have been
 “ forced to give way? Quintius having found Philip
 “ in an inaccessible post, hath driven him out of it,
 “ hath taken his camp, hath pursued him into Thes-
 “ salia, and almost before his face hath taken all the
 “ strongest fortresses of his allies. If we are attacked,
 “ will the King be in a condition to support us against
 “ so formidable an enemy, or shall we be able to de-
 “ fend ourselves?”

“ The medium proposed to us, of continuing
 “ neuter, is a certain means to render us the victor’s
 “ prey, who will not fail to attack us, as cunning
 “ politicians, who wait the event for declaring our-
 “ selves. Believe me, Achæans, there is no medium.
 “ We must either have the Romans for friends, or
 “ enemies. They come of themselves, with a nu-
 “ merous fleet, to offer us their amity and aid. To
 “ refuse such an advantage, and not to seize with
 “ ardor so favourable an occasion, which will never
 “ return, is the last excess of blindness; it is con-
 “ senting to our own destruction through mere wan-
 “ tonness, and without resource.”

This discourse was followed with a great noise and
 murmur of the whole assembly, some applauding it
 with joy, and others opposing it with violence. The
 magistrates themselves were no less divided: these
 were called Demiurgi. Five, of their number, ten,
 declared, that they would bring the affair into deli-
 beration: five protested against it, affirming, that
 the magistrates were prohibited by a law to propose

any

any thing, as were the general assembly to decree any thing contrary to the alliance made with Philip.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

This whole day passed also in debate and tumultuous cries. Only one remained : for the law ordained, that the assembly should break up at the end of the third day. Such violent debates arose upon what should be determined the next day, that fathers could scarce keep their hands off their sons. Memnon of Pellena was one of the five magistrates who refused to make the report. His father long desired and conjured him to suffer the Achæans to provide for their safety, and not to expose them, by his obstinacy, to certain ruin. Finding his intreaties ineffectual, he swore that he would kill him with his own hand, if he did not take his advice, and should consider him not as his son, but as the enemy of his country. Memnon could not withstand such terrible menaces, and at length suffered himself to be overcome by paternal authority.

The next day, the majority being for bringing the affair into deliberation, and the people openly declaring what they thought, the Dymæi, Magalopolitans, and some of the Argives, quitted the assembly before the decree passed. No body was surprized, or took offence at it, because they had particular obligations to Philip ; who, very lately, had done them considerable services. Gratitude is a virtue of all ages and nations ; and ingratitude is universally detested. All the other States, when they came to vote, immediately confirmed by a decree, an alliance with Attalus and the Rhodians ; and as to what regarded the alliance with the Romans, as it could not be concluded without the authority of the Roman Senate and People, it was resolved, that an embassy should be sent to Rome in order to terminate that affair.

In the mean time, three deputies were dispatched to L. Quintius, who was then besieging Corinth, after having made himself master of Cenchreæ : and at the same time the army of the Achæans was sent to join him in carrying on the siege. At first the attack was

Liv. xxxii.
23.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

weak enough, because it was hoped that there would be a division in the city, between the garrison and the inhabitants: but when they found that did not take place, machines were made to approach on all sides, and different attacks were formed, which the besieged sustained with great vigour, and in which the Romans were always repulsed. There were a great number of Italian deserters in Corinth, who expecting no quarter from the Romans if they fell into their hands, fought like men in despair. Philocles, Philip's General, having made a new reinforcement enter the city, and thereby having deprived the besiegers of all hopes of carrying the place, L. Quintius was at length obliged to give into the advice of Attalus. The siege was raised. The Achæans being dismissed, Attalus and the Romans reimarked on board their fleets. The former repaired to the Pyræus, and the latter to Corcyra.

Liv. xxxii.
24.

Whilst the fleets attacked Corinth, the Consul T. Quintius was employed in besieging Elatea, where he was more successful: for, after a long and vigorous defence, he made himself master first of the city, and then of the citadel.

Liv. xxxii.
25.

At the same time, the people of Argos, who continually adhered to Philip, found means to deliver up their city to Philocles, the officer of whom we have just spoke. Thus, notwithstanding the alliance which the Achæans had lately made with the Romans, Philip was master of two of their strongest places, Corinth and Argos.

Liv. xxxii.
26.

The Consul Sex. Ælius did nothing considerable in Gaul. He passed almost the whole year in drawing together the inhabitants of Cremona and Placentia, whom the calamities of the war had dispersed, and to reinstate them in their colonies.

Ibid. 27.

A conspiracy, formed first at * Setia, by the slaves of the young Carthaginian Lords who were kept there as hostages, whom a considerable number of other

* A city of the Volsci.

slaves had joined, gave Rome some alarm. But the conspiracy was discovered, and suppressed that instant. A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

This year, Ambassadors from King Attalus brought to Rome a crown of gold, weighing two hundred and forty-six pounds, and thanked the Senate for having vouchsafed to send Ambassadors to Antiochus, at whose instances that Prince had quitted the dominions of Attalus.

Cato was then one of the Prætors, and had Sardinia for his province. He acted in it in such a manner as made his disinterestedness, sobriety, patience in the rudest toils, incredible remoteness from the least shadow of pomp and luxury, and love of justice, universally admired. The Prætors his predecessors had ruined the country by making it supply them with pavillions, beds, and habits, and sheered the people by numerous trains of domesticks, crouds of friends, and excessive expences in games, feasts, and the like extravagances. Cato, on the contrary, distinguished himself only by an unexampled simplicity in his habit, table, and equipage. He never touched a single farthing of the public money. When he went to visit the cities of his government, it was on foot, without any carriages, attended only by one officer, who carried his robe, and a vessel for making libations at sacrifices. This man, so simple and modest, and so negligent of his outside, resumed the grave and majestic air of a Roman magistrate, and shewed inexorable constancy and inflexible rigor, when the question was to check disorders, and put in execution the regulations established for maintaining good discipline and the laws. In him two characters, that seemed irreconcilable, were united, severity and mildness; so that never had the Roman power appeared either so terrible or so amiable to that people. Plut. in
Caton. 339.
Liv. xxxii.
27.

Sardinia abounded with usurers, who, under the appearance of assisting private persons with sums of money lent them on their occasions, utterly ruined

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

them in the effect. Cato made open war against them, and drove them all out of the island. I do not see why Livy seems to judge Cato too severe in this respect. *M. Porcius Cato, sanctus & innocens, asperior tamen in senore coercendo habitus, fugatique ex insula feneratorum.* Can people, who are the bane and ruin of States, be treated with too much rigor? Would to God, that criminal number of usurers, who support young persons of birth in extravagance and debauchery, were banished for ever from our cities and country!

Suffer me, before I proceed to relate events of the ensuing year, to insert in this place some strokes highly proper to shew us Cato's character. These circumstances are not imitable in themselves, and may seem to have something excessive in them, but they are worthy admiration in the principle from which they proceed; that is, the love of simplicity, sobriety, and of an hard and laborious life.

Plut. in
Cat. 338.

In some of his works he himself wrote, that he had never worn a robe that cost above an hundred drachmas (about fifty shillings); that even when he commanded armies, or was Consul, he drank the same wine as his slaves; that at his meals (the Romans had but one a day) he never had any thing bought at market that cost above thirty asses, that is, about a shilling of our money. And his view in leading this hard and sober life, was to confirm his health, enable him the better to serve his country, and to sustain the fatigues of war with the more ease.

Ibid. 336.

On marches, he always went on foot, carrying his arms, and attended by a single slave, who carried his provisions. And it is said, that he was never angry or out of humour with that slave, about whatever he served him at his meals, but, when he had leisure, after having discharged his military functions, that he often assisted him in dressing his supper. In the army he never drank any thing but water, except sometimes, when being very dry he called for a little vinegar;

vinegar *; or when, finding himself weak through fatigue, he drank a little wine.

A. R. 554.
Ant. C.
198.

One day, blaming the excessive expences which at that time some began to lavish on their tables, he said, “ That it was very difficult to preserve a city, in which a fish was sold for more than an ox.” Every body knows the excessive luxury and expence of the Romans, for fish in particular.

Whilst he commanded the army, he never took from the public more than three medimni of wheat a month for himself and his whole household, that is, not quite thirteen bushels, and something less than three semi-medimni of oats or barley daily for his horses and carriage-beasts.

* Vinegar is refreshing. All the Roman soldiers carried it with them, to correct the crudities of the water they were obliged to drink; sometimes bad enough.

S E C T. III.

Six Prætors created for the first time. The command in Macedonia is continued to Quintius. Interview between King Philip and the Consul Quintius and his allies, all ineffectual. Philip abandons Argos to Nabis tyrant of Sparta. Alliance of Nabis with the Romans. The Boeotians also join them. Death of Attalus. Praise of that Prince. Battle of Cynoscephalæ, in which Philip is defeated by Quintius. Insolent vanity of the Ætolians. Quintius grants Philip a truce and an interview. The allies deliberate concerning a peace. Interview of Philip and Quintius. A peace is concluded in it. The victory gained over Philip occasions great joy at Rome. The plan of the peace sent by Quintius is approved. Ten Commissioners are deputed to regulate the affairs of Greece. Conditions of the treaty of peace. The Ætolians secretly cry down this treaty. The articles of it are made public at the Isthmian games. The Greeks hear the news of their liberty with incredible joy. Reflexions upon this great event. Quintius visits the cities of Greece. Cornelius, one of the ten commissioners goes

from Tempe, where he had conferred with the King, to the city of Thermæ, in which the assembly of the Ætolians was held.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C.
197.

C. CORNELIUS CETHEGUS.

Q. MINUCIUS RUFUS.

Liv. xxxii.
27.

SIX Prætors were nominated this year for the first time, on account of the augmentation of the provinces, and the increase of the empire. Of these six magistrates, two were appointed to administer justice in the city; the one between citizens and citizens, the other between citizens and strangers. The four others had the government of the provinces, Sicily, Sardinia, Hispania Citerior, and Hispania Ulterior.

Liv. xxxii.
28.

After lots had determined the provinces of the Prætors, the Consuls prepared to draw for Italy and Macedonia; when L. Oppius and Q. Fulvius, Tribunes of the People, opposed it. They remonstrated, "That Macedonia being a province remote from Rome, nothing had been more prejudicial to the war made in it, than injudiciously recalling the Consul charged with it, who had a successor sent him, when he had hardly received the informations necessary to his success upon the spot. That this was the fourth year since the beginning of this war. That Sulpicius had passed the greatest part of his Consulship in quest of Philip and his army. That Villius had been reduced to depart, when he had almost joined the enemy. That Quintius, after having been detained at Rome the greatest part of the year by affairs of religion, had however acted in such a manner, that it was easy to judge, if he had arrived sooner in his province, or winter had permitted him to stay longer in it, that he could have entirely terminated the war; and that he was actually preparing to begin it again in the spring, so as to give room to hope, that if a successor was not sent him, he would put an happy end to it the ensuing campaign." The new Consuls having heard these remonstrances of the Tribunes, promised, that they

they would submit to the decision of the Senate, provided that the Tribunes would do the same. They consented; and the Senators in consequence gave the two Consuls Italy for their province, and continued to Quintius the command in Macedonia, till he should be relieved. We have here a dispute begun and ended with great wisdom and moderation.

A. R. 555,
Ant. C.
195.

After the taking of Elatea, the Consul Quintius had already distributed his troops into winter quarters in the countries of Phocis and Locris, when Philip sent an herald to him to demand an interview. He made no difficulty to grant it; because he did not know yet what had been resolved at Rome concerning him, and a conference would leave him at liberty either to carry on the war, if he were continued in the command, or to dispose things for a peace, in case a successor were sent him. The conference was held upon the sea-side, near Nicæa, a city of Locris, not far from Thermopylæ. Philip, who had repaired thither by sea from Demetrias, did not quit his ship. He had several Macedonian Lords, and Cycliades, an Achæan exile, with him. The Roman General was arrived upon the shore, accompanied by Amynder King of the Athamantes, and some deputies from all the allies. After some disputes concerning the ceremonial, Quintius made his proposals, and each of the allies their respective demands. Philip replied; and, as he began to fly out against the Ætolians, Pheneas, their magistrate, interrupted him, by saying: “The question now is not about words. It is either “to conquer in arms, or to yield to the strongest.” Philip retorted, “That’s a clear case, even to a blind “man;” with design to deride Pheneas, whose eyes were bad. * Philip was naturally addicted to raillery, and could not forbear it even in the most serious affairs: which is a great fault in a prince.

Liv. xxxii.
32—37.
Polyb. xvii
742—752.

* Erat dicaciôr natura, quem regem decet, & ne inter seria quidam risu satis temperans. Liv.

A.R. 555.
Ant. C.
197.

This first interview having passed in altercation, they met again the next day. Philip came very late to the place agreed upon. All the reason he gave for his delay was, “that he had passed the whole day in deliberating upon the hardship of the laws imposed upon him, without knowing what to determine.” But it was conjectured, with probability enough, that his design thereby was to deprive the Ætolians and Achæans of time to answer him. And this he confirmed, by demanding that, to avoid losing time in barren disputes, the conference should pass between the Roman General and him. This was not granted him without difficulty. They accordingly discoursed apart. Quintius having related to the allies the proposals made by the King, none of them approved them; and they were upon the point of breaking up all farther conference, when Philip demanded, that the decision should be deferred till the next day, promising, that he would come into their reasons, if he did not make them relish his. At their next meeting he earnestly intreated Quintius and the allies not to oppose a peace, and confined himself to asking time for sending ambassadors to Rome, engaging to accept such proposals as the Senate should think fit to impose, in case his own should not be deemed sufficient. So reasonable a demand could not be refused him, and a truce for two months was concluded; on condition, however, that his garrisons should evacuate the places he held in Locris and Phocis. Ambassadors on both sides were sent to Rome.

When they arrived, those of the allies were first heard. They gave a loose to invectives against Philip. But what struck the Senate most, was their observing, and evidently proving by the situation of the places, that, if the King of Macedonia retained Demetrius in Thessalia, Chalcis in Eubœa, and Corinth in Achaia, cities which he himself called, in terms no less true than injurious, “the fetters of Greece,” Greece never could enjoy liberty. The King’s ambassadors were afterwards called in. As they began a vast discourse, they

they were stopt short, by being asked, whether they would cede those three cities or no. Upon their answering that they had received neither orders nor instructions upon that head, they were dismissed without obtaining any thing. It was left to Quintius, to whom the command in Macedonia had been continued, as we have said, either to make peace or carry on the war, as he should judge most expedient. He rightly comprehended from thence, that the Senate was not averse to it's being continued; and, for his own part, he was much more desirous of terminating the war by a victory than by a treaty of peace. In consequence, he granted Philip no farther interviews, and caused him to be told, that he would hearken to no proposals from him, except he previously agreed to abandon all Greece.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C.
197.

Philip therefore turned his whole thoughts entirely on the war. As he could not easily keep the cities of Achaia, on account of their great distance, he judged it proper to put Argos into the hands of Nabis, tyrant of Sparta; but as a meer depofite, to be restored to him, in case he should have the advantage in this war, and to remain to Nabis if the reverse should happen. Nabis was introduced into the city in the night, and treated the inhabitants like a true tyrant, exercising every kind of violence and cruelty upon them.

Liv. xxxii.
38.

The tyrant soon forgot from whom and upon what condition he held that city. He sent deputies to Quintius and Attalus, to let them know that he was in possession of Argos, and to invite them to an interview, in which he was in hopes that they would easily agree upon the conditions of a treaty of alliance, which he was desirous to make with them. His proposal was accepted. The Proconsul and the King of Pergamus, in consequence, repaired towards Argos. They had an interview. The Romans demanded, that Nabis should furnish them troops, and cease to make war against the Achæans. The tyrant granted the first article; but would consent only to a truce with

Liv. xxxii.
39.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C.
197.

the Achæans for four months. The treaty was concluded upon these conditions. This alliance with a tyrant, so notorious for his perfidy and cruelties as Nabis, is not much for the glory of the Romans. But in times of war, some think all advantages ought to be taken, even at the expence of honour and equity.

Liv. xxxiii.
2.

When the spring returned, Quintius and Attalus conceived thoughts of securing the alliance of the Bœotians, who had hitherto been uncertain and fluctuating. They accordingly went with some deputies of the allies to Thebes, which was the capital of the country, and the place where their general assembly was held. Antiphalus, the principal magistrate, favoured and supported them underhand. The Bœotians believed at first, that they came without troops or an escorte, because they had left them at some distance behind them. They were surprized, when they saw that Quintius had caused a sufficiently considerable detachment to follow him; and judged, that they should have no freedom in the assembly. It was summoned for the next day. They concealed their surprize and grief, which it would have been useless, and even dangerous, to have shewn.

Attalus spoke first, and expatiated upon the services which his ancestors and himself had rendered to all Greece, and in particular to the republic of Bœotia. Indulging his zeal for the Romans too warmly, and expressing himself with more vehemence than suited his age, he fainted, and fell down, half dead, in the midst of his harangue (it was a fit of the palsy) and it was necessary to carry him out of the assembly; which interrupted the deliberation for some time. Aristenes, Prætor of the Achæans, spoke next; and his discourse was the more capable of making impression, as he gave the Bœotians no other counsel, than he had before given the Achæans themselves. After him, Quintius said some few words, in which he insisted more upon the justice and faith of the Romans, than upon their arms and power. The assembly

sembly afterwards proceeded to vote, and an alliance with the Romans was unanimously concluded, no body daring to oppose it, or attempt an useless resistance.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C.
179.

Quintius continued some time at Thebes, to see the event of Attalus's illness. When he found that it was a confirmed palsy, which did not menace that Prince with immediate death, he returned to Elatea. Well pleased with the double alliance he had concluded with the Achæans and Bæotians, by which he had secured himself from enemies behind, he devoted all his cares and endeavours against Macedonia.

As soon as Attalus's strength would permit, he was carried to Pergamus, where he died soon after, at the age of seventy-two, of which he had reigned forty-four years. Polybius observes, that Attalus was not like most men, with whom great fortunes are usually the occasion of great vices and irregularities. The generous and magnificent use he made of his riches, tempered with prudence, gave him the means of augmenting his dominions, and adorning himself with the title of King. He thought himself rich only for others; and was convinced, that it was putting out his money at a very large and legitimate interest, to employ it in acts of beneficence, and in purchasing friends. He governed his subjects with great justice, and always observed an inviolable fidelity in respect to his allies. He was a generous friend, a tender husband, an affectionate father, and in all things discharged every duty of the Prince and the Man. He left four sons: Eumenes, Attalus, Phileterus, and Athenæus. He had taken great care of their education, and had been particularly attentive to establish a tender and sincere unity between them; which is the strongest support of great houses. Polybius observes, as a very extraordinary felicity in the families of Princes, that the brothers of Eumenes, who succeeded Attalus, far from exciting any troubles during his reign, very much contributed to secure its peace and tranquillity. The taste for letters and sciences prevailed much in the court of Pergamus.

Polyb. in
Excerpt.
p 101, 102.
Liv. xxxiii.
21.

Strab. xiii.
623—625.

Polyb. in
Excerpt.
169.

Diog. La-
ert. in La-
cide.

Attalus

A. R. 555. talus had caused the garden where Lacydes, the disciple
 Ant. C. and successor of Arcefilaus, gave his lessons, to be
 197. adorned and embellished in the academy at Athens, a famous place, as every body knows, from the philosophers who taught there, with great reputation. He invited that philosopher to his court. But Lacydes answered him, with a frankness truly philosophical, that Princes were like paintings, which, in order to be esteemed, frequently require to be seen only at a distance. I have spoken elsewhere of the famous Library of Pergamus.

Polyb.
 xvii.

754—762.

Liv. xxxiii.

3—II.

Plut. in

Flamin.

372, 373.

Justin.

xxx. 4.

The armies on both sides had began their march, in order to come to blows, and to terminate the war by a battle. They were very near equal in number, each consisting of five or six and twenty thousand men. The officers and soldiers on both sides ardently desired to come to blows. The nearer the day of battle approached, the more their courage and ambition increased. The Romans thought, that if they were victorious over the Macedonians, whose name the victories of Alexander had rendered so famous, nothing could be added to their glory: and the Macedonians flattered themselves, that, if they overcame the Romans, who were so much superior to the Persians, they should render the name of Philip more famous and more glorious than that of Alexander himself. Quintius advanced into Theffalia, where he was informed, that the enemy were also arrived: but not knowing exactly, yet, where they were incamped, he ordered his troops to cut wood for palisades, and to enable him to fortify his camp wherever it should be necessary. It is in this place that Polybius, and after him Livy, compare the palisades of the Romans with those of the Greeks. This digression may be seen in the Ancient history.

Quintius soon after approached near the Macedonian army, and marched against it at the head of all his troops. After some slight skirmishes, in which the Ætolian cavalry distinguished themselves, and had always the advantage, the two armies halted near

Scotusa.

Scotusa *. The night before the battle great rains fell, with thunder; so that the next morning the weather was so overcast and dark, that the troops could scarce see objects at the distance of two paces. Philip sent out a detachment with orders to seize the eminences called Cynoscephalæ, that separated his camp from that of the Romans. Quintius also detached ten squadrons of cavalry, and about a thousand light-armed soldiers, to view the enemy, recommending it strongly to them to take care of ambuscades, on account of the obscurity of the weather. This detachment met that of the Macedonians who had seized the eminences. This rencounter surprized at first: but both parties soon began to try each other. Both sent to apprise the Generals of what passed. The Romans, ill-led, dispatched couriers to demand aid. Quintius sent immediately Archedamus and Eupolemus, both Ætolians, and with them two Tribunes, each with a thousand foot and five hundred horse, who joining the first, soon changed the face of the battle. On the side of the Macedonians valour was not wanting: but, overwhelmed by the weight of their armour, which was only proper for a standing fight, they saved themselves by flying to the eminences, and from thence sent to demand aid of the King.

Philip, who had detached part of his army to forage, being informed of the danger in which his first troops were, and seeing that the weather began to clear up, made Heraclides set out, who commanded the Thessalian cavalry, with Leon, under whom were that of the Macedonians, and Athenagoras, who had the foreign and mercenary troops, except the Thracians, under him. When this reinforcement joined the first detachment, the Macedonians resumed courage, returned to the charge, and in their turn drove the Romans from the eminences. The victory would even have been compleat, but for the resistance of the Ætolian cavalry, that fought with astonishing valour

* A city of Pelasgia, a province of Thessalia, near Larissa.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C.
197.

and boldness. These were the best horse of the Greeks; especially in parties and rencounters. It sustained the charge and impetuosity of the Macedonians in such a manner, that it prevented the Romans from being put to the rout. They abandoned the hills, but made their retreat without disorder or confusion.

Courier after courier came to Philip; who cried out, that the Romans fled with terror, and that the moment for defeating them entirely was come. Neither the weather nor the place pleased Philip. The hills on which they fought were steep, broken in different places, and very high. However, he could not refuse himself to these repeated cries, nor to the instances of the army, who earnestly demanded to fight; and he made them quit their intrenchments. The Proconsul did the same on his side, and drew up his army in battle.

Both Generals, in this decisive moment, animated their troops by the most affecting motives. Philip represented to his, "that the Persians, Bactrians, Indians, all Asia, and the whole East, had been subdued by their victorious arms; adding, that they must now fight with more valour, as the question here was not for sovereignty, but for liberty, more dear and precious to the brave than the empire of the whole world." The Proconsul set before his soldiers eyes their own still recent victories. On the one side Sicily and Carthage, on the other Italy and Spain, subjected to the Romans; and, to say all in one word, Hannibal, the great Hannibal, undoubtedly equal, perhaps superior to Alexander, driven out of Italy by their triumphant arms; and, what ought still more to encourage them, the same Philip, against whom they were going to fight, conquered more than once by themselves, and obliged to fly before them.

* Animated by such discourses, these soldiers, who on the one side called themselves the conquerors of

* His adhortationibus utrinque concitati milites, prælio concurrunt, alteri Orientis, alteri Occidentis imperio gloriantes, ferentesque in bellum, alii majorum suorum antiquam & obsoletam gloriam, alii virentem recentibus experimentis virtutis florem. JUSTIN. xxx. 4.

the East, and the other the conquerors of the West, both haughty, the former from the ancient glory of their forefathers, and the latter from their own trophies and victories newly gained, prepared for the battle. Flaminius, having commanded his right wing not to stir from their post, placed the elephants in its front, and advancing with a bold and assured air, led on his left wing in person against the enemy. As soon as the Roman troops who had been obliged to quit the eminences, perceived their General and his army, they renewed the fight, and falling upon the enemy, forced them a second time to give way.

Philip then advanced hastily to the top of the hills with his soldiers armed with round shields, and the left wing of his phalanx, and gave Nicanor, one of the principal lords of his Court, orders to follow him immediately with the rest of his troops. When he arrived at the top of the eminence, he perceived some dead bodies, and some arms left there by the Romans; from whence he judged, that the troops had fought, and the Romans been defeated there, and that they were now at blows near their camp. This sight gave him extreme joy. But soon after seeing his own troops flying in effect of the change occasioned by the Proconsul's arrival, he was in suspense for some time, whether he should not make his troops re-enter the camp. However, as the Romans continually approached, and his first detachment obliged, to fly before the enemy, who pursued them, could not fail of being cut to pieces if he did not go to their aid; and lastly, that it was not easy for himself to retreat without great hazard, he found himself reduced to come to blows, before the rest of his army had joined him.

The King having rallied those that fled, formed his right with the soldiers with round shields, and part of his phalanx; and, to prevent their being broke, he lessened his front one half, in order to double his ranks, giving it much more depth than breadth; and at the same time he ordered them to

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Ant. C.
197.

close up so as to touch each other, and to march against the enemy, presenting their pikes. Quintius had also, at the same time, taken those into his spaces who had charged the Macedonians first.

When they came to charge, both sides raised dreadful cries. Philip's right wing had visibly entirely the advantage. The higher ground from whence it fought, in falling impetuously upon the Romans, the weight of their order of battle, the excellency of their arms, all combined to give them a great superiority. The Romans could not sustain the charge of these troops in close order and covered with their bucklers, their front presenting a barrier of pikes: they were therefore obliged to give way.

It was not the same with Philip's left wing, which was then only just come up. It could hardly draw up in phalanx, its ranks being broke and separated by the risings and unevenness of the ground. Quintius, seeing no other remedy for the disadvantage his left wing had sustained, went immediately to his right, and first made his elephants move on against this ill-drawn up phalanx, which had but a bad aspect, and then charged it in person with his quite fresh troops; convinced, that if he could break and put it in disorder, it would draw the other wing after it, though victorious. It happened as he expected. This wing, not being able to support itself in phalanx, or to double its ranks to give itself depth, in which the whole force of the Macedonian order of battle consisted, was entirely dispersed.

On this occasion a Tribune, who had not above twenty companies with him, made a movement which very much contributed to the victory. Seeing that Philip, at a great distance from the rest of his army, was vigorously pursuing the left wing of the Romans, he quitted the right wing, which was already entirely victorious, and without consulting any thing but his own opinion, and the present disposition of the armies, he

he marched towards the phalanx of the enemy's right wing, arrived in its rear, and charged it with all his forces. Now the condition of the phalanx was such, through the excessive length of its pikes, and the closeness of its ranks, that it could neither face about to the rear, nor fight man to man. The Tribune, in consequence, broke forwards continually, killing all as he advanced; and the Macedonians, not being able to defend themselves, threw down their arms and fled. The disorder was the greater, as the Roman troops who had given way had rallied, and came on at the same time to attack the phalanx in front.

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Philip judging, at first, of the rest of the battle from the advantage he had gained on his side, believed his victory compleat. When he saw his soldiers throw down their arms, and the Romans charging them in the rear, he removed a little from the field of battle with a body of troops, and from thence viewed the general state of things. Perceiving the Romans who pursued his left wing were almost at the top of the mountains, he drew together as many of the Macedonians and Thracians as he could, and sought his safety in flight.

After the battle, in which victory had declared on all sides in favour of the Romans, Philip retired to Tempe, where he stopped to wait for those who had escaped from the defeat. He had taken the wise precaution of sending orders to Larissa to burn all his papers, that the Romans might not have it in their power to distress any of his friends. The Romans pursued those who fled for some time. The Ætolians were taxed with having occasioned Philip's escape: for, instead of pursuing him, they amused themselves with plundering his camp; so that the Romans, when they returned from the pursuit, found hardly any thing in it. Very warm reproaches passed on both sides; and on this occasion the animosity of the two nations against each other first broke out.

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197.

The next day, after having set apart the prisoners and the rest of the spoils, the army marched for Larissa. The loss of the Romans in this battle was only about seven hundred men. The Macedonians lost thirteen thousand; of which eight thousand were left dead in the field, and five thousand taken prisoners. So ended the battle of Cynoscephalæ.

On the occasion of this battle, Polybius makes a digression upon the Macedonian phalanx, of which he shews the advantages and inconveniences. The reader may see it in the Ancient History.

Polyb. in
excerpt.
legat. 788.
Liv. xxxiii.
11.

The Ætolians had undoubtedly distinguished themselves in this battle, and not a little contributed to the victory. But they had the vanity, or rather the insolence, to ascribe it solely to themselves, to the prejudice of Quintius and the Romans. An inscription in verse, composed to that effect by Alcæus, a poet of those times, spread this report throughout Greece. Quintius, before disgusted by the impatient avidity with which the Ætolians had fallen upon the plunder without staying for the Romans, was still more offended by such injurious discourses, that affected him personally. From thenceforth he behaved very coldly in respect to them, and communicated nothing to them of the public affairs; affecting, on all occasions to mortify their pride.

Polyb. ib.
789.
Liv. xxxiii.
32.

Some days after the battle, Ambassadors came from Philip to Quintius, who was at Larissa, under pretext of asking a truce for burying the dead, but in reality to obtain an interview of him. The Proconsul granted both, and added politeness for the King, in saying, "that he might hope the best." The Ætolians were extremely offended at those words. As they had little knowledge of the Roman character, and judged of it from their own, they imagined, that Flaminius was inclined to favour Philip, only because the latter had corrupted him with presents; and because that General, the most disinterested that ever was, and the least capable of being allured by
fornid

fordid gain, designed to enrich himself by the King's liberality.

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Ant. C.

The Proconsul had granted the King a truce of fifteen days, and had agreed upon the day they were to confer together. But, in the mean time, he summoned the assembly of the allies, to communicate to them the conditions upon which he believed peace might be granted him. Aminander, king of the Athamantes, who spoke first, without entering into long arguments, said, "that the war was to be terminated in such a manner, that Greece, in the absence of the Romans, might be in a condition to preserve the peace, and to defend its liberty with its own arms."

197.
Polyb. ib.
Liv. xxxiii.
12.

Alexander the Ætolian spoke next, and said, "That if the Proconsul imagined, that by making a treaty with Philip, he should obtain either a solid and lasting peace for the Romans, or permanent liberty for the Greeks, he deceived himself; that the sole means to put an end to the war with the Macedonians, was to dethrone Philip; that the thing was now very easy, provided they took the advantage of the occasion that now offered."

Quintius, addressing himself to Alexander, said, "You know neither the character of the Romans, my views, nor the interests of the Greeks. It is not the custom of the Romans, when they have made war with a Prince, and overcome him, to ruin him entirely: Hannibal, and the Carthaginians, are a good proof of this. As for me, it never was my design to make an irreconcilable war with Philip. I always was inclined to grant him peace, as soon as he should submit to the conditions that should be imposed upon him. Yourself, Ætolians, in the assemblies which have been held upon this subject, never mentioned depriving Philip of his kingdom. Ought victory to inspire us with such a design? How unworthy is such a sentiment! When an enemy attacks us in arms, it

A.R. 555. “ is just to repel him with haughtiness and vigour.
 Ant. C. “ But, when we have beat him down, it is the victor’s
 397. “ duty to shew moderation, lenity, humanity. As
 “ to the Greeks, it is of consequence to them, I
 “ confess, for the kingdom of Macedonia to be less
 “ powerful than heretofore: but it is no less impor-
 “ tant to them, that it should not be entirely de-
 “ stroyed. It is a barrier for them against the Thra-
 “ cians, Illyrians, and * Gauls, without which, as
 “ has frequently happened, all those Barbarians
 “ would not fail to make irruptions into Greece.”

Flamininus concluded with saying, that his opinion and that of the assembly was, if Philip promised faithfully to observe all that had before been prescribed him by the allies, that he should be granted peace, after the Roman Senate should be consulted; and that the Ætolians might take such resolution in the case, as they should judge proper. Pheneas, Prætor of the Ætolians, representing with warmth,
 “ that Philip, if he escaped the present danger, would soon form new projects, and give occasion for a new war.” “ That’s my affair,” replied the Proconsul; “ I shall take care that it shall not be in his
 “ power to undertake any thing against us.”

Polyb. ib. The next day Philip arrived at the place of inter-
 791. view; and, three days after, Quintius, with all the
 Liv. xxxiii. deputies of the allies, gave the King audience; who
 23. spoke with so much prudence and wisdom, that he
 Plut. 374. prejudiced every one in his favour. He said, “ That he accepted, and would execute, all that the Romans and the allies had prescribed at the last interview; and that, as to the rest, he should refer it entirely to the discretion of the Senate.” On these words ensued a profound silence of approbation in the council. Only the Ætolian Pheneas still made some weak difficulties, to which no regard was had.

For the rest, what induced Flamininus to forward the conclusion of the peace, was the news he had re-

* Many Gauls had settled in the countries adjacent to Thrace.

ceived, that Antiochus actually meditated entering Europe with an army. He was afraid that Philip, through the hope of receiving a considerable aid from that prince, might determine to confine himself to the defence of his fortresses, and thereby protract the war. Besides which, he was sensible, that, if another General should come to take his place, the whole honour of this war would be ascribed to him. For which reason he granted the King a truce for four months, ordered him to pay four hundred talents immediately, took Demetrius his son, with some of the great lords of his court, as hostages, and permitted him to send to Rome to receive the decision of his fate from the Senate. Quintius promised the King, that, if the peace did not take effect, he would restore the talents and hostages. After this, all parties concerned sent Ambassadors to Rome; some to solicit peace, and others to oppose it.

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L. FURIUS PURPUREO.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

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Ant. C.
196.

It was under these new Consuls letters were received at Rome from Quintius, with the particulars of the victory gained over Philip. They were read first in the Senate, and then before the people; and public thanksgivings were decreed during five days to the Gods, for the protection they had granted the Romans in the war of Macedonia.

Liv. xxxiii.

24.

Some days after arrived the Ambassadors, to treat of the peace proposed to be made with the King of Macedonia. The affair was discussed in the Senate. The Ambassadors made long discourses in it, each according to their respective views and interests: but at length the opinion for peace prevailed. The same affair being laid before the People, the Consul Marcellus, who passionately desired to command the army in Greece, used his utmost endeavours that the plan of peace might be rejected; but he could not

Liv. ibid.
Polyb. ib.
793.

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Ant. C.
196.

succeed. The People approved the scheme of Flaminius, and ratified the conditions. The Senate then nominated ten of the most illustrious of their body to go and regulate the affairs of Greece, in concert with the Proconsul, and to secure the liberty of the Greeks.

The Achæans, in the same assembly, demanded to be admitted into the number of the allies of the Roman People. This affair, that had some difficulties, was referred to the ten commissioners.

A commotion had happened amongst the Bœotians, between the partisans of Philip and those of the Romans, which was carried to violent excesses on both sides. But it had no consequences, having been appeased by the Proconsul, who applied a speedy remedy to it.

Polyb. ib.

725.
Liv. xxxiii.
30.

The ten commissioners set out from Rome to regulate the affairs of Greece, and soon arrived there. The following are the principal conditions of the treaty of peace which they settled, in concert with Quintius: "That all the * other Grecian cities, as well in Asia as Europe, should be free, and be governed by their own laws. That Philip, before the celebration of the Isthmian games, should evacuate those in which he had garrisons. That he should restore to the Romans all prisoners and deserters, and deliver up all his decked ships, except five feluccas, and the galley with sixteen benches of oars. That he should pay a thousand talents, half immediately, and the other half in ten years, fifty each year, by way of tribute. Amongst the hostages required of him was Demetrius, the youngest of his two sons, who was sent to Rome."

In this manner did Quintius terminate the Macedonian war, to the great satisfaction of the Greeks, and very happily for Rome: for, not to mention

* This word Other is placed here, because the Romans intended to keep garrisons in Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth.

Hannibal, who, entirely conquered as he was, might still find the Romans work enough by his intrigues; Antiochus seeing his power considerably augmented by his glorious exploits, which had acquired him the name of *The Great*, actually meditated carrying his arms into Europe. If, therefore, Quintius had not foreseen, through his great prudence, what might happen; that the war with Antiochus might join in the midst of Greece with that on foot against Philip; and that the two greatest and most powerful Kings then in the world, united in their views and interests, might arm at the same time against Rome, it is certain that it would still be involved in battles and dangers as great as those which they had lately sustained in the war against Hannibal. But a peculiar providence watched over Rome, and disposed events in a manner conformable to the design it had in respect to that future capital of the world.

This treaty of peace, as soon as it was made known, very much satisfied all reasonable persons. Only the Ætolians were discontented with it. They secretly condemned it amongst the allies; saying, "That it contained only words, and nothing more: that the Greeks were amused with the empty name of Liberty, and, under that specious word, the Romans covered their self-interested views: that, indeed, they left the cities situated in Asia free, but that they seemed to reserve those of Europe to themselves, as Oræum, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, Corinth: that, therefore, to speak properly, Greece was not delivered from its chains, and at most had only changed its master."

These complaints gave the Proconsul the more pain, as they seemed entirely without foundation. The Commissioners, according to the instructions they had received from Rome, advised Quintius to restore liberty to all the Greeks; but to keep the cities of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, which were the keys of Greece, and to put good garrisons into them, to secure them against Antiochus. He obtained

A. R. 556.
Ant. C.
196.

Liv. xxxiii.
31.
Polyb. ib.
796.

A. R. 556.
Ant. C.
196.

tained in the council, that Corinth should have its liberty: but it was resolved, that a garrison should be kept in the citadel, as well as in the two cities of Chalcis and Demetrias; and that only for a time, and till nothing farther were to be feared from the King of Syria.

Liv. xxxiii.
32.
Plut. in
Flam. 374.
Polyb. ib.
797.

The * Isthmian games, which were upon the point of being celebrated, always drew thither a great multitude of people, as well through the inclination which the Greeks naturally had for those shews, in which the prizes of strength of body and courage, swiftness in the course, and even excellency in all kinds of arts, were disputed, as, in effect, of the facility of repairing to a place that was equally the port of the two seas. But they flocked thither now in greater numbers than ever, in order to know, in their own persons, the new form of government which was going to be given Greece; and, for certain, what was to be their fate. The conditions of the treaty of peace, which were not yet entirely known, were the subject of all conversations: and people spoke differently of them, most believing, that the Romans would not evacuate all the places they had taken.

All the world were in this uncertainty, when, the Romans having taken their places, the herald advanced into the midst of the Arena; and silence being made by the sound of trumpet, he pronounced, with a loud voice, as follows: THE SENATE AND PEOPLE OF ROME, AND QUINTIUS FLAMININUS, THE GENERAL OF THEIR ARMIES, AFTER HAVING OVERCOME PHILIP AND THE MACEDONIANS, DELIVER FROM ALL GARRISONS AND TRIBUTES, THE CORINTHIANS, THE LOCRIANS, THE PHOCÆANS, THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLAND OF EUBOEÆ, THE ACHÆANS, * PHTHIOTES, THE MAGNESIANS,

* We have given an account of these games in the Ancient History.

† A people entirely distinct from the Achæan league. Those who composed that league had no occasion to be declared free; for they were so.

THE THESSALIANS, AND THE PERRHÆBIANS; DE-
CLARE THEM FREE, RESERVE TO THEM ALL THEIR
PRIVILEGES, AND ORDAIN, THAT THEY SHALL
BE GOVERNED BY THEIR OWN LAWS, AND ACCORD-
ING TO THEIR OWN CUSTOMS.

A. R. 555.
Ant. C. 1
196.

On * these words, which many heard only by halves, in effect of the noise that interrupted them, all the spectators, transported out of their senses, were not capable to contain their joy. They gazed upon one another with surprize, and mutually questioning each other in respect to the articles which related to each State in particular, they could neither believe their eyes nor ears; so much did what they saw and heard appear like a dream. It was necessary for the herald to repeat the same proclamation; which was heard the second time with profound silence, and not a word of the decree lost. Being then fully assured of their good fortune, they again abandoned themselves to their joy, with cries so often and so strongly repeated, that the sea at distance resounded with them; and some ravens, which were accidentally flying over the assembly at that instant, fell into the stadium: and it was then seen, that, of all the blessings of life, there are none so grateful to mankind as liberty. The celebration of the games was presently over, whilst neither the minds nor eyes of the people were intent upon the shews, nobody regarding them; a single object entirely filling the soul, and leaving no room there for any other pleasures.

Polyb. ib.
797.

When the games were ended, almost the whole multitude ran in a body to the Roman General; so

* Audita voce præconis, majus gaudium fuit, quàm quod universum homines caperent. Vix satis credere se quisque audisse. Alii alios intueri mirabundi velut somnii vanam speciem. Quod ad quemque pertineret, suarum aurium fidei minimum credentes, proximos interrogabant. Revocatus præco, cum unusquisque non audire, sed videre libertatis suæ nuntium averet, iterum pronunciat eadem. Tum ab certo jam gaudio tantus cum clamore plausus est ortus, totiesque repetitus, ut facile appareret, nihil omnium bonorum multitudini gratius, quàm libertatem, esse. Ludicrum deinde ita raptim peractum est, ut nullius nec animi, nec oculi, spectaculo intenti essent. Adeo unum gaudium præoccupaverat omnium aliarum sensum voluptatum.

A. R. 556. that every one eagerly pressing to approach their de-
 Ant. C. liverer, to salute him, to kiss his hands, and to throw
 196. crowns and festoons of flowers at his feet : his person would have been in some danger, if the vigour of his years (for he was then scarce three and thirty) and the joy of so glorious a day, had not supported and enabled him to go through the fatigue.

And indeed, could there ever have been a day in human life more agreeable, or more glorious, than this was for Flamininus and the whole Roman People. What are all the triumphs in the world, in comparison with these cries of joy of an innumerable multitude, and these applauses, which come from the heart, and are the natural effect of a lively and warm gratitude ? Pile up all the trophies, join all the victories, all the conquests of Alexander, and what do they appear when compared with this single action of goodness, humanity, and justice ? It is a great misfortune, that Princes are not so sensible as they ought to be to so refined a delight, and so affecting a glory, as that of doing good to mankind.

Liv. xxxiii. The * remembrance of so glorious a day, and so
 53. affecting a beneficence, was renewed from day to day ; and during a great length of time nothing else was talked of at meals and entertainments. People said, with transports of admiration, and with a kind of enthusiasm, “ That there was then a nation in the world, that, at its own expence and danger, undertook wars to procure other people repose and liberty, and that not for neighbouring States, and those who could receive aid by land ; and that crossed seas to

* Nec præsens omnium modò effusa lætitia est, sed per multos dies gratis & cogitationibus & sermonibus revocata : esse aliquam in terris gentem, quæ suâ impensâ, suo labore ac periculo bella gereret pro libertate aliorum : nec hoc finitimis, aut propinquæ civitatis hominibus, aut terris continenti junctis præstet : maria trajiciat, ne quod toto orbe terrarum injustum imperium sit, & ubique jus, fas, lex potentissima sint. Uno voce præconis libertas omnes Græciæ atque Asiæ urbes. Hoc spe concipere, audacis animi fuisse : ad effectum adducere, virtutis & fortunæ ingentis.

prevent unjust sway from subsisting any where, and to establish the rule of laws, equity, justice! That by the voice of a single herald, liberty had been restored to all the cities of Greece and Asia! That it argued a great soul only to form such a design; but to put it in execution was the effect of the most extraordinary good fortune, and the most consummate virtue!"

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196.

They called to mind all the great battles Greece had fought for liberty. "After having sustained so many wars, said they, never did its valour receive so happy a reward, as when strangers came to fight its battles; for then, almost without shedding a drop of blood, or a single tear, she gained the noblest of all prizes, and the most worthy of being pursued by mankind. Valour and wisdom are rare, indeed, in all times: but of all the virtues, the most excellent is justice. The Agesilaus's, the Lyfanders, the Nicias's, the Alcibiades's, knew how to command armies, and gain battles by sea and land: but it was for themselves and their countries, not for unknown people, for strangers. That glory was reserved for the Romans."

Plut. in
Flamin.
375.

Such were the reflexions made by the Greeks upon so happy an event; and the effect soon answered the glorious proclamation made at the Isthmian games: for the commissioners separated, in order to go and cause their decree to be put in execution in all the cities.

Some time after, Flamininus, going to Argos, was made president of the Nemæan games. He acquitted himself perfectly well in that employment, and forgot nothing that could exalt the splendor and magnificence of the festival: and he again caused the liberty of the Greeks to be published in these, as he had done in the Isthmian games, by the herald.

Plut. ibid.
375.

On visiting all the cities, he made wise institutions, reformed abuses in the administration of justice, re-established friendship and concord between the citizens, appeased seditions and quarrels, and caused exiles to return; a thousand times better pleased with being able,

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Ant. C.
196.

able, by the method of persuasion, to reconcile the Greeks to each other, and to make them live in union together, than he had been with conquering the Macedonians; so that liberty itself seemed one of the least benefits they had received from him. And indeed, what good would liberty have done them, if justice and concord had not been recalled along with it? What a fine model is this for a magistrate; for a governor of a province! And what a blessing is it for a people to have such as Quintius!

It is said, that the philosopher Xenocrates having been delivered, at Athens, by the orator Lycurgus, out of the hands of the tax-farmers, who were dragging him to prison to make him pay a tribute that strangers owed the public treasury, and soon after meeting the sons of his deliverer, he said to them: "I pay your father good interest for the favour he did me; for I am the cause that all the world praises him." But the gratitude which the Greeks expressed for Flamininus and the Romans, was not confined to acquiring them praise: it conduced infinitely to the augmentation of their power, by inclining all the world to repose confidence in them, and to rely entirely upon their fidelity: for States were not contented with receiving the Magistrates and Generals they sent into the provinces: they demanded them with passion; they called them in, and put themselves and all their interests into their hands with joy. And not only cities and states, but Princes and Kings themselves, when they had any subjects of complaint against neighbouring Potentates, had recourse to them, and put themselves in a manner under their tuition: so that, in a short time, in effect of the divine protection (as Plutarch expresses it) the whole earth was subjected to their sway.

Liv. xxxiii. 35. Cornelius, one of the Commissioners, had been with Philip; and, after having concluded other affairs with that Prince, before he left him, he asked him whether he was in a disposition to hear useful and sa-

lutory counsel. The King answering, that, so far from taking it amiss, he should be obliged to him for letting him know any thing essentially for his interests; Cornelius strongly exhorted him, as he had concluded a peace with the Roman People, to send Ambassadors to Rome, to change the treaty of peace into a treaty of alliance and amity. He added, that as Antiochus seemed to have designs, he might be suspected, if he did not take his advice, of having waited that Prince's arrival to join him, and begin the war again. Philip thought this very wise counsel, and promised to dispatch Ambassadors immediately to Rome.

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196.

Cornelius then repaired from Tempe, where he had conferred with the King, to * Thermæ, where the Ætolians regularly held a general assembly at a certain time. He made a long speech in it, to exhort them to persevere firmly in the measures they had taken, and never to depart from the alliance and amity they had entered into with the Romans. Some of the principal Ætolians complained, but in a modest style, that the Romans, since the victory, did not seem so well disposed to their nation, as they had been before. Others reproached him in rough and injurious terms, that, without the Ætolians, the Romans not only would not have overcome Philip, but that they would not so much as have set foot in Greece. Cornelius, to leave no room for disputes and altercations, which always have a bad effect, wisely contented himself with referring them to the Senate, promising them, that they might assure themselves of all possible justice. They chose to do so. Thus ended the war with Philip.

* Livy says Thermopylæ; but he is mistaken.







